Science and free will

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But you can't assume that all the random inputs were of the same type, because all "random" means, according to you, is "not determined." And while you may be correct that there are only two types of inputs, it is not a logical necessity, any more than it is a logical necessity that there are only two types of vegetables, just because I define "carrots" as meaning "not lettuce."

It's not like defining "carrots" to mean "not lettuce," because a carrot is another kind of vegetable. It's like defining "nonlettuce" to mean "not lettuce."

I think you're using the word "logical" to mean more than one different thing. Obviously "I" am within the "logical boundaries of the situation," if I'm making the decision. But why can't I assume some sort of dualistic notion of "I"? Why can't part of me - part of "I" - be outside the physical brain? Just because you can't figure out how that would work? Just because I can't figure out how that would work?

I shouldn't have brought up dualism. You just can't assume that the "I" is outside logic. Whatever/wherever is making the decision, logic applies.

That should be the default. Otherwise, how do we pretend we know anything at all? All of our observations that support gravitation, evolution, relativity, QM, germ theory, and so on might be shared hallucinations, just like free will. That's no way to live.

It should absolutely not be the default. There is clear evidence that our internal model of the world is only an approximation. (Heck, Donald Hoffman thinks it's not even a vague approximation.) There are also hundreds of examples of bodily processes that we do not experience or experience in a very indirect fashion. I think one of the biggest problems in the mind/body debate is that people assume their internal experiences can be taken at face value.

Hold on. You said random means "not determined." So you can't now claim that it means "neither determined nor decided some other cool way." If it means "not determined," it means "not determined," and includes all other ways of being decided other than being determined, whether that's one way, as you think, or at least two, as I think.

There is no other way of being decided. Either a decision is determined by a set of precursors, or it is not determined by any precursors. But as I keep saying, if you can give a glimmer of a hint of a whisper of some other option, please do. It does not help to move one of the precursors out of the naturalistic world. That precursor itself was still determined by pre-precursors or by none at all. Or possibly it was fixed in the past, but it was still determined back then, and of what help is a fixed precursor to the libertarian?

~~ Paul

 

[linusrichard]

God is undecidable, but also from what we can observe, extremely unlikely. Like the proverbial invisible pink unicorn. And, indeed, free will. All of them would require fundamental re-jigging of the known laws of nature to exist, so why is one more likely than the other two?

Because one has a veritable Olympus Mons of directly observed evidence, i.e., most of people's entire waking lives, while the other has zero evidence other than particularly unreliable multiple hearsay.

Direct observations have to be corroborated and correspond to an external, measurable state. If not, then the default state is not to trust them. Otherwise...

Under normal circumstances, I see your point. But you experience this too. In the very next paragraph, you use the phrase "no matter how hard I try." You speak as if you can try! You do this because you experience the phenomenon of trying! Now, maybe you think that's an illusion, and maybe you're right and I'm wrong, but don't you have to admit that you do experience apparent free will?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GmU_q5xrnto

It says "This video is not available in your country." Maybe you can find another version of the same video? Or just describe it perhaps?

In all seriousness, the analogy to geocentrism is nearly perfect. No matter how hard I try, I will never experience the rotation of the earth. Every morning that I bother to look, a shining disc about the size of a 50 pence piece will always appear to be slowly rising over a static horizon. And for most of human history, that's been an obvious, tenable position to hold. After all, heliocentrism has only been properly verifiable for the past half century or so. Before that all we had to go on was the same sort of individual experience you're talking about.

Well, that's real. It's not an illusion that relative to the eastern portion of the horizon, the sun moves "up" every morning. That's true, whether the explanation of such a thing is that the earth is rotating or the sun is moving around the earth.

It may have been correct, but Galileo's argument by analogy with the moons of Jupiter wasn't really all that valid.

I'm sorry, I'm not familiar.

