Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[AlBell]

That is easy, moral authority from an unproven deity.

Yawn. Moral authority based on thousands of years of scholarly Judeo-Xian debate and thinking.

I've have been in a so-called christian nation for over 60 years, what do you want to know.

I notice you have no specifics.

ps. You can covet your neighbors ass to your hearts content ... mmkay?

 

[Paulhoff]

Yawn.

You should get more sleep.

Paul

 

[Paulhoff]

I notice you have no specifics.

That is such a long list, where should I start.

Paul

 

[AlBell]

You should get more sleep.

At least you can quote-mine.

That is such a long list, where should I start.

But do nothing else.

 

[fls]

I wasn't criticising you for not providing a complete description, only that your description left out the crucial component of medicine that makes it different from human biology: the moral component. I have no problem coming up with a description of medicine in five words that is more complete than yours.

Medicine is: making people better.

Sorry. When I said "complete," I meant something which captures the essential components and excludes the non-essential, not something which does neither.

Only after you have decided that a body infected with pneumococcus is something that ought not to be. Implicit in all medical interventions is a moral judgement; that something is "wrong" and needs to be corrected. And while well-being is an important consideration in this judgement, it isn't "science" that makes this judgement.

Thank you for making your position clear.

I don't think there are many objective measures of pain used in medical practice, and that's a good thing. It shouldn't be the people administering the drugs to decide "objectively" for the patient how much pain s/he can endure. They are instead taught that "pain is whatever the patient says it is" and that pain is inherently subjective.

That wasn't what I was referring to.

Does science offer us an answer which is more important? Or even the criteria by which we can decide which is more important in which circumstance. I doubt it. The issue is relative to the circumstances and highly subjective.

I'm hard pressed to think of any topic in any field of 'science' which would meet your criteria of 'science', then. I suspect where you differ from Harris is simply the scope of what can reasonably be treated as scientific inquiry.

Linda

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

<snip>

That wasn't what I was referring to.

<snip>

Then give an example.

 

[Paulhoff]

At least you can quote-mine.


But do nothing else.

Where should I start on the list of morals.

With that, give me a list of morals that one should use when one lives on an island by themselves.


Paul

 

[Democracy Simulator]

I don't think Harris attempts to come up with "any other moral value, let's call it Value B" which doesn't depend on Value A.

Nor do I, which is why he fails Hume's challenge.

I'm not so interested in defining whether Harris' claim is the strong claim or the weak claim; it seems to me to be the reasonable claim. For people who can accept Value A -- which it seems to me will be the vast majority of the people with whom I'm interested in discussing moral choices -- it provides a rational basis for sifting decisions into piles of "better" and "worse".

Ah well then I am interested in asking Harris whether he makes the stronger or weaker claim and this is not clear due to his equivocation. It seems to me that a lot of people think he has made the stronger claim and I have produced evidence to the fact that they do. This claim would be remarkable and noteworthy which is why it has been scrutinized by people who are interested in moral philosophy. And why I find it interesting.

The weaker claim is unremarkable and unoriginal; as you say it's a 'reasonable claim', yet still more contentious than you would allow. I find this claim less interesting, because it adds nothing new to the debate. If you are interested in defending Harris' brand of Utilitarianism, be my guest - that is not my principle criticism of his argument, as should be clear.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

Well, you should wonder what is his objection in the first place, since it is well accepted among critical thinkers that science can help us once we've defined the axiom from which to start. So what's he objecting to when he mentions Hume and says that the distinction between values and facts is an illusion? That's exactly what I'm wondering.

^^^^
This

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I don't believe he made that claim. My reading is that he considers the is/ought problem to be a trap, which he has avoided by arguing that the only thing we can reasonably value is the well-being of conscious creatures. If you think there is a more worthy basis for values, please share.

As I have said frequently before, in philosophical terms what Harris actually is seems to me to be very close to a welfare utilitarian. It's a perfectly decent moral framework, albeit one that Harris in no way contributed to inventing, and while it's imperfect in some respects all unitary meta-ethical theories are equally imperfect in my view so that is no great criticism.

However welfare utilitarianism is in no way, shape or form an escape from the is/ought problem. It generates oughts by assuming as an axiom that we should act so as to maximise the fulfilment of the preferences moral agents would have if they were fully informed and rational, and then combining that axiom with facts about the universe.

He then goes on to say that values translate into facts which can be scientifically understood, and that the most important of these facts transcend culture.

Yes. This was a new and important idea when Jeremy Bentham first articulated it. Bentham died in 1832.

By directing our attention to the proper basis of values, he enables us to ask the proper questions: Not "what does the supreme authority require" or "what has the evolutionary process conditioned us to desire" but what is best for the well-being of conscious creatures.

Yup, this is just Bentham. It's an idea which is 200 years old. It is not new. If Harris didn't have a philosophy degree I'd say he reinvented the wheel, since he does I'd say he's trying to pass off the wheel as his own new idea to an audience of the gullible and philosophically illiterate.

Which is what he's done. Again, if you think his moral value judgment is flawed, you are free to propose a better one.

I don't know how often I'll have to say this.

Any moral philosophy must begin by endorsing some moral value judgment as an axiom. That is the only solution to the is/ought problem. They all do it. It doesn't matter whether it's some flavour of utilitarianism like Harris, Bentham, Mill, Rawls and so on endorsed, or some flavour of deontology like Kant or Jesus endorsed. In this sense no moral system can be better, nor can any be worse. They all of necessity must do exactly the same thing.

I believe it is what he's saying -- the pre-existing moral goal is to facilitate the well-being of conscious creatures. If it's of no interest whatsoever to you, I expect your lack of further posts will reflect that.

