Stupid teleportation topic.

[Bri]

So once you actually die, then it is absolutely impossible for you to be alive ever again? Wow! What about every morning when you wake up? Are you the same person as the night before?

I've never met anyone who has died and come back to life, have you? What exactly does sleep have to do with anything? I may lose some atoms as I sleep as well as when I'm awake, but not enough to kill me. Do you believe sleep to be the same as death?

-Bri

 

[Bri]

What you're saying is that I amount to more than a particular arrangement of such ultimate physical entities. That is a point blank denial of materialism my friend.

Not if you consider that a definition of "self" where a unique individual must also occupy the same location. In other words, there cannot be more than one of you since they would necessarily exist at two different locations at the same time, even if otherwise completely identical. It's simply a different definition of "self" than you're using, and I believe one that is much closer to reality when considering the implications of death.

You apparently don't believe those implications, and instead believe that your consciousness will somehow jump to another identically configured body, despite the evidence that your duplicate has a separate consciousness. The fact that you could both remain alive without you jumping to your duplicate's body or even being aware of his existance seems to indicate two separate consciousnesses. Not to mention the fact that dualism might actually be true (then who knows what might happen).

So, I suppose your beliefs are strong enough that you would be the first one standing in line to be simultaneously duplicated and shot in the head, right? Unfortunately, the rest of the world might never know if it worked or if you're dead and someone else who thinks they're you has taken your place. I personally wouldn't risk it, but that's just me. In comparison, taking the bus doesn't seem like such a big deal.

-Bri

 

[Interesting Ian]

Now all that needs to be decided is if the wavefunctions of 'all individual entities -- which is a problem in itself' need be teleported, or is it the wavefunction of the 'individual entities' combined (very very short wavelength) that is teleported.

I don't know what this means. If you're complaining that QM ensures it is not possible to create an exact copy then I don't see this as important so long as the copy created is sufficiently similar. Our physical configuration changes from one infinitesimal fraction of a second to the next anyway.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I've never met anyone who has died and come back to life, have you? What exactly does sleep have to do with anything? I may lose some atoms as I sleep as well as when I'm awake, but not enough to kill me. Do you believe sleep to be the same as death?

-Bri

Deep sleep is similar to non-existence don't you think? Being dead for a while then regaining consciousness is similar to being in deep sleep then waking up, no?

And the question of whether people have "died" and come back to life can surely be answered in the affirmative. That is unless you define death as being irreversible. But defining it this way means by definition people couldn't come back to life. But in turn this means that no-one ever dies since resusitation is always in principle possible eg 1000 years hence create an android with the same functionality as your brain at the moment of your "death".

 

[Cosmo]

Deep sleep is similar to non-existence don't you think? Being dead for a while then regaining consciousness is similar to being in deep sleep then waking up, no?

People in deep sleep exhibit breathing patterns, REM movements, and brain waves, plus dozens and dozens of body processes like digestion continue during sleep as well. Deep sleep is similar to non-existence...how?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Not if you consider that a definition of "self" where a unique individual must also occupy the same location.

Same location? Hang on a sec. Our local group of galaxies is moving away at an accelerating pace from all other groups of galaxies. Our own galaxy, the milky way, is moving in respect to the other galaxies in our group. The milky way itself is rotating (we're about 2/3rds along one of its arms away from the galactic centre). The Earth is orbiting the Sun. And the Earth is spinning. There is no such thing as "same location".

In other words, there cannot be more than one of you since they would necessarily exist at two different locations at the same time, even if otherwise completely identical. It's simply a different definition of "self" than you're using, and I believe one that is much closer to reality when considering the implications of death.

What I'm saying is that at the precise moment of duplication you will either find your environment unchanged (the original), or your environment will suddenly change (the copy). There's a 50/50 chance that your environment will suddenly change (i.e that you are the duplicate). From then on they are 2 individuals because they are now experiencing 2 different environments. But they both have the same memories up to duplication and indeed they are both the same person as the one individual prior to duplication.

You apparently don't believe those implications, and instead believe that your consciousness will somehow jump to another identically configured body, despite the evidence that your duplicate has a separate consciousness. The fact that you could both remain alive without you jumping to your duplicate's body or even being aware of his existance seems to indicate two separate consciousnesses. Not to mention the fact that dualism might actually be true (then who knows what might happen).

