Science and free will

[cyborg]

If that means "free to fly if I jump off a tall building" then no.

No, it doesn't. Choosing to perform an action in the hope of a particular outcome doesn't guarantee that outcome, i.e. you do not choose to fly, you choose to flap your arms in the hope of flying.

 

[Belz...]

Unfortunately, your whole argument rests on what you think "is obvious" and what you are "amazed" other people don't agree with. Your incredulity is not important.

You are very, very confused. My argument is not that I'm amazed. I'm amazed that you believe what you believe.

You said it's uncaused, and that it doesn't "decide, it just acts". Well, if it doesn't decide, how can you call it "free" and "will" ?

 

[Belz...]

You are still mixing up "aware of" and "constrained by".

Yes, that's because they are one and the same. YOU're the one who's unjustifiably distinguishing them.

I think Robin has a point. You seem to think that "free" must mean "free from any influence". Unfortunately, as many people have tried to make you understand, "no influence" means "random". Call it "arbitrary" if you will, but it's a far cry from being what you see as "free".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You are very, very confused. My argument is not that I'm amazed. I'm amazed that you believe what you believe.

You said it's uncaused, and that it doesn't "decide, it just acts". Well, if it doesn't decide, how can you call it "free" and "will" ?

It is free because it wasn't forced to act in a certain way. It is will because the act in question is an act of will.

 

[cyborg]

It is free because it wasn't forced to act in a certain way. It is will because the act in question is an act of will.

And by extension it's behaviour must appear random.

 

[Belz...]

It is free because it wasn't forced to act in a certain way.

I assume by "forced" you mean "influenced by X factors" ?

It is will because the act in question is an act of will.

But you say that the act is not a decision. How can it be "will" if there is no intent behind it ?

As I've said numerous times before, its indistinguishable from randomness, even in principle, and therefore IS random.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

duplicate

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And by extension it's behaviour must appear random.

Must appear random in the eyes of a scientist or objective observer, yes. This does not mean it IS random.

 

[paximperium]

Must appear random in the eyes of a scientist or objective observer, yes. This does not mean it IS random.

Translation: It is every way and definition random except I don't want it to be just because I say so.

 

[cyborg]

Must appear random in the eyes of a scientist or objective observer, yes. This does not mean it IS random.

Actually, that's exactly what it means.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Actually, that's exactly what it means.

So if X appears to be Y then it means X is Y? That's news to me....

 

[paximperium]

So if X appears to be Y then it means X is Y? That's news to me....

If X appears to be Y, it likely is Y and not A like you want it to be.

 

[Belz...]

Must appear random in the eyes of a scientist or objective observer, yes. This does not mean it IS random.

No, I think you refuse to understand that there are things that are independent of your beliefs. Logic is one of them.

So if X appears to be Y then it means X is Y?

No, if X could not possibly appear to be different from Y, then the two are the same.

 

[cyborg]

So if X appears to be Y then it means X is Y? That's news to me....

Under an empirical epistemology there is no difference. You are not going to get any traction by asserting that you "know" that it is not random by non-empirical means; you should realise that by now.

Call a lemon an orange if you must though.

 

[Beth]

I don't think any decision is entirely deterministic, that is, every decision contains some random components. Does that mean that the decision is 'entirely random'?

Wow, I'm getting dizzy from going around in circles. You keep asking me for my definition of random, but you won't provide one of your own.

Random means not determined.

I'm sorry, I thought I had made it clear that 'not determined' is a fine definition. I actually prefer 'outcome not predictable in advance' but the meaning is essentially the same. However, I get very confused when you say things like this:

In what sense are you using the term 'random' here? Because I think you are now meaning random in a sense other than 'not determined'. How do you think the world would be different if all decisions were random rather than some being pre-determined?

The world would be nothing but a random quantum foam, if it existed at all.

Why would having all decisions be not determined in advance result in a random quantum foam? I'm completely comfused by this statement.

I don't know that they do. I think it is possible to have decisions that are not deterministic but probabilistic in ways that allow the individual to control, or skew if you prefer, the probabilities. I think you are terming that as 'random', which is fine, but I also think such controlled randomness is sufficiently different from uncontrolled randomness to merit a third category.

I don't think so.

Okay. You're entitled to your opinion. How we categorize things is an inherently subjective activity.

I agree that conscious intent can alter the probability of the outcome, but that conscious intent is determined.

Why would you assume that it is determined? And determined by what? Perhaps that is the question that is separating LFW from the deterministic approach? Would LFW assume that FW forms the intent versus a deterministic approach that would assume the conscious intent was formed by the precursors?

Determined as anything else is: by precursors and the current state of affairs.

Okay, this answers what you think determines intent. Why do you assume it is deterministic rather than random? While I agree that the precursors and the current state of affairs will influence the probablities of the various outcomes, it still seems probabilistic to me, not deterministic.

Yes, libertarian free will postulates an agent of will that is somehow free from the constraints of determinism and randomness. How would that work?

