Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape Challenge

[kellyb]

I think it really comes down to opinions vs facts.

"Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored" - Aldous Huxley

 

[Sophronius]

What is "worthwhile morality"?

I mean a system of morality that reflects the real world, that reflects our real moral preferences. As opposed to some perfectly coherent, perfectly objective systems of morality like "Whatever my dog thinks is good is good" that do not reflect what we actually believe.

No, another alternative is just accepting the fact that morals and values are subjective.

Depends on what you mean by that. Preferences are subjective in the sense that they vary from person to person. As such there can be no universally compelling moral arguments. You have to start from somewhere. So yes, in that sense morals and values are subjective.

However, this should NOT be taken as an excuse to just make up whatever. We still live in a materialistic universe. Statements of values are still true or false -or meaningless-. If I declare that I believe murder to be good, that is still a factual statement, and it is in fact a lie even if I decide I want it to be true. Values are still part of this materialistic world, they are still a physical part of our brain, same as everything else we believe and feel and think.

I strongly detest this trend of atheists to just go "oh, it's all relative, therefore no system of morality is better than any other and we can just make things up as we go." Bollocks. A system of morality that does not adhere to logic and reason and facts is worthless.

It's not a hypothetical situation:

It's been a while since I last read that article, so it is possible I misremember, but I had the impression he was just arguing the point as a thought experiment. Perhaps he said so in another article in a response to complaints, or something.

When it comes to state-sanctioned torture, I'm ok with some degree of a lack of internal coherence. I'd rather be a torture-opposing hypocrite than a torture-supporting utilitarian.

I will agree with this. This whole "better to be a murderer than a hypocrite" attitude makes no sense, at least from (you guessed it) a consequentialist perspective.

I think it really comes down to opinions vs facts.

"Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored" - Aldous Huxley

Opinions do not go away when they are ignored. Opinions are facts. If I say that I believe that murder is less bad than jaywalking, this is a moral claim and a factual claim and a lie. If I say that you ought to help others, then I am really saying that I prefer to help others and that you and others also want to help others, and therefore I think you should help others if you want to fulfil the moral imperative of society and yourself (and that I think that morality is important, etc.). It all lies on facts. This idea that "everyone is entitled to their own opinion", and people get to believe whatever they want, is not one that I support.

Oh sure, there are opinions that are not factual claims. There are nonsense and not worth our time. For example "You ought not to wear blue socks on sunday because it is just plain wrong!" This is a moral claim/opinion not based on facts, and therefore meaningless prattle.

 

[kellyb]

I mean a system of morality that reflects the real world, that reflects our real moral preferences.

Is "real morality" nothing more than "our [real] moral preference"?

Who us "us"? What % of "us" must agree for this morality to cross over from "not real" to "real"?
51%?
99%?

Preferences exist in objective reality. But to take a simple preference and extrapolate it into a larger, supposedly objective "truth" is fallacious.

I strongly detest this trend of atheists to just go "oh, it's all relative, therefore no system of morality is better than any other and we can just make things up as we go." Bollocks. A system of morality that does not adhere to logic and reason and facts is worthless.

Well, "worthless" is yet another subjective opinion. If "making it up as we go along" is the best we can really do, it is what it is. I find it frightening, too. But the world and reality unfortunately don't cater to our desires. Wishing there was an objective morality larger or more solid than human perception doesn't make it exist.

 

[Sophronius]

Is "real morality" nothing more than "our [real] moral preference"?

Who us "us"? What % of "us" must agree for this morality to cross over from "not real" to "real"?
50%?
99%?
Preferences exist in objective reality. But to take a simple preference and extrapolate it into a larger, supposedly objective "truth" is fallacious.

