Some observations on the problem of evil

[Robin]

I'm not certain that the sole reason for suffering is to provide moral choice, but that is one possibility (assuming that having moral choice is a greater good than not suffering). I don't see how we could have moral choice (i.e. the ability to cause or allow suffering) without suffering. Do you agree that in order for us to have true moral choice, we must have the ability to cause or allow suffering?

Is morality only concerned with suffering?

Do we have to wait around for an earthquake in order to live our lives morally?

Of course. Because a person isn't omniscient, no action performed by a person is assured of achieving a greater good.

But your claim was that the list represented our morality. No, as I have shown it represents the opposite of our morality.

I disagree. If God is omnibenevolent (as we are assuming) then his motives are only good. And if God is omniscient and omnipotent (as we are assuming) then the results of God's actions would only be for the greater good. It is inevitable given our limited ability to understand that some things that are actually good would seem bad to us, just as a child doesn't understand how a painful injection could actually be good.

OK, so answer this question:
If a person believes the child to be under the care of a competent moral professional but does not understand the purpose of the suffering, should they act to prevent the suffering by pulling the needle before the injection is complete, or do nothing?

 

[chriswl]

The answer to that question is more obvious than you might think: the freedom to do what we are NOT psychologically disposed.

That would be the freedom to will things that I have no desire to will. A freedom I would presumably never exercise.

No, randomness is something else entirely. However, what looks like randomness from an empirical viewpoint could conceivably actually be the outcome of free will. You can think of the physical world as being an iterating algorithm with some variables feeding the cycle. What goes into the variables could either be random, or put there by free will. If they are put there by free will, then there are really two sorts of determinism.

Randomness with a deterministic probability distribution. An odd thing for free will to look like. And I still don't understand what libertarian free will means.

Why? What does "perfect" mean?

OK, I mean as perfect a world as is logically possible to create. An omnibenevolent God would create such a world.

That's why don't go there....all sorts of scenarios are conceivable, but some of them are so mind-bending I don't even want to think about it. Look what happened to David Deutsche.

What happened to Deutsch?

 

[Bri]

Is morality only concerned with suffering?

I don't know, is it? Most moral decisions do seem to involve human suffering in one form or another.

Do we have to wait around for an earthquake in order to live our lives morally?

Of course not. We are presented with various moral choices all the time.

But your claim was that the list represented our morality. No, as I have shown it represents the opposite of our morality.

I said no such thing. The first item on the list represents God bringing about the greater good. The other two represent possible results of the human choice to help or not help the suffering person. What I said was that God's morality works according to similar rules as ours. The difference (and it is a huge difference to be sure) is that God is omniscient, and therefore can act for the greater good because he knows all consequences of his actions, whereas we can only act upon the forseeable consequences of our actions.

OK, so answer this question:
If a person believes the child to be under the care of a competent moral professional but does not understand the purpose of the suffering, should they act to prevent the suffering by pulling the needle before the injection is complete, or do nothing?

If to the best of his/her knowledge, the doctor is moral and competent, then the forseeable benefits of the injection would outweigh the forseeable risks. The moral decision would likely be to not prevent the doctor from doing his or her job.

-Bri

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That would be the freedom to will things that I have no desire to will. A freedom I would presumably never exercise.

This statement goes right to the heart of the essence of all religions. It all depends what you mean by "I".

Randomness with a deterministic probability distribution. An odd thing for free will to look like. And I still don't understand what libertarian free will means.

It means the ability to co-create the future instead of being an automaton.

OK, I mean as perfect a world as is logically possible to create. An omnibenevolent God would create such a world.

I believe that is precisely what has happened.

What happened to Deutsch?

He believed that the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics was literally true, and believed the consequences as well. He was a well-respected physicist who basically went mad because he believe that every time he left the house to go to work or the shops that in one of the MWI branches he would get killed in a car crash and leave his wife and children with no David Deutsche. Ok...this is a bit of a simplification, but something along those lines is true. If you actually think it through and believe it, MWI is enough to drive anyone over the edge.

 

[Bri]

God might be timeless but the world isn't. We are assuming that the world is deterministic except for human choice. So God would have to observe our choices and then change the initial conditions of the universe to ensure that that choice results in a perfect outcome.

Since God would be able to know all possible results of our actions, he could ensure that the greater good is served by his actions regardless of our actions.