And I'm actually (apparently) experiencing the sunrise

Be careful. You are actually (apparently) experiencing the sun moving "up" relative to the eastern portion of the horizon. I think 100 out of 100 reasonable people would agree that this is really happening. "Sunrise" may be a linguistic remnant of an incorrect belief about the explanation of this observation, but what you're experiencing isn't necessarily sunrise, that's just what we call it. Just like what I experience when I make decisions may be free will, or it may be an illusion of free will, but from my perspective, that's the experience, that's the observation, however you want to explain it.

 

[linusrichard]

It's not like defining "carrots" to mean "not lettuce," because a carrot is another kind of vegetable. It's like defining "nonlettuce" to mean "not lettuce."

Forget carrots, then. If I define a word, whatever word, let's say "nonlettuce," to mean "not lettuce," that doesn't mean that there are only two types of vegetables, lettuce and nonlettuce. Likewise, if you define a word, whatever word, let's say "random," to mean "not determined," that doesn't mean that there are only two ways to make decisions, random and determined.

I shouldn't have brought up dualism. You just can't assume that the "I" is outside logic. Whatever/wherever is making the decision, logic applies.

Agreed.

It should absolutely not be the default. There is clear evidence that our internal model of the world is only an approximation. (Heck, Donald Hoffman thinks it's not even a vague approximation.) There are also hundreds of examples of bodily processes that we do not experience or experience in a very indirect fashion. I think one of the biggest problems in the mind/body debate is that people assume their internal experiences can be taken at face value.

Is this different from solipsism?

There is no other way of being decided. Either a decision is determined by a set of precursors, or it is not determined by any precursors. But as I keep saying, if you can give a glimmer of a hint of a whisper of some other option, please do. It does not help to move one of the precursors out of the naturalistic world. That precursor itself was still determined by pre-precursors or by none at all. Or possibly it was fixed in the past, but it was still determined back then, and of what help is a fixed precursor to the libertarian?

Okay, well what is the problem exactly if I say that LFW is not determined by any precursors?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Forget carrots, then. If I define a word, whatever word, let's say "nonlettuce," to mean "not lettuce," that doesn't mean that there are only two types of vegetables, lettuce and nonlettuce. Likewise, if you define a word, whatever word, let's say "random," to mean "not determined," that doesn't mean that there are only two ways to make decisions, random and determined.

You're talking as if there aren't any dichotomies at all. I agree that defining a word to produce a false dichotomy is a mistake. But there is no logical room in "not deterministic" for something that is determined another way.

Is this different from solipsism?

I'm not sure what solipsism has to do with what I'm saying. I'm simply saying that internal experiences shouldn't be taken at face value. Just because you feel that some kind of nondeterminstic, nonrandom core "you" made the decision doesn't mean that's what happened. Just because you think the NDE showed you heaven doesn't mean that's what happened. Just because I had an experience while meditating of feeling that all the stars would forever be my friends doesn't mean that they will be.*

Okay, well what is the problem exactly if I say that LFW is not determined by any precursors?

Then it is random. In particular, it has nothing whatsoever to do with you, because your state of affairs at the time of the decision surely ought to have something to do with the decision.

~~ Paul

* True experience.

 

[Beth]

It should absolutely not be the default. There is clear evidence that our internal model of the world is only an approximation.

This seems a non-sequitor to me. While there is clear evidence that our internal model is only an approximation, that's no reason to abandon the idea that our senses are the best way to assess reality. In fact, it's the only way we have. Combined with the reported senses of other humans, we arrive at agreement on a reasonably consistent reality.

There is no other way of being decided. Either a decision is determined by a set of precursors, or it is not determined by any precursors.

What about a decision that is constrained to limited number of options by various precursors but the final decision is random in the sense that it cannot be predicted other than statistically? That is, to my mind, the best short description of what occurs when humans make choices. I don't think that we can say the choice is either determined or random.

For example, when I decide to have a drink, the precursors include what's currently available and what sounds best to my current physical state. While those precursors limit my choices (I'm not going to have a pan-galactic gargle-blaster), the only way to predict what I will choose is with statistical probability, not certainty. To claim that it is entirely a random choice is not correct. It clearly depends on those precursors. To claim that it is deterministic is equally incorrect as the end result cannot be predicted with anything other than a statistical probability.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

What about a decision that is constrained to limited number of options by various precursors but the final decision is random in the sense that it cannot be predicted other than statistically? That is, to my mind, the best short description of what occurs when humans make choices. I don't think that we can say the choice is either determined or random.

