Science and free will

[UndercoverElephant]

If they are caused by will, then they are not uncaused. So we're down to whether will itself is caused.

And it isn't. WILL is acausal. NOT RANDOM.

Think of it it in terms of your own experience of being conscious. You have a belief system and you act according to that belief system. As a determinist, you don't believe in any metaphysical entity called "WILL" so you believe that everything you do is dependent either on that belief system interacting deterministically with your environment, or by purely random influences from QM. But for somebody who believes in WILL as a metaphysical entity there isn't just a belief system - there is also a WILL. Imagine somebody you really don't like. Now WILL them to drop dead. It won't work, of course, but that's not the point. I'm trying to get you to understand what WILL means from your own subjective point of view. In our normal state, that WILL is a prisoner of our belief system. It is UNFREE. Which leaves us with the questions like "how does WILL become free of our belief system (or ego)?" and "how does WILL act independently of that belief system?" You won't find any answers to those questions in science and you won't find much in the way of answers from philosophy - at least not any philosophical answers that are easily understood. As Thomas Nagel put it "it is probable that nothing true has ever been written about the subject of free will." If you want to try to understand what free will is or how it might "work" then you have to turn to religious and occult literature - and don't expect that to be easy to understand either. The question is deeply religious. Attaining free will is on a par with attaining enlightenment. I personally believe them to be exactly the same thing. Both require something which seems paradoxical and which Kierkegaard called "faith." First, you have to somehow be totally detached from the world in terms of your own personal ambitions and desires (Kierkegaard's "Knight of infinite resignation") Second, you also have to love the world and want to be acting in the best interest of the whole ("Knight of faith.") There may also be other conditions.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knight_of_faith

Kierkegaard's Silentio contrasts the knight of faith with the other two, knight of infinite resignation (infinity) and the aesthetic "slaves". Kierkegaard uses the story of a princess and a man who is madly in love with her, but circumstances are that the man will never be able to realize this love in this world ever. A person who is in the aesthetic stage would abandon this love, crying out for example, "Such a love is foolishness. The rich brewer's widow is a match fully as good and respectable." A person who is in the ethical stage would not give up on this love, but would be resigned to the fact that they will never be together in this world. The knight of infinity may or may not believe that they may be together in another life or in spirit, but what's important is that the knight of infinity gives up on their being together in this world; in this life.

The knight of faith feels what the knight of infinity feels, but with exception that the knight of faith believes that in this world; in this life, they will be together. The knight of faith would say "I believe nevertheless that I shall get her, in virtue, that is, of the absurd, in virtue of the fact that with God all things are possible." This double movement is paradoxical because on the one hand it is humanly impossible that they would be together, but on the other hand the knight of faith is willing to believe that they will be together through divine possibility.

That's the theological version. There are other versions which come from eastern mysticism and western occultism, but they are trying to say the same thing.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I just explained why that isn't true. You haven't responded to that explanation. You've just ignored it and repeated the same claim you made before.

I responded to you in post #114.

And it isn't. WILL is acausal. NOT RANDOM.

I think you mean that will is not caused. We usually use acausal to mean a system that does not cause anything, although that is a bastardization of the technical definition of acausal.

Meanwhile, you have not defined will as uncaused, but in fact as informed.

Think of it it in terms of your own experience of being conscious. You have a belief system and you act according to that belief system. As a determinist, you don't believe in any metaphysical entity called "WILL" so you believe that everything you do is dependent either on that belief system interacting deterministically with your environment, or by purely random influences from QM. But for somebody who believes in WILL as a metaphysical entity there isn't just a belief system - there is also a WILL. In our normal state, that WILL is a prisoner of our belief system. It is UNFREE. Which leaves us with the questions like "how does WILL become free of our belief system (or ego)?" and "how does WILL act independently of that belief system?" You won't find any answers to those questions in science and you won't find much in the way of answers from philosophy - at least not any philosophical answers that are easily understood. As Thomas Nagel put it "it is probable that nothing true has ever been written about the subject of free will." If you want to try to understand what free will is or how it might "work" then you have to turn to religious and occult literature - and don't expect that to be easy to understand either. The question is deeply religious. Attaining free will is on a par with attaining enlightenment.

Yes, in the sense that they are both fictitious states that are nothing but moods.