So, I suppose your beliefs are strong enough that you would be the first one standing in line to be simultaneously duplicated and shot in the head, right?

Well no. I believe that we are souls. I believe that duplicating a body will simply result in a corpse. I was merely talking about what materialism necessarily entails.

 

[Interesting Ian]

People in deep sleep exhibit breathing patterns, REM movements, and brain waves, plus dozens and dozens of body processes like digestion continue during sleep as well. Deep sleep is similar to non-existence...how?

Because in both we are wholly non-conscious. Remember I'm talking about deep sleep and not dreaming sleep.

 

[Cosmo]

Because in both we are wholly non-conscious. Remember I'm talking about deep sleep and not dreaming sleep.

No. Non-existent "people" is a nonsensical concept. You're not non-conscious, conscious, angry, happy, or sad if you *don't exist*. Tell me Ian, were you conscious 10 years before you were born? Were you ecstatic, aroused, or annoyed, perhaps?

 

[Bri]

Deep sleep is similar to non-existence don't you think?

No.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

That is unless you define death as being irreversible. But defining it this way means by definition people couldn't come back to life. But in turn this means that no-one ever dies since resusitation is always in principle possible eg 1000 years hence create an android with the same functionality as your brain at the moment of your "death".

I would say that death is irreversible. Otherwise there would be no such crime as murder. I don't think the android you described would be you, although it would think it was you.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

There is no such thing as "same location".

The fact that you're moving doesn't mean that you aren't at a location at any given moment in time. And for that matter, you're at a unique location that nobody else is at. That location can not only distinguish you from someone identical to you who is located elsewhere, but can distinguish you from any other person.

What I'm saying is that at the precise moment of duplication you will either find your environment unchanged (the original), or your environment will suddenly change (the copy).

Yes, exactly. And the duplicate will be a different person than you are. At no time would you be aware of the duplicate's existance unless someone told you.

There's a 50/50 chance that your environment will suddenly change (i.e that you are the duplicate).

Actually, there is a 0% chance that you will suddenly become the duplicate if you were the original. The duplication process doesn't even affect the original at all, therefore you will no more become the duplicate than you could had you never been duplicated. You will continue to be you. There is also a 100% chance that the duplicate will feel as though he was the original, but it is a fact that he never was. He is simply an exact copy. In fact, if he looks out the window and sees that he's in a different location immediately after "teleportation," he will immediately know that he's not the original since the original is still at the original location. At no time would either the duplicate or the original meet each other and be confused about which one is "himself," nor be confused about whether there are one person or two in the room.

From then on they are 2 individuals because they are now experiencing 2 different environments. But they both have the same memories up to duplication...

yes...

...and indeed they are both the same person as the one individual prior to duplication.

...no

If I make an identical copy of a document in a copy machine, I can still identify the original and the duplicate as two separate things, and I can clearly identify one as the original and the other as the copy. In fact, it would be very difficult for anyone to consider both of the documents as the same piece of paper when they are clearly two pieces of paper.

Well no. I believe that we are souls. I believe that duplicating a body will simply result in a corpse. I was merely talking about what materialism necessarily entails.

Even with materialism, the result of the proposed hypothetical will be either a living original and an exact duplicate, or a corpse and an exact duplicate. I don't agree with a definition of "person" that claims that they are both the same person, even in a materialistic scenario. You then have the problem of whether you still consider them the same person after divergence, or whether if the duplicate were created in a room identical to the original's room, they would remain the same person until one walked out of their room, and then all of a sudden one or both of them would become a different person than they were when they were inside the room.

If they both remain the same person after divergence, then killing one of them might not be murder any more than chopping a person's arm off would be (it doesn't result in the death of the person). You would also require a new term such as "instance" to distinguish between the two because nobody, least of all them, would consider them to be one person.

When you have to keep redefining other terms and indeed ethics itself in order to make them fit within a given definition of "person" it seems to me that you've defined "person" in an inappropriate way.

-Bri

 

[Z]

I was going to reply, but Bri has covered it quite well already.

And, no, deep sleep is absolutely unlike death or non-existence.

