Stupid teleportation topic.

[Bri]

Which apparently means you think that the atoms of the original are somehow special.

Where in the world did this come from? I believe I said the opposite, that the atoms are not different, that the atoms of the copy and the original are exactly the same. Only their context makes them different in any way, specifically that both have memories of their atoms experiencing something that only one of their atoms actually experienced.

Because I claim that a "person", at any moment, is no more than the information which is discribed in a body. Information can be perfectly duplicated, so it becomes meaningless to say "this is the original information".

Again, you are using the term "information" in a non-materialistic way. The only information is the configuration of the atoms in the body. Prove to me that it's meaningless to say that one set of atoms is the original and the other is a copy, even if they are configured in the same way.

Even if you're correct and such a distinction is meaningless, that is a different discussion than the discussion of whether they are two different people. Two identical people are still two distinct people, even if we cannot determine which is the original and which is the copy. If we cannot determine which is the original and which is the copy, it certainly creates problems given that they will both have a claim to one life. But that only proves my point which is that there is good reason not to use this technology even if it existed.

You call them "false" and "real". If it's not a difference, why would you distinguish between them?

Two things can be identical, yet different in their context. The same statement can be true in one context and false in another. If two people are stuck in cells with different locks, and both have identical keys that open only one of the locks, one key is very useful while the other key is useless even though they are exactly the same. It is clear that not only is the configuration of the atoms of the keys important, but so is the location of the key and its surrounding context. In other words, the two keys have potentially different futures because they exist at different locations even though they are otherwise exactly the same.

I distinguish between the material bodies, but not the person inside the material bodies, if you're wondering.

Then you're a dualist, if you're wondering. If you were a materialist, there would be no "person inside the material bodies" at all.

If I have godlike powers and can arbitrarily switch their place, and no difference will arise because the atoms have been changed, they are interchangable and thus the same person (Remember a person must be contained entirely within the body, since this is materialism, and the only material of consequence is atoms). The minor difference of one being on mars is no more an important difference to the "person", than if I randomly (using nuclear decay, for example) decide to take the bus rather than the train. It may lead to differenes, but those differences have not meaningfully changed the person yet.

Nice try! The entire discussion assumes that this cannot be done. If it could be done (that atoms could magically move from point A to point B), we wouldn't have a hypothetical situation we're discussing at all (we would be able to teleport without making a copy). These "godlike powers" of which you speak would require something other than materialism to be true.

Nonetheless, this only illustrates why it would be a bad idea to mix up the original and the copy, and if it were possible to do so, that would only be another reason not to use this technology if it existed.

I'm not asking if they are two different people afterwards. After the duplications they immediately start to diverge (personally, I think they'd diverge any time they are concious afterwards, even in identical rooms)

We were assuming that random quantum fluctuations don't exist. As someone already pointed out, if they do exist this sort of teleportation wouldn't work anyway. If they don't exist, then the two people would never diverge as long as they remained in completely identical rooms. Even so, I would still contend that they are two different but identical people.

I suppose, given godlike powers, that if I take the "original", and put him in some situation, and take the "clone", and put him in the situation, they will behave the same way (as much as if I flip two identical coins, they will show the same patterns, though probability may mean they do not behaive identically).

If they have diverged there is no reason to believe that they will behave in the same way in the same situation. Since we're not accounting for random quantum fluctuations, if they have not diverged they will necessarily act in exactly the same way in exactly the same situation (which could only occur in identical rooms).

-Bri

 

[Z]

I would say a divergence occurs when anything at all that might influence them is different. So unless you are also duplicating the room on a quantum level, the radiation emissions in the room, gravity, magnetic fields, etc.... and are continuing to ensure absolute duplication for the remainder of both beings' existences, I would contend that divergence is instant, the moment of duplication. The only conceivable way you could duplicate a person perfectly would be to do so at the precise spacetime coordinates of the original... which would be a waste of time, obviously, and impossible besides.

All that aside, they would still never be the same person singular, unless they occupied the same spacetime location and used the same matter and energy for any given point in spacetime, and unless the net divergence of the person from one moment in time to the next was not significantly different.

