Stupid teleportation topic.

[Tez]

As a quick response to DD (sorry if someone mentioned this)

It is actually possible to prove, using the laws of quantum mechanics, that a quantum state cannot be "copied". That is, within the laws of quantum mechanics it is impossible to construct a machine into which I input a person in quantum state P, along with a lump of "substrate" (stuff the copy is to be made of) and out comes P P (two seperate copies of P).

THis is called the "no cloning theorem", where is probably should be called the "no duplication theorem".

Now, it is possible if you've measured the quantum state of the person in minute detail, to then reconstruct the state you've measured. Unfortunately the measurement in quantum mechanics is problematic - it doesnt reveal the "actual" state of the person, with various probabilities it reveals different outcomes. And after many such random outcomes on every atom of your body it is simple to show that the revealed state will be VERY far from that of a valid human being.

So at best we can do something like this: Meaure your quantum state exactly, turning you from person P into lump of sludge P'. Create two copies of P'.

Incidentally this is why in quantum teleportation the original quantum state is necessarily destroyed before it can be reconstructed at the receiving station...

Gotta race, no time to edit, hope this makes some sense...

Tez

 

[toddjh]

Are you suggesting that no murder has taken place because no information was "lost?"

Yes, that is what I am suggesting. Is "death" simply the destruction of our physical form, or is it the end of the information that makes up our identity: the organization of our neurons which gives rise to our memories and personality? I argue for the latter. If that organization is preserved, the fate of the original atoms is irrelevant.

Think of it like a book: the loss of, oh, Romeo and Juliet would be a great tragedy to the literary community. But would anybody cry over the loss of an individual copy? No, because the information is still preserved.

Would you agree to teleportation if it left behind a dead body?

Yes, assuming I was convinced the process would be instantaneous.

Jeremy

 

[Z]

Yes, that is what I am suggesting. Is "death" simply the destruction of our physical form, or is it the end of the information that makes up our identity: the organization of our neurons which gives rise to our memories and personality? I argue for the latter. If that organization is preserved, the fate of the original atoms is irrelevant.

Think of it like a book: the loss of, oh, Romeo and Juliet would be a great tragedy to the literary community. But would anybody cry over the loss of an individual copy? No, because the information is still preserved.



Yes, assuming I was convinced the process would be instantaneous.

Jeremy

In that case, you should have no problem if I store all the information about your identity - organization of neurons, etc. - in a computer database, and execute you. Right?

 

[toddjh]

In that case, you should have no problem if I store all the information about your identity - organization of neurons, etc. - in a computer database, and execute you. Right?

Fine, I'll expand my definition to include the requirement that my "organization of neurons" be allowed to continue to interact with the real world in the same way as before.

Jeremy

 

[Bri]

Yes, that is what I am suggesting. Is "death" simply the destruction of our physical form, or is it the end of the information that makes up our identity: the organization of our neurons which gives rise to our memories and personality? I argue for the latter. If that organization is preserved, the fate of the original atoms is irrelevant.

OK, so just to make sure that I understand what you're saying... Let's assume that there is a machine that can make a copy of you so that there are two living versions of you walking about. Let's say that it is also possibile for this machine to inject you with a substance that will kill you the very instant the copy of you is created. We are of course assuming that it would be certain that you would die the very instant the duplicate is created at the other end.

The first possiblity (that both the original and the duplicate would be left alive) has some obvious drawbacks, of course. After all, who wants to share their wife with another "you" who might be better in bed? But if it could be assured that you would be killed the very instant the copy is created elsewhere it would be OK? You would actually have no problem walking into a teleportation chamber knowing that you will die as long as your "information" will live on in your duplicate?

Think of it like a book: the loss of, oh, Romeo and Juliet would be a great tragedy to the literary community. But would anybody cry over the loss of an individual copy? No, because the information is still preserved.

A book isn't a human being, and more importantly it isn't YOU! A book doesn't consent to being destroyed, and somehow I doubt that you'd consent to a lethal injection, even though your information would "live on" in an exact duplicate.

-Bri

 

[toddjh]

You would actually have no problem walking into a teleportation chamber knowing that you will die as long as your "information" will live on in your duplicate?

Well, you're using loaded terms like "die" that I don't agree with. To use equally loaded terms, my version would be that I would have no problem walking into a teleportation chamber knowing that my identity would be transferred to a new substrate, even though the physical form which composed the old substrate would be destroyed in the process.