And, no, movement does not entail being in multiple locations at the same time.

So, especially under materialism, teletransportation is a silly concept.

 

[Dilb]

The fact that you're moving doesn't mean that you aren't at a location at any given moment in time. And for that matter, you're at a unique location that nobody else is at. That location can not only distinguish you from someone identical to you who is located elsewhere, but can distinguish you from any other person.

But it does mean that you are never in the same location between 2 differenent moments in time. Which is exactly what teleportation implies.

Yes, exactly. And the duplicate will be a different person than you are. At no time would you be aware of the duplicate's existance unless someone told you.

Yes, they would be different iterations. That does not mean that they shouldn't be considered equal to each other. No one said that teleportation would spilt you into 2 bodies which share information, only that it is meaningless to say one is a "truer" continuation of the "before" body than the other.

Actually, there is a 0% chance that you will suddenly become the duplicate if you were the original. The duplication process doesn't even affect the original at all, therefore you will no more become the duplicate than you could had you never been duplicated. You will continue to be you. There is also a 100% chance that the duplicate will feel as though he was the original, but it is a fact that he never was. He is simply an exact copy. In fact, if he looks out the window and sees that he's in a different location immediately after "teleportation," he will immediately know that he's not the original since the original is still at the original location. At no time would either the duplicate or the original meet each other and be confused about which one is "himself," nor be confused about whether there are one person or two in the room.

It is entirely that there is a chance that, for a materialistic definition of "You" from "before", that "you" will be in (roughly speaking) the original location, or "you" will be in the new location. Both will agree about the history of their constituant atoms, but, as was said before, "atoms have no hair". The atoms themselves are irrelevant to defining "you", both before and after. To suppose the atoms are relevant add a definitely non-materialist element to them.

If I make an identical copy of a document in a copy machine, I can still identify the original and the duplicate as two separate things, and I can clearly identify one as the original and the other as the copy. In fact, it would be very difficult for anyone to consider both of the documents as the same piece of paper when they are clearly two pieces of paper.

They are not the same piece of paper, they are the same ("perfectly equivilent" or "perfectly switchable") document. The relevant part of a document is the information conveyed, not the material which is holding it together. If the copier is perfect, down to the atom, then while you can distinguish the documents, there is no meaningful reason to. By every test that matters, they are the same. If someone else took these two documents and switched them, they would be indistinguishable by every test available, or even every test possible. The history of it's atoms does not matter to the document.

Even with materialism, the result of the proposed hypothetical will be either a living original and an exact duplicate, or a corpse and an exact duplicate. I don't agree with a definition of "person" that claims that they are both the same person, even in a materialistic scenario. You then have the problem of whether you still consider them the same person after divergence, or whether if the duplicate were created in a room identical to the original's room, they would remain the same person until one walked out of their room, and then all of a sudden one or both of them would become a different person than they were when they were inside the room.

You seem to be getting caught on "divergence". That doesn't matter at the single instant of teleportation. Immediately afterwards they start becoming slightly different people, just like immediately after any single instant in time, you start changing slightly into a different person.

If they both remain the same person after divergence, then killing one of them might not be murder any more than chopping a person's arm off would be (it doesn't result in the death of the person). You would also require a new term such as "instance" to distinguish between the two because nobody, least of all them, would consider them to be one person.

When you have to keep redefining other terms and indeed ethics itself in order to make them fit within a given definition of "person" it seems to me that you've defined "person" in an inappropriate way.

-Bri

Except we don't have a perfect ethical description of a person to begin with, or even a system of ethics which we can agree upon. Myself, I'm a utilitarian, so here's how I break it down.

It would be murder, because you have killed a person. Whether it is wrong is the question. I can't construct any particularily good reasons to not kill someone (painlessly, which is important) if they won't be missed.

As a human, the "copy" still deserves all the same rights to not be made to suffer in any way. They are a human, and I extend that right to anything which feels pain, regardless of pretty much everything else. Death, on the other hand, isn't something a materialist particularily cares about. You're dead, you don't "feel" anything after that, you can't care.

However, I can argue that murder is wrong entirely because of how it impacts other people, people who care about the person. If you have 2 perfectly interchangable instances of a person, they the people who care about the person havn't lost anything.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Hi Ian! Where have you been?

