Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[fls]

...and then the company line....

Blatantly biased (and factually incorrect)….therefore irrelevant.

The epistemology of science is simply not amenable to dealing with the human condition (as Chomsky implicated). The epistemology of science is a formidable accomplishment and quite effectively and capably deals with an explicitly limited range of issues. Human beings have a singular epistemology that we use when dealing with just about everything else. It might be described as some fathomless combination-interaction of intuition / wisdom / reason / feelings / intelligence / rationality. It is an exclusive function of one word: faith. We did not create it, we do not create it, we do not control it, and we do not understand it. What we are….as David Fincher so succinctly concluded, is ‘in charge’. In charge of what? A miracle, magic, the ‘image of God’ ????…who knows, but what we do know is that if we abdicate that responsibility, ‘in charge’ doesn’t work. One thing is certain though….science does not know. All the mindless wishful thinking

of all the skeptics in the world isn’t going to change that.

That, specifically, is the issue here. There is a reason that Dan Dennet called human consciousness ‘the last remaining mystery’. It is because the phenomenon of human reality is singularly unique. All these simplistic attempts to reduce it to scientifically manageable / intellectually intelligible proportions (which, by the way, skeptics are just as guilty of…if not far more frequently guilty of….than any Christians I’ve encountered) are simply intellectually dishonest…if not outright delusional.

Mr. Katz….I understand your position, but you clearly are missing the point. And it’s a very very very big point. I suggest you go and read the full text. It is actually relevant to this discussion since Mr. Atran, at the time, was responding to Mr. Harris (among others) who, at the time, was waxing typically vitriolic over his thinly veiled disgust at all things religious / irrational. It can be found here: http://www.edge.org/discourse/bb.html

Mr. Atran (surely Dr.?), does not come out well in that exchange, although after all we've been through here, it is heart-warming to see that even powerful intellectuals can talk past one another.

I don't think anyone claims that understanding the human condition is simple, only that perhaps we'd be better off approaching it with reason.

Linda

 

[fls]

As usual, we disagree. Anyone who actually knows exactly what you've said in this thread is welcome to clarify the matter.

Ought they do so?

???

I find it hard to believe that anyone here confuses me as an apologist for theism. Or that anyone could consider it of importance to clarify the matter.

Linda

 

[JoelKatz]

"I want my son's penis to look like his dad's" is a common reason parents give for circumcision in the USA. If that's not "torturing children for pleasure", what is?

And you'll notice that for some reason, this is an exception that Americans typically agree on. So far from being arbitrary, this is more evidence that it's not arbitrary -- we just don't know what it is based on.

So it would be very strange for people not to have similar ideas about what's right ot wrong, even though those ideas may ultimately be arbitrary.

Well then you've diluted arbitrary to the point of it being meaningless. By this standard, what isn't arbitrary? If I am repeating you, what you say is arbitrary, but what I'm saying is not -- it's determined by you.

It also seems likely that there are behavioural biases encoded in our genome which make particular moral choices more likely than others. E.g., nice guys finish first and evolutionary stable strategies.

Then it's not arbitrary, it's partially determined by what we really, in fact, are. Your just slandering these objective facts by calling them "biases" so you can pretend they're arbitrary.

That or a number of similar questions can serve as nice examples of how weighing various criteria differently can result in people giving different answers, all of which are correct (or incorrect, depending on your point of view).

I agree. That really just shows that we don't fully understand the question.

What is the total distance around the coastline of the UK?

Exactly. No good answer because the question is too vague. What answer you get depends on how you measure and the right way to measure depends on what you want to know.

Right, so Harris' has managed to rule out morality based on gibberish. How many people outside a Lewis Carroll story subscribe to such a system of morality?

I'd say about 80% of the human population accepts a morality based on gibberish.

 

[AlBell]

???

I find it hard to believe that anyone here confuses me as an apologist for theism. Or that anyone could consider it of importance to clarify the matter.

Linda

Being an apologist for, and noting current moral systems often use theism as the stated basis for need to adhere to same are not the same thing.

