Stupid teleportation topic.

[Z]

I already answered. The personality that I know myself to be would see X (if we ask the original) and the personality I know myself to be would see O (if we ask the copy).

So you would see an X.

 

[DanishDynamite]

Sorry for the delayed response.

No, there is a unique instance of you that is a part of the continuous and dynamic physical you. Creating a second 'you' does not satisfy the continuous, dynamic aspect of what you are; it only creates a copy of you.

Not understood. What physical properties does a duplicate not have that the original does? What are these mysterious "continous and dynamical" properties?

There may be nothing at all to distinguish between the two, except for differential experience. At the point any experience differs between the two, the distinguishment is made. But here's the catch: since your personal record of a continual and dynamic existence would be faced with cessation, how on earth can you say that you would 'transport' anywhere?

Yes, there is nothing physical to distinguish the two. What is "differential experience"? Some new physical property?

I've noticed that those who propose what you are claiming above often have to resort to scenarios where the difference is deliberately disguised; where the original has to be killed before realizing that a difference exists, or where conditions have to be so nearly identical as to not create a sense of difference. Why? Because any signifigant difference would illustrate that the original consciousness remains trapped within its own body, unable to transport ANYWHERE, and suffers a fatal fate - no getting around that one, I'm afraid. UNLESS folks like DD above are proposing that identical twins share a consciousness, or that you can have a continuous and dynamic record of existence shared between two physically separated but otherwise identical beings... and of course, if that's not being proposed, we see clearly that duplication does NOT equal transportation of conscious awareness.

I don't resort to any strange scenarios as far as I know. And i don't know why you keep refering to identical twins. They are of no relevance to this thread.

Another argument, that so far I have not offered because I have certain problems with it, is that we're never the same person, from moment to moment - due to cellular replacement, for example; yet the neurons of the brain remain largely the same throughout human life, and since there's no reason to think that consciousness ISN'T tied to the brain, there is therefore reason to think that a particular consciousness may very well be tied to a particular collection of neurons.. and that duplicating that set of neurons would only create a second, identical consciousness - not the SAME consciousness.

No, there is no reason to suspect that the particular elementary particles which happen to get incorporated into your brain have special properties in addition to those properties which are known. When you are born you have a certain number of atoms in your brain. This number increases as you grow until IIRC age 7 or so.

I look at it this way: if I have a drawing of a cat, and I take that drawing and create two copies in the copy machine, is each copy the other copy? Is copy A identical to copy B? Of course. But is copy A copy B? Of course not. If I burn copy B, does anything happen to A? Not necessarily.

The copy is not a duplicate as the word is used in this thread. A duplicate is accurate down to individual quantum states.

Now suppose that copy A was actually a copy of B... now does A burn? Not necessarily.

Now imagine if copy B had self-awareness... what then?

See above.

I'm not arguing for an imaginary soul; I'm arguing against a magical transfer of consciousness from one set of atoms to a completely unrelated and disconnected set of atoms. It's obvious that what's being proposed is a magical transfer; or, more appropriately, that no transfer at all is actually occuring, and that DD and others seem to prefer the idea of somebody carrying on as them, rather than continuing themselves. Why? Beats the hell out of me.

Yes, no tranfer is necessary. YOU only exist if a machinery generating you exists. If two such exist, two YOUs exist.

DD - If the duplicate is made, and the original is NOT killed - which one is you? Yes, I know that you're both identical in most respects - but which one has been you and will continue to be you? Will you suddenly have awareness of being on Mars, or will you merely be aware that a duplicate of you is on Mars? Answer very carefully, because within that answer lies my whole problem with this nonsense.

At the moment of duplication, both will be me. You don't seem to understand this concept. Let me make an example:

Suppose a time machine was invented and you were transported back in time by one day. Into your own bedroom. Where your "old" you is brushing your teeth.

Which YOU is the real you? The one observing or the one brushing teeth?

 

[DanishDynamite]

So you would see an X.

One of me would, yes.

 

[Z]

DD - you simply don't understand. That much is clear.

 

[Z]

One of me would, yes.

Since 'me' is a singular pronoun, there is only one of 'me' - only one of you. So you would see an X. You would not see an 'O'.

 

[Z]

Not understood. What physical properties does a duplicate not have that the original does? What are these mysterious "continous and dynamical" properties?

We've been through this before.

Physically, duplicate and original might be absolutely identical, with the minor exception of spatial location. But the duplicate does not have a continuous connection to the original - only the illusion of a continuous connection. This continuity, physically, is in the form of the continual, gradual replacement of particles within the body/brain. Please recall, some of those particles are never replaced! So we have, first, a continual connection requirement - that the duplicate does not share.