Dilb is simply confusing 'same type of person' with 'same person'.

As I have always understood it, 'person' means, simply 'an individual human being'. This means the arrangement of atoms that comprises any single given being, with the understanding that this arrangement continuously changes in minute ways every given moment. Notice: individual. Single. You cannot have two identical person. It just doesn't work that way.

As such, you are only ever one person. If duplicated, you don't stop being the person you were prior to duplication; you are simply you, and now you have a duplicate. The duplicate is someone else. And if you are scheduled to die now, guess what: that someone else doesn't magically become 'you'. Maybe externally, maybe legally, maybe even from his own point of view; but never, ever from yours.

Thought experiment: Let's say, for a moment, somehow, that after your death, assuming there isn't much brain damage at first, you remain aware, albeit to a lesser degree. At what point do you stop being the dead/aware vegetable, slowly rotting away, and become the living, breathing thing on Mars? How?

Notice, Dear Reader, how Dilb, like so many others, still refuses to address the issues of divergent environment, of survival of the original in a different environment, etc. No, he must insist, rather, upon discussing what happens if all the differences were carefully hidden. "What if no one knew which was which?"

Thus, we use a difference - for example, a red X or O. Which would you see? Whichever was shown to the original, of course. Period. Yet we've even had someone claim to see both X and O...! Curious state of affairs, that.

 

[Dilb]

Then you're a dualist, if you're wondering. If you were a materialist, there would be no "person inside the material bodies" at all.
-Bri

Why not? If I only care about the information, what do I care about the physical medium?

If I say I have a recorded piece of music, I can refer to my cd, specifically the pits on a cd. If I copy that onto my computer, I think it's the same music, though it now exists as a magnetic field. I can copy it back onto another cd, and have the same music on the same medium, making it identical and interchangable to the original for everything I'd ever want to do with the music. I have effectively transferred music from one location to another.

I claim a person is like the music on a cd. Please tell me why you and/or zaayrdragon think this is wrong, and the original material is somehow necessary to talk about the person.

 

[Dilb]

Notice, Dear Reader, how Dilb, like so many others, still refuses to address the issues of divergent environment, of survival of the original in a different environment, etc. No, he must insist, rather, upon discussing what happens if all the differences were carefully hidden. "What if no one knew which was which?"

Thus, we use a difference - for example, a red X or O. Which would you see? Whichever was shown to the original, of course. Period. Yet we've even had someone claim to see both X and O...! Curious state of affairs, that.

I'm sure I did explain that. Imagine you, strutting along the timeline

me-me'-me''-me'''-me''''-me'''''
t->

and so on. With teleportation, it looks like this
________me1-me1-me1'
me-me'<
________me2-me2-me2'

I split into 2 people, who have equal claim to being me' at the instant of duplication. Both equivalently share the necessary part of being me, which I claim is only the information stored in my brain. As much as me''' can claim to be me'', me1 and me2 can both claim to be me'. You can see why pronouns get awkward.

When I say "I" see both, I mean that a thing with a valid right to be called me sees X, and another thing, also with a valid right to be called me, sees o. "I", strictly speaking, see both, because "I" (If I can use a math metaphor) is a multivalued function. Like how cos(0) and cos(360) both equal 1. It is meaningless to say cos(0) is different from cos(360), if you can't ever see the 0 or 360 part, but only ever see 1 and 1.

 

[Bri]

I split into 2 people, who have equal claim to being me' at the instant of duplication.

You're not suggesting that your atoms actually SPLIT like cells, are you? I didn't think so.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Why not? If I only care about the information, what do I care about the physical medium?

OK, so if your brain state is stored on a CD-ROM, then the CD-ROM now has equal rights to your wife, kids, and job? How about if there is no technology to restore the CD-ROM to a body? Are you still claiming that only the data is important and not the location of that data?

I claim a person is like the music on a cd. Please tell me why you and/or zaayrdragon think this is wrong, and the original material is somehow necessary to talk about the person.

If you only have a CD player, the music stored on audio tape is not the same as the exact same data stored on a CD. The context -- the location of the data -- is important.

