And that doesn't tell us anything about the objective existence of gods, right?
So facts about concepts that arise in our brains don't necessarily extrapolate to facts that objectively exist outside our brains. That's overwhemingly obvious, so the argument is flawed if you want to prove the objectivity of "moral truths" (or whatever you want to call it, since you seem to have problems with the word "moral", even if it's included in the title of the thread and is a statement made by Harris).
It is relevant to whether the position is up or down on the moral landscape.
And what kind of argument are you putting forth? I'm having difficulties following what you're saying. You said:
The body of facts which includes the brain states of conscious creatures will be different in the presence of our existence that it will be in our absence.
I answered how is it relevant to the argument that there are scientifically grounded moral values, and now you're talking about the moral landscape. It looks like you missed some steps in your argument, because your response is not answering my question.
No it doesn't. What reference point should be used when describing the motion of the planets?
One that can help us
describe the motion of the planets. But we're going off topic. Preference, in a moral sense, isn't a scientific principle.
I've been trying to, to some extent. The word keeps getting brought up. For example, when I was talking about values and good and bad actions, you brought the word "moral" back into the discussion.
I apologize for bringing the word "moral" when you talk about values and good and bad actions. I apologize too in the name of Sam Harris for the use of these terms.
Yours is a semantic dead end.
That was the point. We form reference points which make sense within a system, but "they are not objective properties of things in the universe," when it comes to physical references. So clearly doing so is not considered unscientific a priori.
Yes, we choose the reference point, but the reference point for up and down is objective. It objectively exists
somewhere. Where is the objective reference of
goodness, or
morally better or
worse?
What do you think utilitarianism is? The moral landscape as described by Harris is different from the use of utility measures, so it would help if I knew what you think utilitarianism is, in order to understand why you think they are the same.
What do I think utilitarianism is? Just what it is. I'm not redefining its meaning. Take a look at the Wikipedia article, or if you prefer you can check the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/
Utilitarianism is one of the most powerful and persuasive approaches to normative ethics in the history of philosophy. Though not fully articulated until the 19th century, proto-utilitarian positions can be discerned throughout the history of ethical theory.
Though there are many varieties of the view discussed, utilitarianism is generally held to be the view that the morally right action is the action that produces the most good. There are many ways to spell out this general claim. One thing to note is that the theory is a form of consequentialism: the right action is understood entirely in terms of consequences produced. What distinguishes utilitarianism from egoism has to do with the scope of the relevant consequences. On the utilitarian view one ought to maximize the overall good — that is, consider the good of others as well as one's own good.
The Classical Utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, identified the good with pleasure, so, like Epicurus, were hedonists about value. They also held that we ought to maximize the good, that is, bring about ‘the greatest amount of good for the greatest number’.
Utilitarianism is also distinguished by impartiality and agent-neutrality. Everyone's happiness counts the same. When one maximizes the good, it is the good impartially considered. My good counts for no more than anyone else's good. Further, the reason I have to promote the overall good is the same reason anyone else has to so promote the good. It is not peculiar to me.
So what's the significant difference? Moreover, where did he prove that the distinction between facts and (moral) values is illusory? He just put forth a very similar moral assumption. Many people have done that in the past. So? And even if it were different, it would just be another type of consequentialist morality.
"I'm going to prove a very common misconception among scientists and philosophers: science can help us with a consequentialist moral approach". Really? D'uh!