Even with materialism, the result of the proposed hypothetical will be either a living original and an exact duplicate, or a corpse and an exact duplicate. I don't agree with a definition of "person" that claims that they are both the same person, even in a materialistic scenario. You then have the problem of whether you still consider them the same person after divergence, or whether if the duplicate were created in a room identical to the original's room, they would remain the same person until one walked out of their room, and then all of a sudden one or both of them would become a different person than they were when they were inside the room.

No, within materialism, both would be you. Materialism holds that there is nothing more to you than your physical parts. There is no extra unmeasurable bit. Your current position is immaterial. If a warp in space suddenly opened and you were transported 10 lightyears in 0 time, you would still be the person you were before.

To repeat, if two identical (not just clones) instances of you exist, two of you exist. If you disagree, please give me reasons based on materialism, not irrelevant analogies on Xerox machines. Xerox machines are not duplicators or teletransporters.

 

[Bri]

No, within materialism, both would be you. Materialism holds that there is nothing more to you than your physical parts.

The issue is simply definition and has nothing to do with materialism. It has to do with how you define "person" and perhaps how you define "you." If there are two of "you" then they are both distinct people in my opinion. They necessarily exist at different locations and therefore will potentially have different futures. One can be identified as the original and one as the copy.

In addition, if a "person" is defined as the state of one's brain, then as soon as those states diverge, there are certainly two different people. If you define the un-diverged people as being the same person simply because their brains are identical, then if the entire room (with no windows) were duplicated along with a person inside then the two people would remain the same person after the "teleportation." But as soon as they walk outside of the room, one or both of them would suddenly become a different person than they were before. I cannot agree with this definition.

There is no extra unmeasurable bit.

I never said there was.

Your current position is immaterial. If a warp in space suddenly opened and you were transported 10 lightyears in 0 time, you would still be the person you were before.

Perhaps, but that is a different scenario than the one we are discussing which involves no warp in space and involves a copy existing at a different location than the original.

To repeat, if two identical (not just clones) instances of you exist, two of you exist. If you disagree, please give me reasons based on materialism, not irrelevant analogies on Xerox machines. Xerox machines are not duplicators or teletransporters.

I disagree that there is no valid definition of "person" that involves location, allowing us to define both as separate people. Otherwise, I agree.

So, do you believe that your definition allows us to ethically kill the original since they are really the same person as others have contended? Does divergence matter in this regard? In other words, in the above scenario, is it OK to kill one of them before they have walked outside of the room? How about after they have left the room? If one of them were YOU, would it be OK with you if someone shot you in the head, and would it make a difference to you if it was before or after you walked outside of the room?

-Bri

 

[Bri]

You seem to be getting caught on "divergence".

The divergence issue was brought up by another poster in order to explain why it would be OK to kill someone at the moment of "teleportation" but not to kill them at some point afterwards ("loss of information" was the term used). Of course, if the entire room were duplicated, that also means that you could kill either at any point before he leaves the room since there would be no "loss of information." This seems problematic to me, and certainly would be to the one killed.

That doesn't matter at the single instant of teleportation. Immediately afterwards they start becoming slightly different people, just like immediately after any single instant in time, you start changing slightly into a different person.

Several years after the event, they could be extremely different, so when do you determine that they are different people and it's no longer OK to kill one of them? Or are you actually saying that it's always OK to kill one of them as long as at some point in their past they were identical? If that is the case, then if we took a pair of twins, reconfigured one's brain temporarily to be identical to the other, then changed it back, we could then kill either of them since they were at one time identical?

Except we don't have a perfect ethical description of a person to begin with, or even a system of ethics which we can agree upon. Myself, I'm a utilitarian, so here's how I break it down.

It would be murder, because you have killed a person. Whether it is wrong is the question. I can't construct any particularily good reasons to not kill someone (painlessly, which is important) if they won't be missed.

Both the life of the person being killed and the life of those around them would be affected by killing them. For that matter, the life of the duplicate could be different if you killed the original (there would no longer be the potential of them meeting). Can you give me a scenario where a person "won't be missed" and it would be OK to kill them? In the case of our identical people, which one would you kill, and do you think it would matter to them which one you decided to kill?