I do not think that free will is completely free from the constraints of determinism and randomness. I think it occurs within the constaints of determinism and randomness. What I don't understand is why this isn't considered free will.

UE, could you comment on this? Does LFW, as you understand it, abide by the constraints of determinism and randomness? Or is it unaffected by them?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Why would having all decisions be not determined in advance result in a random quantum foam? I'm completely comfused by this statement.

Wait a minute, what do you mean by "in advance"? I'm saying that if there was no determinism at all, if everything was random, then the world would just be a random quantum foam with no order whatsoever.

Okay. You're entitled to your opinion. How we categorize things is an inherently subjective activity.

Not in this case it isn't. Your term "controlled randomness" means that things are random except to the extent that determined activity skewed the probabilities. You still have nothing but determinism and randomness.

Okay, this answers what you think determines intent. Why do you assume it is deterministic rather than random? While I agree that the precursors and the current state of affairs will influence the probablities of the various outcomes, it still seems probabilistic to me, not deterministic.

Sigh. It is probabilistic, but the probabilities were determined by a deterministic determining determiner. No matter how many times we have this dance, you still cannot specify how the agent is anything but a combination of deterministic and nondeterministic.

I do not think that free will is completely free from the constraints of determinism and randomness. I think it occurs within the constaints of determinism and randomness. What I don't understand is why this isn't considered free will.

Yes, free will is not completely free from the constraints of determinism and randomness. So now let's consider only the portion that is free. How does that portion contribute to the decision in a way that is neither deterministic nor random?

~~ Paul

 

[Lord Emsworth]

I do not think that free will is completely free from the constraints of determinism and randomness. I think it occurs within the constaints of determinism and randomness. What I don't understand is why this isn't considered free will.

Because it will create even more problems for (moral) responsibility than strict determinism does.



In fact, I think that free will does not require a third mechanism (just in the same way that a square circle does not describe a third geometrical shape). Its need to be both deterministic and indeterministic at the same time. The indeterminsm is in there to introduce two or more possible outcomes, without which there'd be no real choice. The determinism is in there to make you the cause of each of these possible outcomes.

And here lies the problem for something where you have skewed probabilities. You cannot have the same effect skew different outcomes. A load may bias dice towards one side, but what about the remaining sides? If they come up, they come up despite the load. They'd come up because of nothing.

 

[Beth]

Wait a minute, what do you mean by "in advance"? I'm saying that if there was no determinism at all, if everything was random, then the world would just be a random quantum foam with no order whatsoever.

I'm sorry. I thought you would have realized that. After all, the past is well established as being unalterable. It's only the future that isn't known to be determined.

Let me repeat the question: How do you think the world would be different if all decisions were random rather than some being pre-determined? Now, knowing that I'm talking about random in advance of a decision being made as opposed to afterward (however that might work?), how does your answer change?

Not in this case it isn't. Your term "controlled randomness" means that things are random except to the extent that determined activity skewed the probabilities. You still have nothing but determinism and randomness.

Okay. We're not in disagreement on that point. I just think that it is reasonable to set up different classifications of random. At bottom, at least if you believe QM is correct, everything is random. Some outcomes are simply so probable they can essentially be regarded as certain. I usually equate this to what you mean by deterministic. That's why I don't regard setting up a third category as being terribly different from the two you are using.

Sigh. It is probabilistic, but the probabilities were determined by a deterministic determining determiner. No matter how many times we have this dance, you still cannot specify how the agent is anything but a combination of deterministic and nondeterministic.

Did I ever say it wasn't? Actually, I think everything is random and there is nothing truly deterministic, but that's a whole 'nother discussion.

Yes, free will is not completely free from the constraints of determinism and randomness. So now let's consider only the portion that is free. How does that portion contribute to the decision in a way that is neither deterministic nor random?

~~ Paul

If I intentionally alter something so that the probabilities of the various outcomes are changed, I think that is free will in operation. That doesn't mean that it is neither deterministic nor random. If you want to argue that, you're going to have to find someone else to converse with. As I said above, I consider everything to be random. Uh, let me add - before occurring. Afterward, nothing is!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'm sorry. I thought you would have realized that. After all, the past is well established as being unalterable. It's only the future that isn't known to be determined.

Let me repeat the question: How do you think the world would be different if all decisions were random rather than some being pre-determined? Now, knowing that I'm talking about random in advance of a decision being made as opposed to afterward (however that might work?), how does your answer change?

Sorry, i don't understand what you are asking. Are you saying that everything is determined except human decisions, and then asking what the world would be like? Or are you asking what the world would be like if everything was random?

Okay. We're not in disagreement on that point. I just think that it is reasonable to set up different classifications of random.

You keep saying this, but so far you haven't given any classification except the usual one where random means completely undetermined.

At bottom, at least if you believe QM is correct, everything is random. Some outcomes are simply so probable they can essentially be regarded as certain. I usually equate this to what you mean by deterministic. That's why I don't regard setting up a third category as being terribly different from the two you are using.

Then set up the category: Please describe how it works.