~~ Paul

 

[Matt the Poet]

I don't know what is special about "external" observations. I observe the phenomenon of making decisions probably millions of times per day. I could finish typing this, or delete it and get back to work. I could do this, or I could do that. Even for determinists, this is what is experienced. And for each of these decisions, I could have done something else - at least, that is what I observe, that at the time, I had the ability to make a different choice. Now maybe this is illusion - maybe determinism is at work here, or determinism + random (which I think is more likely). But I don't think that's the proper thing to assume, simply because we lack a mechanism to explain what is observed.

Well, yes, but my point is that there is no 'proper thing to assume', that the question is undecideable.

You, on the other hand, appear to think that we need to start from a particular position. This would be fine if you were happy enough to declare that you had faith in free will regardless of evidence. I mean, not fine by me, as far as I’m concerned faith is a mental illness, but fine in terms of the fact that we can both agree there is nothing ‘real’ for us to argue about and disengage.

But neither you nor Undercover Elephant seem to be doing that. You seem to be doing what god-botherers do when trying to claim their position is terribly well thought through, which is to tell me that there is something going on, that you’re not just ‘wishing’, but that it’s terribly complicated and anyway you can’t explain it to me except in terms that I would see as vague and question-begging, but that aren’t really (for reasons you can’t explain to me except in terms that I would see as vague and question-begging, but that aren’t really (for reasons you can’t explain to me except in terms…)))))

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

To say that "not determined means random" may be true (as a free willy, I sort of think I have to say it's not true), but even if it's true, it's not true of logical necessity. To say that something could be both determined and not determined is illogical. Or to say that something could be neither determined nor not determined. But it is not illogical to say that something could be neither determined nor random, even if it's wrong.

The technical definition of random is "not determined." If you can find an alternative definition that allows for a third means of making free decisions, I'm all ears.

The explication is missing, yes. The mechanism is unknown. It may be unknowable. But I'm still being asked to dismiss my observations as illusions not because they're impossible, and not because we have a better explanation of why I appear to be observing what I'm observing, but only because we lack an explanation for how what I'm observing could be happening.

What observations are you talking about? I am saying that it is logically impossible for you to describe a third way of making decisions.

Is there any other time in science when it's appropriate to say, well, we can't come up with any natural process that would cause the observed effect, so we must conclude ipso facto that the observation itself is an illusion? Isn't the better scientific position to find a cause for the effect, or the observation, first? (Disclaimer: I'm not a scientist, but I fancy I have at least a little understanding of the methods and philosophy of science...)

It's not a scientific question, it's a logical one. There is no logical room in "not determined" for anything but random. If there is logical room, then you should be able to give a logical description of this third way of making decisions. (Again, I have no idea what observed effect you're talking about.)

~~ Paul

 

[yy2bggggs]

Yet still you use the phrase ‘willfully decide’, as if you think I really am doing something special that other kinds of system, however chaotic, aren’t doing.

Right. I don't actually deny that randomness could affect our behavior, though. I deny that, insofar as it does, I can be blamed for said behavior.

I don’t dispute that I internally feel as though I’m selecting options,

But you seem to be disputing that we are selecting options.

I maintain that we select options if and only if we can consider alternatives, and act in a particular way in accordance with who we are (select one of the possibilities). That's all that's needed. And we do that.

In fact, this has to be deterministic. The conflict is based on an incorrect intuition--that we're not part of the universe. Here's why...

The mistaken notion calls for the implication: "if it's all just X that determines our actions, we don't really decide--it's really X". That implication requires you to divorce yourself from X, because if X were, in fact, you, this would be nonsense. And that is the core mistake. Any laws of the psyche we use to get at our decision must be laws of the universe, because our psyche is part of the universe.

You're using physical law as X. But you're part of the universe--so if there's a you at all, and all there is is physical law, then guess what--you are X!

 

[linusrichard]

Well, yes, but my point is that there is no 'proper thing to assume', that the question is undecideable.

Well, I think I agree with you that it's ultimately undecideable. But I think God is ultimately undecideable, and that doesn't keep me from being an atheist.

You, on the other hand, appear to think that we need to start from a particular position.

I do. I think we need to start from a position of trusting our senses. This may be wrong sometimes, but anything else just seems impossible.

This would be fine if you were happy enough to declare that you had faith in free will regardless of evidence.

