Science and free will

[cyborg]

It's a cause-free agent, dude!

~~ Paul

More importantly it's a cause-free agent that does not look like a cause-free agent but isn't a caused agent either.

 

[Beth]

Why is the "simply" not simple then?

It is simple. It's also immensely difficult. I learned something in a seminar more than 20 years ago that I still find very useful:

Simple does not mean easy to do.

Complicated does not mean hard to do.

 

[cyborg]

Sounds fair enough.

 

[Belz...]

Not necessarily. Still, assuming it's true, then free will is caused.

Of course it's uncaused. It if was caused then it wouldn't be free.

Maybe you want to read my post again.

Now, assuming it's UNcaused, then it STILL isn't free. I'm amazed you don't see that.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It is a misunderstanding of the term "agent." "The agent of free will means "that entity which is responsible for us having the potential for free will." If so, there has to be an agent of free will, else we wouldn't have free will.

That's what the agent is?! So it's like the agent of potential energy or the agent of gravity? It's not the entity making the decisions?

Then why are we talking about whether the agent is caused or uncaused or a source of cause or whatever? None of that is relevant to free choice. Who in the name of all that is holy is actually making these free decisions?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Okay. So do you think that decision is deterministic or free? If you feel it is deterministic, could you explain why?

Because my decision to join weight watchers was a deterministic (and possibly somewhat random) decision based on precursors and the current situation in my life.

The third "technique" is easy. It's a decision made consciously and deliberately. A simpler terminology is with intent, such as the decision to lose weight or the decision to join weight watchers in order to increase the probability of losing weight. We humans made decisions with intent every day. I don't think either or those decisions is reasonably called 'deterministic' nor are they random in the sense that all outcomes are equally probable (is that how you are using random?). They can be considered random in the sense that there are various outcomes that have varying probabilities, but another decision can also impact the probability of various outcomes and may have been made deliberately in order to affect the probabilities of the various outcomes of another decision.

You seem to be describing compatibilist free will, not libertarian free will. The bolded part is the only reference to determinism, but you do not justify why you think the decision is not deterministic.

What definition of random are you using at this point and why do you think it is mutually exclusive with LFW?

Random means "not determined." I don't think that a decision made without reference to precursors is of any help to the libertarian.

So you claim. I'm not so sure and I'm as reluctant to accept your definition of LFW as I am to accept UE's definition of materialism. Incidently, name calling does not improve your argument IMO.

I have no definition of LFW, because I think it is an incoherent concept. It makes reference to some sort of decision making that is neither determined nor random, yet no one can define this method of decision making. Sorry about "libertarian free willies," but "libertarian free willists" just doesn't read well.

I am simply not convinced that your logic in dismissing the concept of LFW is as sound as you believe it to be.

And yet you cannot describe how "not determined" allows for anything other than random. I think you are taking the existence of free will on faith.

~~ Paul

 

[Beth]

Because my decision to join weight watchers was a deterministic (and possibly somewhat random) decision based on precursors and the current situation in my life.

I don't think it can be presumed to be deterministic and if it's random, it's not deterministic - right?

You seem to be describing compatibilist free will, not libertarian free will. The bolded part is the only reference to determinism, but you do not justify why you think the decision is not deterministic.

It may be compatibilist. I feely admit that I don't fully grasp the difference between them. I think it is not deterministic because I think it there is some randomness in it.

Random means "not determined." I don't think that a decision made without reference to precursors is of any help to the libertarian.

Because 'not determined' does not imply that there is no reference to precursors. Random does not necessarily mean unlimited possibilities. It only means it's not completely determined (or predicted) from the precusors.

I have no definition of LFW, because I think it is an incoherent concept. It makes reference to some sort of decision making that is neither determined nor random, yet no one can define this method of decision making. Sorry about "libertarian free willies," but "libertarian free willists" just doesn't read well.

And yet you cannot describe how "not determined" allows for anything other than random. I think you are taking the existence of free will on faith.

I'm not saying that 'not determined' is other than random. I'm saying that random does not imply that free will is not a part of the decision-making process. Since conscious intent can alter the probabilities of the various outcomes, that seems like free will to me. Whether it fits with LFW I'll leave it to UE to determine as he is the only person posting that appears to understand what that is and how it differs from compatablist FW

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Maybe you want to read my post again.

