Stupid teleportation topic.

[PixyMisa]

In other words, if we put up this smokescreen, wave our hands a bit, and lie our [rule 8] off, then both 'selves' are the same.

Sure, because people are never unconscious.

The point is, you cannot tell from looking at the two "mes" which one is the original.

Neither of the two "mes" can demonstrate they are the original.

You can only tell which is which if you have observed the entire process without interruption.

Pixy, consider the alternative scenario - one is slowly tortured over a period of a decade, unto death, while the other is lavished affection, attention, material goods, and various favors. From your own, current, point of view, which would you be doing? NOT the person who appears to be exactly like you, but YOU.

Unless you can answer with 100% certainty that YOU, the person I am addressing right now, would be enjoying the sweet life and NOT tortured, the answer would be 'NO'.

That didn't make any sense.

 

[Beerina]

Yes, that sounds right to me.



The last sentence is the problem. I was assuming the original was destroyed before it had a chance to diverge from the copy. If the two are given a chance to diverge to a significant degree (and I'm not really qualified to define what "significant" means here), then they would indeed be two different people, and it would be unethical to kill one, because information would be lost.

Jeremy

What if it's just one second? Hell, for that matter, what if some alien super-psychic (gag, sorry) kept their brains in exact sync for a year? Would it then be OK to kill one? No info is lost.

Of course, the reason murder is bad is because you're stopping the existence of a person's being. Assume two identical individuals with identical minds in parallel universes. Is it OK to kill one because no info is lost?

 

[PixyMisa]

The point is, zaayrdragon's definition of "self" is not an operational definition. It asserts that there is an original and a copy, and they are different people, but it provides no way to differentiate apart from continuous observation.

DD's definition (and mine) is operational. It provides no way to differentiate between the original and the copy either, but that doesn't matter, since it does not assert that "self" cannot be copied.

zaayrdragon, you simple define the problem out of existence. You can do that, but it's not very useful.

Of course, there remains the minor point that consciousness arises from material systems in the real universe, and perfect transporters are impossible in the real universe.

Also, consciousness is not continuous.

 

[toddjh]

What if it's just one second? Hell, for that matter, what if some alien super-psychic (gag, sorry) kept their brains in exact sync for a year? Would it then be OK to kill one? No info is lost.

Well, I suppose so, noting that your hypothetical scenario is so ludicrous that it hardly deserves an answer.

As for a divergence of only one second, I would tend to play it safe and say that's too significant. I wouldn't be comfortable unless the original never regained consciousness at all. I'd much prefer it if there wasn't any neural activity, i.e. the body was completely frozen, or somesuch.

Of course, the reason murder is bad is because you're stopping the existence of a person's being.

Yes. Like I said to Bri, the disagreement here is simply on how to define a "person." I think a person is defined by the neural configuration which gives rise to memories and personality, and others think that a person is defined by the entire physical body. And still others think a person is defined by some kind of soul. This is a pretty fundamental disagreement, and I don't think there will ever be a consensus.

Assume two identical individuals with identical minds in parallel universes. Is it OK to kill one because no info is lost?

I think you need to demonstrate the existence of parallel universes before that question is meaningful.

But regardless, if you kill someone in one parallel universe, information is indeed lost...at least to the people who cared about that person, who will never see him again, since the "copy" is inaccessible to them.

Would it be murder? I dunno. Questionable. Would it be mean? Definitely.

Jeremy

 

[Bri]

For the reasons I and other have hinted at: it would be problematic to have a copy of yourself walking around. It would cause all kinds of legal problems, and generally be creepy.

I agree, but being killed to prevent it would be even creepier! Somehow, I don't think that other "me" would be the same "me" that is being killed, so I think I'll take the bus today instead!

-Bri

 

[Bri]

The point is, zaayrdragon's definition of "self" is not an operational definition. It asserts that there is an original and a copy, and they are different people, but it provides no way to differentiate apart from continuous observation.

It's possible that physical and temporal location can distinguish them. In other words, in order to be the same person, your body must not only have the exact same state, but be in the exact same place at the exact same time.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

But regardless, if you kill someone in one parallel universe, information is indeed lost...at least to the people who cared about that person, who will never see him again, since the "copy" is inaccessible to them.

How is this different than killing the person at one end of a teleporter. Information is lost to those around the original person since the copy is not immediately accessible to them.

-Bri

 

[PixyMisa]

It's possible that physical and temporal location can distinguish them. In other words, in order to be the same person, yout body must not only have the exact same state, but be in the exact same place at the exact same time.