You misunderstand me. I am not arguing that there is some universal moral truth "out there". Rather I am arguing the following points:

1) There is no universally compelling morality. There is no objective source of morality "out there" that we would have to follow. Even if a god existed, we would have no compulsion to do what he said was good. I assume we agree on this one.
2) Morality flows from moral preferences. The only alternative to this is an outside source of morality or some definition of morality that does not capture what we mean by it. Since there is no outside source of morality , I assume you agree with this as well.
3) Moral preferences are real. They are a part of the brain and therefore a part of the universe, and can be measured objectively. (you already agreed to this one).
4) Moral claims logically flow from preferences, and are susceptible to logic and reason like everything else. If I desire to satisfy the preferences of others, and they in turn also desire to satisfy the preferences of others still, then from this flows a logical moral imperative.
5) Moral claims can be objectively wrong. An Islamist teenager who thinks that he should blow himself up along with as many innocents as possible because he is told that he will get a place in paradise if he does so is logically, factually, irrevocably and objectively wrong. He does not actually want to die, he does not actually want to kill innocents, and as such his moral claim conflicts with his own moral preferences as well as those of society.
6) Moral preferences differ from person to person. However, in practice there is still significant overlap, at least between human beings. As such, common moral rules are viable for most of society. The existence of psychopaths should not prohibit the rest of us from getting along.
7) The lack of a universally compelling morality is not actually a bad thing. We would not actually WANT to have some sky fairy dictate our morality for us. Discussion of morality is still subject to the same standards of reason, logic and facts as everything else. Moral agreement is still possible. There is no reason to panic.

Please let me know which, if any, of these points you disagree with. If we cannot narrow our disagreement down then I see no way for this discussion to go forward, so please answer seriously.

 

[kellyb]

Ok, here:

4) Moral claims logically flow from preferences, and are susceptible to logic and reason like everything else. An Islamist teenager who thinks that he should blow himself up along with as many innocents as possible because he is told that he will get a place in paradise if he does so is logically, factually, irrevocably and objectively wrong. He does not actually want to die, he does not actually want to kill innocents, and as such his moral claim conflicts with his own moral preferences as well as those of society.

Someone who kills people to get something is operating outside of "morality" (unless you redefine morality in Ayn Randian terms, which I don't think deserves serious consideration.)

Your hypothetical Islamist is "wrong" there because his virgins don't exist. A paid mercenary doesn't become "moral" by virtue of his employers having good credit and an impeccable record of paying up.

2) Morality flows from moral preferences.

What is the difference between "morality" and "moral preference"?
Would you agree that what we call morality IS moral preference?

 

[Sophronius]

Ok, here:

Someone who kills people to get something is operating outside of "morality" (unless you redefine morality in Ayn Randian terms, which I don't think deserves serious consideration.)

I disagree. He is doing what he thinks is good, just like everybody else who tries to be moral. "I ought to kill unbelievers in the name of the lord" is a moral claim. Just because we don't agree with him does not mean that it falls outside of morality. It's just bad morality.

Your hypothetical Islamist is "wrong" there because his virgins don't exist. A paid mercenary doesn't become "moral" by virtue of his employers having good credit and an impeccable record of paying up.

Of course not, that is not a good example since the paid mercenary is not trying to be moral. But to name a different example, an inquisitor who tortures people so that they confess their sins so they won't have to go to hell IS trying to be moral. And what's more, if they were right and god did exist, and if they really could force people to repent so that they really would not have to suffer for all eternity, then forcing them to confess really might be the right thing to do.

Moral claims are based on facts, or else they are unsubstantiated. Moral claims based on falsehood tend to be wrong.

What is the difference between "morality" and "moral preference"?
Would you agree that what we call morality IS moral preference?

Not exactly. A society can decide on a set of moral rules and principles based on the individual moral preferences of its constituents, but because moral preferences vary from person to person somewhat they will never perfectly overlap.

 

[kellyb]

I disagree. He is doing what he thinks is good, just like everybody else who tries to be moral. "I ought to kill unbelievers in the name of the lord" is a moral claim.