Now, assuming it's UNcaused, then it STILL isn't free. I'm amazed you don't see that.

Unfortunately, your whole argument rests on what you think "is obvious" and what you are "amazed" other people don't agree with. Your incredulity is not important.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That's what the agent is?! So it's like the agent of potential energy or the agent of gravity? It's not the entity making the decisions?

There is no "decision." Thinking of it is as a decision is the wrong way to think of it. "Deciding" is a complex process. Willing is not.

Then why are we talking about whether the agent is caused or uncaused or a source of cause or whatever? None of that is relevant to free choice. Who in the name of all that is holy is actually making these free decisions?

There are no "decisions."

 

[Lord Emsworth]

It may be compatibilist. I feely admit that I don't fully grasp the difference between them.

I think the most simple way to state the difference between those two may be:
You could have done different if
vs
You could have done different.

I think it is not deterministic because I think it there is some randomness in it.

I think it may just be a matter of perspective whether to focus on the skewing, i.e. determining, influences on the overall outcome, or to focus more on the remaining openness of that outcome.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I don't think it can be presumed to be deterministic and if it's random, it's not deterministic - right?

You don't think any aspect of my decision was determined by precursors and my current state of affairs? Then you are saying my decision was entirely random. I don't think the world would look like it does if all decisions were random.

It may be compatibilist. I feely admit that I don't fully grasp the difference between them. I think it is not deterministic because I think it there is some randomness in it.

I agree that your decisions have both deterministic and random aspects. What I can't grok is how they can have some third aspect that is neither.

Because 'not determined' does not imply that there is no reference to precursors. Random does not necessarily mean unlimited possibilities. It only means it's not completely determined (or predicted) from the precusors.

I agree that there may be aspects of my decisions that are random. But what does that have to do with libertarian free will?

I'm not saying that 'not determined' is other than random. I'm saying that random does not imply that free will is not a part of the decision-making process. Since conscious intent can alter the probabilities of the various outcomes, that seems like free will to me. Whether it fits with LFW I'll leave it to UE to determine as he is the only person posting that appears to understand what that is and how it differs from compatablist FW

Compatibilist free will is compatible with determinism. Libertarian free will is explicitly incompatible with determinism. I agree that conscious intent can alter the probability of the outcome, but that conscious intent is determined.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

There is no "decision." Thinking of it is as a decision is the wrong way to think of it. "Deciding" is a complex process. Willing is not.
...
There are no "decisions."

If my willing is free of decisions, then it is either fixed for all time or random. If my willing can take various paths depending on precursors and the current state of affairs, then decisions are being made, although you may choose to use a synonym of "decision."

But to say that no decisions are being made yet the outcome can be different depending on circumstances is gobbledegook.

~~ Paul

 

[Beth]

I don't think it can be presumed to be deterministic and if it's random, it's not deterministic - right?

You don't think any aspect of my decision was determined by precursors and my current state of affairs? Then you are saying my decision was entirely random.

I don't think any decision is entirely deterministic, that is, every decision contains some random components. Does that mean that the decision is 'entirely random'?

I don't think the world would look like it does if all decisions were random.

In what sense are you using the term 'random' here? Because I think you are now meaning random in a sense other than 'not determined'. How do you think the world would be different if all decisions were random rather than some being pre-determined?

It may be compatibilist. I freely admit that I don't fully grasp the difference between them. I think it is not deterministic because I think it there is some randomness in it.

I agree that your decisions have both deterministic and random aspects. What I can't grok is how they can have some third aspect that is neither.

I don't know that they do. I think it is possible to have decisions that are not deterministic but probabilistic in ways that allow the individual to control, or skew if you prefer, the probabilities. I think you are terming that as 'random', which is fine, but I also think such controlled randomness is sufficiently different from uncontrolled randomness to merit a third category.

Because 'not determined' does not imply that there is no reference to precursors. Random does not necessarily mean unlimited possibilities. It only means it's not completely determined (or predicted) from the precusors.

I agree that there may be aspects of my decisions that are random. But what does that have to do with libertarian free will?

I'm no expert at LFW. I simply think being able to control the probabilities of outcomes allows for free will. If you want to argue that it isn't LFW, that's fine with me.