You, Harris, Paul, etal feel they ought not, pretending Science will get us from "is" to (some other) "oughts", without using any apriori "ought" .

 

[Paulhoff]

Again, and this is simple, Sam Harris said that science wasn't the only way but just one more.

Simple, but like most humans many what to read themselves into what others say.

Paul



Now I know some here will run amok with that simple idea.

 

[qayak]

???

I find it hard to believe that anyone here confuses me as an apologist for theism. Or that anyone could consider it of importance to clarify the matter.

Linda

AlBell is a theist who believes morality only comes from religion.

You can add me to your list of people who don't believe that.

 

[fls]

Being an apologist for, and noting current moral systems often use theism as the stated basis for need to adhere to same are not the same thing.

You, Harris, Paul, etal feel they ought not, pretending Science will get us from "is" to (some other) "oughts", without using any apriori "ought" .

I'm sorry. I can't understand what you are trying to say - I'm having trouble parsing what you wrote.

Linda

 

[qayak]

Blatantly biased (and factually incorrect)….therefore irrelevant.

The epistemology of science is simply not amenable to dealing with the human condition (as Chomsky implicated).

That's funny because there is so much evidence to support just the opposite.

It is simply a well worn, and non-confrontational cliche to say science is not able to deal with this issue. It makes religious people feel self important, even superior to people of reason. Unfortunately for them, it appears scientists are going to turn their attention to the problem. That never bodes well for religion! )

Harris isn't the only one to disagree with it.

 

[AlBell]

I'm sorry. I can't understand what you are trying to say - I'm having trouble parsing what you wrote.

Linda

Ditto.

Al

 

[Beth]

It is actually relevant to this discussion since Mr. Atran, at the time, was responding to Mr. Harris (among others) who, at the time, was waxing typically vitriolic over his thinly veiled disgust at all things religious / irrational. It can be found here: http://www.edge.org/discourse/bb.html

Thanks. I've watched the Beyond Belief videos on the internet. It was nice to see this further expounding on the themes.

Mr. Atran (surely Dr.?), does not come out well in that exchange.

I have to disagree. Dr. Atran (I'm presuming he holds a Ph.D.) was the only person on that page to back up what he was saying with actual data. He studies religion and how religious beliefs contribute to the actions of people scientifically. As he is an expert in that area, I do tend to give his opinion more weight on the matter than the opinion of other scientists who specialized in fields like biology and neurology. In particular, I thought he came off as having better evidence to support his points than Harris.

Dennett is also an expert in that area, but he didn't dispute the points that Atran was arguing. He contended that Atran misinterpreted Harris. Myself, I don't know. What I get from listing to Harris, Dawkins, etc. is not what Dennett felt they were saying and is in line with Atran's interpretation.

although after all we've been through here, it is heart-warming to see that even powerful intellectuals can talk past one another.

Here we agree. Although I think that such things happen in pretty much every type of human endeavor requiring more than two people.

I don't think anyone claims that understanding the human condition is simple, only that perhaps we'd be better off approaching it with reason.

Linda

I see Dr. Atran as doing that very thing and basing his conclusions on the information he has acquired through his studies. Why did you feel that he didn't come off well in the exchange?

 

[Sophronius]

Obviously, I completely disagree. They are the same kind of statement.

I have difficulty wrapping my head around this. Murder is bad expresses feelings a person has towards a certain act. Hydrogen is flammable describes what will happen if you perform a certain act. One is normative, the other is descriptive. Do you seriously believe that we should not distinguish between normative and descriptive statements? That there is, in fact, no difference?

This seems to say that there is no such thing as opinion.

The core difference is that "hydrogen is flammable" solely describes reality, while "murder is bad" describes feelings one has ABOUT a reality (murder). Surely you must be able to see the value in distinguishing between the two? Because even though those feelings are part of reality, they are different from person to person?

How many times do I have to address this same argument? How would you test if hydrogen was flammable without making it subject to human opinion? Even if you could make some machine to do the test, some human would have to design and build the machine and interpret the results.