For example, when I decide to have a drink, the precursors include what's currently available and what sounds best to my current physical state. While those precursors limit my choices (I'm not going to have a pan-galactic gargle-blaster), the only way to predict what I will choose is with statistical probability, not certainty. To claim that it is entirely a random choice is not correct. It clearly depends on those precursors. To claim that it is deterministic is equally incorrect as the end result cannot be predicted with anything other than a statistical probability.

You mean like loaded dice? Ultimately it won't matter so much. The precursors will just give a higher probability to one of the possible outcomes. (And in fact, the more the better.) Everything else is outside of any kind of control, by definition.

The unadulterated chances of a diceroll are 1/6 for each outcome. Whatever happens is not controlled by anything. Now bring in the load, and the chances are now 1/2 for one of the outcomes while the rest splits up the remaining chances by 1/10 for each. The dice-roll is now somewhat controlled, but only with respects to one of the outcomes. What if a non-loaded side comes up? That particular outcome is still not connected to anything and the same old problem remains.


(Or were you merely thinking that the process - even if determinstic - is too complex and cannot in practice be predicted other than making estimates?)

 

[Frank Newgent]

Under normal circumstances, I see your point. But you experience this too. In the very next paragraph, you use the phrase "no matter how hard I try." You speak as if you can try!

Please do not hold anyone... I mean the unit... "responsible" for making such a mistake... oh wait, there are no mistakes.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Which has exactly what to do with whether I really can 'choose' between different outcomes?

This:

I'm disputing that we can ever know whether we are or not [selecting options], and adding that if we are we're doing something that nothing else does, via a mechanism that doesn't correspond to anything we know about

...being a misconception is what it has to do with. Let me break this down.

I have the ability to choose options if all of the following are true:

• I can consider options
• I can select an option among those I am considering
• The process by which I select the option depends on precisely who I am (my goals, wishes, desires, etc).

Those are necessary conditions. They are also sufficient. There need not be equal probability of selection--there need not even be unpredictability. The only thing I have to show to show that it was indeed me that picked the option, was that I was involved in the selection process (that is, the selection depends on who I am), and that I was able to consider the option (that is, I personally can imagine consequences of the options and select according to what I desire).

What you are doing is claiming that this is insufficient, for no good reason, and claiming that in addition, we have another requirement (or two). One of these possible requirements is as follows:

• It must have been me, and only me, deciding, and not any other physical process.

This is because if you find an X, you're going to say, no. I didn't decide the option. X did. It was determined by X, and therefore I could not have had any real choice. Here, X is physical law... just like everything else is.

To this, I add the following absurdity:

• It must have been me, and only me, deciding, and not any other physical process, including physical processes that are me.

The reason this fails is that you need to do more than say that it was X to show it wasn't me. You need to show that it wasn't me. If I am, indeed, X, then showing that X determined which option was selected does not in any way mean that I didn't select it.

The other requirement is:

• There must have been some real, ontological sense in which I actually could have chosen a different option.

This doesn't fly either. In order to be a bona fide choice, the selection process must rely on me. That's a causal link. I can only possibly choose to do one thing out of a set of mutually exclusive options--that's an ontological "event". Be this future or past, the only thing I can possibly choose to do at a given time is the thing I actually do once the time arrives. Furthermore, even if you could erase all of my memories, and turn back time, and put me in the same exact state, with the same inputs, were I to pick a different option, I would be no more "free". In fact, if this were possible, I would be less free, because it would imply that my alleged selection was not actually dependent on precisely who I am. It therefore could not have been something that I selected.

Now, the concept of free will involves one of the two options above, but the concept of will most certainly does not. Will only requires that I be able to pick and act--that's it.