But I have the evidence of me making decisions. I have the evidence of me observing myself exercising free will. This may be an illusion (just as every observation may be an illusion), but it's not fair to say that it's not evidence. Unless you want to go down the road of solipsism, I think you have to give at least some weight and credibility to direct observations.

I mean, not fine by me, as far as I’m concerned faith is a mental illness, but fine in terms of the fact that we can both agree there is nothing ‘real’ for us to argue about and disengage.

But neither you nor Undercover Elephant seem to be doing that. You seem to be doing what god-botherers do when trying to claim their position is terribly well thought through, which is to tell me that there is something going on, that you’re not just ‘wishing’, but that it’s terribly complicated and anyway you can’t explain it to me except in terms that I would see as vague and question-begging, but that aren’t really (for reasons you can’t explain to me except in terms that I would see as vague and question-begging, but that aren’t really (for reasons you can’t explain to me except in terms…)))))

A fair point, I guess. Except I don't see it as terribly complicated. I just see it as terribly difficult to express. This may have as much to do with my communication skills as it does with any inherent incoherency of LFW. The difference between me and a Goddy is that I am experiencing (or experiencing the illusion of) me making decisions. In other words, it's one or the other: what I'm experiencing is either me making decisions, or it's an illusion. A Goddy experiences either nothing at all (the usual case, I'd wager), or something that could be any number of things without being either God or an illusion. The difference is that God is not the (apparent) experience itself, but is offered by the Goddy as a cause of or explanation for the experience. I'm not explaining the experience as being caused by me exercising my will - I'm actually (apparently) experiencing the exercise of my will.

The other frustrating thing is that you, and every determinist, and every human being in the world, experiences the same thing. All human language (including that used by determinists) reflects this experience.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, in the sense that they are both fictitious states that are nothing but moods.

~~ Paul

That's what you believe.

 

[linusrichard]

The technical definition of random is "not determined." If you can find an alternative definition that allows for a third means of making free decisions, I'm all ears.

All right, then free will is "random" in the sense of "not determined." As long as we understand that that doesn't carry any of the other baggage normally associated with "random."

What observations are you talking about? I am saying that it is logically impossible for you to describe a third way of making decisions.

Just the ordinary decision-making of everyday life. Someone offers me coffee or tea. I think about what I want, and I pick one. I could have picked the other one. Was it random (in the colloquial sense) that I picked tea? Was it inevitable? Would any normal person describe it that way? Any person would describe their experience as one of having chosen tea. Selected, opted, elected, decided, chose - these are all words that normal people, including determinists, use all of the time. Do you experience life as a passenger, passively watching your body make the motions it was fated to make based on the distribution of matter and energy immediately after the Big Bang? When you decide to try to make it through the yellow light rather than stop, does it feel to you like one more in an incredibly long and complex chain of dominoes has dropped? When someone asks why you decided to golf even though the forecast called for rain, do you explain to them about the state of the matter and energy in your brain at the time the "decision" on whether to golf was made, and about how matter and energy follow physical laws and you could not have done otherwise? Do you know people who would put up with that kind of answer?

I mean, maybe it's true, but if it is, it's a truth that is contrary to all experience.

It's not a scientific question, it's a logical one. There is no logical room in "not determined" for anything but random. If there is logical room, then you should be able to give a logical description of this third way of making decisions. (Again, I have no idea what observed effect you're talking about.)

If it's "random" it's random only in the technical sense of not being determined. Not in the normal sense. The "observed effect" is the making of decisions through the exercise of will. You use your will to decide what to do. You decide - you are not a domino falling, or a die rolling, but a person making a decision.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

All right, then free will is "random" in the sense of "not determined." As long as we understand that that doesn't carry any of the other baggage normally associated with "random."

It carries all the other baggage associated with the technical definition of random. In particular, a random decision bears no relationship to the state of affairs about which the decision was supposedly made.

Just the ordinary decision-making of everyday life. Someone offers me coffee or tea. I think about what I want, and I pick one. I could have picked the other one. Was it random (in the colloquial sense) that I picked tea? Was it inevitable? Would any normal person describe it that way? Any person would describe their experience as one of having chosen tea. Selected, opted, elected, decided, chose - these are all words that normal people, including determinists, use all of the time. Do you experience life as a passenger, passively watching your body make the motions it was fated to make based on the distribution of matter and energy immediately after the Big Bang? When you decide to try to make it through the yellow light rather than stop, does it feel to you like one more in an incredibly long and complex chain of dominoes has dropped? When someone asks why you decided to golf even though the forecast called for rain, do you explain to them about the state of the matter and energy in your brain at the time the "decision" on whether to golf was made, and about how matter and energy follow physical laws and you could not have done otherwise? Do you know people who would put up with that kind of answer?