Are you serious? Are you really saying that "hydrogen is flammable" is a subjective statement because it has to be witnessed by a human? So "the sun is going to come up tomorrow" is subject to human opinion?

It's not. Reality is not influenced by human opinion. That is what reality MEANS. "Reality is that what doesn't go away when you stop believing in it"

Are you really serious, or are you just messing with me? Because I don't get how you can say that hydrogen being flammable is subject to human opinion. If that were true, then all of reality would have to exist solely in our minds. And if you made that assumption, then you'd essentially have to throw out all of science.

I never claimed science would show that morality isn't subject to opinion.

And yet, you insist that morality is objective, that murder being bad isn't subject to opinion, and whenever you are pressed for evidence you say that science will deliver it later. But you know what, it doesn't matter. There is no evidence for any of this, either way.

Then please, explain to me what "good in an of itself" is.

It's how humans feel about morality. They feel that some acts "simply are" wrong. You yourself argue along the same lines, when you claim that morality isn't subject to opinion. (and yet, hydrogen being flammable is?)

You're simply saying "he is not making a statement of fact" because you don't know what the facts that underly the value judgment are. Just as a person who says "ice cream tastes great" may not know what facts underlie his value judgment. But there are such facts. And if there weren't, his value judgment would be of no value at all.

No, no, no. You don't get it. A person who says murder is bad is not making a statement of fact about murder itself. The only fact he describes is that he feels about murder in a certain way. Likewise, the person who says he likes icecream is not making a factual statement about icecream but rather his personal preference for it. If another person says that they hate ice cream they are not WRONG, they simply have a different preference. That makes it different from objective fact: it varies from person to person.

Yes, the underlying reality is the same. The ice cream is the same. The murder is the same. I get it. No need to point it out. But the value judgement says MORE than that. It adds a subjective interpretation of the underlying reality. This extra layer is what morality is all about, and what prevents it from being objective. If people just said "murder causes people to die", that would be objective fact; it's true regardless what anyone thinks of it. Similarly, if someone said that "I don't like murder", that would be a factual statement. Either it's true or it's not. But if someone says "murder is bad", well, then he is making a statement of preference not just for himself, but in general. And that simply cannot hold for everyone. This is what makes it subjective: it is true for some, false for others. You cannot simply say that "murder is bad" is true or false because then you ignore the preferences of those who disagree. And there is simply no reason to believe that anyone's preferences can be wrong in the factual sense.

Is there anything in there that you disagree with? Please take the time to understand and reply carefully, because this is the best that I can explain myself, and if this doesn't help then I suspect nothing will.

And you might notice that your attempts to insist that moral value judgments are magical and based on no facts isn't working at all either. But ...

I don't get why you're doing this. I really don't. You KNOW I've never claimed this. And believe it or not, I have spent a great deal of effort in trying to understand your position. I don't understand why you cannot extend the same courtesy, and insist on this insulting straw man.

We disagree over the validity of my argument. Using some other argument won't fix *that* disagreement. That's actually a simpler disagreement than our larger one over morality. So giving up this wedge would be a huge step backwards in us reaching any agreement.

I have tried arguing your argument many times. You simply keep going back to the same points that I already replied to 10 times already. It's not going to work.

When you have tried the same argument so many times already, it's time to try a different one. If your position is correct and morality is really objective, then there is no reason why you should be dependent on the colour analogy. In fact there should be no need for any analogy at all. Simply argue for objective morality on its own merits.

 

[JoelKatz]

I have difficulty wrapping my head around this. Murder is bad expresses feelings a person has towards a certain act. Hydrogen is flammable describes what will happen if you perform a certain act. One is normative, the other is descriptive. Do you seriously believe that we should not distinguish between normative and descriptive statements? That there is, in fact, no difference?

That's precisely what I'm saying. Hydrogen is flammable also expresses feeling I have about hydrogen. Murder is bad also describes things that will happen if you perform certain acts. One is written in an normative way and the other is written in a descriptive way, but as I argued, you can push in from both sides to fuzzy boundary.