-Bri

 

[Z]

I'm sure I did explain that. Imagine you, strutting along the timeline

me-me'-me''-me'''-me''''-me'''''
t->

and so on. With teleportation, it looks like this
________me1-me1-me1'
me-me'<
________me2-me2-me2'

I split into 2 people, who have equal claim to being me' at the instant of duplication. Both equivalently share the necessary part of being me, which I claim is only the information stored in my brain. As much as me''' can claim to be me'', me1 and me2 can both claim to be me'. You can see why pronouns get awkward.

When I say "I" see both, I mean that a thing with a valid right to be called me sees X, and another thing, also with a valid right to be called me, sees o. "I", strictly speaking, see both, because "I" (If I can use a math metaphor) is a multivalued function. Like how cos(0) and cos(360) both equal 1. It is meaningless to say cos(0) is different from cos(360), if you can't ever see the 0 or 360 part, but only ever see 1 and 1.

Actually, that's not correct. The illustration above would be a splitting - a divergence of equal parts, like cell division.

The teletransporter works along these lines:

me--me--me--me--me--me--me--me
___________\
--------------\----me2--me2--me2-me2.

The original never splits off into the secondary - there is no loss or transfer of information from the original.

The CD or tape copy of music is not itself music; it only becomes music when translated back through a machine. And as any music afficionado is happy to report, a recording of a piece of music is not the same as a live piece of music, just as a performance in a bar is not the same as a performance in a music hall.

If anything, your illustrations above demonstrate a clear lack of general comprehension of the entire idea of 'original' versus 'duplicate' - as well as a general mangling of ideas such as 'music' and 'person'.

The information is NOT what makes a person, under materialism; it is the matter itself, arranged according to that information and existing in continuous yet dynamic fashion, that makes a person.

I'm not trying to bash you, Dilb - I'm suggesting that your understanding of certain concepts is not the generally accepted understanding of those concepts, and that your ideas are not aligned with the actual principles of materialism/naturalism/physicalism. In point of fact, without a method of translation, information simply does not exist, at all. Ergo, a person cannot be merely information; this information must be translated via a medium, and that translation is what makes a person who or what it is. Use a different medium, and you have a different person. If I record Fur Elise (forgive the lack of marks) on a CD, I have a different piece of music than if I record it on cassette, 8-track, or record. And it becomes even more different depending what machine I put it on.

Sorry - I'm terrible about analogies. I always over-analyze them.

edited to fix my piss-poor graphics...

 

[Dilb]

The information is NOT what makes a person, under materialism; it is the matter itself, arranged according to that information and existing in continuous yet dynamic fashion, that makes a person.

I understand completely what you're saying. I still don't see why you insist on a "continuous and dynamic fasion", which is limited exclusively to atoms in the body.

If "I" can only be defined with a reference to the history of my atoms, what does that say about everything else in the universe? If I can't make the assumption that identical things, separeted by space-time, will behave the same, and thus are interchangable, thus the same if I want to do something with them, I have to throw out reason entirely. I'd never be able to say with any sort of reason that anything should happen, because don't have the history of everything, and can't ever learn that history, because it is not a part of the material of the object.

If that wouldn't be a problem, I aparently have lost nothing, even though the "person" is different. If no difference ever arises, then I say it's not a difference. If there is no difference, how can you not say they are the same person?

Your comparisons to "live music" show that you don't understand my point, as those have obvious physical differences in the information. Going cd to cd is what I ment, and you can use purely "information" if music is confusing you. I think a person is a person regardless of the history of the medium which he occupies. You think differently, but still haven't given me a reason why. What would be wrong about making a person independant of the history of the atoms in his body?

 

[Melendwyr]

The idea that a "thing" is defined by the history of its atoms has two problems.

1) How exactly do you decide which atoms belong to this "thing"?
2) Our everyday understanding of what we mean by a "thing", especially so-called "abstract" things, completely contradicts this.

If you're not going to establish conceptual parameters that define what the thing in question is, how can you draw the line between that thing and everything else? If I copy a printed version of a story onto notebook paper in my own handwriting, isn't it still the same story? How is this possible if the two versions have no atoms in common?

