Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[Egg]

I don't believe that moral claims are incapable of being objectively true. But if they were, then yes, including that one.

If we have limited knowledge or limited time in which to make a decision, we may have to act on the basis of claims whose truth we are not thoroughly convinced of. But that is a very different from acting on the basis of a claim we believe is not even capable of being true.

If a claim is no better and no worse objectively supported than the contradiction of that claim, it is irrational to act on one rather than the other.

I think my quibble with this lies in the point that the moral claims we're talking about are entirely reliant on some kind of value axiom. The value cannot be true or false since it's a value and not a claim.

If we take your sentence as an example:
"If moral claims are not capable of objectively being true, we should just ignore them the same way we ignore other claims that are not capable of being true."
My guess is that the "should" here is based on the axiom of valuing truth. Perhaps knowing the truth might be considered to have intrinsic worth, perhaps it's value lies in better reaching some other value (such as well-being or happiness). For the sake of argument, let's say you consider truth to have an intrinsic value.

My next point is really an issue of language and of how we might state this value. Firstly, I think we should deal with turning it into an objective statement by making it something like "JoelKatz values truth". While such a statement can clearly be either true or false, it's a different statement from the axiom behind the "should".

We can state this value in a way that makes it appear like an objective statement or claim by saying "truth is intrinsically valuable". But the problem here is the one you touched on in your previous post with your "by whom?" question to "ice-cream is enjoyable". As far as we're aware truth can only be intrinsically valuable to somebody. The statement expresses an idea and not a fact about the universe and, as such, cannot be true or false.

I think you're probably right to say that it would be irrational to act on some claim no better supported than another. Since we all rely on such axioms as well-being or truth or family having intrinsic value, perhaps ultimately we have to face that at the heart of all our reasoning lies irrationality - that we need some irrationality to form something to base our rationality on.

 

[JoelKatz]

My guess is that the "should" here is based on the axiom of valuing truth. Perhaps knowing the truth might be considered to have intrinsic worth, perhaps it's value lies in better reaching some other value (such as well-being or happiness). For the sake of argument, let's say you consider truth to have an intrinsic value.

Yes, I do.

My next point is really an issue of language and of how we might state this value. Firstly, I think we should deal with turning it into an objective statement by making it something like "JoelKatz values truth". While such a statement can clearly be either true or false, it's a different statement from the axiom behind the "should".

I agree.

We can state this value in a way that makes it appear like an objective statement or claim by saying "truth is intrinsically valuable". But the problem here is the one you touched on in your previous post with your "by whom?" question to "ice-cream is enjoyable". As far as we're aware truth can only be intrinsically valuable to somebody. The statement expresses an idea and not a fact about the universe and, as such, cannot be true or false.

Only because it fails to state by whom. The statement actually fails to express an idea at all. It's just vague.

You can easily fix it by interpreting it as "truth is intrinsically valuable to me, and to the extent other people are constructed similarly to me, I'd expect it to be valuable to them." This sort of helps and sort of doesn't, because it's not clear what it means to say that truth is valuable to me. Yes, it helps me thrive, but if thriving is not justifiably valued, then why does it helping me thrive justify me valuing it?

That is, the ambiguity about who values it is not the real problem. The problem is -- at root, what precisely is a value?

I think you're probably right to say that it would be irrational to act on some claim no better supported than another. Since we all rely on such axioms as well-being or truth or family has intrinsic value, perhaps ultimately we have to face that at the heart of all our reasoning lies irrationality - that we need some irrationality to form something to base our rationality on.

I disagree. It is entirely rational, we just don't fully understand it yet. This is precisely the same as why it was always entirely rational for us to rely on our color vision even before we understood how it worked or what objective properties it was measuring.

The mere agreement between people on colors (even though imperfect) was sufficient to justify relying on color vision to distinguish objective facts, even in the absence of understanding what those facts were. The evidence that moral claims measure objective properties is nearly overwhelming and there is no alternative that is even comprehensible.

 

[Egg]

Only because it fails to state by whom. The statement actually fails to express an idea at all. It's just vague.