I do think we have no choice but to distinguish between normative and descriptive statements. But that's because we don't understand the difference yet. It's the same way we once didn't understand the difference between "blue light" and "light that looks blue to a person".

This seems to say that there is no such thing as opinion.

Not quite. What I'm saying is that opinions are relationship facts. We simply state them in the 'primitive' way because that's the must useful.

For example, consider "it's raining out". What could be a more descriptive, factual statement? But if someone says "it's raining out", how is that any different from "I have collected facts and evidence that, in my opinion, justify concluding that it's in fact raining out"? See how fact statements and opinion statements can each be pushed in towards the other from either side? You just have to figure out the facts and processes that lead to the opinion, and then you can turn the opinion statement into a fact statement. However, if you don't know the process yet, you can't do this. That's why we once couldn't turn "the sky looks blue to me" into "the sky is emitted specific frequencies of light that have certain specific effects".

The core difference is that "hydrogen is flammable" solely describes reality, while "murder is bad" describes feelings one has ABOUT a reality (murder). Surely you must be able to see the value in distinguishing between the two? Because even though those feelings are part of reality, they are different from person to person?

Sure, but height is different from person to person. Relationship facts can differ from person to person, that doesn't make them less facts.

Go back to "it's raining out". If you understand that to really be saying "I have evidence that justifies my believing that it's raining out" (which is what anyone who says "it's raining out" means), it now becomes different from person to person. You may have no reason to believe it's raining out.

Are you serious? Are you really saying that "hydrogen is flammable" is a subjective statement because it has to be witnessed by a human? So "the sun is going to come up tomorrow" is subject to human opinion?

Yes, as much as "murder is bad" is. That's precisely what I'm saying. That the fact/value distinction is not fundamental. Fact statements and value statements can be freely interconverted with an understanding of what facts and processes underlie the value.

It's not. Reality is not influenced by human opinion. That is what reality MEANS. "Reality is that what doesn't go away when you stop believing in it".

Nope. Our opinions are just as much part of reality as rocks and rivers are. Statements about our beliefs are just as capable of being objectively true or false as statements about rocks and rivers. Our brains are not magic. A part of reality does go away when I stop believing in it, that part of reality that was that belief.

Are you really serious, or are you just messing with me? Because I don't get how you can say that hydrogen being flammable is subject to human opinion. If that were true, then all of reality would have to exist solely in our minds. And if you made that assumption, then you'd essentially have to throw out all of science.

You choose to see one side of the equivalence I'm arguing. I'm saying that there are only facts. Opinions are a species of fact. This also means that humans can only get to facts through their opinions regarding their truth, but those opinions are themselves facts.

No, no, no. You don't get it. A person who says murder is bad is not making a statement of fact about murder itself. The only fact he describes is that he feels about murder in a certain way.

That is only because you choose to view it that way. You could equally well choose to view it as "murder itself has precisely the properties needed for me to consider it bad". Now it's about murder itself. There is no difference between "I am so constructed as to think that murder is bad" and "murder is constructed such that I will think it's bad". These are, again, relationship facts, just like "hydrogen is flammable" which states that hydrogen is such that it will interact with oxygen (which exists and is precisely what it is) in a particular way.

Likewise, the person who says he likes icecream is not making a factual statement about icecream but rather his personal preference for it. If another person says that they hate ice cream they are not WRONG, they simply have a different preference. That makes it different from objective fact: it varies from person to person.

But it doesn't differ from person to person. I, JoelKatz, like ice cream does not conflict with you, Sophronius, do not like ice cream. This is no different from "I am six feet tell". These are relationship facts. It can be a fact that your relationship to ice cream is different from mine, just like I can be in a room and you can be outside it.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

That you no longer are capable of even recognizing that 'health' is analogous is perhaps the best argument in favor of Harris' proposal. Once 'health' is wrested from the grip of teleology, it doesn't even occur to us to question the idea that one can make reference to the physical world in order to answer health questions.
Linda

fls, consider the following analogy which I posted earlier:

If I assumed a priori that God existed and that the minds of conscious creatures were a reflection of the mind of God, I could then study the minds of conscious creatures, with the claim that I could find scientific knowledge about them which would give me the knowledge of the mind of God.