 

[Dilb]

OK, so if your brain state is stored on a CD-ROM, then the CD-ROM now has equal rights to your wife, kids, and job? How about if there is no technology to restore the CD-ROM to a body? Are you still claiming that only the data is important and not the location of that data?

It's about equivilant to me in a permanent coma. However, that version never diverges, so no, it doesn't have rights.

If you only have a CD player, the music stored on audio tape is not the same as the exact same data stored on a CD. The context -- the location of the data -- is important.

-Bri

That's not important to the information. Just because it's difficult to acess doesn't mean it's different information. Admitedly, all the information is not the same in that case, since cd's have extra information so cd players work correctly. Which is why I only refer to the music. Also, tape is analog, while cd's are digital.

 

[Z]

OK, the analogies are slowly wandering off into la-la land...

We're also starting to confuse ideas with things here... and a person is a thing, not an idea. Ideas can be transported about, because an idea is not comprised of atoms at all. A thing cannot, not in the fashion being discussed.

But if you hand-copy a story into a notebook, while you have the idea (or will, once you re-translate the story by reading it), you don't have the original writing, now do you?

*shakes head*

Dilb, if I'm reading you right, you think that 'personhood' is a quality independent of matter. That is, it does not matter, to you, what physical format is used, as long as all information that makes up this quality of personhood is present. This means that 'person', for you, is an immaterial quality - and thus reveals a dualist belief at the core of this discussion.

 

[Dilb]

OK, the analogies are slowly wandering off into la-la land...

We're also starting to confuse ideas with things here... and a person is a thing, not an idea. Ideas can be transported about, because an idea is not comprised of atoms at all. A thing cannot, not in the fashion being discussed.

But if you hand-copy a story into a notebook, while you have the idea (or will, once you re-translate the story by reading it), you don't have the original writing, now do you?

*shakes head*

Dilb, if I'm reading you right, you think that 'personhood' is a quality independent of matter. That is, it does not matter, to you, what physical format is used, as long as all information that makes up this quality of personhood is present. This means that 'person', for you, is an immaterial quality - and thus reveals a dualist belief at the core of this discussion.

No it doesn't. You're the one supposing that "personhood" involves the history of atoms, which is decidedly non-material (atoms do not recored their history. They have no hair, no inner element to record history on). Either your distinction is meaningless, or it is not material. When talking about the story, and all it's qualities, no one in their right mind would say that the ink used to write it (or heaven forbid, the history of the ink used to write it) had any impact on the "story". The literal configuration of atoms is not what is ment by "story", the idea being conveyed is. I claim it is the same with a person.

I claim that a "person" is an emergent quality of atoms in a certain arrangement. Thus, any "person" can equally well be in any location if the atoms are in the right arrangement.

 

[Z]

No it doesn't. You're the one supposing that "personhood" involves the history of atoms, which is decidedly non-material (atoms do not recored their history. They have no hair, no inner element to record history on). Either your distinction is meaningless, or it is not material. When talking about the story, and all it's qualities, no one in their right mind would say that the ink used to write it (or heaven forbid, the history of the ink used to write it) had any impact on the "story". The literal configuration of atoms is not what is ment by "story", the idea being conveyed is. I claim it is the same with a person.

I claim that a "person" is an emergent quality of atoms in a certain arrangement. Thus, any "person" can equally well be in any location if the atoms are in the right arrangement.

And if one set of atoms in a certain arrangement continues to be one set of atoms in a certain arrangement, that is one person; if another set of atoms appears in a certain arrangement that is a second person. The two may be identical, but they are not the same person. Further, from the first person perspective of the brain comprised of one of those two sets of atoms, at no time ever does its perceptions include those being impressed/received by the other set of atoms of a certain arrangement; ergo, it is still a singular person, not two sets of the same person.

If we create a dozen absolutely identical computers, all running absolutely identical programs, we still have a dozen separate units. Yes, all of the same type, but still a dozen separate units. Cessation of operation is, itself, a divergence as well - so destroying one of these necessarily makes it different from all the rest as well. So it is with people.