It seems to me that you're trying to box up the idea in such a way as to make it a claim that can be true or false. Yes, it fails to state by whom, but I don't think it's vague or not expressing an idea. "Truth is intrinsically valuable" is an idea that you can agree or disagree with. Some people might state the value (or some similar idea) as if it were an objective fact about the universe and consider somebody who disagreed to be "wrong", but it's not something that can be proved scientifically either way.

You can easily fix it be interpreting it as "truth is intrinsically valuable to me, and to the extent other people are constructed similarly to me, I'd expect it to be valuable to them." This sort of helps and sort of doesn't, because it's not clear what it means to say that truth is valuable to me. Yes, it helps me thrive, but if thriving is not justifiably valued, then why does it helping me thrive justify me valuing it?

If it were only valuable because it helped you thrive, it wouldn't be intrinsically valuable - it would be the thriving that had intrinsic value. I think you capture the issue by saying "thriving is not justifiably valued". When you get down to intrinsic values, I don't think there is any justification for the actual value. Perhaps your point about expecting similarly constructed people to hold similar values outlines how we could justify why someone might hold a certain intrinsic value, but not the value itself.

I disagree. It is entirely rational, we just don't fully understand it yet. This is precisely the same as why it was always entirely rational for us to rely on our color vision even before we understood how it worked or what objective properties it was measuring.

The mere agreement between people on colors (even though imperfect) was sufficient to justify relying on color vision to distinguish objective facts, even in the absence of understanding what those facts were. The evidence that moral claims measure objective properties is nearly overwhelming and there is no alternative that is even comprehensible.

I understand your analogy about seeing colours, but I don't see how it works as a logical argument to suggest that we can therefore expect to understand morals in an objective way in future. Perhaps there's a suggestion from the analogy that we might, but not necessarily that we will.

If a whole group of people were brought up in an environment that made them think that another were inferior, would you say it would be rational for them to treat the other race as inferior beings?

What sort of evidence are you talking about to suggest moral claims measure objective properties?

 

[Democracy Simulator]

I don't think they are different. Which is why I have spoken against the axiom-based approach taken by philosophers, and why I have said that a science-based approach should not take this form.
Linda

fls, I'm not sure you understand the point of my analogy. The second example is what Sam Harris has done:

If I assume a priori that moral truth exists and that the well-being of conscious creatures was the key to understanding moral truth, then I could study the well-being of conscious creatures, with the claim that I could find scientific knowledge about this well-being which would give me moral knowledge.

You seem to be arguing against this approach now as not being a 'science-based approach'. Yeah, well I agree with you. Has your support of Harris weakened somewhat?

The point of my analogy was to demonstrate that if Harris' analogy with health actually achieves anything, then we must also accept the 'Mind of God' example as analogous to health and that such a study could also be legitimised as science. I'll ask you again:

How useful are these analogies with health in being able to justify 'a science' of anything?

So are you saying that the existence of suicidal persons negates the idea that some actions can be considered unhealthy, just like the presence of suicidal persons negates the idea that the vaporization of humans can be considered undesirable?

No, I am saying that the existence of suicidal persons does not negate the idea that some actions can be considered unhealthy for everyone (therefore we have an objective basis for studying health), whereas the existence of suicidal persons does mean that vaporization is not always 'bad' for everyone.

How can that be?

Under what circumstances is vaporization healthy for anybody? In contrast, if we were talking about the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of vaporization there are some circumstances where an individual might view their own (or others) vaporization as a 'good thing'.

Anyway, this part of the discussion is only necessary if Harris' analogy to health achieved anything, which it does not.

About the same as 'perception of health' has to do with the absence of disease and impairment. There is some correspondence between the two, but obviously perceptions can differ. The subject who thinks they are healthier because the salicylates they took for their abdominal pain has temporarily relieved the pain from the gastric ulcer caused by the salicylates, or the subject who has achieved balance in their humours by the letting of blood, or the parents who think that sex is unhealthy for their children and deliberately withhold vaccines against diseases which are transmitted sexually, would be examples where science differs from our intuitions/perceptions.

Well, you see you agree with me after all. All of these examples can in principle be solved by recourse to the facts. Isn't that why anti-vaccers like to put forward lots of 'evidence' for their position?