Exactly. That's not an operational definition. (Well, if we assume that space-time is uniform it isn't.)

 

[toddjh]

How is this different than killing the person at one end of a teleporter. Information is lost to those around the original person since the copy is not immediately accessible to them.

"Not immediately accessible" is not the same as "not accessible." I'm assuming there's no ability to move between universes here.

But "not immediately accessible" is no different from going on a long trip.

Jeremy

 

[toddjh]

I agree, but being killed to prevent it would be even creepier!

I know, but that's just because we disagree on what "being killed" entails.

Somehow, I don't think that other "me" would be the same "me" that is being killed, so I think I'll take the bus today instead!

Out of curiosity, what's the difference between the "other you" and the "same you?" If the two "yous" were side by side, how could you tell them apart?

Jeremy

 

[Bri]

I know, but that's just because we disagree on what "being killed" entails.

So, tell me how you define death.

I would imagine that receiving a lethal injection would qualify as being killed, regardless of whether a clone of you exists elsewhere or not. I would think that being killed implies a change in the state of your body (perhaps described as a loss of consciousness or the inability of your brain to change state). There would be no difference between this state if a copy of you existed elsewhere and this state if no copy existed of you elsewhere -- you'd be equally dead in either case.

Out of curiosity, what's the difference between the "other you" and the "same you?" If the two "yous" were side by side, how could you tell them apart?

I understand what you're saying, but they would have different personalities and different memories if they exist in two different locations. The fact is that they're never exactly the same since at the moment the copy is created the two exist in different locations at the same time (and therefore perceive the world differently). If they were both left alive, they would obviously diverge immediately since one is seeing one thing and the other is seeing another thing. They are never exactly the same person.

Perhaps you wouldn't consider it death, but I certainly would not allow myself to be killed even if a copy was made of me elsewhere at the same instant.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Exactly. That's not an operational definition. (Well, if we assume that space-time is uniform it isn't.)

I don't know what the term "operational definition" means aside from your previous statement that it requires continuous observation to differentiate them, so I may simply be misunderstanding the term. But it doesn't require continuous observation to differentiate them even if they are exactly the same physically because they are in different locations at that moment in time.

-Bri

 

[Elind]

I'm sure most of you are familiar with the issue. You have the ability to teleport to any location you want with out any danger. The problem is that the teleportation actually just destroys you and creates a replica at another location. Do you enjoy your great new life teleporting anywhere you want to go or do you let dopey philosophical concerns ruin your life?

Why does the original always have to be destroyed? Wouldn't it be double the fun to just duplicate? Question: How long would it take for the entire universe to be filled with you, if all of you traveled that way every weekend?

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't know what the term "operational definition" means aside from your previous statement that it requires continuous observation to differentiate them, so I may simply be misunderstanding the term. But it doesn't require continuous observation to differentiate them even if they are exactly the same physically because they are in different locations at that moment in time.

Well, you can tell a toaster from a clock because they do different things. It doesn't matter how you shuffle them about, or if you go away on holidays for a month and then come back. One is still a toaster, and the other is a clock.

An operational definition is one that is based on the properties and/or processes of the object being defined. The reason we like operational definitions is because they are useful; you can determine what something is without having to watch it constantly to maintain a record of its identity.

We know that location in space-time is not an intrinsic property of self because identity persists as we move about. So zaayrdragon's definition, while valid, is not operational and not particularly useful.

Under an operational definition of self, the existence of a duplicating transporter means that self is duplicable.

 

[PixyMisa]

Oh, and the other point:

You can differentiate in that you know there are two of me. You can't differentiate in the sense of knowing which is the original - without continuous observation.

Under an operational definition of self, both are me. Different instantiations of me, but me nonetheless.

Consider a self-aware computer program, running on classical, best-attempt deterministic hardware. We can pause the program at will, duplicate its state, and then restart both instances. (In fact, most operating systems have a system call that does precisely this.)

This is our transporter/duplicator made real, with the proviso that we don't know for certain that human-level consciousness is possible in a deterministic system.

Which is the original, and how do you tell?

 

[DanishDynamite]

My definition of 'self' is a matter of simplicity - the continuous and dynamic record from the first person singular point of view. If this first person singular experience were to be disrupted, it would cease altogether.