I'm not seeing how thinking "I should do this to get that" is moral. I don't see it as immoral, either.

Just because we don't agree with him does not mean that it falls outside of morality. It's just bad morality.

I need to know your definition of morality here.
If he's doing it to help himself (get virgins) how is it moral or immoral by any definition (err...except Ayn Rands)?

Of course not, that is not a good example since the paid mercenary is not trying to be moral.

It's every bit as moral as the morality of getting paid in virgins (which I agree is not what I would call moral.) The only difference is that the Islamist's virgins don't exist.

I agree about the hypothetical Inquisitor.

Moral claims are based on facts

Sometimes.

or else they are unsubstantiated

Are the following moral claims substantiated?

- Killing people is wrong.
- Human suffering is bad.
- People should try to help and not harm others.

Moral claims based on falsehood tend to be wrong.

Tend to what percentage of the time?

What is the difference between "morality" and "moral preference"?
Would you agree that what we call morality IS moral preference?

Not exactly. A society can decide on a set of moral rules and principles based on the individual moral preferences of its constituents, but because moral preferences vary from person to person somewhat they will never perfectly overlap.

Do you see that you didn't actually answer either of my questions?

 

[mumblethrax]

The is-ought problem is not really a problem, since in fact the only worthwhile morality (ought) is directly derived from reality (is).

I can't actually think of anyone for whom the is-ought problem is more serious than someone who thinks the only worthwhile morality derives oughts from ises.

 

[Sophronius]

I'm not seeing how thinking "I should do this to get that" is moral. I don't see it as immoral, either.

I need to know your definition of morality here.
If he's doing it to help himself (get virgins) how is it moral or immoral by any definition (err...except Ayn Rands)?

It's every bit as moral as the morality of getting paid in virgins (which I agree is not what I would call moral.) The only difference is that the Islamist's virgins don't exist.

In the hypothetical I proposed, I meant that the teenage islamist didn't do it for the virgins: He genuinely thought that blowing himself up would land him in paradise because it was the right thing to do as decreed by his god.

Sometimes.

Do you think there are any moral claims that are not either based on facts, or unsubstantiated nonsense?

Are the following moral claims substantiated?

- Killing people is wrong.
- Human suffering is bad.
- People should try to help and not harm others.

Well, as you write them down, no, because you just presented the claims without any substantiation. But that does not mean that those claims cannot be substantiated. Most people would not feel the need to do so, since others are likely to agree anyway, but I would certainly expect substantiation from a philosopher making those claims.

In the case of "killing people is wrong", I would substantiate it by rephrasing it as "Killing people is morally bad because it goes against the preferences of the person killed (unless it's euthanasia of course), as well as that person's family, as well as the rest of society by extension." "Human suffering is bad" can simply be defended by pointing out that human suffering goes directly against human moral preferences, which is the basis of human morality. Note that this is not arbitrary: It is a scientific fact that people have these preferences, and it logically follows that humans should therefore avoid things that cause suffering (in isolation, ceteris paribus etc.).

Tend to what percentage of the time?

Depends on whether the falsehood is integral to the claim. If it is, the moral claim might still be right, but solely by coincidence. I have no idea what the percentage of all moral claims that are correct is , but I don't see why it should matter.

Do you see that you didn't actually answer either of my questions?

Honestly, no. I was defining morality as encompassing the moral preferences of society, and I was saying that therefore moral preferences and morality are not quite the same. I don't see why the semantics matter though.

I can't actually think of anyone for whom the is-ought problem is more serious than someone who thinks the only worthwhile morality derives oughts from ises.

You are claiming that worthwhile human morality cannot be derived from reality? If that is how you interpret the is-ought fallacy, then I will go ahead and say that that is simply wrong.

 

[mumblethrax]

You are claiming that worthwhile human morality cannot be derived from reality? If that is how you interpret the is-ought fallacy, then I will go ahead and say that that is simply wrong.

