Some observations on the problem of evil

[elliotfc]

No, people imagine an old man with a grey beard in a cloak or something. People CANNOT imagine "that which they cannot imagine."

I agree that people cannot imagine that which they cannot imagine.

But people can imagine God attributes, and not in the concrete example you just gave. Really. They really can.

The only attribute you can give such a thing is that you can't give it any attributes at all.

That's not true, people give God lots of attributes. Really.

-Elliot

 

[rocketdodger]

That's not true, people give God lots of attributes. Really.

Look, there are only two ways about this.

1) God is exactly what we cannot imagine -- then we cannot give it anyattributes, by definition.

2) God is partially what we cannot imagine and partially what we can imagine -- then you are free to give it any attributes you want.

You seem to be saying that your god is of the 2) sort. So be it. You would be DEMEA and I would be PHILO. I would only suggest that it seems somewhat arbitrary to pick and choose which attributes god would get, and I would question yourself as to why you choose what you choose.

 

[elliotfc]

Look, there are only two ways about this.

1) God is exactly what we cannot imagine -- then we cannot give it anyattributes, by definition.

No...we could *still* give him attributes, even in this case.

2) God is partially what we cannot imagine and partially what we can imagine -- then you are free to give it any attributes you want.

This sounds OK.

You seem to be saying that your god is of the 2) sort. So be it. You would be DEMEA and I would be PHILO. I would only suggest that it seems somewhat arbitrary to pick and choose which attributes god would get, and I would question yourself as to why you choose what you choose.

Not if you have a basis to pick and choose, like Jesus. Or something else. In this case it would be conforming to a standard. Arbitrary in what standard to conform to? I guess so.

-Elliot

 

[Bri]

You are entitled to your view that it is not a threat to "proper" Christianity as defined by you.

I'm not a Christian, and I have no idea what "proper" Christianity is, nor do I remember defining it.

It is a threat to the faith of real actual Christians and has been for hundreds of years. I mean objectively so - many people can no longer believe in the religion for this very reason and will say so.

I question the number of people who left Christianity solely because of logic problems such as the PoE. I imagine that most do so for more emotional reasons, or perhaps because they've decided that there is no evidence that God exists.

Like I said, these are non-answers. They would only satisfy someone who was determined to believe in the Christian God regardless of the evidence.

I agree that they are not answers for someone who demands evidence that such a God exists. Like I said, it is possible that the God described by the PoE exists, and that's all that matters to most Christians.

You don't think that merely proving them wrong will stop them, do you? The PoE argument is quite convincing enough even without absolute proof. Those believers who just want to ignore the argument will continue to do so whatever we say.

If they were proven wrong, then some Christians would probably change religions or even become atheists. Some Christian sects would probably modify their idea of God to one which could not be proven wrong. And some would probably cling to beliefs that they know are wrong.

But the PoE isn't very convincing of anything at all in my opinion, since it fails to show that the God it describes cannot exist.

-Bri

 

[rocketdodger]

No...we could *still* give him attributes, even in this case.

I don't see how you can give any attribute to a something that is defined exactly as "that which we cannot imagine." Even the definition is misleading because maybe we could imagine it -- the whole point is we don't even have an idea where to start.

Not if you have a basis to pick and choose, like Jesus. Or something else. In this case it would be conforming to a standard. Arbitrary in what standard to conform to? I guess so.

Same thing. You could make up your own, in which case you would be conforming to a standard of 1. At any rate the point is that I can make up any arbitrary attribute for god and claim it as gospel truth. Long ago in the past, someone did that, and the result is now christianity.

 

[rocketdodger]

But the PoE isn't very convincing of anything at all in my opinion, since it fails to show that the God it describes cannot exist.

Even if it did, it wouldn't be a problem for most religions, since none of their gods are omnibenevolent to begin with.

 

[elliotfc]

I don't see how you can give any attribute to a something that is defined exactly as "that which we cannot imagine." Even the definition is misleading because maybe we could imagine it -- the whole point is we don't even have an idea where to start.

Maybe you're right I guess. I'm thinking like...no, you can't really imagine God...but you can come to some conclusions about God based on whatever, and those can be attributes. I can't imagine God, but I can make assertions about God based on what I do know. Something like that. Is it messy? It appears so, eh?

Same thing. You could make up your own, in which case you would be conforming to a standard of 1. At any rate the point is that I can make up any arbitrary attribute for god and claim it as gospel truth. Long ago in the past, someone did that, and the result is now christianity.