But why should the way a decisions feels lead you to assume anything in particular about how the physical decision was made? When you breath, do you feel like your cells are exchanging oxygen for carbon dioxide? Apparently it is of no evolutionary advantage to experience low-level physiological events.

Also, what about the countless decisions that you make every day that you do not experience? What's making those decisions?

If it's "random" it's random only in the technical sense of not being determined. Not in the normal sense. The "observed effect" is the making of decisions through the exercise of will. You use your will to decide what to do. You decide - you are not a domino falling, or a die rolling, but a person making a decision.

I agree that your decision is not random in the folksy way we talk about randomness: haphazard, without aim, arbitrary. But that is of no comfort to the libertarian.

~~ Paul

 

[linusrichard]

It carries all the other baggage associated with the technical definition of random. In particular, a random decision bears no relationship to the state of affairs about which the decision was supposedly made.

I think you're doing an excluded middle thing on me now. If random (=not determined) means that the outcome bears no relationship to the state of affairs beforehand, and determined means that the outcome is totally controlled by the state of affairs beforehand, then what do we do if the outcome is influenced by, but not totally controlled by, the state of affairs beforehand?

But why should the way a decisions feels lead you to assume anything in particular about how the physical decision was made?

I don't know what you mean by "the physical decision." I don't assume anything in particular about how the decision was made. I only assume that I made it, because I experienced myself making it. If determinism is right, it doesn't make sense to say that I made the decision, at least not truly. It's using those words in a weird way, which I don't know if it's done for the sake of compatibilism, or what it's about.

When you breath, do you feel like your cells are exchanging oxygen for carbon dioxide?

No.
The better question is, if, when I breathe, I did feel the exchange of oxygen for carbon dioxide, but nobody could explain how such an exchange might occur, would it be sensible for me to assume that there was no such exchange occurring?

Also, what about the countless decisions that you make every day that you do not experience? What's making those decisions?

Can you give an example? Do you mean like my heart beating, or breathing when I'm not thinking about it, or digesting food? I don't consider those "decisions." Is that what you mean? I can't think of what you might possibly mean that would serve to refute my point. Just because there are decisions I don't experience (which I don't concede quite yet) and don't make (ditto), doesn't mean that there aren't plenty that I do, which is the point.

I agree that your decision is not random in the folksy way we talk about randomness: haphazard, without aim, arbitrary. But that is of no comfort to the libertarian.

If all random means is not determined, that's of plenty "comfort" to this libertarian.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It carries all the other baggage associated with the technical definition of random. In particular, a random decision bears no relationship to the state of affairs about which the decision was supposedly made.

~~ Paul

There is a confusion here between the meaning of "decision."

Will is an act, not a process. "Deciding" is what Deep Blue does when it is working out what move to make next. Humans also do something very similar. But when deep blue eventually acts, the act is just another process, governed by a different layer of the program. The "act" is just the point where Deep Blue has arrived at an answer to the question "what is the best move?" and displays it on a screen. Humans also do something like this - Gary Kasparov thinks (albeit in a different way to Deep Blue) and eventually comes to a conclusion about what is the best move, and moves the relevant piece. "Will" is something which doesn't apply to Deep Blue at all, but occurs in humans at the moment they act. Arriving at the conclusion isn't what makes it an act of will. In a human, unlike deep blue, the act itself isn't being determined by a higher-level cognitive process, but by a metaphysical act of will. Usually this is irrelevant, because it doesn't matter that this will is chained to the ego and belief-system. It only matters when the decision in question was an ethical or religious decision. An intelligent machine like Deep Blue can't even make ethical or religious decisions of this sort, let alone act on them. Why not? Because Deep BLUE isn't conscious, doesn't understand the meaning of death or pain and wouldn't be able to make any more sense of religion than your average JREFer can.