Jeremy

 

[Bri]

Well, you're using loaded terms like "die" that I don't agree with. To use equally loaded terms, my version would be that I would have no problem walking into a teleportation chamber knowing that the information which constitutes my identity would be transferred to a new substrate, even though the physical form which composed the old substrate would be destroyed in the process.

If the possiblity exists that both the original and the copy could live (resulting in multiple identities), then how can you view killing one as a "transfer" of a single identity?

So, that leads to the obvious question...which would you choose given the choices of: 1) teleporting and creating multiple versions of you 2) teleporting and receiving a lethal injection so that there would be only one version of you or 3) taking the bus?

-Bri

 

[toddjh]

If the possiblity exists that both the original and the copy could live (resulting in multiple identities), then how can you view it as a "transfer" of a single identity?

Because there was one "me" before, and one "me" after, and at no point was there another person involved. Sounds like a transfer to me!

So, that leads to the obvious question...which would you choose given the choices of: 1) teleporting and creating multiple versions of you 2) teleporting and receiving a lethal injection so that there would be only one version of you or 3) taking the bus?

Well, given the engineering difficulties of teleportation, I imagine taking the bus would be safer and cheaper.

But between the others, I'd choose 2. There are big ethical issues with allowing multiple duplicates to coexist. Which would be the "real" me for legal purposes? Which "me" is my wife still married to? And so on.

Jeremy

 

[Bri]

There are big ethical issues with allowing the creation of multiple duplicates from whole cloth. Which would be the "real" me for legal purposes? Which "me" is my wife still married to? And so on.

There are bigger ethical and legal issues with needlessly killing a person to prevent other ethical and legal issues.

-Bri

 

[toddjh]

There are bigger ethical and legal issues with needlessly killing a person to prevent other ethical and legal issues.

But that's begging the question -- does destruction of the body constitute "killing a person" if their identity is preserved in a new, identical body?

Jeremy

 

[Bri]

But that's begging the question -- does destruction of the body constitute "killing a person" if their identity is preserved in a new, identical body?

Seems like if taking no action (i.e. not giving the person a lethal injection) would result in the person continuing to live, then performing the action of giving the person a lethal injection would indeed be killing them.

-Bri

 

[toddjh]

Seems like if taking no action (i.e. not giving the person a lethal injection) would result in the person continuing to live, then performing the action of giving the person a lethal injection would indeed be killing them.

It would be killing the cells of the body, but would it be killing the person? After all, everything the person was and knew still exists somewhere else. Nothing is being destroyed except for cells, and that happens every second of every day whether you want it to or not.

If you're saying that the original copy had the potential to develop into a different person if the body continued to exist, then that's true...but if we have the obligation to let that happen, don't we also have the obligation to duplicate people as often as possible to make sure all those "potential people" are given their shot, too? I don't consider the concept of "potential people" meaningful, either in the abortion debate or here.

Jeremy

 

[Bri]

It would be killing the cells of the body, but would it be killing the person? After all, everything the person was and knew still exists somewhere else.

Didn't you agree that if the two people are left alive that they are two separate people? Therefore, the copy is not "everything the person was and knew" since the copy is necessarily a different person simply because the copy will live a different life than the original would have lived (if for no other reason than because the copy is in a different location than the original would have been if allowed to live). Are you really saying that allowing the original person to live would actually be worse than killing them?

If you're saying that the original copy had the potential to develop into a different person if the body continued to exist, then that's true...

It's not a body if allowed to live, it's a person. Therefore, you are destroying the person with the lethal injection, not a body. Sounds a lot like death to me.

...but if we have the obligation to let that happen, don't we also have the obligation to duplicate people as often as possible to make sure all those "potential people" are given their shot, too?

It is likely that there are ethical differences between taking action to prevent a healthy person from continuing to live (actively killing them) and not having as many babies or to cloning as many people as possible in order create as many potential people as possible.

-Bri

 

[wolfgirl]

This thread is making my brain bleed!

I guess I'm in the "continuous consciousness" camp. I think that if I could have continuous consciousness and KNOW that I was still going to be me on the other end, it'd be okay. I just don't know how you could ever know that.