Secondly, since an individual is a dynamic state of continuous existence, we can eliminate the foolishness of 'a second ago, I was a different me'. Since any given organism or object is a continuous and dynamic state of existence, any disruption to the continuity equates a cessation of existence; where gradual change is not considered a disruption of continuity, but simple dynamic existence.

Yes, there is nothing physical to distinguish the two. What is "differential experience"? Some new physical property?

Simple English, DD - look up the terms.

I don't resort to any strange scenarios as far as I know. And i don't know why you keep refering to identical twins. They are of no relevance to this thread.

You don't? So you're happy with analyzing the scenario where the original is in a bright blue room surrounded by Beethoven, and the duplicate forms in a red room being blasted by Garth Brooks, and the original is wearing his old clothes, and the duplicate forms in a nylon jumpsuit?

And they can't tell which is which? Yeah, right.

And actually, identical twins are very relevant to the thread. Theoretically, you could raise two completely identical twins in a completely identical fashion; however, that doesn't make these twins two instances of the same self. Likewise, generating a duplicate - creating a twin - doesn't create a second instance of the same self.

The copy is not a duplicate as the word is used in this thread. A duplicate is accurate down to individual quantum states.

So, then, could the copy be. Now, the same questions apply. Or are you now resorting to 'self is a result of certain quantum fluctuations?'

Yes, no tranfer is necessary. YOU only exist if a machinery generating you exists. If two such exist, two YOUs exist.

Ghost in the machine!

The machinery doesn't generate YOU - the machinery is an integral part of YOU. If two machines exist, two beings exist - one is you, and one is someone else. Simple.

At the moment of duplication, both will be me. You don't seem to understand this concept. Let me make an example:

Suppose a time machine was invented and you were transported back in time by one day. Into your own bedroom. Where your "old" you is brushing your teeth.

Which YOU is the real you? The one observing or the one brushing teeth?

Supposing time travel of this nature were even vaguely possible, both would be the real self. Since you have specifically mentioned that you were transported back in time, then the 'real you' in this example is the you observing the previous you. However, at the moment you both co-exist, neither of you receives input or data from the other. As such, neither of you is the same being simultaneously. In fact, there would be three similar but not identical selves created - you pre-time-travel, no self exposure; you pre-time-travel, with self exposure;.......wait. Actually, four of you. No, maybe even more.

But now you're dealing with entirely complex issues - time travel is a mess to begin with.

One thing is certain, though - if you kill your past self, you could cease to exist entirely. This is a considerably different issue than the duplicator, where what affects one will have no affect on the other.

 

[Dogdoctor]

Um Yeah, I teleport all the time. I play this game, Ultima online and you only need a little magery to teleport. If you mean in real life, we can't teleport, but hypothetically if we could then it would depend on if when we are destroyed would the replica be exact and what are the risk's involved. If the replica is exact and there is no to minimal risk then I would have no problem with it.

 

[PixyMisa]

Physically, duplicate and original might be absolutely identical, with the minor exception of spatial location. But the duplicate does not have a continuous connection to the original - only the illusion of a continuous connection. This continuity, physically, is in the form of the continual, gradual replacement of particles within the body/brain. Please recall, some of those particles are never replaced! So we have, first, a continual connection requirement - that the duplicate does not share.

You are defining "self" to require physical continuity. That's acceptable, but it means teleportation is impossible. Also, it is not clear why physical continuity is necessary.

DD is using a definition of "self" based on observable properties. That too is acceptable, and it means that it is possible to have duplicate selfs - although such would immediately diverge because their experiences would be different. Under DD's definition, "me" is no longer exclusively singular.

Likewise, generating a duplicate - creating a twin - doesn't create a second instance of the same self.

That depends solely on your definition of "self".

 

[Z]

My definition of 'self' is a matter of simplicity - the continuous and dynamic record from the first person singular point of view. If this first person singular experience were to be disrupted, it would cease altogether. Certainly, it can change in such a way that I am no longer the person I am right now - consider certain instances of brain damage. The key to the teletransporter problem, as I see it, is that if the original is NOT destroyed, 'you' would only exist as the original being - the continuous and dynamic first-person experience would never leave the body on Earth and wind up on Mars, obviously. And since this is infallibly true, why would that change just because we kill the original being?

I don't disagree that the duplicate would be a perfect, identical copy of you in every way possible (minus space-time location, of course) - but a perfect, identical copy of you will never share the same continuous, dynamic first-person sense of being that you have. In short, at no point, EVER, would you see out of the other body's eyes. Yes, someone would, and that someone would have all of your memories, etc - but it would just be another person, not YOU.