Aside from the fact that you keep bringing mysterious unknown physical properties into the equation ("continous and dynamic record"?), what do you mean by "disruption"? How about a period of non-dreaming unconsciousness? Would that qualify as a disruption in your view?

Certainly, it can change in such a way that I am no longer the person I am right now - consider certain instances of brain damage. The key to the teletransporter problem, as I see it, is that if the original is NOT destroyed, 'you' would only exist as the original being - the continuous and dynamic first-person experience would never leave the body on Earth and wind up on Mars, obviously. And since this is infallibly true, why would that change just because we kill the original being?

Once again, please define and explain how to measure those properties of "continous and dynamic experience".

Suppose that you decided to take a step to the right. Suppose that I zapped you as you were about to move and created a duplicate in the correct position at that time. In what sense is that duplicate not you?

I don't disagree that the duplicate would be a perfect, identical copy of you in every way possible (minus space-time location, of course) - but a perfect, identical copy of you will never share the same continuous, dynamic first-person sense of being that you have. In short, at no point, EVER, would you see out of the other body's eyes. Yes, someone would, and that someone would have all of your memories, etc - but it would just be another person, not YOU.

Once again, YOU are generated by your physical make-up. You don't exist unless such a make-up exists.

If the issue were simple survival of species, or continuation of personal genes, or some altruistic interest in maintaining the person under my name, that would be one thing; but the issue here is one of personal survival, of pure selfishness.

Teletrans supporters love to mask the issue numerous ways, by concealing the identity of the original one way or another, so that the original and duplicate are fooled in some manner; so let's try the question from another angle, similar in nature to their approach:

Let's say that you're approached by a well-known and popular scientist, who has been known to award people millions of dollars for participating in his experiments. He asks you to simply sit in this booth for five minutes, and he'll give you a million dollars. You enter the booth, wait your five minutes, and exit; and here comes the professor, not with a check, but with a handgun. He shoots you and leaves you dying, and you wonder, where is your money? Why did he shoot you?

Of course, what you and I both know, but the poor schmuck in the example does not, is that the booth made a perfect duplicate, and this dupe received $1,000,000. Obviously, we can't have two of them wandering around sharing an identity, so the doc kills the original.

So where are you now? Dead. Why? Because at no point did you share a continual record of existence with the duplicate in question. You weren't even aware of any duplicate, at all. With no transfer of material whatsoever, your singular instance of self cannot and will not move beyond your own particular physical person.

YOU exist wherever the machinery to project you exists. You don't have an independent existence aside from such machinery. You don't have a soul, for example.

 

[Bri]

We know that location in space-time is not an intrinsic property of self because identity persists as we move about. So zaayrdragon's definition, while valid, is not operational and not particularly useful.

I think I understand the difference, but I'm not sure I agree that zaayr's definition isn't useful. Two completely identical people would diverge immediately because of the fact that they don't exist in the same location as each other, so no two things are entirely identical if they exist at different locations. At the same time, we identify a lot of things through continuous observation. I can only find my car in a parking lot full of similar models because I remember where I parked it.

You can differentiate in that you know there are two of me. You can't differentiate in the sense of knowing which is the original - without continuous observation.

It seems to me that whether the original "you" is killed or not wouldn't affect the duplicate "you" at all. It also seems fairly likely that if the original "you" is killed, you might just be dead and someone who thinks they're you might be having sex with your wife. Your wife wouldn't know the difference, and neither would the duplicate, but you might...being dead and all!

So how certain are you that you're right? Without knowing what really constitutes "self" would you actually attempt teleportation by having someone kill you at the very moment that a copy of you is created elsewhere, or do you think that maybe--just maybe--you'd just be...dead?

-Bri

 

[PixyMisa]

I think I understand the difference, but I'm not sure I agree that zaayr's definition isn't useful. Two completely identical people would diverge immediately because of the fact that they don't exist in the same location as each other, so no two things are entirely identical if they exist at different locations.

Well, no. They'd diverge because they'd be interacting with different environments. The separation in spacetime has no direct effect on identity.

At the same time, we identify a lot of things through continuous observation. I can only find my car in a parking lot full of similar models because I remember where I parked it.

First, that's not continuous observation.

Second, that won't work if someone moves your car.

Third, you do have other ways to identify your car, it's just that it is most convenient to look for it where you last left it.

It seems to me that whether the original "you" is killed or not wouldn't affect the duplicate "you" at all.

True.

It also seems fairly likely that if the original "you" is killed, you might just be dead and someone who thinks they're you might be having sex with your wife.

