Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[Kevin_Lowe]

Perhaps you should, as you seem to have an "is/ought" problem or is that just where you got the idea that you ought to have such an "is/ought" problem?

You seem to be determined to misunderstand me, and unwilling to do any work to catch up on the thread to avoid such misunderstandings, so I don't think this discussion is going to be productive.

Moral or not “ought” is still just a claim of what one thinks should be. Like a positive and a negative charge ought to attract.

No, this is just wrong. Objects with mass just do feel a mutually attractive force. Objects with opposite charges just do feel a mutually attractive force. There is absolutely no moral ought to the matter.

Actually was still responding to your assertions, one being.

No you weren't. You were responding directly to my summary of Harris' argument. Scroll back and look at what went before.

You claimed an "is/ought" problem if you can’t explain exactly what your problem is then perhaps you still don't understand it.

If you find my explanation confusing then use Google and read someone else's explanation of the problem until you get it. Come back when you're done.

So, that Harris is wrong was your point.

No. My argument does not boil down to a black-and-white talking point.

See you might have found some science in it after all, but I guess we’ll still just have to agree to disagree about there being a problem to start with.

Or you could go and do some reading as I originally suggested. Just because you can't figure something out when you jump into an ongoing thread on the thirty-eighth page without doing any homework of your own whatsoever, when the thread topic is university-level philosophy, doesn't mean that there is nothing to figure out.

 

[JoelKatz]

But they aren't the same.

They are the same if you take away our scientific understanding of color.

From a position of scientific naivety, I would be inclined to regard color perception as being directed at some real feature of the external world, but I would do so because was can have, say, two otherwise identical balls, viewed under identical conditions, and see one as red and the other as blue, and other people would reliably report their colors the same way I do. This would seem to deny the claim that color is merely conventional any footing--there's just nothing else in our experience to hang it on.

But you can't have two "otherwise identical balls" that are different colors under the same conditions. If you could, that would be an incredibly perplexing thing for us to understand. In fact, their surface composition has to be different or there has to be some similar difference. These differences are perceptible by other senses.

Moral intuitions are exactly not like this. We never have two otherwise identical acts such that one is right and the other wrong.

Imagine if we could have two otherwise identical acts such that one is accurately judged right and the other is accurately judged wrong. That would prove morality is subjective because here is nothing objective the judgment could measure.

If you had some kind of 'proxy' you could pass vision through. of course something different would have to pass through the proxy to see red rather than blue. If you could feed vision through such a proxy, and the same input produced different colors seen, that would *refute* objectivity.

Moral assessments do generally pass through such a proxy. I speak the thing you judge. So of course, I have to speak something different for you to judge something different. Were it not so, morality could not be measuring objective properties -- there must be some difference to measure.

In fact, because we can test morality under circumstances where we completely control the input, it's much easier to argue that the assessment is of objective properties. We can actually see that a person is assessing two different inputs, with objective differences that might be what they're measuring, when they produce different output.

We sweep whole classes of acts into one moral category or the other. We even completely disregard details that we don't consider relevant--it's generally taken to be a desirable feature of a moral system that its prescriptions be universalizable. And it's trivial to propose a mechanism to explain this without reference to some set of mind-independent facts about the world: maybe values are just transmitted from one generation to the next. Maybe they're ingrained in our biology. It doesn't matter in any case--none of this will get you to exotic entities like moral facts with normative force that provide logical grounds for moving from is to ought.

But this is the same about color. For example, the fact that we consider a mix of pure yellow and pure blue to be the same color as green is due to facts about our color vision. Two green balls can emit spectra of light that are as difference as a blue ball and a yellow ball, yet we see them as the same color because of facts ingrained in our biology.

We disregard all kinds of things when we assess an object's color. We zoom in on those things that relate to color, just as when making moral assessments, we zoom in on things that relate to morality.

Color names are transmitted from one generation to the next too. We draw the line between red and orange at a point that's learned, not necessarily part of biology. But whatever we learn about morality, it must be that we are learning how to assess some property. The question is what exactly is that property.

 

[KingofMadCows]

Isn't he kind of rehashing arguments made by BF Skinner? Although I think Skinner's arguments were more in-depth and he had some ways of modifying human behavior in order to solve social problems.

 

[fls]

Assertion isn't argument.

I agree.

You can assert all day that I have misunderstood you and that I'm wrong, but such assertions are empty unless you also explain why I am wrong and what your position is.

I agree.

There is nothing to "interrogate".

The reason you have never been able to clearly state a solution is that you do not have one.

I agree.