"Believe" is a generous description of what they are doing here. They are mouthing words that don't mean anything, that's all.

I'm not sure what you mean by that.

I agree with Dennett. What I am describing here is not only a deterministic world but an allegedly perfect one (as required if a perfectly good God set up a deterministic universe). A world where there can never be and never have been any morally bad acts. If such a world looked anything like this one then that would be all our commonsense notions of right and wrong out of the window.

Again, you are assuming that the greater good would be served by removing free will, which may not be the case. Free will may be the greatest good possible.

He will have heard every variation on every argument and have carefully crafted pieces of rhetoric to counter them all, and be able to deliver them in several languages, probably including Latin. But that doesn't mean he isn't lying to himself at some very deep level. These people are impervious to logic.

I'm not Catholic, and have never met the Pope, but I would be willing to bet that he is much more versed on the PoE and other similar theological debates than you are.

The simple truth of the matter is that there is no "right" answer as you would like to believe. The belief that God doesn't exist is as much a belief based on faith (rather than fact) as a theist's belief that God does exist.

-Bri

 

[Robin]

But your claim was that the list represented our morality. No, as I have shown it represents the opposite of our morality.

I said no such thing

Yes you did – here:
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=1681814#post1681814

• no suffering - good
• suffering, but presenting a choice to another person who makes the wrong choice - better
• suffering, but presenting a choice to another person who makes the right choice – best

But that does not match our morality.

Yes, it most certainly does match our morality.

Do you take this back now and admit that it is the opposite of our morality?

The first item on the list represents God bringing about the greater good. The other two represent possible results of the human choice to help or not help the suffering person. What I said was that God's morality works according to similar rules as ours. The difference (and it is a huge difference to be sure) is that God is omniscient, and therefore can act for the greater good because he knows all consequences of his actions, whereas we can only act upon the forseeable consequences of our actions.

This makes no difference. You have suggested that God might inflict an instance of suffering for no other reason than to provide the opportunity for moral choice.

This is wrong in principle in our own moral code. So how could any knowledge of consequences make it right?

You may as well have said that God inflicts suffering for his own pleasure and that this is OK, because he knows all the consequences of his actions.

 

[Robin]

OK, so answer this question:
If a person believes the child to be under the care of a competent moral professional but does not understand the purpose of the suffering, should they act to prevent the suffering by pulling the needle before the injection is complete, or do nothing?

If to the best of his/her knowledge, the doctor is moral and competent, then the forseeable benefits of the injection would outweigh the forseeable risks. The moral decision would likely be to not prevent the doctor from doing his or her job.

In other words if we believe that an instance of suffering is necessary to some greater good then the moral decision would be not to prevent it. Which is what I have said all along.

Would we believe under any circumstances that a competent and moral professional is sticking a needle in the child for the sole purpose of providing us with an opportunity of pulling it out again? No, of course not, since the doctor could hardly have that motive if he was moral.

 

[Bri]

Yes you did – here:
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=1681814#post1681814

I apologize for the mixup. I meant that the first item in the list which represents God's action matches the rules of our own morality, namely that we must weigh the forseeable consequences of our actions and to do the action that we believe will result in the most good.

Although God's morality and our morality follow the same rule, the choices we make as a result are necessarily different because God is omniscient. God can forsee all consequences of an action, whereas we can only forsee possible immediate consequences of our actions (and imperfectly at that). Which is why as you pointed out, it would never be morally acceptable for a human who is not omniscient to play God.

Do you take this back now and admit that it is the opposite of our morality?

Umm...no. It's not the opposite of our morality. The morality itself is the same, but the moral choices we make are necessarily different than God's. If you misunderstood that, then I apologize for not being more clear.

This makes no difference. You have suggested that God might inflict an instance of suffering for no other reason than to provide the opportunity for moral choice.

This is wrong in principle in our own moral code. So how could some knowledge of consequences make it right?

No, actually. I've explained now three times, but perhaps I wasn't clear. Our moral code is simply to weigh the forseeable consequences of our actions and to do the action that we believe will result in the most good. Same as God's moral code. If we were omniscient, then in order to stick with that moral code we would have no choice but to cause suffering if the result was a greater good.

You may as well have said that God inflicts suffering for his own pleasure and that this is OK, because he knows all the consequences of his actions.