How is this different from?:

If I assume a priori that moral truth exists and that the well-being of conscious creatures was the key to understanding moral truth, then I could study the well-being of conscious creatures, with the claim that I could find scientific knowledge about this well-being which would give me moral knowledge.

How useful are these analogies in being able to justify 'a science' of anything?

Yet we are unable to tell whether being vaporized in a nuclear blast would be perceived as good for everyone? I find that a bit hard to believe.

Do you think that for a suicidal person, being vaporised instantly would be a 'bad' thing? Of course, it would be unhealthy for them
Also, I'm not sure what 'perception of good' has to do with objective good?

I think this is your strongest argument against the idea that Harris is proposing utilitarianism - i.e. you have shown that his proposals fail to be meaningful or provide some of the necessary information if you try to force them into that particular slot.

One of my arguments is that Harris is proposing a kind of moral realism, yet his argument actually backfires in that it ends up supporting moral relativism via 'the worst possible misery', rather than providing an objective basis for moral knowledge. What do you think of this argument? What moral knowledge can we gain from 'the worst possible misery universe'?

Also, I'm confused by your comments. Harris doesn't think that the well-being of conscious creatures should be the basis for deciding what is good or bad? That's the assumption I was making. If he does, has he defined what he means by conscious? If he is including all creatures which have a capacity or otherwise for well-being (which would seem sensible), then don't the problems I outlined arise?

 

[fls]

fls, consider the following analogy which I posted earlier:

If I assumed a priori that God existed and that the minds of conscious creatures were a reflection of the mind of God, I could then study the minds of conscious creatures, with the claim that I could find scientific knowledge about them which would give me the knowledge of the mind of God.

How is this different from?:

If I assume a priori that moral truth exists and that the well-being of conscious creatures was the key to understanding moral truth, then I could study the well-being of conscious creatures, with the claim that I could find scientific knowledge about this well-being which would give me moral knowledge.

How useful are these analogies in being able to justify 'a science' of anything?

I don't think they are different. Which is why I have spoken against the axiom-based approach taken by philosophers, and why I have said that a science-based approach should not take this form.

Do you think that for a suicidal person, being vaporised instantly would be a 'bad' thing?

So are you saying that the existence of suicidal persons negates the idea that some actions can be considered unhealthy, just like the presence of suicidal persons negates the idea that the vaporization of humans can be considered undesirable?

Of course, it would be unhealthy for them

How can that be?

Also, I'm not sure what 'perception of good' has to do with objective good?

About the same as 'perception of health' has to do with the absence of disease and impairment. There is some correspondence between the two, but obviously perceptions can differ. The subject who thinks they are healthier because the salicylates they took for their abdominal pain has temporarily relieved the pain from the gastric ulcer caused by the salicylates, or the subject who has achieved balance in their humours by the letting of blood, or the parents who think that sex is unhealthy for their children and deliberately withhold vaccines against diseases which are transmitted sexually, would be examples where science differs from our intuitions/perceptions.

One of my arguments is that Harris is proposing a kind of moral realism, yet his argument actually backfires in that it ends up supporting moral relativism via 'the worst possible misery', rather than providing an objective basis for moral knowledge. What do you think of this argument? What moral knowledge can we gain from 'the worst possible misery universe'?

What JoelKatz was referring to - as a thought experiment, areas of consensus allow us to recognize those properties relevant to what our intuitions imperfectly discover. I suspect there is more consensus on misery than well-being.

Also, I'm confused by your comments. Harris doesn't think that the well-being of conscious creatures should be the basis for deciding what is good or bad? That's the assumption I was making. If he does, has he defined what he means by conscious? If he is including all creatures which have a capacity or otherwise for well-being (which would seem sensible), then don't the problems I outlined arise?