As I recall, your position is based on a different error, usually referred to as the naturalistic fallacy. While Harris blatantly helps himself to the assumption that the flourishing of conscious beings is morally good, you covertly help yourself to the assumption that what we have evolved to think of as good is good. Then when you get called on it you run around chasing your own tail saying "That's not what I'm saying, but it is, but it's more complicated!".

Thank you. That makes your position clear.

You're far from the first to fall in to that trap, and you certainly won't be the last. You're not saying anything new, deep or clever, if that's what you were thinking.

No. At least, I hope not. I'd hate to be the only one, or one of a few, to say something clever.

Linda

 

[JoelKatz]

As I recall, your position is based on a different error, usually referred to as the naturalistic fallacy. While Harris blatantly helps himself to the assumption that the flourishing of conscious beings is morally good, you covertly help yourself to the assumption that what we have evolved to think of as good is good. Then when you get called on it you run around chasing your own tail saying "That's not what I'm saying, but it is, but it's more complicated!".

I think most of us would agree that if we were given some incontrovertible mechanism to know how much to value particular goals, ends or outcomes, then the question of what actions would most achieve those goals would become an objective/scientific one. If we have to choose between two actions, and we could objectively put a 'value' on the result of each action, the one with the highest value would objectively be 'right', in the sense that it maximizes that value. However, you then have to face the problem of how to value the ends these actions achieve.

To an extent, it's axiomatic that what we've evolved to think of as good is good in one sense of 'good'. To go back to color vision again (sorry), it's absurd to argue that we are calling what is really red by the word 'blue' and what is really blue by the word 'red'. In an important sense, 'red' *is* whatever we decide call red. The labeling of colors and the choice of their boundaries is somewhat arbitrary. The challenge for science is to figure out precisely what in the real word corresponds (and to what extent) to what we call 'good'.

I should also point out that to a very real extent, there does not really exist inherent in objects themselves a pure property that corresponds to what we call 'green'. We call pure 525nm light 'green'. We call mixes of 460nm light and 580nm light also 'green'. What makes these 'the same color' is at least as much in us as in the objects we look at. Understanding moral judgments will also help us understand how much of morality comes from how we judge, and I bet our understanding of what 'good' really is will change just as our understanding of colors did.

In other words, part of my response to the argument that morality is 'subjective' is that color vision sort of is subjective too. Subjective does not mean arbitrary, useless, whatever someone says it is, or the like. It just means that the boundaries around what objective aspects are part of the property and what aren't and how they are measured is somewhat dependent on *our* nature. All measurements, perceptions, and judgments are subjective in this sense. If I ask you how long something is, part of what affects the answer I get from you is what you have available to do the measuring with. That doesn't change the fact that extent is an objective property.

 

[fls]

To those who have read the book:

Does Harris explain how we might get people to do the right thing once science has determined what that might be?

As Kevin has pointed out above, given the moral philosophies people claim to be guided by we already know quite clearly what we ought to be doing, but most of us and most of our governments seem to find lots of excuses as to why we're not doing them now.

Perhaps science could help us with that problem before we think about throwing out moral philosophy and replacing it with a science of morality?

I think it starts with throwing out religious dogmatism.

Linda

 

[Dragoonster]

I think it starts with throwing out religious dogmatism.

Linda

Well, that's like basing a world morality upon throwing out addiction to heroin, alcohol, tobacco, wasteful materialism, (serial killing, murder, assault), etc. Nice in theory, never going to universally happen.

Second, you didn't really answer the question.

As response to Ivor--Harris has suggested brain operations to make people comply with the (aka his) True Morality. I think this cite is way back in the thread.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I think most of us would agree that if we were given some incontrovertible mechanism to know how much to value particular goals, ends or outcomes, then the question of what actions would most achieve those goals would become an objective/scientific one. If we have to choose between two actions, and we could objectively put a 'value' on the result of each action, the one with the highest value would objectively be 'right', in the sense that it maximizes that value. However, you then have to face the problem of how to value the ends these actions achieve.

Yes.

To an extent, it's axiomatic that what we've evolved to think of as good is good in one sense of 'good'.

No. Or rather, not in any useful sense of the word good. We've evolved to think of rape and genocide as good, in that sense of 'good', hence it's not a very useful sense.

 

[fls]

Well, that's like basing a world morality upon throwing out addiction to heroin, alcohol, tobacco, wasteful materialism, (serial killing, murder, assault), etc. Nice in theory, never going to universally happen.

Second, you didn't really answer the question.

Ivor the Engineer asked about what was in the book.

Linda

 

[Beth]

To those who have read the book:

Does Harris explain how we might get people to do the right thing once science has determined what that might be?