Did I ever say it wasn't? Actually, I think everything is random and there is nothing truly deterministic, but that's a whole 'nother discussion.

If everything was random, you wouldn't be here. And if you were here and everything suddenly became random, you would fly apart in a shower of subatomic particles.

If I intentionally alter something so that the probabilities of the various outcomes are changed, I think that is free will in operation.

You need to describe how your intention works. Is it more than determinism and randomness?

That doesn't mean that it is neither deterministic nor random. If you want to argue that, you're going to have to find someone else to converse with.

Why would I want to argue it when I've been saying that random means not deterministic? If you are not arguing it either, then you are describing compatibilist free will, not libertarian. In which case we have no argument.

As I said above, I consider everything to be random. Uh, let me add - before occurring. Afterward, nothing is!

If everything is random, then we wouldn't be here. We are not random. We successfully reduce entropy. A universe which had been random all along would be nothing but a swirl of subatomic particles, or less. Perhaps when you use "random" you really mean "somewhat arbitrary."

~~ Paul

 

[Beth]

I'm sorry. I thought you would have realized that. After all, the past is well established as being unalterable. It's only the future that isn't known to be determined.

Let me repeat the question: How do you think the world would be different if all decisions were random rather than some being pre-determined? Now, knowing that I'm talking about random in advance of a decision being made as opposed to afterward (however that might work?), how does your answer change?

Sorry, i don't understand what you are asking. Are you saying that everything is determined except human decisions, and then asking what the world would be like? Or are you asking what the world would be like if everything was random?

I went back and gathered up the relevant snippets of conversation to help us both recall the original context.

You said: You don't think any aspect of my decision was determined by precursors and my current state of affairs? Then you are saying my decision was entirely random. I don't think the world would look like it does if all decisions were random.

I responded: In what sense are you using the term 'random' here? Because I think you are now meaning random in a sense other than 'not determined'. How do you think the world would be different if all decisions were random rather than some being pre-determined?

You responded: The world would be nothing but a random quantum foam, if it existed at all.
I asked: Why would having all decisions be not determined in advance result in a random quantum foam?

you responded: Wait a minute, what do you mean by "in advance"? I'm saying that if there was no determinism at all, if everything was random, then the world would just be a random quantum foam with no order whatsoever.

At which point I repeated the question, which brings us to this post. When I originally asked the question, I was thinking of human decisions.

Okay. We're not in disagreement on that point. I just think that it is reasonable to set up different classifications of random.

You keep saying this, but so far you haven't given any classification except the usual one where random means completely undetermined.

Post 473 : I think it is possible to have decisions that are not deterministic but probabilistic in ways that allow the individual to control, or skew if you prefer, the probabilities. I think you are terming that as 'random', which is fine, but I also think such controlled randomness is sufficiently different from uncontrolled randomness to merit a third category.

At bottom, at least if you believe QM is correct, everything is random. Some outcomes are simply so probable they can essentially be regarded as certain. I usually equate this to what you mean by deterministic. That's why I don't regard setting up a third category as being terribly different from the two you are using.

Then set up the category:

see above

Please describe how it works.

Post 435: Consider this example. I am overweight. I wish to lose weight to improve my health and looks. I try dieting and fail. I join weight watchers with my sister, who also wishes to lose weight and we both succeed. The decision to lose weight is what I think UE is referring to as 'will'. It is a choice I make. By choosing to join weight watchers, I purposefully alter the probability that I will succeed in losing weight. But it isn't a deterministic alteration. I might or might not succeed with the program nor do I know, in advance, how much of a difference it will make in the probability of my success.

Did I ever say it wasn't? Actually, I think everything is random and there is nothing truly deterministic, but that's a whole 'nother discussion.

If everything was random, you wouldn't be here. And if you were here and everything suddenly became random, you would fly apart in a shower of subatomic particles.

Everything physical is composed of sub-atomic particles. We describe the behavior of those particles with statistical distributions rather than deterministically. Doesn't that fit the definition of random? What am I missing here? Seems to me that everything is random and yet, we do not fly apart in a shower of subatomic particles.

If I intentionally alter something so that the probabilities of the various outcomes are changed, I think that is free will in operation.

You need to describe how your intention works. Is it more than determinism and randomness?

I don't know. I think it is possible, but it is also possible it is not.

That doesn't mean that it is neither deterministic nor random. If you want to argue that, you're going to have to find someone else to converse with.

Why would I want to argue it when I've been saying that random means not deterministic? If you are not arguing it either, then you are describing compatibilist free will, not libertarian. In which case we have no argument.

We have no argument. I am unable to distinguish between compatibilist and libertarian free will.

As I said above, I consider everything to be random. Uh, let me add - before occurring. Afterward, nothing is!

If everything is random, then we wouldn't be here. We are not random. We successfully reduce entropy. A universe which had been random all along would be nothing but a swirl of subatomic particles, or less. Perhaps when you use "random" you really mean "somewhat arbitrary."

I use random to mean predictable with a statistical distribution - i.e. not determined.

~~ Paul[/QUOTE]