I'm saying that if you think deriving oughts from ises is necessary for a worthwhile morality, and you cannot actually identify any way of doing so, the is-ought problem is totally devastating to your position.

 

[jiggeryqua]

In the case of "killing people is wrong", I would substantiate it by rephrasing it as "Killing people is morally bad because it goes against the preferences of the person killed (unless it's euthanasia of course), as well as that person's family, as well as the rest of society by extension."

This topic has arisen in several threads in the relatively short time I've been here. It's been quite frustrating, listening to those who want to replace worship of fictional gods with the worship of 'measuring things'.

Your substantiation can be rephrased as "X is bad because it entails Y, and I've decided Y is bad." X and Y can be objectively, scientifically measured, so when you have a morality, science can answer questions relating to it. But it doesn't (and cannot) form the foundation of a morality. It just measures things against a standard you've determined without the aid of science. That very many people may agree with you that Y is bad and therefore so is X is factual, certainly, but the weight of opinion is not enough. It is factual that very many people believe in a supreme being, but neither of us accept that being as a fact.

"Human suffering is bad" can simply be defended by pointing out that human suffering goes directly against human moral preferences, which is the basis of human morality. Note that this is not arbitrary: It is a scientific fact that people have these preferences, and it logically follows that humans should therefore avoid things that cause suffering (in isolation, ceteris paribus etc.).

Ah, ceteris paribus. As if anything ever existed in isolation. Is it really a 'scientific fact' that 'human moral preferences' are against suffering? I guess that most individual humans would prefer not to suffer, but plenty of them seem happy enough to dole out suffering. Prefering not to suffer is not a 'moral' preference.

You are claiming that worthwhile human morality cannot be derived from reality?

What is "worthwhile" human morality? Is it a variant of the No Truly Worthwhile Scotsman fallacy?

 

[Sophronius]

I'm saying that if you think deriving oughts from ises is necessary for a worthwhile morality, and you cannot actually identify any way of doing so, the is-ought problem is totally devastating to your position.

But I did, several times now. Human preferences are facts. Human morality is part of nature. You can measure them. They are real.

You can derive morality from human preferences. There you go, you derived morality from the way reality is. What is the problem with this?

(And before you point it out: No, you cannot create a universally compelling "objective" morality this way, which as I have pointed out is of course not what I am trying to do. So this is not a problem.)

This topic has arisen in several threads in the relatively short time I've been here. It's been quite frustrating, listening to those who want to replace worship of fictional gods with the worship of 'measuring things'.

As opposed to, oh, I don't know, throwing out fictional gods and then maintaining most of the virtue/duty based morality that it imparted?

Also, one count of claiming that the other party "worships" their position followed by sarcasm --> zero chance of you changing your mind or being interested in a reasonable discussion, so nevermind I guess. Kellyb is at least interested in seriously engaging my points.

 

[jiggeryqua]

Also, one count of claiming that the other party "worships" their position followed by sarcasm --> zero chance of you changing your mind or being interested in a reasonable discussion, so nevermind I guess. Kellyb is at least interested in seriously engaging my points.

I am seriously interested in engaging with your points. I'm more interested in getting you to see the flaws in them, but if you insist that's not a reasonable discussion I guess we're done. There was a little more in my post than "sarcasm" - there were serious questions, which you decided not to answer.

Here's just one, in the hope that you'll seriously engage with it:

How does science derive a morality against which it can measure moral questions?

So far, your answer appears to be "by agreeing with me as to what is 'good'". You'll understand, I hope, that just as I have no wish to worship gods, I have no desire to worship science and even less desire to install you as my moral compass.

 

[kellyb]

In the case of "killing people is wrong", I would substantiate it by rephrasing it as "Killing people is morally bad because it goes against the preferences of the person killed (unless it's euthanasia of course), as well as that person's family, as well as the rest of society by extension."