Yet, as even Sam Harris admits, there are many moral disagreements which cannot be in principal solved by recourse to the facts. Because morality is a different beast to health. I really think Harris should have called his book, 'The Scienitific Study of Well-Being'. I know it's a bit of a boring title, but it would have been a more accurate reflection of the work within. Also, his analogy to health would then be useful.

What JoelKatz was referring to - as a thought experiment, areas of consensus allow us to recognize those properties relevant to what our intuitions imperfectly discover. I suspect there is more consensus on misery than well-being.

That doesn't really blunt my criticism as my criticism here is directed towards the insufficiency of the consensus view. The people whose worst misery looks a bit different from 'the norm'; they're 'wrong' are they? Also, I'm still not sure what you think about the well-being of conscious creatures? Which creatures' well-being is worth including in this 'scientific' morality? Do we admit tadpoles?

I don't think that Harris is proposing that the well being of conscious creatures forms an axiom from which we derive morality.

Here's what I wrote that prompted that comment:

Also, I'm confused by your comments. Harris doesn't think that the well-being of conscious creatures should be the basis for deciding what is good or bad?

I'll ask Harris what he thinks:

1. Are there right and wrong answers to moral questions?

Morality must relate, at some level, to the well-being of conscious creatures. If there are more and less effective ways for us to seek happiness and to avoid misery in this world—and there clearly are—then there are right and wrong answers to questions of morality.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

Again, and this is simple, Sam Harris said that science wasn't the only way but just one more.

Again, from Harris:

1. Are there right and wrong answers to moral questions?

Morality must relate, at some level, to the well-being of conscious creatures. If there are more and less effective ways for us to seek happiness and to avoid misery in this world—and there clearly are—then there are right and wrong answers to questions of morality.

Sounds like 'it's my way or the highway', unless by 'wright and wrong answers', Harris means that his right and wrong answers are not better than anyone else's right or wrong answers, but of course he doesn't mean this as it would be nonsensical claptrap and he's written a whole book explaining why his way is the best.

Simply put, Harris thinks that science is the right way and that is what the argument has been about.

 

[JoelKatz]

I understand your analogy about seeing colours, but I don't see how it works as a logical argument to suggest that we can therefore expect to understand morals in an objective way in future. Perhaps there's a suggestion from the analogy that we might, but not necessarily that we will.

My point is that there is no coherent alternative. That leaves two possibilities, objective truth, or something else that we don't yet understand. In either case, it would be science that would be the tool since there is no other.

If a whole group of people were brought up in an environment that made them think that another were inferior, would you say it would be rational for them to treat the other race as inferior beings?

Not unless the other race were in fact inferior in some meaningful way. That is, the validity of their treatment would hinge on objective facts that could justify the disparate treatment -- or not.

What sort of evidence are you talking about to suggest moral claims measure objective properties?

The existence of broad areas of agreement. The utility of such claims. The necessity of moral reasoning. Facts we understand about how conscious entities actually work.

If they were literally arbitrary, there would be no agreement more than you expect by chance. If they were not based on objective facts, they would have no utility.

Why do we find moral reasoning subjectively helpful? If it didn't tell us something about how the world really is, what good would it be?

Morality must relate, at some level, to the well-being of conscious creatures.

I think Harris is right, I just don't know why. It's much the same way as we all know that color vision must relate, at some level, to the light that comes off a colored object (even if we didn't understand the details of color vision).

If there are more and less effective ways for us to seek happiness and to avoid misery in this world—and there clearly are—then there are right and wrong answers to questions of morality.

This is the problem when you guess what morality is based on. A "happy pill" might effectively seek happiness and avoid misery. However, most people's moral sense do not agree at all that this is right nor can they do a very good job of explaining why. Morality does not just measure happiness/misery, it measures more than that. In fact, I would argue that finding happiness and avoiding misery is a consequence of moral action, not its defining characteristic, just as making objects pop out of the background is a consequence of color vision, not its defining characteristic.

 

[fls]

fls, I'm not sure you understand the point of my analogy. The second example is what Sam Harris has done:

You seem to be arguing against this approach now as not being a 'science-based approach'. Yeah, well I agree with you. Has your support of Harris weakened somewhat?

No. The difference is that you think Harris is attempting an axiom-based approach and I think he is not.