Yours is a theory that is worth considering, and I can see how some people accept the theory.

-Elliot

 

[elliotfc]

Even if it did, it wouldn't be a problem for most religions, since none of their gods are omnibenevolent to begin with.

Is Jesus omnibenevolent? -Elliot

 

[Darat]

Is Jesus omnibenevolent? -Elliot

He is "all loving" if that is what you mean (in all the Christian doctrines that I'm aware of).

 

[rocketdodger]

Is Jesus omnibenevolent? -Elliot

Jesus is not your god by any means. He might be the figure of worship, and rightly so because I find it pointless to worship something so abstract and removed from the world, but he still isn't god.

An omnibenevolent god would have the mindset jesus did, though, if that helps you visualize.

 

[chriswl]

If they were proven wrong, then some Christians would probably change religions or even become atheists. Some Christian sects would probably modify their idea of God to one which could not be proven wrong. And some would probably cling to beliefs that they know are wrong.

But the PoE isn't very convincing of anything at all in my opinion, since it fails to show that the God it describes cannot exist.

OK, here's something I thought up over breakfast this morning:

1) Determinism is compatible with any meaningful definition of free will (see compatibilism). Our actions being ultimately determined does not effect our experience of apparent free will.

2) So, God has no particular reason to give humans absolute free will. We wouldn't even know if we had it, it cannot make our lives any better or worse.

3) Absolute free will would mean that humans could act in ways that God could not predict. This would really mess up his plans for a perfect world where everything ultimately ends up for the best.

4) Therefore a wholly good God would create a deterministic world as it would allow him total freedom to create the best world possible.

5) If God exists and is omnipotent and omnibenevolent then we live in a deterministic world which has been set up to be the best that it can possibly be. This includes the actions of all humans.

6) So, the actions of not just Mother Teresa and Nelson Mandela but Hitler and Pol Pot are all part of God's plan. God was performing his work through them.

7) So why is Mandela a better role model than Hitler? We know that it will all turn out for the best whatever we decide. We have no need of any notion of morality. Even the most hideous suferring and the most grotesque atrocities will somehow be triumphantly transformed into the ultimate bliss. As will heroic opposition to those attrocities. And indifferent appathy. It all works. It must, we are in the best of all possible worlds.

8) So we arrive at extreme nihilism, albeit with a bizarrely optimistic twist. This contradicts the values of Christianity, to put it mildly.

I know some people will take exception right from the start at point 1. But many philosophers have defended this position and I'll leave the heavy lifting of arguing that point to them. A search for "compatibilism" will give lots of support for that part of my argument.

So what do you think Bri? If someone could forward this to the Pope he'd pack it all in?

 

[rocketdodger]

1) Determinism is compatible with any meaningful definition of free will (see compatibilism). Our actions being ultimately determined does not effect our experience of apparent free will.

I can tell you right now that most christians support the notion of absolute free will, not just compatibilist free will. Of course, they also somehow think that this is compatible with the notion of a omnipotent deity....

Pretty much, when it comes to reason, the christians have lost the battle.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

OK, here's something I thought up over breakfast this morning:

1) Determinism is compatible with any meaningful definition of free will (see compatibilism).

This is simply wrong. Determinism is incompatible with libertarian/co-creational free will. This is not a meaningless definition of free will - it is very easy to define what it means and impossible to prove it doesn't exist.

 

[Bri]

OK, here's something I thought up over breakfast this morning:

1) Determinism is compatible with any meaningful definition of free will (see compatibilism). Our actions being ultimately determined does not effect our experience of apparent free will.

Interesting ideas! This is a topic of hot debate these days (look up Daniel Dennett if you're not already familiar with his work), but is a topic for another thread. Many would disagree that determinism is compatible with any meaningful version of free will, holding that only libertarian free is meaningful. Nonetheless, it cannot be proven that we don't have libertarian free will (and that determinism is false), so it has little bearing on our discussion of the PoE.

2) So, God has no particular reason to give humans absolute free will. We wouldn't even know if we had it, it cannot make our lives any better or worse.

It does not necessarily follow that because we don't know if we have libertarian free will or not that it wouldn't make our lives any better or worse if we had or didn't have it. If we have libertarian free will, we have no idea what our lives would be like if we didn't, and vice versa. Even if some version of apparent free will is enough to provide morality in a determistic world (this is far from a known fact), it doesn't necessarily follow that libertarian free will (the kind that is incompatible with determism) wouldn't be better.