I've never said that personhood has anything at all to do with the history of atoms; rather, I've said that a person is a particular set of atoms, arranged in a certain pattern, which continues to be generally in that pattern, allowing for some variation over time, of course. Destroy that set of atoms, and you destroy that person, forever. Create an identical pattern of atoms, and you've made a duplicate - a clone. Not the same person. Continuity has been destroyed, for the original.

Your definition of 'person' (as an emergent property) is illogical. A person is a thing, not a property, not an idea. It is a singular member of the human species, not a general concept of some individual. Otherwise, your definition could lead to us declaring reasonable stores of data on computers to be 'persons'... which they would never be.

And all of this does nothing to change the fact that you - this particular instance of your personhood - will never experience anything on Mars using this form of transportation. Your information might travel all over the universe, and somewhere there might be a being with the total conglomerated knowledge of all that has transpired for that pattern of atoms over the course of a thousand years - but you'll never experience a bit of it. Because you are the matter of which you are made, and that matter either never left Earth, or worse, was simply vaporized.

End of discussion, really. Unless you can demonstrate how your individual instance of consciousness - which is what I consider to be a person - can magically move from here to Mars while still remaining on Earth.

 

[Dilb]

I've never said that personhood has anything at all to do with the history of atoms;

okay...

rather, I've said that a person is a particular set of atoms, arranged in a certain pattern, which continues to be generally in that pattern, allowing for some variation over time, of course.

That's exactly the history of their atoms.

Destroy that set of atoms, and you destroy that person, forever. Create an identical pattern of atoms, and you've made a duplicate - a clone. Not the same person. Continuity has been destroyed, for the original.

Different history, different person. The "clone" only differs because of the history of his atoms.

I think it isn't different. I think a person can ignore the history of their atoms, whether their atoms were mostly in their body a second ago, or their atoms were "miscillanious teleporter goo" a second ago. You seem to want to believe there is a difference, but won't say what happens to the person if that information is lost (like in my "two duplicates wake up next to each other, not knowing who the original is, and then mix themselves up randomly so the person who put them their doesn't know" example). Am I to believe this difference affects nothing (in which case I say it is not a difference), or that the atoms have somehow recorded their history?

Your definition of 'person' (as an emergent property) is illogical. A person is a thing, not a property, not an idea. It is a singular member of the human species, not a general concept of some individual. Otherwise, your definition could lead to us declaring reasonable stores of data on computers to be 'persons'... which they would never be.

So your definition rules out aliens, or other sentient species, or concious computers to begin with? Or our ancestors a million years from now, when they're a different species? Not a good definition, in my mind. You mean to tell me if neanderthals hadn't been wiped out, but stayed along with humans as intelligent species, they wouldn't be people?

Allright, (I'm pretty sure you'll say), the specific species doesn't matter. But the fact that it's a member of a sentient species does.

So then no sufficiently advanced computer program, or designed lifeform, however well (even perfectly) it immitates conciousness, it won't be a person? A p-zombie is possible? I'd love to see a full materialist arguement for p-zombies (really, it would be interesting, if you have a link or anything).

And all of this does nothing to change the fact that you - this particular instance of your personhood - will never experience anything on Mars using this form of transportation. Your information might travel all over the universe, and somewhere there might be a being with the total conglomerated knowledge of all that has transpired for that pattern of atoms over the course of a thousand years - but you'll never experience a bit of it. Because you are the matter of which you are made, and that matter either never left Earth, or worse, was simply vaporized.

I will agree that the atoms of my body will never visit mars by the teleporter. I strongly disagree that "I" am the matter in my body. "I" am a much less specific thing.

End of discussion, really. Unless you can demonstrate how your individual instance of consciousness - which is what I consider to be a person - can magically move from here to Mars while still remaining on Earth.

Then we simply disagree on our definition of person. I think your definition is overly specific, and nothing is added to a "person" by chaining them in a set of atoms. Just like I can "move" a cd full of music only by copying the relevant data (no one will miss the fact that they are a different set of plastic molecules), I can move a person by copying everything they need to be a person. Everything I want to do with a "person" is contained in the information in their brain. Nothing about a "person" is lost, so they are the same "person", if in different instances.