The point of my analogy was to demonstrate that if Harris' analogy with health actually achieves anything, then we must also accept the 'Mind of God' example as analogous to health and that such a study could also be legitimised as science. I'll ask you again:

How useful are these analogies with health in being able to justify 'a science' of anything?

Not useful if they fail to be understood.

No, I am saying that the existence of suicidal persons does not negate the idea that some actions can be considered unhealthy for everyone (therefore because we have an objective basis for studying health), whereas the existence of suicidal persons does mean that vaporization is not always 'bad' for everyone.

Under what circumstances is vaporization healthy for anybody? In contrast, if we were talking about the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of vaporization there are some circumstances where an individual might view their own (or others) vaporization as a 'good thing'.

ETA: This presupposes that we have no way of guessing that vaporizing humans may be bad other than by taking a poll about what humans think about the idea, yet we have no trouble presupposing that vaporizing humans is unhealthy for those humans, regardless of what our poll of suicidal persons shows. It seems foolish to think this presupposition is correct.

Anyway, this part of the discussion is only necessary if Harris' analogy to health achieved anything, which it does not.

I agree.

Well, you see you agree with me after all. All of these examples can in principle be solved by recourse to the facts. Isn't that why anti-vaccers like to put forward lots of 'evidence' for their position?

Yet, as even Sam Harris admits, there are many moral disagreements which cannot be in principal solved by recourse to the facts. Because morality is a different beast to health. I really think Harris should have called his book, 'The Scienitific Study of Well-Being'. I know it's a bit of a boring title, but it would have been a more accurate reflection of the work within. Also, his analogy to health would then be useful.

No. Then it would no longer be analogous to health.

That doesn't really blunt my criticism as my criticism here is directed towards the insufficiency of the consensus view. The people whose worst misery looks a bit different from 'the norm'; they're 'wrong' are they?

Consensus doesn't tell you what set of circumstances equals ''misery" equals "bad", and which do not. Consensus tells you that there are characteristics of circumstances other than "some humans do not value them".

Also, I'm still not sure what you think about the well-being of conscious creatures? Which creatures' well-being is worth including in this 'scientific' morality? Do we admit tadpoles?

Would facts about the richness of the internal experience of tadpoles alter our perception on how they should be treated? Are there reasons that we treat dogs differently than tadpoles which go beyond a tally of how many people like dogs?

Linda

 

[fls]

Again, from Harris:

Sounds like 'it's my way or the highway', unless by 'wright and wrong answers', Harris means that his right and wrong answers are not better than anyone else's right or wrong answers, but of course he doesn't mean this as it would be nonsensical claptrap and he's written a whole book explaining why his way is the best.

Simply put, Harris thinks that science is the right way and that is what the argument has been about.

He doesn't mean that science is the right way. Just like we can be right or wrong about whether a particular action will make us healthy (say taking a vaccine against a disease which can be transmitted sexually), we can be right or wrong about other questions which are currently treated as moral questions. Science is simply a very good way of discovering which ideas are right or wrong. It's not the only way. It's just far better than anything else we've tried.

Linda

 

[fls]

This is the problem when you guess what morality is based on. A "happy pill" might effectively seek happiness and avoid misery. However, most people's moral sense do not agree at all that this is right nor can they do a very good job of explaining why. Morality does not just measure happiness/misery, it measures more than that. In fact, I would argue that finding happiness and avoiding misery is a consequence of moral action, not its defining characteristic, just as making objects pop out of the background is a consequence of color vision, not its defining characteristic.

I think that's a very good point. I don't know if you've read Harris' book, but I think the chapters where he discusses what happens in our brains with respect to moral action show that there is more richness to this idea than simply "happiness" or "misery". The terms really seem to just serve as placeholders until we have a clearer understanding of what it is we are guessing at.

Linda

 

[The Man]

I think that's a very good point. I don't know if you've read Harris' book, but I think the chapters where he discusses what happens in our brains with respect to moral action show that there is more richness to this idea than simply "happiness" or "misery". The terms really seem to just serve as placeholders until we have a clearer understanding of what it is we are guessing at.

Linda

Absolutely, the frontal lobe would seem to be the place to look for such brain responses in moral considerations. It would seem rather incongruent if such functioning of the brain were not based on facts about the brain.