Now, there's no "mechanism that doesn't correspond to anything we know about" in the way that you mean it, and I don't mean to say that this implies we don't make choices. I mean, instead, that the concept of free will is broken. The question of whether or not we have free will isn't merely something we can't know, it's something that can't even be wrong. It's a leading question making false assumptions.

Now, none of this means we can make choices, and it's not intended to. But if you drop all of the baggage, and just focus on what my selecting an option actually entails, then everything required is met by events that occur. I am able to select from options that I consider, based on who I am (what I desire, for example, especially including delayed effects as a result of my consideration of the consequences of an act).

 

[linusrichard]

Just because I had an experience while meditating of feeling that all the stars would forever be my friends doesn't mean that they will be.

You had an experience one time, under unusual circumstances, about two subjects (stars and friendships) that we know an awful lot about, and that experience contradicted our understanding of those two subjects. A perfect candidate for rejecting the evidence of our senses.

Free will is experienced every waking moment, by every human being on earth, it concerns two subjects (the human mind and human decision-making) about which we know comparatively very very little, but it appears to contradict what little we think we know. This strikes me as a lousy candidate for rejecting the evidence of our senses.

 

[Matt the Poet]

This:
I have the ability to choose options if all of the following are true:

• I can consider options
• I can select an option among those I am considering
• The process by which I select the option depends on precisely who I am (my goals, wishes, desires, etc).

Your premises are riddled with begged questions. Words like ‘select’, ‘goal’, ‘wish’ and ‘desire’ are – as you seem to admit in the rest of the post – nothing more than tags we apply to certain kinds of internal sensation. In trying to discuss the ontological reality of ‘choice’ they are irrelevant. If we aren’t able to produce different outputs to identical stimuli then your argument only becomes true in the rather trivial sense that these words do, in fact, correspond to some sort of inner experience – the only difference between us and a tumbling dice, or a water molecule in a cloud, is that we’re aware of what’s happening. Can I direct you to my previous post about C14 – how would a ‘conscious’ C14 molecule ‘experience’ itself? How would you convince it that it wasn’t ‘choosing’ to decay?

Your point about me being part of the overall system is key to this. The universe is unfolding according to a (relatively) simple set of self-consistent physical laws. At least one part of the universe consists of a medium-sized region of complex interacting molecules which, as a result of these laws, is aware of itself as a unified, bounded physical being with a continuous ‘inner life’ in which it experiences various things, some of which correspond to physical events outside the bag and some of which don’t. If all this is true, what does ‘will’ mean – why do we need a special word for that particular part of the overall process?

 

[Beth]

You mean like loaded dice? Ultimately it won't matter so much. The precursors will just give a higher probability to one of the possible outcomes. (And in fact, the more the better.) Everything else is outside of any kind of control, by definition.

The unadulterated chances of a diceroll are 1/6 for each outcome. Whatever happens is not controlled by anything. Now bring in the load, and the chances are now 1/2 for one of the outcomes while the rest splits up the remaining chances by 1/10 for each. The dice-roll is now somewhat controlled, but only with respects to one of the outcomes. What if a non-loaded side comes up? That particular outcome is still not connected to anything and the same old problem remains.


(Or were you merely thinking that the process - even if determinstic - is too complex and cannot in practice be predicted other than making estimates?)

Er, yes, I think. IF the porcess is deterministic, we cannot predict it. Further, we cannot state with certainty that it IS deterministic.

It may be random at the subatomic level, but at the macroscopic level we make choices. We choose to whether we wish to drink coffee or tea or pan-galactic gargle blasters. We can plan to have the various options available (or not) to us beforehand. We can thus set precursors for our future actions.

I also agree with what LinusRichard said

Free will is experienced every waking moment, by every human being on earth, it concerns two subjects (the human mind and human decision-making) about which we know comparatively very very little, but it appears to contradict what little we think we know. This strikes me as a lousy candidate for rejecting the evidence of our senses.

 

[Frank Newgent]

If all this is true, what does ‘will’ mean – why do we need a special word for that particular part of the overall process?