As a human, the "copy" still deserves all the same rights to not be made to suffer in any way. They are a human, and I extend that right to anything which feels pain, regardless of pretty much everything else.

That's touching that you don't want to cause him pain, but it's OK to kill him! How about the right to live?

Death, on the other hand, isn't something a materialist particularily cares about. You're dead, you don't "feel" anything after that, you can't care.

A materialist would rather be dead than feel pain? There must be a lot of materialists committing suicide since that would avoid all future pain.

However, I can argue that murder is wrong entirely because of how it impacts other people, people who care about the person. If you have 2 perfectly interchangable instances of a person, they the people who care about the person havn't lost anything.

I don't think the person being killed would consider himself "interchangable" or expendable, regardless of other people who might or might not care about him. Furthermore, they certainly wouldn't be interchangable after a certain amount of time passed since they would be quite different. That said, if you have two identical valuable vases, is there no loss if you smash one of them? Why wouldn't two identical people both be valuable considering that their future experiences would potentially be very different?

-Bri

 

[Dilb]

The divergence issue was brought up by another poster in order to explain why it would be OK to kill someone at the moment of "teleportation" but not to kill them at some point afterwards ("loss of information" was the term used). Of course, if the entire room were duplicated, that also means that you could kill either at any point before he leaves the room since there would be no "loss of information." This seems problematic to me, and certainly would be to the one killed.

Why? How could a materialist care about dying? They're dead, they can't possibly care. Suffering, being tortured to death, those are bad things they can care about.If they know about your attempt to kill them though, you've diverged them, and then killing is an issue.

Several years after the event, they could be extremely different, so when do you determine that they are different people and it's no longer OK to kill one of them? Or are you actually saying that it's always OK to kill one of them as long as at some point in their past they were identical? If that is the case, then if we took a pair of twins, reconfigured one's brain temporarily to be identical to the other, then changed it back, we could then kill either of them since they were at one time identical?

I say they're different people pretty much any time after teleporting. Which is why I'd want to kill one person at the time of teleporting. I'm also saying they diverge in the same way that everyone changes naturally. I'm certainly not the same person I was a week ago.
At no point did I say it was okay to kill them indefinitely afterwards. I really don't know how you read that.

Both the life of the person being killed and the life of those around them would be affected by killing them. For that matter, the life of the duplicate could be different if you killed the original (there would no longer be the potential of them meeting). Can you give me a scenario where a person "won't be missed" and it would be OK to kill them? In the case of our identical people, which one would you kill, and do you think it would matter to them which one you decided to kill?

When the person is using the machine like a teleporter. If I need to hop over to Mars, my family isn't going to be concerned if I come back later as an identical person composed of different atoms, completely indistinguishable from the person I left as by any test they can apply.

If a copy of me is made, and they diverge, I would fully argue they are 2 similar but different people, similar to identical twins, and would never allow them to be killed for being an unnecessary copy.

That's touching that you don't want to cause him pain, but it's OK to kill him! How about the right to live?

I don't currently have a good reason to suppose a "right to live". Do you demand that all women constantly have babies, based on the potential baby's "right to live"? Killing a perfect duplicate, at the moment of duplication, is about as bad in my eyes as not having a baby. It takes away life from something that doesn't have anything to lose. It doesn't make sense to demand that I have the right to 2 lives, since at that instant, there are only 2 iterations of "me", a single person.
The obvious problems of duplicates means I'd also want one of "me" to be killed, and if I can die painlessly, I won't mind before I step into the transporter. I'd mind afterwards, as I've said above, which is why I'd want to be killed painlessly at the moment of teleportation, or at least so soon afterwards that the difference is trivial (something like less than a second of consciousness).

If I am conscious afterwards of being killed, divergence has occurred and I would now be 2 different people.

A materialist would rather be dead than feel pain? There must be a lot of materialists committing suicide since that would avoid all future pain.

Except I also enjoy being happy, and I know other people care about me. Both of which dissuade me from just avoiding pain.
Also, I only said a materialist shouldn't care about his death, so long as he strictly is thinking of himself. That doesn't suggest he should kill himself and save the bother. There are plenty of other reasons to stay alive.