 

[Dani]

Well, everything we think happens in our brains, included our scientific thinking.

What happens in our brains when we do logic? Should we think about changing terms such as inference or conclusion based on what happens in our brains?

 

[Paulhoff]

Your Brain = YOU, to talk as if it is separate don't make sense, so it should be stated as, “What happens within ourselves when we do logic?

Paul

 

[fls]

Well, everything we think happens in our brains, included our scientific thinking.

What happens in our brains when we do logic? Should we think about changing terms such as inference or conclusion based on what happens in our brains?

That's a good question. For example, we value loss differently from valuing gain. We will preferentially avoid an activity couched in terms of loss and preferentially undertake an activity couched in terms of gain, even though the actual value of the thing lost or gained remains the same in the two scenarios. Our brains tell us the physical properties are different, but objective measures of the physical properties tell us that they are the same. Yet we don't see philosophers suggesting that a bit of gold gains mass when it is given to someone and it loses mass when it is taken away.

Linda

 

[Dani]

That's a good question. For example, we value loss differently from valuing gain. We will preferentially avoid an activity couched in terms of loss and preferentially undertake an activity couched in terms of gain, even though the actual value of the thing lost or gained remains the same in the two scenarios. Our brains tell us the physical properties are different, but objective measures of the physical properties tell us that they are the same. Yet we don't see philosophers suggesting that a bit of gold gains mass when it is given to someone and it loses mass when it is taken away.

Linda

I'm not sure I understand you, in particular the highlighted bit. Can you put a practical example?

 

[fls]

I'm not sure I understand you, in particular the highlighted bit. Can you put a practical example?

Take the example I used - a gram of gold. A person will give up more to avoid losing that gold than they will give up to buy the gold in the first place. That is, the gold has greater value once they own it than it did before they owned it. Since gold has a specific value based on it's weight, one would have to guess that alterations in its value meant that its weight altered (if it has to be based on our values).

Linda

 

[AlBell]

What does that have to do with a discussion about morals.

How about an on topic example?

 

[Dani]

Take the example I used - a gram of gold. A person will give up more to avoid losing that gold than they will give up to buy the gold in the first place. That is, the gold has greater value once they own it than it did before they owned it. Since gold has a specific value based on it's weight, one would have to guess that alterations in its value meant that its weight altered (if it has to be based on our values).

Linda

I see. But this doesn't mean that our brains tell us that the physical properties of gold vary depending on whether we own it or not.

And anyway, I don't see how this has anything to do with my observation.

 

[fls]

I see. But this doesn't mean that our brains tell us that the physical properties of gold vary depending on whether we own it or not.

It does if we claim that that something depends only upon our values.

And anyway, I don't see how this has anything to do with my observation.

Well, why don't our intuitions about logic change the meaning of inference or conclusion?

Linda

 

[Dani]

It does if we claim that that something depends only upon our values.

Honestly, I'm lost.

Well, why don't our intuitions about logic change the meaning of inference or conclusion?

Same here.


To clear things up, the underlying idea of my observation is the following:

Happiness and misery are abstract concepts that we use to describe mind states which are subjectively experienced by human beings.

When we recognize these mind states, we can find a correlation between them and their physical substratum by observing the brain activity that is occurring at that moment.

Locating the physical substratum that causes happiness and misery doesn't give us any further information about these abstract concepts. That's because we've already established these concepts, and then found their physical correlate, not the other way around.

Similarly, physically locating moral thinking doesn't give us any additional information about the concept.

 

[fls]

To clear things up, the underlying idea of my observation is the following:

Happiness and misery are abstract concepts that we use to describe mind states which are subjectively experienced by human beings.

When we recognize these mind states, we can find a correlation between them and their physical substratum by observing the brain activity that is occurring at that moment.

Locating the physical substratum that causes happiness and misery doesn't give us any further information about these abstract concepts. That's because we've already established these concepts, and then found their physical correlate, not the other way around.

Similarly, physically locating moral thinking doesn't give us any additional information about the concept.

Okay. So other than their physical location in the brain, happiness and misery are unconnected to any physical events.

It makes you wonder why jail is considered a punishment if misery is unconnected to imprisonment. Oh well.

Linda