Farting around on purpose is so much more rewarding.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Your premises are riddled with begged questions.

It's not begging the question for me to merely disagree with you.

I dare you to show me exactly where I'm doing this--in particular, where I'm assuming something specific that I'm trying to conclude.

Here are the words we're using, if that helps:
choice^dict
choose^dict
Pick a sense.

Words like ‘select’, ‘goal’, ‘wish’ and ‘desire’ are – as you seem to admit in the rest of the post – nothing more than tags we apply to certain kinds of internal sensation. In trying to discuss the ontological reality of ‘choice’ they are irrelevant.

Do you mean trying to discuss the ontological reality of "could have"? That is irrelevant. What makes it a choice is whether or not I can pick a different option if I want to. That is met by my being able to consider the options and act based on said consideration. If you disagree, I'm afraid you're going to have to explain what is missing, and why it's required.

If we aren’t able to produce different outputs to identical stimuli then your argument only becomes true in the rather trivial sense that these words do, in fact, correspond to some sort of inner experience – the only difference between us and a tumbling dice, or a water molecule in a cloud, is that we’re aware of what’s happening.

That's not the only difference--in fact, you're missing critical differences. Tumbling dice cannot consider options. Water molecules cannot consider options. I can. The options are in my head--that's the only place they really have to be, the only place where they are, and the only place where they could be. I can imagine them. I can mull them over--play them out. I can arrive at consequences for the actions. I can use the consequences to help me figure out which option to select (which is quite a useful thing to do).

Can I direct you to my previous post about C14 – how would a ‘conscious’ C14 molecule ‘experience’ itself?

I do not know how to explain the mechanism behind a magically conscious C14 atom experiencing itself, nor do I see the relevance.

How would you convince it that it wasn’t ‘choosing’ to decay?

I do not know how to convince a magically conscious C14 atom of anything, nor do I see the relevance.

Your point about me being part of the overall system is key to this.

Then please take it seriously (see below).

The universe is unfolding according to a (relatively) simple set of self-consistent physical laws.

That means that I am unfolding according to a (relatively) simple set of self-consistent physical laws. This doesn't erase my ability to consider options (i.e., it doesn't mean I can't imagine them in my head)--it simply means that it's not magical. But not only can I choose if things are determined, things have to be determined if I'm to say that I chose something--for if I were not able to actually cause the choice to be made, there would be no way you can blame the choice on me.

That's the critical part of the debate--whether or not I can be blamed for the actual choice. You need to connect who I am to the act of choosing. If I can't be connected to the choice, there's no choice. You need causality to connect me to the choice. You have causality, and you have reason to believe I'm there... so where's the conflict?

At least one part of the universe consists of a medium-sized region of complex interacting molecules which...

Okay, sure.

If all this is true, what does ‘will’ mean

Are you asking me? If I answer are you going to say that I'm begging the question because you disagree?

Regardless--will refers to sense 1, 2, or 3:
will^dict
1 is talking about the faculty itself, 2 the power, 3 the act, but they're all the same thing--the ability to choose, and for us to be doing it.

– why do we need a special word for that particular part of the overall process?

Because it's particularly useful to discuss deliberate actions and volition. It's especially useful for us to model other entities that can, in themselves, consider outcomes (introduce game theory). And it is most definitely different than anything a die is going to do.

FYI, I offer you our ability to plan, at all, for evidence that we're not merely seeming to select outcomes, but are actually doing so (planning, in particular, involving considering the outcome of alternatives and selecting an option based upon that outcome).

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

This seems a non-sequitor to me. While there is clear evidence that our internal model is only an approximation, that's no reason to abandon the idea that our senses are the best way to assess reality. In fact, it's the only way we have. Combined with the reported senses of other humans, we arrive at agreement on a reasonably consistent reality.

I never said otherwise. I was simply pointing out that to assume some internal experience/mood is an accurate reflection of some event would be a mistake.

What about a decision that is constrained to limited number of options by various precursors but the final decision is random in the sense that it cannot be predicted other than statistically? That is, to my mind, the best short description of what occurs when humans make choices. I don't think that we can say the choice is either determined or random.