I am therefore arguing that only conscious beings can have free will and that computers can't have free will because they aren't conscious. I don't know what the situation would be if we were ever to build a biological computer, based on a biological brain and which shared whatever quantum properties I've suggested must be responsible for brains being able to support consciousness. We would then potentially end up with a conscious machine which had the potential for free will and may even fear its own death or have a religious conversion. I hope such a thing never happens, because I think it is deeply unethical - humans playing God on a grand scale, with no regard to the potential suffering of the machine.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I think you're doing an excluded middle thing on me now. If random (=not determined) means that the outcome bears no relationship to the state of affairs beforehand, and determined means that the outcome is totally controlled by the state of affairs beforehand, then what do we do if the outcome is influenced by, but not totally controlled by, the state of affairs beforehand?

Then some of the inputs to the decision were determined and some were random.

I don't know what you mean by "the physical decision." I don't assume anything in particular about how the decision was made. I only assume that I made it, because I experienced myself making it. If determinism is right, it doesn't make sense to say that I made the decision, at least not truly. It's using those words in a weird way, which I don't know if it's done for the sake of compatibilism, or what it's about.

Of course you made the decision. You just have to be careful not to assume that "I" is an entity outside the logical boundaries of the situation. In other words, you can't assume some sort of dualistic notion of "I."

No.
The better question is, if, when I breathe, I did feel the exchange of oxygen for carbon dioxide, but nobody could explain how such an exchange might occur, would it be sensible for me to assume that there was no such exchange occurring?

Again, not being able to explain something is different from that thing being illogical. But that doesn't answer the question about why you should assume that what something feels like is an accurate mirror of what that thing actually is.

Can you give an example? Do you mean like my heart beating, or breathing when I'm not thinking about it, or digesting food? I don't consider those "decisions." Is that what you mean? I can't think of what you might possibly mean that would serve to refute my point. Just because there are decisions I don't experience (which I don't concede quite yet) and don't make (ditto), doesn't mean that there aren't plenty that I do, which is the point.

The decision you made to turn left on Maple Street even though you weren't paying attention to driving at all. The decision you made to turn off the alarm when it rang, even though you were almost completely asleep.

If all random means is not determined, that's of plenty "comfort" to this libertarian.

Sorry, but determined and not determined exhaust all the logical possibilities. Random does not mean "not determined, but decided some other cool way." It means not determined by any precursors.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

"Will" is something which doesn't apply to Deep Blue at all, but occurs in humans at the moment they act. Arriving at the conclusion isn't what makes it an act of will. In a human, unlike deep blue, the act itself isn't being determined by a higher-level cognitive process, but by a metaphysical act of will.

If will is a momentary event producing an act that is not determined by precursors, then whatever you do at that moment is arbitrary. In particular, it has nothing to do with your current or past state of affairs. To whatever degree the act is guided by the state of affairs, it is determined by that state.

What I want is an act that is "freely decided upon" by "my will" with at least some components of the decision being neither predetermined nor random. I don't see how I can get there.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If will is a momentary event...

It's not an event, either. When you say "event", you're thinking "physical event."

...producing an act that is not determined by precursors, then whatever you do at that moment is arbitrary.

No it isn't, it is an act of WILL.

In particular, it has nothing to do with your current or past state of affairs.

Not directly, but it indirectly has something to do with you current or past state of affairs, because it is the same YOU all along.

To whatever degree the act is guided by the state of affairs, it is determined by that state.

What I want is an act that is "freely decided upon" by "my will" with at least some components of the decision being neither predetermined nor random. I don't see how I can get there.

"Freely decided upon" ignores my previous post. "Freely acted" is not the same as "freely decided". We are not talking about a "free cognitive process". We are not talking about a cognitive process at all.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

It's not an event, either. When you say "event", you're thinking "physical event."

This is pretty irrelevant. Do those acts of will occur at all? If so, we have an event (in the most general sense maybe, but still.) If not, well ...

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's not an event, either. When you say "event", you're thinking "physical event."

If nothing occurs, then how does the act of will produce any action?

No it isn't, it is an act of WILL.

You can call is FISH if you want, but if it's not determined by precursors, then it is arbitrary.

Not directly, but it indirectly has something to do with you current or past state of affairs, because it is the same YOU all along.

Boy, this is a lot of mush-speak. It may be the same ME doing it, but if it is not determined by precursors, it might as well be a RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR.