What's "wrong" or "morally bad" about acting against the preference of another person or society? Is it incorrect in the sense that saying "1+1=3" is incorrect?

"Human suffering is bad" can simply be defended by pointing out that human suffering goes directly against human moral preferences, which is the basis of human morality.

You can say that you think it's bad because it goes against most people's moral preference, but that's it. And that's a great deal different from "it is bad."

It is a scientific fact that people have these preferences, and it logically follows that humans should therefore avoid things that cause suffering (in isolation, ceteris paribus etc.).

No, it does not logically flow. Not without some qualifiers, at least.

Do you see that you didn't actually answer either of my questions?

Honestly, no. I was defining morality as encompassing the moral preferences of society, and I was saying that therefore moral preferences and morality are not quite the same. I don't see why the semantics matter though.

You're kind of jumping around with different definitions of morality here.
I don't know if this is really just semantics or not, but hear me out.

1) If morality is just the moral preference of society, then morality is strictly subjective, regardless of the underlying data and whether or not it's correct or incorrect.

2) It makes no sense to say you're "defining morality as encompassing the moral preferences of society" and then, also say "moral preferences and morality are not quite the same thing" ESPECIALLY with a "therefore" in between!

 

[Earthborn]

(And before you point it out: No, you cannot create a universally compelling "objective" morality this way, which as I have pointed out is of course not what I am trying to do. So this is not a problem.)

It is what Sam Harris is trying to do: to create/map out a universally compelling "objective" (because SCIENCE) moral landscape. It is also what the "is-ought" problem refers to; if it was just about people's preferences it would have been called the "is-want" problem.

 

[kellyb]

Human morality is part of nature. You can measure them. They are real.

No, human morality is a mental construct rooted in instincts.

You can derive morality from human preferences. There you go, you derived morality from the way reality is. What is the problem with this?

Many of our instincts lead us to do things which I believe are immoral. The very fact that something is "natural" for us and rooted in neurology and natural selection does not make it "moral." Not by my standards, at least (and probably not yours.)

 

[mumblethrax]

But I did, several times now. Human preferences are facts. Human morality is part of nature. You can measure them. They are real.

You can derive morality from human preferences. There you go, you derived morality from the way reality is. What is the problem with this?

The basic problem is that you're assuming several crucial unstated premises for your argument (that human preferences ought to be fulfilled, that similarly serious human preferences ought to be weighted similarly, that there's something really special about human preferences as opposed to non-human preferences) each of which is going to be controversial. You're smuggling in your oughts, which means that you didn't actually show us how to get from an is to an ought. You showed us how to get from an ought plus an is to another ought, which everyone understands to be possible.

(And before you point it out: No, you cannot create a universally compelling "objective" morality this way, which as I have pointed out is of course not what I am trying to do. So this is not a problem.)

Here you're doing the Harris two-step: claim that you can derive morality from reality, and then say "Well, of course I can't actually derive morality from reality alone. So it's not a problem that I can't do the thing I said I could do."

 

[Sophronius]

I am seriously interested in engaging with your points. I'm more interested in getting you to see the flaws in them, but if you insist that's not a reasonable discussion I guess we're done. There was a little more in my post than "sarcasm" - there were serious questions, which you decided not to answer.

Here's just one, in the hope that you'll seriously engage with it:

How does science derive a morality against which it can measure moral questions?

So far, your answer appears to be "by agreeing with me as to what is 'good'". You'll understand, I hope, that just as I have no wish to worship gods, I have no desire to worship science and even less desire to install you as my moral compass.

In my experience, engaging with someone who starts a discussion with sarcasm and in bad faith, with as only purpose to convince the other that they are wrong since they couldn't possibly be wrong themselves, never results in anything good.

But fine, I will engage your serious question. Science can be used to objectively measure moral preferences. One can then measure whether those preferences are being satisfied by existing moral systems. This does not mean that science can dictate what preferences you "ought to have" in the first place, which is a nonsensical notion that I would never defend. But science can certainly be used to point out that an existing moral system does not do what it purports to do.