3) Absolute free will would mean that humans could act in ways that God could not predict. This would really mess up his plans for a perfect world where everything ultimately ends up for the best.

Not exactly true, as we have discussed previously on this thread. If God is not affected by time (timeless) as many theists believe, then he could indeed predict future events that are the result of free will by simply observing them.

4) Therefore a wholly good God would create a deterministic world as it would allow him total freedom to create the best world possible.

Or not. Especially if libertarian free will is a greater good than some apparent free will as many theists believe. If that is the case, the best possible world could not be purely deterministic.

5) If God exists and is omnipotent and omnibenevolent then we live in a deterministic world which has been set up to be the best that it can possibly be. This includes the actions of all humans.

But of course that would make humans robots without any true choice, and human action is all simply the result of predetermined prior causes rather than choice. If it's best that we have the ability to make truly free choices, then the best world cannot be deterministic.

6) So, the actions of not just Mother Teresa and Nelson Mandela but Hitler and Pol Pot are all part of God's plan. God was performing his work through them.

It is possible that some theists indeed hold that this is true, that we are all part of God's plan and that no humans have free will. Others believe that a world in which all humans have free choice must be better than a world in which humans don't have free choice.

7) So why is Mandela a better role model than Hitler? We know that it will all turn out for the best whatever we decide. We have no need of any notion of morality. Even the most hideous suferring and the most grotesque atrocities will somehow be triumphantly transformed into the ultimate bliss. As will heroic opposition to those attrocities. And indifferent appathy. It all works. It must, we are in the best of all possible worlds.

This is precisely the basis for one argument that libertarian free will must exist if God is omnibenevolent. We know that your description isn't quite true since even most atheists agree that morality has meaning. Daniel Dennett and others have attempted to show that apparent free will is enough to provide a basis for acting morally in a deterministic world.

8) So we arrive at extreme nihilism, albeit with a bizarrely optimistic twist. This contradicts the values of Christianity, to put it mildly.

I tend to agree that an omnibenevolent God would require libertarian free will. But there may be some valid argument against this that I don't know about. In addition, it is possible that compatibilism provides an adequate model for apparent free will that resolves some of the contradictions you brought up.

I know some people will take exception right from the start at point 1. But many philosophers have defended this position and I'll leave the heavy lifting of arguing that point to them. A search for "compatibilism" will give lots of support for that part of my argument.

I'm familiar with some of the arguments on either side.

So what do you think Bri? If someone could forward this to the Pope he'd pack it all in?

I imagine that the Pope is already well-aware of this. Since he hasn't packed it all in, you probably have your answer.

-Bri

 

[chriswl]

This is simply wrong. Determinism is incompatible with libertarian/co-creational free will. This is not a meaningless definition of free will - it is very easy to define what it means and impossible to prove it doesn't exist.

From the wiki entry on compatibilism:

Compatibilism, most famously championed by Hume, is a theory that suggests that free will and determinism are in fact compatible. According to Hume, free will should not be understood as an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires. That is, when I say that I could either continue to edit this page or to delete it, I don't really mean that both choices are compatible with the complete state of the world right now, but rather that if I had desired to delete it I would have, even though as a matter of fact I actually desire to continue editing it, and therefore that is what will actually happen.

Hume also maintains that free acts are not uncaused (or mysteriously self-caused as Kant would have it) but rather caused by our choices as determined by our beliefs, desires, and by our characters. While a decision making process exists in Hume's determinism, this process is governed by a causal chain of events. For example, a person may make the decision to support Wikipedia, but that decision is determined by the conditions that existed prior to the decision being made.

So, if compatibilist free will is the freedom to do what we are "psychologically disposed" to do then what could libertarian free will be in addition to that? Do you want freedom from the very things that motivate your actions? You are asking for freedom of your will from itself.

 

[rocketdodger]

So, if compatibilist free will is the freedom to do what we are "psychologically disposed" to do then what could libertarian free will be in addition to that? Do you want freedom from the very things that motivate your actions? You are asking for freedom of your will from itself.

I think we kind of are. Or, rather, we want our wills to be at least partially determined by some unknown that is beyond the materialist universe.

 

[Bri]

Again, although this is getting way off-topic, many argue the value of being the "ultimate source" of our actions afforded by libertarian free will. That is, some condition necessary for the action originates within us rather than entirely from external circumstances. With compatibilist free will, we are not the ultimate source of our actions, and it can therefore be argued that we are not ultimately responsible for our actions (they are entirely caused by circumstances external to us).

Here is a good article on the subject.