I don't think the person being killed would consider himself "interchangeable" or expendable, regardless of other people who might or might not care about him. Furthermore, they certainly wouldn't be interchangeable after a certain amount of time passed since they would be quite different. That said, if you have two identical valuable vases, is there no loss if you smash one of them? Why wouldn't two identical people both be valuable considering that their future experiences would potentially be very different?
-Bri

A vase is valuable because of it's material. Two vases have twice the material, so they are twice as valuable (ignoring things like lower supply of vases after I smash one).

I, however, see no value in the material of a person. I place the entire value of a person in their information (their mind). Information does not increase in value by duplicating it.

 

[DreadNiK]

One can be identified as the original and one as the copy.

That is news to me.

I thought we were talking about an identical copy. In which case that is not true. The two people that you say are 'different people' are indistinguishable in terms of 'who was here first'.

Even after the creation of the duplicate, while the two people will start to diverge in experiences, you won't be able to say which was the 'original'.

 

[DreadNiK]

Both the life of the person being killed and the life of those around them would be affected by killing them.

He said 'if they won't be missed'.

For that matter, the life of the duplicate could be different if you killed the original (there would no longer be the potential of them meeting). Can you give me a scenario where a person "won't be missed" and it would be OK to kill them? In the case of our identical people, which one would you kill, and do you think it would matter to them which one you decided to kill?

Yes. A newborn baby who's entire family has been killed. No one loses except the baby, and can anyone honestly tell me they remember being a baby and thinking 'I hope no one kills me?'

I don't think the person being killed would consider himself "interchangable" or expendable, regardless of other people who might or might not care about him. Furthermore, they certainly wouldn't be interchangable after a certain amount of time passed since they would be quite different. That said, if you have two identical valuable vases, is there no loss if you smash one of them? Why wouldn't two identical people both be valuable considering that their future experiences would potentially be very different?

-Bri

Just because something has potential or real value doesn't mean it is automatically wrong to destroy it.

However, destruction for the sake of it would seem rather unethical. I suppose there might have to be some reason for it.

 

[Interesting Ian]

The divergence issue was brought up by another poster in order to explain why it would be OK to kill someone at the moment of "teleportation" but not to kill them at some point afterwards ("loss of information" was the term used). Of course, if the entire room were duplicated, that also means that you could kill either at any point before he leaves the room since there would be no "loss of information." This seems problematic to me, and certainly would be to the one killed.



Several years after the event, they could be extremely different, so when do you determine that they are different people and it's no longer OK to kill one of them? Or are you actually saying that it's always OK to kill one of them as long as at some point in their past they were identical? If that is the case, then if we took a pair of twins, reconfigured one's brain temporarily to be identical to the other, then changed it back, we could then kill either of them since they were at one time identical?



Both the life of the person being killed and the life of those around them would be affected by killing them. For that matter, the life of the duplicate could be different if you killed the original (there would no longer be the potential of them meeting). Can you give me a scenario where a person "won't be missed" and it would be OK to kill them? In the case of our identical people, which one would you kill, and do you think it would matter to them which one you decided to kill?



That's touching that you don't want to cause him pain, but it's OK to kill him! How about the right to live?



A materialist would rather be dead than feel pain? There must be a lot of materialists committing suicide since that would avoid all future pain.



I don't think the person being killed would consider himself "interchangable" or expendable, regardless of other people who might or might not care about him. Furthermore, they certainly wouldn't be interchangable after a certain amount of time passed since they would be quite different. That said, if you have two identical valuable vases, is there no loss if you smash one of them? Why wouldn't two identical people both be valuable considering that their future experiences would potentially be very different?

-Bri

Bri, I entirely share all your sentiments. However it's a consequence of materialism. It really is truly staggeringly counter-intuitive.

Here's how to understand it.

Materialism holds that there is no continuing self. We have a sense of a continuing self, but that's an illusion. There is literally nothing which persists from one second to the next. All that exists are similar psychological states swiftly succeeding one another thereby creating the illusion of a same self having differing experiences. But that's an illusion.

In a sense what is happening is that constantly throughout our existence we are spontaneously ceasing to exist every infinitesimal fraction of a second only to be replaced by an almost exact duplicate. That is why a materialist should not fear death or think death is a bad thing because in a sense s/he is constantly dying anyway.