I'm not saying that 'not determined' is other than random. I'm saying that random does not imply that free will is not a part of the decision-making process. Since conscious intent can alter the probabilities of the various outcomes, that seems like free will to me. Whether it fits with LFW I'll leave it to UE to determine as he is the only person posting that appears to understand what that is and how it differs from compatablist FW

Compatibilist free will is compatible with determinism. Libertarian free will is explicitly incompatible with determinism. I agree that conscious intent can alter the probability of the outcome, but that conscious intent is determined.

Why would you assume that it is determined? And determined by what? Perhaps that is the question that is separating LFW from the deterministic approach? Would LFW assume that FW forms the intent versus a deterministic approach that would assume the conscious intent was formed by the precursors?

At any rate, I would assume that conscious intent has random components and is not deterministic. That doesn't mean that precursors are not influential in forming intent, it only means that they are not sufficient to predict the outcome.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If my willing is free of decisions, then it is either fixed for all time or random. If my willing can take various paths depending on precursors and the current state of affairs, then decisions are being made, although you may choose to use a synonym of "decision."

But to say that no decisions are being made yet the outcome can be different depending on circumstances is gobbledegook.

~~ Paul

You are still mixing up "aware of" and "constrained by".

You are saying "if the agent was aware of my knowledge then it also must have been constrained by that knowledge", but the root claim of free will is that it is not constrained by the knowledge even though it is aware of it.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I don't think any decision is entirely deterministic, that is, every decision contains some random components. Does that mean that the decision is 'entirely random'?

Wow, I'm getting dizzy from going around in circles. You keep asking me for my definition of random, but you won't provide one of your own.

Random means not determined.

In what sense are you using the term 'random' here? Because I think you are now meaning random in a sense other than 'not determined'. How do you think the world would be different if all decisions were random rather than some being pre-determined?

The world would be nothing but a random quantum foam, if it existed at all.

I don't know that they do. I think it is possible to have decisions that are not deterministic but probabilistic in ways that allow the individual to control, or skew if you prefer, the probabilities. I think you are terming that as 'random', which is fine, but I also think such controlled randomness is sufficiently different from uncontrolled randomness to merit a third category.

I don't think so.

I'm no expert at LFW. I simply think being able to control the probabilities of outcomes allows for free will. If you want to argue that it isn't LFW, that's fine with me.

What you describe is compatible with determinism. Libertarian free will is not supposed to be.

Why would you assume that it is determined? And determined by what? Perhaps that is the question that is separating LFW from the deterministic approach? Would LFW assume that FW forms the intent versus a deterministic approach that would assume the conscious intent was formed by the precursors?

Determined as anything else is: by precursors and the current state of affairs. Yes, libertarian free will postulates an agent of will that is somehow free from the constraints of determinism and randomness. How would that work?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You are still mixing up "aware of" and "constrained by".

You are saying "if the agent was aware of my knowledge then it also must have been constrained by that knowledge", but the root claim of free will is that it is not constrained by the knowledge even though it is aware of it.

If it is not constrained at all by any knowledge, then it is random. If it is not constrained by knowledge concerning me, then it is not my free will.

Also note that if it is not constrained by some knowledge, then it has no need to be aware of that knowledge. The knowledge has no effect on the agent. The awareness is vapid.

~~ Paul

 

[Robin]

Of course it's uncaused. It if was caused then it wouldn't be free.

How are you defining "free"? You seem to think that a choice can be free from everything, even from the underlying order that made the choice possible in the first place.

 

[cyborg]

I don't know that they do. I think it is possible to have decisions that are not deterministic but probabilistic in ways that allow the individual to control, or skew if you prefer, the probabilities.

Right, so:

1) How?
2) Why?
3) How or why aren't the answers to 1 or 2 reducable to either something that is either describable as deterministic or non-deterministic?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

How are you defining "free"? You seem to think that a choice can be free from everything, even from the underlying order that made the choice possible in the first place.

If that means "free to fly if I jump off a tall building" then no.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Has an invisible pink flying unicorn hopping on the surface of Pluto been detected?

The concept of free will especially as it relates to the idea of moral responsibility goes back to the Greek philosophers.

No, because it's invisible

You've just proven my point



So? The concept that the earth is flat also dates back to philosophers. That doesn't make it any more true

Still no invisible pink flying unicorn hopping on the surface of Pluto has been detected has it RT? Just because it cannot be seen doesn't mean it cannot be detected.

Unlike ancient Greek philosophers discussing free will/moral responsibility who were.