That would not be the case if God's moral code is the same as ours. Causing suffering for the sole purpose of one's own pleasure would not result in more good than not causing the suffering.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

In other words if we believe that an instance of suffering is necessary to some greater good then the moral decision would be not to prevent it. Which is what I have said all along.

Then we are in agreement.

Would we believe under any circumstances that a competent and moral professional is sticking a needle in the child for the sole purpose of providing us with an opportunity of pulling it out again? No, of course not, since the doctor could hardly have that motive if he was moral.

Not unless the competent and moral professional were also omniscient and could thereby ensure that sticking a needle in a child achieved a greater good than not doing so. If the doctor was omniscient and therefore knew that sticking a needle in a child achieved a greater good than not doing so, he would be morally remiss if he didn't.

-Bri

 

[elliotfc]

Jesus is not your god by any means. He might be the figure of worship, and rightly so because I find it pointless to worship something so abstract and removed from the world, but he still isn't god.

My God is, by definition, defined to be a triune God, with Jesus as a part of that trinity. I'm not saying, indignantly, "don't tell me what my god is". I'm just saying it gently. Matter of factly.

An omnibenevolent god would have the mindset jesus did, though, if that helps you visualize.

It does.

-Elliot

 

[Robin]

Although God's morality and our morality follow the same rule, the choices we make as a result are necessarily different because God is omniscient.

But our moral code says that it is better for the child not to develop cancer than it is for the child to develop cancer, no matter how many opportunities this might represent for moral choice. Let me emphasise no matter how many opportunities this might represent for moral choice.

How could God follow this rule and conclude that it is better for the child to develop cancer? God would have to change the rule. So God’s moral code would be different from ours.

That would not be the case if God's moral code is the same as ours. Causing suffering for the sole purpose of one's own pleasure would not result in more good than not causing the suffering.

A. Causing suffering for the sole purpose of one's own pleasure would not result in more good than not causing the suffering.
B. Causing suffering for the sole purpose of presenting the opportunity of alleviating it would not result in more good than not causing the suffering.

You suggest that an omniscient God might see something that would make B right, even though it is wrong by our moral code.

So to be consistent you would have to also say that an omniscient may also see something that makes A right. What is the difference?

 

[elliotfc]

But our moral code says that it is better for the child not to develop cancer than it is for the child to develop cancer, no matter how many opportunities this might represent for moral choice. Let me emphasise no matter how many opportunities this might represent for moral choice.

How could God follow this rule and conclude that it is better for the child to develop cancer? God would have to change the rule. So God’s moral code would be different from ours.

This is not essentially different from the free will thing. Out moral code says that it is better to not commit murder than to commit murder. So why does God go against that moral code and allow murder? Doesn't he agree with our moral code?

The answer could be *yes*, but his agreement does not extend into necessary (in our opinion) action. Or, his action happens in a different way. The evils (cancer, murder) are not so great that they must not be allowed to even occur. Of course you may disagree.

A. Causing suffering for the sole purpose of one's own pleasure would not result in more good than not causing the suffering.
B. Causing suffering for the sole purpose of presenting the opportunity of alleviating it would not result in more good than not causing the suffering.

Assuming God causes suffering.

You suggest that an omniscient God might see something that would make B right, even though it is wrong by our moral code.

You also left out other options. Like pedagogical reasons for suffering. Or salvific. Or character building. Or existential. I'm just throwing options out there, I could come up with more.

Sorry for intruding, excellent discussion.

-Elliot

 

[ExitDose]

This is what I thought you meant. But you have a big problem now -- where does god fit in? If it is part of the diverging universe, then whatever it is will also only experience the illusion of continual existence that we do. If it is apart from the diverging universe, then what is it and how do you explain it?

In other words by attempting to explain our own existence with this model you have either limited your god along with humans or else simply pushed the problem one level further.

I'm an atheist so it isn't crucial to my own viewpoint. I was merely speaking in the hypothetical.

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm an atheist so it isn't crucial to my own viewpoint. I was merely speaking in the hypothetical.

Yeah but even as an atheist you have to realize that the MWI falls short regarding metaphysics, like any other model. It only accounts for the illusion of free-will and an explanation of what is going on when something "random" happens. It doesn't explain existence any better.

 

[Bri]

But our moral code says that it is better for the child not to develop cancer than it is for the child to develop cancer, no matter how many opportunities this might represent for moral choice. Let me emphasise no matter how many opportunities this might represent for moral choice.