And in case your reply is "well is that all?", please consider that a combination of being able to measure the goal and being able to measure whether it is being achieved... gives you pretty much everything you need. Nothing is 'up for grabs' at that point, and you certainly could not justify statements like 'Oh it's all opinion anyway', which is what people on JREF tend to do.

 

[Sophronius]

What's "wrong" or "morally bad" about acting against the preference of another person or society? Is it incorrect in the sense that saying "1+1=3" is incorrect?

No. When I say that there is no such thing as a universally compelling moral argument, I am granting you this point. A complete psychopath who cares nothing for other people's preferences can not be convinced by any logical argument that what they are doing is "wrong" in any objective sense, because there simply is no such universal standard. Only someone who has moral preferences in the first place, can potentially be convinced that their actions are (logically, objectively) not in line with their moral preferences.

I do, however, argue that this is not such a deal breaker as you may think. Most people are not complete psychopaths: There is substantial overlap between people's preferences. If I care about the preferences of a dozen people, and they each care about the preferences of a dozen people, and so on and so on... then it logically follows that I should care about the preferences of pretty much everyone on the world. Science can then be used to discover what actions satisfy these moral preferences and which do not, and science can therefore be used to dictate which actions are moral and which are not. This is what I mean by deriving logical moral conclusions using science and reason.

In other words, even though morality is "subjective" in the sense that it is based on preferences which vary from person to person, this does not mean that the whole discussion is "just a matter of opinion".

(I am skipping the semantics debate, sorry. I will instead do my best to specify what I actually mean, as in the paragraph above. I find this to be more helpful than discussing the meaning of words)

It is what Sam Harris is trying to do: to create/map out a universally compelling "objective" (because SCIENCE) moral landscape. It is also what the "is-ought" problem refers to; if it was just about people's preferences it would have been called the "is-want" problem.

He certainly seems to be saying that, especially going from the title, but he backs down whenever confronted with it, and insists that anyone who claims that must have never read his book. I suspect that the concepts are not clear enough in his mind that he can truly tell the difference. He does not actually understand why people disagree.

No, human morality is a mental construct rooted in instincts.

Many of our instincts lead us to do things which I believe are immoral. The very fact that something is "natural" for us and rooted in neurology and natural selection does not make it "moral." Not by my standards, at least (and probably not yours.)

You misquote me, hopefully by accident. I said that preferences are found in nature. Nonetheless, I can easily argue that morality is also found in nature, since humans are part of nature and we have morality. This is not disingenuous: It counters the idea that morality and science are separate magisteria. Morality is a subject of science like everything else. It either makes falsifiable claims about reality, or it is hogwash.

No, the fact that something is natural does not make it moral. But our preferences are literally the only thing that can motivate us. Any morality that is worth a damn therefore has to be based on our preferences.

The basic problem is that you're assuming several crucial unstated premises for your argument (that human preferences ought to be fulfilled, that similarly serious human preferences ought to be weighted similarly, that there's something really special about human preferences as opposed to non-human preferences) each of which is going to be controversial. You're smuggling in your oughts, which means that you didn't actually show us how to get from an is to an ought. You showed us how to get from an ought plus an is to another ought, which everyone understands to be possible.

I am not claiming or assuming these things. You are assuming that I must take this position, like everybody else apparently, just because the position is clearly stupid and easy to attack. But that does not mean I have to actually hold that position.

Once again, in case it helps: I am not arguing in favour of universally compelling moral arguments. I am not saying that science can determine what values we ought to have. I am saying that we can objectively measure our moral preferences and logically deduce how to go from there. I am also arguing that just because a system is based on what we actually want does not make it less than a moral system based on religious hogwash: Quite the opposite in fact. I am saying that this desire for universally compelling morality is silly.

 

[kellyb]

We have to define "moral" and "morality".