If the issue were simple survival of species, or continuation of personal genes, or some altruistic interest in maintaining the person under my name, that would be one thing; but the issue here is one of personal survival, of pure selfishness.

Teletrans supporters love to mask the issue numerous ways, by concealing the identity of the original one way or another, so that the original and duplicate are fooled in some manner; so let's try the question from another angle, similar in nature to their approach:

Let's say that you're approached by a well-known and popular scientist, who has been known to award people millions of dollars for participating in his experiments. He asks you to simply sit in this booth for five minutes, and he'll give you a million dollars. You enter the booth, wait your five minutes, and exit; and here comes the professor, not with a check, but with a handgun. He shoots you and leaves you dying, and you wonder, where is your money? Why did he shoot you?

Of course, what you and I both know, but the poor schmuck in the example does not, is that the booth made a perfect duplicate, and this dupe received $1,000,000. Obviously, we can't have two of them wandering around sharing an identity, so the doc kills the original.

So where are you now? Dead. Why? Because at no point did you share a continual record of existence with the duplicate in question. You weren't even aware of any duplicate, at all. With no transfer of material whatsoever, your singular instance of self cannot and will not move beyond your own particular physical person.

You are defining "self" to require physical continuity. That's acceptable, but it means teleportation is impossible.

EXACTLY my point.

 

[PixyMisa]

My definition of 'self' is a matter of simplicity - the continuous and dynamic record from the first person singular point of view.

Fine. But all it is is a definition.

Also, it suffers from the same problem as neutrons: If you look away, and then look back, and there are now two of them (neutrons or DDs) it is impossible to tell which (if either) of them is the original.

 

[Z]

Not for the original...

 

[Filip Sandor]

Not for the original...

Filip stumbles in the door....

There you are!! I found you! ...hufff....pufff... I sent you a private message, did you get it??

Oh, pardon my barging in!

 

[PixyMisa]

Not for the original...

Yes, for the original as well.

If the original cannot demonstrate physical continuity, because he was unconscious during the process or because the process was such as to obscure physical continuity, then the original and the duplicate will have equally valid claim to being the original (so far as anyone can determine).

 

[Jyera]

Sitting on the sidelines watching DD and ZD debating each other...

I think both of you are right.

DD assert that both the original and duplicate are DD.
ZD assert that only the original is ZD.

I would say the following:
(1) From an Engineering approach, I would engineer the teleporter to make the teleportee falls asleep. And make sure the original is "destroyed" instantaneously before the the duplicate regain consciousness.

(2) From the legal point of view, I would outlaw any attempt to side-step the procedure as set out in point 1. And I would also give legal protection infavour of the original should there be any conflict of interest between the original and the duplicate.

This doesn't mean the original is the only me, the duplicate is indeed me too.

Base on the above, consider the Torture-original-and-give-duplicate-a-million scenario. The million dollar belongs to the original, but is tranferred automatically to the duplicate upon the original's death. It would be extremely silly for the original to subject himself to torture for any period of time.

All these assuming the teleporting is perfect.
In short, Both DD and ZD are correct, but ZD position allows the law to protect me better.

 

[Z]

Yes, for the original as well.

If the original cannot demonstrate physical continuity, because he was unconscious during the process or because the process was such as to obscure physical continuity, then the original and the duplicate will have equally valid claim to being the original (so far as anyone can determine).

emphasis mine

In other words, if we put up this smokescreen, wave our hands a bit, and lie our [rule 8] off, then both 'selves' are the same.

Uh-huh.

But it don't work that way, every time, now does it?

Pixy, consider the alternative scenario - one is slowly tortured over a period of a decade, unto death, while the other is lavished affection, attention, material goods, and various favors. From your own, current, point of view, which would you be doing? NOT the person who appears to be exactly like you, but YOU.

Unless you can answer with 100% certainty that YOU, the person I am addressing right now, would be enjoying the sweet life and NOT tortured, the answer would be 'NO'.

 

[Bri]

Let's say that an exact copy and configuration of all atoms were made elsewhere, wouldn't both at least feel that they are the "real" you? In other words, if the two were unaware of each other, one would feel that the teleport was successful (that they teleported) and the other would feel that it didn't work (they are still where they were). Would the "real" you be the original?

Now, let's say that the teleportation is being offered as a service run by an unscrupulous company. They tell people that they are actually being moved from point A to point B, but in fact they are being copied as previously described. The "original" is then subsequently bludgeoned to death. Would anybody ever know? Certainly the other "you" wouldn't know and would identify and feel entirely as you. But we would probably consider the killing of the original to be immoral. Most of us probably wouldn't volunteer to be teleported if we knew what the company was doing.