 

[Z]

Well, let me add that a person is a sentient, self-conscious life-form, then - in other words, a singular member of a sentient species, or possibly a unique individual sentience.

I think your definition of 'person' eliminates the individual and replaces it with a general unit. Unfortunately, since we are only ever one person, if you kill us, we're dead.

Everything I want to do with a "person" is contained in the information in their brain.

And when you kill that brain, that person is gone. If you have ten identical copies of that brain, you still don't have that person. They're dead.

Send in the clones.

 

[Bri]

It's about equivilant to me in a permanent coma. However, that version never diverges, so no, it doesn't have rights.

That is quite interesting, because the term "diverges" as you're using it here simply means changing gradually over time, doesn't it? Isn't that very thing you keep insisting shouldn't be part of a definition of a person?

That's not important to the information. Just because it's difficult to acess doesn't mean it's different information.

I never said the information was different. In fact, I agreed that it was exactly the same, except that it exists in two different locations (in this case on two different mediums, only one of which you can read). The differences in their locations means that they have very different futures, and therefore are of differing importance to you if you can only access one of them. If one were, say, buried three miles below the surface of the earth, it wouldn't be as useful as the one that is readily available. So, the information itself obviously isn't the only part of what we consider "valuable" about something, is it?

Admitedly, all the information is not the same in that case, since cd's have extra information so cd players work correctly. Which is why I only refer to the music. Also, tape is analog, while cd's are digital.

Of course there are digital tapes and I was assuming that the information stored on the two was identical. The difference between a CD laying on a table and a CD buried three miles beneath the earth better illustrates my point. One is obviously more valuable to you even though the information they contain is exactly the same.

Likewise, two people who are otherwise exactly alike are both valuable -- simply because they exist in different locations. One might go on to cure cancer, and the other might save that one from dying before he cures cancer.

-Bri

 

[Dilb]

Well, let me add that a person is a sentient, self-conscious life-form, then - in other words, a singular member of a sentient species, or possibly a unique individual sentience.

So a person can be created. Good to establish.

I think your definition of 'person' eliminates the individual and replaces it with a general unit. Unfortunately, since we are only ever one person, if you kill us, we're dead.

Well yes, that's the entire reason why I think the teleporter would work. You've yet to tell me WHY a person must be singular. Just saying "since we are only ever one person" is the entire issue under debate.

I claim that a person must be no more than an arrangement of atoms at any one time. Over time, a person continuously changes, but that is what people do ordinarily, not a part of the definition. A person, in time, is really a connected series of similar people. A person only truely exists in an instant as a configuration of atoms. That configuration can be duplicated, therefore the person must be duplicated, or else there is a non-material aspect to a person.

If you can give me a compelling reason why I should include the history of a person's atoms in their definition, I would agree with you that we are merely creating an almost perfect duplicate. As it is, you seem to be defining a person based on what they ordinarily are, rather than the minimum of what they should be to be a person.

 

[Dilb]

That is quite interesting, because the term "diverges" as you're using it here simply means changing gradually over time, doesn't it? Isn't that very thing you keep insisting shouldn't be part of a definition of a person?

A divergence would be a development as a person. Staying the same while the other changes is not the same as becoming a new person. Because of the way a "person" is linked through time, they are the same "person" as they were some time ago. When two people diverge, neither is connected back through time to exactly the other person, only to the single person they split from. They are both (more specifically, are both linked to) "past person", but Person A is different from Person B.

I never said the information was different. In fact, I agreed that it was exactly the same, except that it exists in two different locations (in this case on two different mediums, only one of which you can read). The differences in their locations means that they have very different futures, and therefore are of differing importance to you if you can only access one of them. If one were, say, buried three miles below the surface of the earth, it wouldn't be as useful as the one that is readily available. So, the information itself obviously isn't the only part of what we consider "valuable" about something, is it?

Yes, having the information is a reletively important part of saying it gives you value. Having a tape you can't read is the same, or at least extremely similar in hypothetical situations, as saying you don't have the information. When we get only into the reletive logistics of whether it would be more convinent to play a cd vs. build our own tape reader or buy something else, it's just economics. When I say that two cds with identical information have the same value, I was making the assumption that both could be read, which include having the equipment and having the cd.