If that were true then there are a lot of immoral cancer patients out there. I don't think our moral code says anything about cancer since it's not something that human beings can generally control. Our moral code does say that we shouldn't inflict suffering on others unless it's for a greater good. For example, you can give a child an injection. You can even shoot a person -- if you do so to prevent them from injuring others while committing a crime.

I'm sorry, Robin, but in everything we do we weigh the forseeable good outcomes with the forseeable bad outcomes and then determine the best course of action. God would have to do the same thing if he's omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent.

Because God can forsee what we cannot forsee, it is inevitable that some of what he does would seem "wrong" to us even though it results in a greater good. It's precisely like a child receiving an injection. To the child, the doctor seems evil because the child can only forsee the immediate pain that will result from the injection, and cannot forsee the greater good that will result from the cure.

How could God follow this rule and conclude that it is better for the child to develop cancer? God would have to change the rule. So God’s moral code would be different from ours.

Once more, no. God, just like us, would weigh the good and bad outcomes. If the child developing cancer serves a greater good (i.e. the good outcomes outweigh the bad outcomes) then he would be remiss if he didn't cause the child to develop cancer.

A. Causing suffering for the sole purpose of one's own pleasure would not result in more good than not causing the suffering.

Probably correct.

B. Causing suffering for the sole purpose of presenting the opportunity of alleviating it would not result in more good than not causing the suffering.

Possibly incorrect. If free will is a greater good than not having any suffering, then providing a person the opportunity to freely choose right over wrong might indeed be the greater good.

You suggest that an omniscient God might see something that would make B right, even though it is wrong by our moral code.

It's not wrong by our moral code, as I've already explained. It would only be wrong for us to attempt to play God because we're not omniscient and therefore for us the immediately forseeable good (which is all we're capable of) would not outweigh the immediately forseeable bad. God, on the other hand, can forsee the actual good and bad that will result, and therefore would not be acting in the most moral way (i.e. producing the most good) if he acted any other way.

So to be consistent you would have to also say that an omniscient may also see something that makes A right. What is the difference?

He may, which is why I said "probably." But that would depend on God's pleasure somehow being for the greater good. If God's morality matches ours as you indicated it must, then it is unlikely that would be the case.

Since I find myself repeating the same responses to the same arguments, I think it may be that you and I are at an impasse.

-Bri

 

[ExitDose]

I am not exactly sure what this statement means. I guess I will see when you address geoff.

I won't be addressing him anymore. He acted in a very immature fashion, and I don't have the time for that. So I will instead address it directly to your query, as you have kept a civil tongue.

The argument I was putting forth was that indeterminance of an action produces a similar situation to what occurs with probabilistic phenomena. The situation opens itself to the Many Worlds Interpretation by the fact that it affords uncertainty regarding the decision; it's not fixed as in a deterministic explanation for choice. If you grant that the decision will have a determinable outcome then you unwittingly force it into determinism. If the MWI is true then there is no direct violation to the idea of omniscience, as omniscience carries an implicit notion of omnitemporal knowledge.

I ran the argument by a friend who is three months away from finishing up his doctorate in philosophy and he had this to say:

The libertarian argument causes some serious problems for omniscience, if the MWI is false. Much of the reasoning behind determinist theories stems from a concept of causality that is more inspired by Newtonian mechanics and relativity than from quantum theory. The ideas of the hard determinists, as they are called, is that the universe is causally closed and self-contained and that everything that happens is a direct result of prior causes. So, one model of time that arises from this is sometimes called the 'B-series' (from the philosophy of time, originally coined by a dude called McTaggart, if I recall correctly) - this can be thought of as a linear sequence of events (a series of a, b, c, d, etc). So, it denies that the laws of nature or whatever allow for alternative future states - everything that happened, happens, or will happen is the only possible reality. Under this view of time and causation, omniscience is comprehensible and not under any threat. The problem for libertarians is that if this determinist theory is true, then it becomes very hard to understand how free will fits into the picture (compatibilism is an attempt to let the two be consistent with one another).