I don't think that Harris is proposing that the well being of conscious creatures forms an axiom from which we derive morality.

Linda

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

<snip>

I don't think that Harris is proposing that the well being of conscious creatures forms an axiom from which we derive morality.

Linda

So what axiom is he proposing?

 

[Sophronius]

That's precisely what I'm saying. Hydrogen is flammable also expresses feeling I have about hydrogen. Murder is bad also describes things that will happen if you perform certain acts. One is written in an normative way and the other is written in a descriptive way, but as I argued, you can push in from both sides to fuzzy boundary.

This makes no sense. "Hydrogen is flammable" is not a statement meant to convey feeling. No person alive, other than apparently yourself, would take it that way. Likewise, "murder is bad" is generally not meant to describe the factual reality of murder. You can ask anyone who says that murder is bad what they mean by it and you will generally find that they are conveying opinion, not describing facts.

I can see the mistake you are making now, however. You say "But that they have that opinion is a fact! So it's the same kind of statement." But that is missing the point. The reason that "murder is bad" is not a factual statement is because there is no "I think that" attached to it, and because "Bad" is not expressed in practical terms. This is an important distinction that you are ignoring in order to make your point. But the simple fact of the matter is that phrasing the statement to remove the element of opinion makes it a different statement. So no, "murder is bad" and "Hydrogen is flammable" are not the same kind of statement. Rather they differ in the same sense that "Murder is bad" differs from "Murder causes people to die".

I see no sensible reason to try to equivocate the two by means of saying "But really, murder is bad IMPLIES a reality about murder which is objectively true, so that makes the entire statement objective truth." No. That is simply bending logic in an attempt to make a point. The distinction is there.

Not quite. What I'm saying is that opinions are relationship facts. We simply state them in the 'primitive' way because that's the must useful.

You seem to be saying that people are currently expressing themselves in a subjective way because they do not understand the underlying reality enough to make purely factual statements that express the same thing.

If that's what you're saying, you give people too much credit by far. A person why says "god is good" is not expressing an underlying reality in a primitive way. He is not expressing anything meaningful. His statement is rooted in ignorance and as far from objectively true as it is possible to be. A person who says "murder is bad" generally means to express the same sentiment. It is not based on reason. It is only marginally more meaningful than the previous statement. It is still subjective.

For example, consider "it's raining out". What could be a more descriptive, factual statement? But if someone says "it's raining out", how is that any different from "I have collected facts and evidence that, in my opinion, justify concluding that it's in fact raining out"? See how fact statements and opinion statements can each be pushed in towards the other from either side? You just have to figure out the facts and processes that lead to the opinion, and then you can turn the opinion statement into a fact statement.

I see your point, but disagree with the conclusion. "It is raining out" is an honest attempt to present facts about reality. "Murder is bad" is generally NOT meant to do that. No, it's not even an honest attempt to express feelings, which are indeed part of reality, because in that case "I think that" would have been added to it. "Murder is bad" is often an attempt to present someone's feelings AS objective facts about murder itself. It is misleading in this way.

It is true that you can turn the statement INTO a fact statement by changing the wording. But then it means something else from what it was intended to mean. You are making a mistake by assuming that all opinions are honest efforts to present facts about reality. And even if they were all intended to do just that, those that fail horribly could still not reasonably be called factual statements. There is such a thing as a meaningless statement, you know.

There are several ways to discuss murder. One is to honestly present the facts. Another is to present one's opinion and claim that it is fact. (NOT: fact that they have that opinion). The second is clearly different from the first, and your attempt to equivocate the two does nothing but remove useful information.

Sure, but height is different from person to person. Relationship facts can differ from person to person, that doesn't make them less facts.

Okay. If I say "People are tall", is that a factual statement? Is it true? Is it false?

Of course not. People are only tall relative to other things. Furthermore, the difference in height varies a great deal from person to person. This kind of blanket statement can never be universally true or false, not when discussing something like "tallness".