-Bri

 

[chriswl]

It does not necessarily follow that because we don't know if we have libertarian free will or not that it wouldn't make our lives any better or worse if we had or didn't have it. If we have libertarian free will, we have no idea what our lives would be like if we didn't, and vice versa. Even if some version of apparent free will is enough to provide morality in a determistic world (this is far from a known fact), it doesn't necessarily follow that libertarian free will (the kind that is incompatible with determism) wouldn't be better.

Well, actually I think libertarian free will is incoherent, unless it just means randomness. I think we can imagine quite easily that having random aspects to our behaviour would not make us feel more free. Our actions would just be determined by random processes instead of deterministic ones.

Not exactly true, as we have discussed previously on this thread. If God is not affected by time (timeless) as many theists believe, then he could indeed predict future events that are the result of free will by simply observing them.

God might be timeless but the world isn't. We are assuming that the world is deterministic except for human choice. So God would have to observe our choices and then change the initial conditions of the universe to ensure that that choice results in a perfect outcome. Either this is logically impossible or we have to consider the change to the past as a "branching off" of a new universe. But if we are truly free there is no reason why our choices in this new universe will come out the same as in the old one. So God's calculations will be wrong. Even if it worked, the branching off idea also means that God is leaving a mess of imperfect universes behind in the other branches.

Or not. Especially if libertarian free will is a greater good than some apparent free will as many theists believe.

"Believe" is a generous description of what they are doing here. They are mouthing words that don't mean anything, that's all.

We know that your description isn't quite true since even most atheists agree that morality has meaning. Daniel Dennett and others have attempted to show that apparent free will is enough to provide a basis for acting morally in a deterministic world.

I agree with Dennett. What I am describing here is not only a deterministic world but an allegedly perfect one (as required if a perfectly good God set up a deterministic universe). A world where there can never be and never have been any morally bad acts. If such a world looked anything like this one then that would be all our commonsense notions of right and wrong out of the window.

But there may be some valid argument against this that I don't know about.

I think that's taken as read everytime we make a claim about anything. The fact that an argument might always turn out to be wrong in a way we haven't thought of is not, in itself, an argument against it. If it was we could never claim anything. Only in mathematics can we proceed by rigorous proof.

I imagine that the Pope is already well-aware of this. Since he hasn't packed it all in, you probably have your answer.

He will have heard every variation on every argument and have carefully crafted pieces of rhetoric to counter them all, and be able to deliver them in several languages, probably including Latin. But that doesn't mean he isn't lying to himself at some very deep level. These people are impervious to logic.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

From the wiki entry on compatibilism:

So, if compatibilist free will is the freedom to do what we are "psychologically disposed" to do then what could libertarian free will be in addition to that?

The answer to that question is more obvious than you might think: the freedom to do what we are NOT psychologically disposed.

Do you want freedom from the very things that motivate your actions?

I want freedom from the things that motivate my actions on a physical, empirical level.

You are asking for freedom of your will from itself.

No, I am asking for freedom from the deterministic laws of physics. Free will is freedom from determinism. We are pyschologically/evolutionarily/biologically disposed to act in our own interest. Free Will, in the libertarian sense, can only mean the freedom to transcend this. And quantum mechanics provides the possibility for it to happen. QM cannot prove it happens, but it leaves just enough wiggle-room.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, actually I think libertarian free will is incoherent, unless it just means randomness.

No, randomness is something else entirely. However, what looks like randomness from an empirical viewpoint could conceivably actually be the outcome of free will. You can think of the physical world as being an iterating algorithm with some variables feeding the cycle. What goes into the variables could either be random, or put there by free will. If they are put there by free will, then there are really two sorts of determinism.

I think we can imagine quite easily that having random aspects to our behaviour would not make us feel more free. Our actions would just be determined by random processes instead of deterministic ones.

That's not freedom.

God might be timeless but the world isn't. We are assuming that the world is deterministic except for human choice. So God would have to observe our choices and then change the initial conditions of the universe to ensure that that choice results in a perfect outcome.

Why? What does "perfect" mean?

Either this is logically impossible or we have to consider the change to the past as a "branching off" of a new universe.

Don't even go there.....

But if we are truly free there is no reason why our choices in this new universe will come out the same as in the old one. So God's calculations will be wrong. Even if it worked, the branching off idea also means that God is leaving a mess of imperfect universes behind in the other branches.

That's why don't go there....all sorts of scenarios are conceivable, but some of them are so mind-bending I don't even want to think about it. Look what happened to David Deutsche.