Sorry, I didn't mean the entire decision was one or the other. I meant that the components of a decision are either determined or random. A complex decision is made up of many components.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You had an experience one time, under unusual circumstances, about two subjects (stars and friendships) that we know an awful lot about, and that experience contradicted our understanding of those two subjects. A perfect candidate for rejecting the evidence of our senses.

Free will is experienced every waking moment, by every human being on earth, it concerns two subjects (the human mind and human decision-making) about which we know comparatively very very little, but it appears to contradict what little we think we know. This strikes me as a lousy candidate for rejecting the evidence of our senses.

You have no evidence that the feeling of free will is an accurate reflection of what's going on. You only have your feeling on the matter. My example is rather obviously just a mood, but there are plenty of examples that are more subtle. One is the fact that people are notoriously bad eyewitnesses even though they are sure what they saw. Another is phantom limb syndrome. Another is optical illusions. Another is psychosis.

You have no evidence that your will is actually free, nor can you describe how a free decision might actually work. Taken together, I think these make libertarian free will unlikely.

~~ Paul

 

[Belz...]

They are factors which are caused by WILL. What is the problem? :shrugs:

Maybe the thing you're not getting is that "WILL" appears in this system as a foundational entity in its own right. It's not reducible to anything else.

That doesn't matter.

We're talking about logical alternatives, here. If "Will" makes a decision based on previous states, then it's deterministic and superfluous. Occam's razor takes care of that. If it doesn't, then it's random, and again superfluous.

There are no other LOGICAL options. Unless you can demonstrate otherwise. Just claiming that "will" is somehow a third possibility isn't convincing, as I can say that candy is a fourth one.

 

[Belz...]

That's what you believe.

You said this:

So it is acausal (because WILL is acausal) but it is not random because it is informed by knowledge stored in a brain.

If it's informed then it is caused. Your explanation is contradictory.

 

[Belz...]

Will is an act, not a process. "Deciding" is what Deep Blue does when it is working out what move to make next. Humans also do something very similar. But when deep blue eventually acts, the act is just another process, governed by a different layer of the program.

I fail to see a distinction based on your example.

Humans also do something like this - Gary Kasparov thinks (albeit in a different way to Deep Blue) and eventually comes to a conclusion about what is the best move, and moves the relevant piece.

See ? How is that different ? You can substitute "Kasparov" for "Deep Blue" and it still works.

In a human, unlike deep blue, the act itself isn't being determined by a higher-level cognitive process, but by a metaphysical act of will.

So you keep claiming, but I'm yet to see any evidence, even after centuries, if not millenia, of debate on the matter.

 

[Beth]

I never said otherwise. I was simply pointing out that to assume some internal experience/mood is an accurate reflection of some event would be a mistake.

But the 'event' we are discussing is an internal experience. While I agree that it could be in error, it seems rather silly to assume that all the reports of those experiences, which are universal and consistent from one person to another, is an error. This is not to say that is couldn't be a generally mistaken impression, only that there is no reason to assume so and in the absense of any compelling reason to assume we are all mistaken about it, why do so?

Sorry, I didn't mean the entire decision was one or the other. I meant that the components of a decision are either determined or random. A complex decision is made up of many components.

~~ Paul

Okay. We agree. Why is that an issue in discussing free will? Why does having many components, some of which are random, some determined, and many of them unknown, negate the concept of free will. The sum total of all those components is the act of making a conscious choice between various alternatives. Why isn't that considered free will?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So you keep claiming, but I'm yet to see any evidence, even after centuries, if not millenia, of debate on the matter.

No evidence is possible in principle. It's exactly the same as the situation with idealism/materialism. People say things like "of course materialism is true, because if I throw a cat out of the window, it doesn't hover in mid-air." They have missed the point. Science doesn't provide evidence which can falsify or support metaphysical beliefs like this. There is no reason to believe that science could falsify or support free will either. Free will could exist and science would never know anything about it.