The exact same holds for murder. "Murder is bad". Really? For who? When? What is meant by bad? Is this statement true or false? Are people who disagree right or wrong? It's neither.

Go back to "it's raining out". If you understand that to really be saying "I have evidence that justifies my believing that it's raining out" (which is what anyone who says "it's raining out" means), it now becomes different from person to person. You may have no reason to believe it's raining out.

Yes, but regardless of whether it is successful or not, it is an honest attempt to convey fact. "Murder is bad" is not. It's an entirely different kind of statement, that cannot be true or false. This is because "Bad" is not defined in any objective fashion: Its meaning varies from person to person. Therefore it's subjective.

Yes, as much as "murder is bad" is. That's precisely what I'm saying.

No, this is simply wrong. Hydrogen is flammable, regardless of what anyone thinks of it. You can test if hydrogen is flammable by igniting it. It will subsequently be inflamed, regardless of what anyone thinks of it. There is no human interpretation necessary.

Nope. Our opinions are just as much part of reality as rocks and rivers are.

The belief exists, obviously. But the belief itself does not directly affect reality (OTHER THAN ITSELF). It is simply ludicrous to claim that one's beliefs affect whether or not hydrogen is flammable or whether the sun will come up tomorrow. It is false. It is absurd. It is absolute insanity.

If you insist on claiming this, then there is nothing I can do to convince you otherwise. If you insist that your beliefs will determine reality, then this discussion is pointless.

You choose to see one side of the equivalence I'm arguing. I'm saying that there are only facts. Opinions are a species of fact.

This is false. It is a fact that humans have opinions. That does not make the things that the opinions are expressing facts. If my opinion is that red is really blue, then that is not a fact. If my opinion is that a certain band is good, then it's a fact that I have that opinion, but the opinion itself is not fact.

That is only because you choose to view it that way. You could equally well choose to view it as "murder itself has precisely the properties needed for me to consider it bad". Now it's about murder itself.

No. Those statements are completely different. Someone who says that "Murder is objectively bad" is NOT trying to make a statement about the properties of murder that makes them consider it bad. Those properties can be inferred, yes. But that is not what the statement is meant to say.

There is no difference between "I am so constructed as to think that murder is bad" and "murder is constructed such that I will think it's bad". These are, again, relationship facts, just like "hydrogen is flammable" which states that hydrogen is such that it will interact with oxygen (which exists and is precisely what it is) in a particular way.

Sure, but the first two statements are ones you just came up with, and not the topic of discussion. We were talking about "murder is bad", which is entirely different from "I think murder is bad" or "Murder has certain properties that make me consider it bad".

But it doesn't differ from person to person. I, JoelKatz, like ice cream does not conflict with you, Sophronius, do not like ice cream.

So the enjoyment of ice cream does differ from person to person. So the enjoyment of ice cream IS a subjective matter. Otherwise it could not vary from person to person. So the statement that ice cream is enjoyable is subjective.

You seem to be confused with the statement "I enjoy ice cream", which is a factual statement, and entirely different from the statement "Ice cream is enjoyable" (which makes a general statement that cannot be true for everyone). Of course, if a clause "For most people" were to be added, it would become a factual statement again.

Now, if someone says that ice cream tastes good, they do usually mean "for me" or "for most people". This does not hold for someone who says that "murder is objectively bad", as the word objectively is meant to indicate.

 

[JoelKatz]

You seem to be confused with the statement "I enjoy ice cream", which is a factual statement, and entirely different from the statement "Ice cream is enjoyable" (which makes a general statement that cannot be true for everyone). Of course, if a clause "For most people" were to be added, it would become a factual statement again.

Now, if someone says that ice cream tastes good, they do usually mean "for me" or "for most people". This does not hold for someone who says that "murder is objectively bad", as the word objectively is meant to indicate.