No

 

[Paulhoff]

Does Harris explain how we might get people to do the right thing once science has determined what that might be?

Yes, the same thing that is used now, it is called JAIL.

Paul

 

[JoelKatz]

No. Or rather, not in any useful sense of the word good. We've evolved to think of rape and genocide as good, in that sense of 'good', hence it's not a very useful sense.

I think this is somewhat akin to arguing that vision is not useful because of the existence of optical illusions. However, if your point is that it would be absurd to say that because a pencil looks bent when under water, it must actually *be* bent and if we don't consider it bent, then we should change our definition of 'bent' to mean precisely the same thing as 'looking bent', then I agree with you.

Once we understand how our moral sense works and how it can go wrong, we can figure out cases where things "seem right" even though they are "really wrong" just as the pencil may "look bent" or the two lines may "look the same length".

This is the same thing that happened with color vision. At one time, 'green' simply meant things that looked green to normal human vision. As we understood how color vision works, our understanding of 'green' has evolved to one that more accurately affects what's "really green" in the real world and we've separated "really green" (a particular range of frequencies) from "looking green" (stimulating our color vision the same way light in that range does).

 

[The Man]

You seem to be determined to misunderstand me, and unwilling to do any work to catch up on the thread to avoid such misunderstandings, so I don't think this discussion is going to be productive.

Yet you persist.

No, this is just wrong. Objects with mass just do feel a mutually attractive force. Objects with opposite charges just do feel a mutually attractive force. There is absolutely no moral ought to the matter.

So “ought” isn’t an assertion of what one thinks should be? So people just don‘t feel something ought to be moral or not?

No you weren't. You were responding directly to my summary of Harris' argument. Scroll back and look at what went before.

Indeed I was, if you think not then I suggest you scroll back and read what I said I was responding to. If you would simply like to limit that response to something of your own preference there is not much I or anyone (but you) can do about that.

If you find my explanation confusing then use Google and read someone else's explanation of the problem until you get it. Come back when you're done.

I found nothing in that confusing. So your assertion is that I should agree with you (or them) first then “Come back”?

No. My argument does not boil down to a black-and-white talking point.

Sure it does you think Harris wrong if he thinks he has solved the “”is/ought" problem”. Is there something else you think he is wrong about?

Or you could go and do some reading as I originally suggested. Just because you can't figure something out when you jump into an ongoing thread on the thirty-eighth page without doing any homework of your own whatsoever, when the thread topic is university-level philosophy, doesn't mean that there is nothing to figure out.

I’m not the one who claimed to have a problem so it is just that you can't figure something out. One of the ways to try to figure something out is to first explicitly and exactly state what the problem is. If you can’t than it is unlikely that you will find a solution if there is one or even the problem if there was one.

Also, I suspect that The Man's question was not meant to indicate ignorance of the "is/ought problem", but was meant as a device to ask you to interrogate the question. But I think you're right - he can't have been paying attention to this thread if he thought this was a possibility.

Linda

Exactly.

 

[The Man]

I think most of us would agree that if we were given some incontrovertible mechanism to know how much to value particular goals, ends or outcomes, then the question of what actions would most achieve those goals would become an objective/scientific one. If we have to choose between two actions, and we could objectively put a 'value' on the result of each action, the one with the highest value would objectively be 'right', in the sense that it maximizes that value. However, you then have to face the problem of how to value the ends these actions achieve.

Again science only has the same tools to make such evaluations as it does in any other consideration.

To an extent, it's axiomatic that what we've evolved to think of as good is good in one sense of 'good'. To go back to color vision again (sorry), it's absurd to argue that we are calling what is really red by the word 'blue' and what is really blue by the word 'red'. In an important sense, 'red' *is* whatever we decide call red. The labeling of colors and the choice of their boundaries is somewhat arbitrary. The challenge for science is to figure out precisely what in the real word corresponds (and to what extent) to what we call 'good'.

It is the same challenge as it is to figure out what we call ‘red’. It is just that most people would tend to agree on some designation of ‘red’ than what they might call ‘good’. People tend to have less of an emotional investment in ascriptions like ‘red’ or ‘blue’ than they do with ‘good’.

I should also point out that to a very real extent, there does not really exist inherent in objects themselves a pure property that corresponds to what we call 'green'. We call pure 525nm light 'green'. We call mixes of 460nm light and 580nm light also 'green'. What makes these 'the same color' is at least as much in us as in the objects we look at. Understanding moral judgments will also help us understand how much of morality comes from how we judge, and I bet our understanding of what 'good' really is will change just as our understanding of colors did.

