I can tell you what prescriptive moral ideas are: they're claims to the effect that people should behave in certain ways. They are purely value judgments, and they have no truth value. Science cannot prove them to be correct or incorrect because they are just the wrong kind of thing for science to engage with.
This doesn't help, because you've used the word "should". When I ask what prescriptive morality actually is, what I want do know is what it means when we say someone "should" do something.
And it also doesn't help to say it best achieves some goal or purpose. Committing suicide best achieves the goal or purpose of ending your life. The question of "should" is the question of what it means to say a particular goal is the "best" one or the most appropriate one. For something to be "best" it has to be best
at something.
I think you are side-stepping the fact that we really do not understand what it means for something to "be right" or "be best" precisely as we once did not understand what it means for something to "be blue". (Because we always had to reduce it to it seeming so to us.)
That is, the is/ought problem or the descriptive/proscriptive dichotomy are all artifacts of the fact that we do not understand what making moral judgments actually is, much as we once didn't understand what seeing in color actually was. Once we do understand that, there will be no dichotomy. It will be what it will be, and we will know what it is.
As a hypothetical, imagine if science had discovered that the physical universe and everything in it obeys strict, hard physical determinism. That is, given a particular state of the universe, there is only one possible set of succeeding states of the universe. Had such a scientific discovery been made, the entire concept of prescriptive ethics would, I think, become meaningless. If there is only ever one thing it is physically possible for a person
to do, what does it mean to talk about what a person
should do? If men are basically just complicated hammers, then there is no prescriptive morality. No sane person wonders what a hammer
should do. (The notion of 'should' only applies to entities for which more than one course of action is physically possible.)
We don't yet even understand how people implement choices. If they don't, then there is no prescriptive ethics, and science can answer all meaningful moral question. If they do, then science can explain
how they implement choices. Can you seriously argue that understanding how people choose and how they physically implement their decisions (the physical facts that make prescriptive ethics exist in the first place) won't teach us anything about it? That's akin to arguing that understanding color vision won't tell us anything about color. It's facially absurd.