Let's assume that instead of being bludgeoned, the original is killed instantly and painlessly. Again, most would have a problem with it. But wouldn't that actually be exactly the same as the Star Trek scenario where your atoms are disassembled (killing the original), beamed one by one to another location, and then reassembled on the other end (making a copy of the original)? For that matter, the dissassembly process could be extremely horrible and painful and nobody would ever know since the copy doesn't experience the pain and believes that it is you.

So I would think that most people would have a problem with teleportation.

-Bri

 

[Roboramma]

Zaayrdragon, it seems like the opposing viewpoint is that they are both you.

The idea is hard to get my head around, and I'm not sure I can agree with it, but it's also hard to argue against. What connects me now to the me of five minutes ago?

I find that to be a similar question to "What connects the original to the copy?"

And I'm not sure that the answer to those two questions is different. On the other hand, I'm not sure it's the same. I don't think our brains were designed to deal with questions like this - we've got this sense of self that works under most conditions, but it's flawed in some ways. Ways that are almost never relevant. But still, those flaws are there.

And that, I think, is why this question is so difficult to answer.

ETA - oh, and by saying that they are both you, I'm not saying that they would both be the same person. After the divergence of course they are separate. But if the question is, which one will I become? I'm not sure of the answer. I can see how it could be "both". That doesn't mean that you will experience both at the same time. It means the concept "I" is flawed, and we've come up against one of it's failing points. I'm still not convinced that we have, but I wonder if that's just because I can't get past my own flawed concepts.

 

[Bri]

Zaayrdragon, it seems like the opposing viewpoint is that they are both you.

This is really a question about cloning, not about teleportation per se.

Both would certainly think that they are you. The question is, would you want multiple copies of yourself running around (since killing one of them would be inethical). Also, what would the experience be like to be teleported? For one of you, it would seem like the teleportation worked, and for the other it would seem like it didn't work. For both, there would be a clone running around, although both would have a unique view of "self" (neither would look at the other and say "Hey, you're me!"). But both would fully feel as though they were the "original."

This scenario creates other problems as well. Neither version may actually be any less the original than the other. This would create all sorts of identity problems, such as which of you goes to work the next day, and which gets to sleep with your wife?

Even if we assume the one for which the teleportation seemingly "failed" would be the "real" one, essentially all we've done is made a clone of yourself elsewhere who thinks they are you. Of course, this other person feels that the one for whom the teleportation failed is the clone. This person would feel that they are the one who previously had the job and the wife (and if you define "self" as the configuration itself, they are correct). To take these things away would itself be cruel and inethical.

So teleportation means that there are two simultaneous outcomes: 1) nothing happens (you aren't teleported at all) but now a clone who thinks they are you exists elsewhere; and at the same time 2) you teleport to another location but no longer are "you" and lose your previous life.

I can think of a lot of reasons that this would not be something that a lot of people would do, materialist or not.

-Bri

 

[toddjh]

Let's say that an exact copy and configuration of all atoms were made elsewhere, wouldn't both at least feel that they are the "real" you? In other words, if the two were unaware of each other, one would feel that the teleport was successful (that they teleported) and the other would feel that it didn't work (they are still where they were). Would the "real" you be the original?

They would both be equally real, and would both have an equal claim to being "you." They would not, however, be identical, since their physical states would rapidly diverge. In a matter of fractions of a second, I would say they would've diverged enough to be considered different people.

Now, let's say that the teleportation is being offered as a service run by an unscrupulous company. They tell people that they are actually being moved from point A to point B, but in fact they are being copied as previously described. The "original" is then subsequently bludgeoned to death. Would anybody ever know? Certainly the other "you" wouldn't know and would identify and feel entirely as you.

In this case, the original has already diverged from the copy, and so they are no longer the same person. Killing one of them causes the irrevocable loss of information, which wouldn't be the case if the original were, in fact, destroyed as part of the teleportation process. These are two different situations.

But wouldn't that actually be exactly the same as the Star Trek scenario where your atoms are disassembled (killing the original), beamed one by one to another location, and then reassembled on the other end (making a copy of the original)?

No, because that process assumes the state of the copy is exactly the same as the state of the original when it was destroyed, so no information is being lost.

Jeremy

 

[Bri]

No, because that process assumes the state of the copy is exactly the same as the state of the original when it was destroyed, so no information is being lost.

What if we assume that a "copy" is made (rather than actually moving the atoms from point A to point B). Let's also assume that the original person is killed the instant the new person is assembled at the other end, so that there is no loss or difference of information. The only problem is that there is a body lying there at the original site. Are you suggesting that no murder has taken place because no information was "lost?" Would you agree to teleportation if it left behind a dead body?

-Bri