Of course there are digital tapes and I was assuming that the information stored on the two was identical. The difference between a CD laying on a table and a CD buried three miles beneath the earth better illustrates my point. One is obviously more valuable to you even though the information they contain is exactly the same.


Likewise, two people who are otherwise exactly alike are both valuable -- simply because they exist in different locations. One might go on to cure cancer, and the other might save that one from dying before he cures cancer.

I would disagree. I would pay exactly the same for the information on either cd. One cd has a different cost associated with its material, but the information is of equal value.

That value of the future of the second duplicate is no more real than the value of any other person in the future. No one (assuming genetic factors are unknown) should randomly have a baby because they expect the baby to be the next Euler. Not that the baby won't, just that it's unreasonable to invest in having children on the expectation of what they might accomplish. Is a person less valuable because of all the crimes they might commit?

 

[Z]

It is not the history of their atoms; it is the continuity of their histories, as patterned as a person. I think we all can agree that there are emergent properties to material things that supercede the properties of their components; for example, an electron has no color, nor do protons nor neutrons; yet atoms and molecules have some color reactivity, do they not? A table is nothing but atoms, yet from this precise pattern and arrangement we gain a new thing, a 'table'. So a person is both its atoms and the patterns that make up those atoms, and necessarily, the continuity (history) of the patterns of atoms. Not the history of the atoms themselves. Otherwise, without recognizing continuity as part and parcel of personhood, we are free to undertake any endeavor with no moral quivocation whatsoever, since (by what you said above) we are nothing more than a series of related peoples. Without recognizing the continuity of the person, we would be free (in theory) to deny responsibility for any past action, on the grounds that this was some different person.

...

I notice you're still employing an error in thought, in spite of the correction offered earlier: the idea that person A and person B both 'split from' past person - and as demonstrated earlier, that thinking is incorrect. Past person is still present - let us say, as person A; while person B is a duplicate, with only a pattern connection to the original; no material connection, no continuity, and no continuous and dynamic correllation through time. In other words:

Person A----------------------------->Person A (Earth)
_________________\
__________________\---------------->Person B (Mars)

What you seem to think - and I still cannot fathom why - is that it should look like this:

__________________/--------->Person B
Person A-----------<
__________________\--------->Person C

as if we were discussing cellular division, or something. We're not. And that seems to be yet another point of confusion on your part.

 

[Bri]

A divergence would be a development as a person. Staying the same while the other changes is not the same as becoming a new person. Because of the way a "person" is linked through time, they are the same "person" as they were some time ago. When two people diverge, neither is connected back through time to exactly the other person, only to the single person they split from. They are both (more specifically, are both linked to) "past person", but Person A is different from Person B.

Seems to me that you have to keep making up new definitions in order to support your notion of "person." In this case, your definitions are assuming change over time, which is exactly as zaayr has been saying all along.

When I say that two cds with identical information have the same value, I was making the assumption that both could be read, which include having the equipment and having the cd.

But of course you cannot make the assumption that they can both be read since they exist at different locations (one might be orbitting Saturn). You previously claimed that if we cannot tell the two people apart then they have the same value to the world and therefore must be considered the same person. If you're going to claim that a person is defined by his or her value to other people, then you must admit that two identical people at different locations are different, just as two identical CD's can have different value.

I would disagree. I would pay exactly the same for the information on either cd. One cd has a different cost associated with its material, but the information is of equal value.

Really? Then I have a bridge to sell you (of course, it happens to be orbitting Saturn)...

No one (assuming genetic factors are unknown) should randomly have a baby because they expect the baby to be the next Euler.

Again, back to comparing existing human beings with non-existant human beings. We've already discussed why this is a poor analogy. If you keep insisting on coming back to it, we might think that you're desperate to make a point.

Is a person less valuable because of all the crimes they might commit?

A person is different from another person who might currently be completely identical aside from location because one might commit crimes in the future and the other might not. More valuable? Perhaps not. Different? Absolutely. The same person? Absolutely not.

-Bri