Now, a libertarian denies the truth of determinism. This can come in many forms, ranging from denying the existence of causation (which has many problems, most ironically in that it makes free will even more mysterious), to denying that determinism is true everywhere in the universe. But let's assume that you believe in free will and you want to still retain hold of omniscience - does your invocation of MWI help? I think it doesn't. The MWI states that all possible future quantum states are realised (or actualised), but that each quantum event spawns a large number of different future states that each embody a different universe. Now, an omniscient being would know all of the future possibilities embodied in the laws of nature and not one of the many different future states would come as a surprise. In the end, the MWI is more like the hard determinist position, but instead of thinking of time and causation as a closed linear sequence of events, it views time and causation more like an evolutionary tree of descendent. Because of that, it doesn't really help the libertarian. It is still a theory that retains a concept of causation that is rather strong, albeit a little more complicated than the Newtonian causation.

Bottom line is that the MWI would preserve omniscience, insofar as the hard determinist position does. Assuming, of course, that the MWI and hard determinism were true.

I then asked: "How is it that in this conception of free will that an action may remain undetermined but still hold that the true decision is the only true decision while still remaining non-deterministic? Doesn't holding to a singular outcome lead back to determinism?" Unfortunately, he wasn't able to answer that question, and pointed to the fact that it wasn't his primary focus of study; sharing my reservations about the concept of free will.

So, take from my argument what you will. If you have any thoughts on the subject I'm curious to hear what they are.

 

[ExitDose]

Yeah but even as an atheist you have to realize that the MWI falls short regarding metaphysics, like any other model. It only accounts for the illusion of free-will and an explanation of what is going on when something "random" happens. It doesn't explain existence any better.

I think you're taking my argument a few steps further than I had any intention of going with it. I was merely playing with the idea Geoff presented on its own, and in no way does it reflect my thoughts on the subjects of existence or free will.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I ran the argument by a friend who is three months away from finishing up his doctorate in philosophy and he had this to say:

Sounds like he was agreeing with me, not you.

I then asked: "How is it that in this conception of free will that an action may remain undetermined but still hold that the true decision is the only true decision while still remaining non-deterministic? Doesn't holding to a singular outcome lead back to determinism?" Unfortunately, he wasn't able to answer that question, and pointed to the fact that it wasn't his primary focus of study; sharing my reservations about the concept of free will.

No, a singular outcome does not lead back to determinism. It would only do so if that singular outcome had been determined by a previous state, and this must be false if free will exists. Instead, there must be another sort of determinism in play - the sort which we call free will. What appears to be random is determined by free will. There is nothing strange about this. It is implied in Kant's philosophy, for example.

 

[rocketdodger]

So, take from my argument what you will. If you have any thoughts on the subject I'm curious to hear what they are.

I assumed you were some kind of an intelligent yet crazy theist, but since you aren't, I don't really have any questions anymore hehe.

I would have asked (maybe I asked it already, I forget), where god fits into the MWI -- is it part of the growing tree of universes, or apart from it? It is kind of an interesting notion that every event also spawns a number of god-copies, and in the end there will be a bazillion of them running around.

FYI I think trying to mix omniscience and free-will is utter nonsense. It is only done by theists who want to retain the snuggly feeling of their god and the empowering feeling of autonomy. I often wonder, if they had to give up one or the other, which would it be?

 

[chriswl]

Since God would be able to know all possible results of our actions, he could ensure that the greater good is served by his actions regardless of our actions.

No, of course he couldn't. If God sets up the universe to be optimal for one set of human choices, then it is obviously going to be less than optimal if different choices are made. If God can constrain our choices (determinism) he can pick the best of all the options.

Again, you are assuming that the greater good would be served by removing free will, which may not be the case. Free will may be the greatest good possible.

As far as I can see, compatibilist free will is free will. What do you mean by libertarian free will other than randomness?

The simple truth of the matter is that there is no "right" answer as you would like to believe.

Yes there is - God exists or he doesn't. The question is, can we know it?

The belief that God doesn't exist is as much a belief based on faith (rather than fact) as a theist's belief that God does exist.

Two points here. Firstly, this doesn't apply to Gods that are defined in such a way that they make contradictory claims or imply things about the world that we can see to be false. These Gods cannot exist. Any God that claims to be omni-anything is skating on pretty thin ice here.

Secondly, I don't think that it requires "faith" to disbelieve in highly improbable things. In fact it comes quite naturally. Your continual assertions that we may really live in the best of all possible worlds, supported by no arguments whatsoever, are more like what most people mean by faith: doggedly clinging to ideas that have no basis in reality because you like the sound of them.