Exactly just as a waveform can be broken down into a combination of other, even opposing waveforms. What one takes as predominantly good or bad can likewise be a combination of other elements that on their own could have different and perhaps opposing ascriptions.

In other words, part of my response to the argument that morality is 'subjective' is that color vision sort of is subjective too. Subjective does not mean arbitrary, useless, whatever someone says it is, or the like. It just means that the boundaries around what objective aspects are part of the property and what aren't and how they are measured is somewhat dependent on *our* nature. All measurements, perceptions, and judgments are subjective in this sense. If I ask you how long something is, part of what affects the answer I get from you is what you have available to do the measuring with. That doesn't change the fact that extent is an objective property.

No, subjective does not mean arbitrary, however it also doesn’t preclude that determination from being just arbitrary and arbitrary does infer subjectivity.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Yet you persist.

Up to a point.

 

[Beth]

Again science only has the same tools to make such evaluations as it does in any other consideration.



It is the same challenge as it is to figure out what we call ‘red’. It is just that most people would tend to agree on some designation of ‘red’ than what they might call ‘good’. People tend to have less of an emotional investment in ascriptions like ‘red’ or ‘blue’ than they do with ‘good’.

I like the color analogy. I disagree with it only in that it is considered an 'objective' property of objects. But I think that objectivity is an illusion anyway. Or more properly, that true objectivity is an unattainable perfection of measurement. Ithink of objective/subjective as two extremes of a continuous property of all measurements.

The big different I see is that color is measuring a property of material object. Sam Harris is proposing we scientifically attempt to measure an intangible property of material objects, namely us.

If we accept that normal humans have an inborn propensity towards describing certain behaviors as 'good' or 'bad', then we should be able to construct better and more objective measures of such.

I think that this leads to a 'the majority is always sane' ethos. Consider this, the majority of humans in my society consider a sincere belief in some sort of religion or god a primary indicator of morality. Suppose we identify neurologically what is different about people people who do and don't believe in god. Who do you think that people in my society will consider 'broken' and in need of 'fixing'.

 

[Dragoonster]

Ivor the Engineer asked about what was in the book.

Linda

"I think it starts with throwing out religious dogmatism"?

That quote is in the book?



And does that sentence fulfillingly and completely answer "Does Harris explain how we might get people to do the right thing once science has determined what that might be?"

Is he going to jail people who don't throw out their religious dogmatism (and that's worked awesome in past history!)? How does he design to get people to throw out their religious dogmatism?

DETAILS

 

[Trent Wray]

Of course science can answer moral questions. So long as we agree there are no correct or incorrect responses.

Every judicial system can be replaced with Magic 8 Balls.

 

[Beth]

"I think it starts with throwing out religious dogmatism"?

That quote is in the book?



And does that sentence fulfillingly and completely answer "Does Harris explain how we might get people to do the right thing once science has determined what that might be?"

Is he going to jail people who don't throw out their religious dogmatism (and that's worked awesome in past history!)? How does he design to get people to throw out their religious dogmatism?

DETAILS

I think the general idea is that science can measure what is wrong with people neurologically and then prescribe treatments to address moral deficiencies. We are actually able to do such things in a very primitive way at the moment. IIRC, there have been experiments regarding drug regimens for convicted rapists. 'Chemical Castration' is a headline I recall, though I haven't heard anything more about it in years so that particular experiment may not have worked out.

If I am understanding Harris correctly, that would be an example of science solving a moral problem. If that isn't a good example, I'd appreciate hearing why and a different example provided.

Of course science can answer moral questions. So long as we agree there are no correct or incorrect responses.

We can define responses we consider 'good', same as we define what we consider 'red'. It only remains to get similar concurrence on the issue by the rest of humanity.

Every judicial system can be replaced with Magic 8 Balls.

Sadly, I think such a system might be an improvement over our current one.

 

[AlBell]

I think the general idea is that science can measure what is wrong with people neurologically and then prescribe treatments to address moral deficiencies. We are actually able to do such things in a very primitive way at the moment. IIRC, there have been experiments regarding drug regimens for convicted rapists. 'Chemical Castration' is a headline I recall, though I haven't heard anything more about it in years so that particular experiment may not have worked out.

If I am understanding Harris correctly, that would be an example of science solving a moral problem. If that isn't a good example, I'd appreciate hearing why and a different example provided.

The rather large majority of humanity who profess to believe in god, and likely consider non-belief a moral deficiency, may decide Harris and other atheists need some chemical (or other) "fixing" so they believe in god too.