If you were to go and ask the "new me" if it was really me, it would in all honesty say yes. It would have all of my memories and knowledge, all of my neuroses and flaws, etc. It might even have a continuous memory of the transfer process. But did I somehow cease to exist at some point during the transfer? The me standing there in the transporter (or whatever)? Did my continuous stream of consciousness come to an end, just like in death? The new me would say no. But would that actually be me? Or just a copy of me with all of my memories, etc.? So there's no way of finding out if there is a death process of some kind because the only one that could truly know if they had "died" is in fact now "dead." And the one you're asking is just a copy and assumes it has been continuously existing, but it hasn't, so it's actually lying, albeit unknowingly.

I say all of this from a point of not believing in a soul, etc. I can only imagine the added dimension that belief in a soul would bring into the mix! Then my brain would probably actually explode!

 

[toddjh]

Didn't you agree that if the two people are left alive that they are two separate people?

If you go back and read my earlier posts, you'll see that I said they would be different people only if the bodies were allowed to diverge (because then the destruction of one would represent loss of information). If the "original" is destroyed in the teleportation process, then the two would not have an opportunity to diverge and there would only be one person involved.

I don't think we'll agree on this topic. My position is internally consistent; the problem is simply that we're operating under different definitions of personhood.

Jeremy

 

[toddjh]

If you were to go and ask the "new me" if it was really me, it would in all honesty say yes. It would have all of my memories and knowledge, all of my neuroses and flaws, etc. It might even have a continuous memory of the transfer process. But did I somehow cease to exist at some point during the transfer?
...
I say all of this from a point of not believing in a soul, etc.

Actually, I think you are acting as if you have a soul. You're treating consciousness as something that inhabits your body, rather than something that arises from your body.

In your example, who is this person asking, "is that copy really me?" The very question implies that your consciousness exists independently of your body, or else there's nobody around to ask that question. There would only be the "new you," who would be completely satisfied with her teleportation experience, and no one else.

Jeremy

 

[Bri]

If you go back and read my earlier posts, you'll see that I said they would be different people only if the bodies were allowed to diverge (because then the destruction of one would represent loss of information).

If the original and the clone are both left alive, there would be two bodies and two (now divergent) states of those bodies. If the state of the body defines the person, then there are now two separate people with two separate non-identical bodies. That's all I was saying (and I think that's consistent with your definition if I'm understanding correctly).

Now, assuming that death is also just a change in state of the body, how does the death of one all of a sudden mean that they are now the same person? There are still two bodies, both with different states, one dead and the other not. The one that was "you" before teleportation is the dead one. The other one is living a different life than you would have lived if you hadn't been killed. That doesn't seem like a choice that most people would make.

I don't think we'll agree on this topic. My position is internally consistent; the problem is simply that we're operating under different definitions of personhood.

You might very well be right about that. I think I understand your definition but have a hard time agreeing with it. Perhaps your location in space might also have something to do with defining you as a person.

-Bri

 

[toddjh]

If the original and the clone are both left alive, there would be two bodies and two (now divergent) states of those bodies. If the state of the body defines the person, then there are now two separate people with two separate non-identical bodies. That's all I was saying (and I think that's consistent with your definition if I'm understanding correctly).

Yes, that sounds right to me.

Now, assuming that death is also just a change in state of the body, how does the death of one all of a sudden mean that they are now the same person? There are still two bodies, both with different states, one dead and the other not.

The last sentence is the problem. I was assuming the original was destroyed before it had a chance to diverge from the copy. If the two are given a chance to diverge to a significant degree (and I'm not really qualified to define what "significant" means here), then they would indeed be two different people, and it would be unethical to kill one, because information would be lost.

Jeremy

 

[Bri]

The last sentence is the problem. I was assuming the original was destroyed before it had a chance to diverge from the copy.

Doesn't killing one of them still cause them to diverge? How does killing one of them keep them from being two separate people? And if not, then why would you rather be dead and have a clone than alive and have a clone?

-Bri

 

[toddjh]

Doesn't killing one of them still cause them to diverge? How does killing one of them keep them from being two separate people?

Sorry, I misunderstood. The relevant thing here isn't divergence of any kind, but divergence which causes information (i.e. memories and personality) to be lost. Simply destroying the original body doesn't cause any information to be lost, because it's already preserved in the copy. Allowing the original to stay conscious for a few hours and then killing him, on the other hand, would destroy information, and so it would be murder.

And if not, then why would you rather be dead and have a clone than alive and have a clone?

For the reasons I and other have hinted at: it would be problematic to have a copy of yourself walking around. It would cause all kinds of legal problems, and generally be creepy.

Jeremy