The question is, are they correct in thinking they are you? And the answer depends only on the definition of self.

Your wife wouldn't know the difference, and neither would the duplicate, but you might...being dead and all!

Except that you do not necessarily have any way of telling the difference either.

So how certain are you that you're right? Without knowing what really constitutes "self" would you actually attempt teleportation by having someone kill you at the very moment that a copy of you is created elsewhere, or do you think that maybe--just maybe--you'd just be...dead?

I'm not saying I'm right and zaayrdragon is wrong.

What I am saying is that all that zaayrdragon has is a definition, and it's not even a useful definition.

My point is that the entire argument hinges on the definition of self; everything else is frills and frippery.

 

[Bri]

Well, no. They'd diverge because they'd be interacting with different environments. The separation in spacetime has no direct effect on identity.

Don't you think that the difference in perception from different points of view would cause them to diverge very rapidly? By rapidly, I mean immediately (one would all of a sudden perceive that they had just teleported and the other wouldn't). It would be impossible for two people to interact with the exact same environment given that they can't exist in the exact same place at the exact same time.

The question is, are they correct in thinking they are you? And the answer depends only on the definition of self.

I can agree with that, but you didn't answer the question. Are you so confident in your definition of "self" that you'd have yourself killed in order to "teleport into" a duplicate body rather than taking the bus to work? Assuming the machine never even touches you to get the information needed to make the duplicate, you wouldn't all of a sudden become that other guy if you decided not to kill yourself would you? So if the other guy is unaffected either way, how could you become that other guy if you did kill yourself? It sure seems like the only thing you have to gain by killing yourself is death.

Admittedly, it would certainly be less complicated for your wife if there was only one of you, but you should have thought about that when you decided not to take the bus to work!

Except that you do not necessarily have any way of telling the difference either.

Not necessarily, except that you might very well be dead. Anyone observing the teleportation would know that he's not the real you. Even if there were no witnesses, the fact that others think that other guy is really you (and that even he thinks he's you) would be no consolation to you if you're actually dead. Especially if you enjoyed living (and having sex with your own wife).

I'm not saying I'm right and zaayrdragon is wrong.

What I am saying is that all that zaayrdragon has is a definition, and it's not even a useful definition.

My point is that the entire argument hinges on the definition of self; everything else is frills and frippery.

Zaayr's definition could be extremely useful if he's right and you're DEAD!

-Bri

 

[PixyMisa]

Don't you think that the difference in perception from different points of view would cause them to diverge very rapidly?

That's exactly what I said. Separation in space-time has no direct effect, since space-time itself is uniform, but the two selfs are interacting with different environments.

I can agree with that, but you didn't answer the question. Are you so confident in your definition of "self" that you'd have yourself killed in order to "teleport into" a duplicate body rather than taking the bus to work?

All it is, is the definition of a word.

The argument on whether it is a good idea to use a teleporter or not is largely separate from that.

After the fact, I will be convinced that the teleporter worked perfectly.

Before the fact, I will have no evidence one way or another.

Zaayrdragon has defined teleportation to be suicide (or murder). But all this is, is a definition. The actual evidence says precisely the opposite, which is problematic.

(Besides which, teleporters are impossible in the real world.)

Assuming the machine never even touches you to get the information needed to make the duplicate, you wouldn't all of a sudden become that other guy if you decided not to kill yourself would you?

That question makes no sense.

So if the other guy is unaffected either way, how could you become that other guy if you did kill yourself?

That also makes no sense.

It sure seems like the only thing you have to gain by killing yourself is death.

What is death?

From all external observations, I'm still alive.

From the subjective point of view of the me that is running around, I'm still alive.

The me that is not running around doesn't have a subjective point of view, being, after all, dead.

Not necessarily, except that you might very well be dead. Anyone observing the teleportation would know that he's not the real you.

And anyone not observing the teleoportation could not tell, even in principle. That's the point.

Even if there were no witnesses, the fact that others think that other guy is really you (and that even he thinks he's you) would be no consolation to you if you're actually dead.

Which is not an argument of any sort.

If there are no witnesses to the event of teleportation, there is no way to distinguish between the original and the copy, not even for the original and the copy themselves. You can't say that I am dead, because it is impossible for you to determine which one is me.

Zaayr's definition could be extremely useful if he's right and you're DEAD!

Zaayr's definition doesn't even allow you to determine if I'm ME, let alone if I'm dead, unless you have me under continuous observation.