I think you are just completely hung up on how people choose to express themselves rather than the thoughts that they are actually trying to convey. There is absolutely no difference between a person who says "murder is objectively bad" and a person who says "It is my opinion that murder is bad". This is just the same as someone who says "it is raining out" is simply using a short sequence of words to express the complex notion that they possess evidence that they believe justifies believing that it is raining out.

Sure, a person may say "No, I just wanted to express the fact that it is actually raining out". But the way human beings express facts is by stating their opinion that the fact is correct.

You think this somehow denigrates facts to the level of opinions. But the reverse is true, it elevates opinions to relationship facts. Humans can only express facts by indicating some relationship they have to that fact. That's the limitation we suffer because we are not omniscient.

In most cases, it makes no difference. We can freely convert. However, there are some cases where we lack sufficient understanding to convert. Not understanding color vision, we could not easily convert "the sky is blue" to what they were really saying. It is not just "the sky looks blue to me". We similarly lack an understanding of proscriptive morality. So we cannot easily convert proscriptive moral claims to their underlying relationship facts. If there are none, then such claims are not just subjective but arbitrary. In which case, the only rational response to them is to ignore them.

Of course, we shouldn't ignore them now. Even though we don't understand them, we have no choice but to use them until we do. This is precisely the same as how we could certainly use our color vision even before we understood what physical information it was giving us. It worked, so we used it. We do the same now with proscriptive morality.

 

[JoelKatz]

There is absolutely no difference between a person who says "murder is objectively bad" and a person who says "It is my opinion that murder is bad".

Actually, this part of my argument is not correct. There is a difference between these two things. There is no difference, however, between someone who says "murder is objectively bad" and someone who says "I have reasons to believe that murder is bad independent of whether anyone thinks it is bad".

The problem arrives, however, when we analyze his claim. We're not particularly interested in whether he believes murder is bad or whether he has evidence that he believes justifies him believing murder is bad. What we want to know is -- does the evidence justify us also believing that murder is bad? And to do that, we need standards for whether or not murder actually is objectively bad. If there are no such standards, then we are not justified in accepting that claim. (Although, of course, sometimes we may have to take actions or make decisions even without sufficient evidence to determine with confidence which choice is the best. We shouldn't accept that no choice is the best though, just that we don't know which and have no choice but to act anyway.)

Again, if there is no way in which murder can objectively be bad, then we are never justified in accepting that it is in fact bad. If 'oughts' cannot be objectively justified, they should not be accepted. (Except perhaps as the best we can do in a circumstance in which we admit we have limited information or knowledge.)

So the enjoyment of ice cream does differ from person to person. So the enjoyment of ice cream IS a subjective matter. Otherwise it could not vary from person to person. So the statement that ice cream is enjoyable is subjective.

"Enjoyable" means capable of being enjoyed. If some people in fact enjoy ice cream, the claim is objectively true. At worst, the claim is imprecise because it doesn't state who is doing the enjoying. If it means "all people enjoy ice cream", it is false. If it means "many people enjoy ice cream", it is true. I don't see how you can get it to be subjective other than by making it imprecise.

"Over six feet tall" varies from person to person. Is it subjective? When you call something "subjective", it seems to just mean that it is a relationship fact that is imprecise about one end of the relationship. -- "Jack is tall" compared to what? "Ice cream is enjoyable" by whom? Is "The Sun is bright" subjective because the Sun is not as bright as some other stars?

If moral claims are not capable of objectively being true, we should just ignore them the same way we ignore other claims that are not capable of being true.

 

[Egg]

If moral claims are not capable of objectively being true, we should just ignore them the same way we ignore other claims that are not capable of being true.

Such as that sentence?

 

[JoelKatz]

Such as that sentence?

I don't believe that moral claims are incapable of being objectively true. But if they were, then yes, including that one.

If we have limited knowledge or limited time in which to make a decision, we may have to act on the basis of claims whose truth we are not thoroughly convinced of. But that is a very different from acting on the basis of a claim we believe is not even capable of being true.

If a claim is no better and no worse objectively supported than the contradiction of that claim, it is irrational to act on one rather than the other.