"Freely decided upon" ignores my previous post. "Freely acted" is not the same as "freely decided". We are not talking about a "free cognitive process". We are not talking about a cognitive process at all.

So the act of will is also unrelated to my memories.

Can you give us even a notion of a clue how this actually works?

~~ Paul

 

[Matt the Poet]

But you seem to be disputing that we are selecting options.

I'm disputing that we can ever know whether we are or not, and adding that if we are we're doing something that nothing else does, via a mechanism that doesn't correspond to anything we know about

You're using physical law as X. But you're part of the universe--so if there's a you at all, and all there is is physical law, then guess what--you are X!

Absolutely. I am, in a wholly unmystical sense, one with the universe. I'm a localized consequence of the underlying physics in the same way that a droplet in the foam at the crest of a wave is a localized consequence of the moon's gravitational pull on the earth.

Which has exactly what to do with whether I really can 'choose' between different outcomes?

 

[Matt the Poet]

Well, I think I agree with you that it's ultimately undecideable. But I think God is ultimately undecideable, and that doesn't keep me from being an atheist.

God is undecidable, but also from what we can observe, extremely unlikely. Like the proverbial invisible pink unicorn. And, indeed, free will. All of them would require fundamental re-jigging of the known laws of nature to exist, so why is one more likely than the other two?

Unless you want to go down the road of solipsism, I think you have to give at least some weight and credibility to direct observations.

Direct observations have to be corroborated and correspond to an external, measurable state. If not, then the default state is not to trust them. Otherwise...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GmU_q5xrnto

In all seriousness, the analogy to geocentrism is nearly perfect. No matter how hard I try, I will never experience the rotation of the earth. Every morning that I bother to look, a shining disc about the size of a 50 pence piece will always appear to be slowly rising over a static horizon. And for most of human history, that's been an obvious, tenable position to hold. After all, heliocentrism has only been properly verifiable for the past half century or so. Before that all we had to go on was the same sort of individual experience you're talking about.

It may have been correct, but Galileo's argument by analogy with the moons of Jupiter wasn't really all that valid.

I'm not explaining the experience as being caused by me exercising my will - I'm actually (apparently) experiencing the exercise of my will.

And I'm actually (apparently) experiencing the sunrise

The other frustrating thing is that you, and every determinist, and every human being in the world, experiences the same thing. All human language (including that used by determinists) reflects this experience.

See the word 'sunrise' above...

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Can you give us even a notion of a clue how this actually works?

~~ Paul

I only have clues myself. I don't have "the answer". The biggest clue I can give you is this: it involves what would look to you like retrocausality or a temporal anomaly.

 

[linusrichard]

Then some of the inputs to the decision were determined and some were random.

But you can't assume that all the random inputs were of the same type, because all "random" means, according to you, is "not determined." And while you may be correct that there are only two types of inputs, it is not a logical necessity, any more than it is a logical necessity that there are only two types of vegetables, just because I define "carrots" as meaning "not lettuce."

Of course you made the decision. You just have to be careful not to assume that "I" is an entity outside the logical boundaries of the situation. In other words, you can't assume some sort of dualistic notion of "I."

I think you're using the word "logical" to mean more than one different thing. Obviously "I" am within the "logical boundaries of the situation," if I'm making the decision. But why can't I assume some sort of dualistic notion of "I"? Why can't part of me - part of "I" - be outside the physical brain? Just because you can't figure out how that would work? Just because I can't figure out how that would work?

Again, not being able to explain something is different from that thing being illogical. But that doesn't answer the question about why you should assume that what something feels like is an accurate mirror of what that thing actually is.

That should be the default. Otherwise, how do we pretend we know anything at all? All of our observations that support gravitation, evolution, relativity, QM, germ theory, and so on might be shared hallucinations, just like free will. That's no way to live.

The decision you made to turn left on Maple Street even though you weren't paying attention to driving at all. The decision you made to turn off the alarm when it rang, even though you were almost completely asleep.

I see. I don't know. I would think those are in the same category as normal decisions.

Sorry, but determined and not determined exhaust all the logical possibilities. Random does not mean "not determined, but decided some other cool way." It means not determined by any precursors.

Hold on. You said random means "not determined." So you can't now claim that it means "neither determined nor decided some other cool way." If it means "not determined," it means "not determined," and includes all other ways of being decided other than being determined, whether that's one way, as you think, or at least two, as I think.