You seem to think that I'm arguing that Harris' moral philosophy is bad. Drop that idea. It's wrong. Forget it. Never state it again.

I'm arguing that it sneaks the non-scientific moral value judgment "we ought to facilitate the well-being of conscious creatures" in to its position, and then hypocritically denies that it has snuck in any non-scientific moral value judgment.

Possibly you think that this non-scientific moral value judgment is so obviously true that it doesn't even count as a non-scientific moral value judgment? If so you're just wrong. It is still a member of that category no matter how intuitively seductive it is.

It's been a while since I watched that talk. I remember he said something about proposing to do more than just tell us how to get what we want, but to help us define what we should want.

This whole argument is about whether or not he can back up the claims he makes in the first few minutes of that talk. There is no other topic which is being contested here whatsoever.

One more time: Absolutely nobody, not even one little bit, not ever, has at any stage argued that science isn't useful for figuring out how to achieve our goals. If You are arguing against such a position you are attacking a straw man, end of story. Don't attack straw men. Engage with what we are actually saying.

Having read his book, I don't think "helping us define what we should want" extends to his pre-existing moral goal, but to correctly casting intermediate goals in light of that goal:

Should we want women to cover themselves in public, and if so, to what extent?

Should we want restrictions on experiments involving embryonic stem cells, and if so how severe?

etc.

In other words, which course of action is more consistent with facilitating the well-being of conscious creatures?

Peter Singer has been writing about exactly these sorts of issues, using exactly the same utilitarian moral framework, and doing it far, far better for over thirty years. Harris isn't doing anything new on that front.

The only reason Harris is interesting at all is because he claimed he'd solved the is/ought problem. That's the only reason we are talking about Harris.

Otherwise we'd be talking about Bentham, Mill, Rawls, Singer... moral philosophers who had something new to say.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

Sophronius brought up this quote from Sam Harris, which I believe encapsulates his main problem:

My critics have been especially exercised over the subtitle of my book, “how science can determine human values.” The charge is that I haven’t actually used science to determine the foundational value (well-being) upon which my proffered science of morality would rest. Rather, I have just assumed that well-being is a value, and this move is both unscientific and question-begging.

What Harris does not say is whether his critics are right - is the move unscientific and question begging? He does not seem to refute this, so the criticism stands. Instead he moves the grounds of the argument.

He dodges the criticism - it doesn't matter (according to Sam Harris) that it is not demonstrably true i.e it is question-begging and unscientific, that 'Science can determine human values', as it is a useful starting point for the discussion. How does the example of science or medicine answer whether:

Science can determine human values

Is question begging and unscientific? Well it answers that it is question begging and unscientific. Harris then says this doesn't matter, we need a few presuppositions, they can't be attacked in any meaningful way. Whatever, Sam - it remains that your subtitle is question begging and unscientific. No?

Hasn't Harris already effectively acknowledged that a book with the following subtitle would be problematic?:

How Science can determine the values of science

Also, Harris says, and I can't let him get away with this:

One who doesn’t share these values cannot do science. But nor can he attack the presuppositions of science in a way that anyone should find compelling

Ah but the problem here is that someone who does not share his moral presupposition can do morality if by morality he means deciding what ought or ought not be the right course of action, which is the descriptive sense of the word. If by morality he means 'My version of morality', then he is right, but of course this is a completely circular argument:

You can't do my version of morality, unless you are doing my version of morality.

I'm totally happy for people to be inspired by Harris and want to engage with his brand of Utilitarianism in order to work out the benefits and problems of such a view, but until he really gets to grip with the relationship of facts and values, then he will encounter problems. If he is honest enough to admit that his subtitle is question begging and unscientific, a charge that he does not refute, then he should understand that the relationship between facts and values is illusory unless we presuppose that it isn't via our foundational ethic, and it does not matter how reasonable that presupposition seems to be, it remains unscientific. Science deals with logic and evidence, there is no logical or evidential link between facts and values unless Harris has refuted Hume. Of course there might be a perceived relationship of the concepts of fact and value in the human mind, but this is hardly science, is it?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Good post, Democracy Simulator.

It's really quite staggering that even after Harris has admitted that he helped himself to one unscientific supposition to get his moral theory off the ground, and hearing with their own ears his claim that he has solved the is/ought problem (the problem of getting from facts to moral values without such a supposition) people are still trying to defend him.

Give it up, guys and girls. He hasn't done what he said he would do. He has done what every other previous claimant to have solved the problem did, which was try to covertly smuggle in a moral assumption. He's been caught doing it and he has admitted doing it.

As such he's advanced the world of moral philosophy exactly zero steps past where, say, Peter Singer has been for over thirty years. He has given us absolutely nothing new. No new science, and no new philosophy. Just smoke and mirrors.

 

[fls]

said:

You're a fast reader.

Linda

 

[Democracy Simulator]

You're a fast reader.

Linda

Sorry I know I said I wouldn't comment until I finished the Moral Landscape.

A foolish promise perhaps - I couldn't resist responding to a few of the comments here. Perhaps you will forgive me; I've tried to address things Sam Harris has actually said, whether they are from the book, the talk, or the rebuttals, so hopefully no misrepresentation.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

Thanks Joey McGee for the link to Michael Shermer, who also seems to think Harris has solved the is/ought problem:

...cogent writer Sam Harris, a neuroscientist who in his book The Moral Landscape (Free Press, 2010) wields a sledgehammer to the is-ought wall.

Does the hammer strike through, or does it rebound solidly?

I'll make a simple argument:

1. Harris does not solve the is/ought problem

2. By frequent referral to is/ought Harris (and his supporters) give the impression that it has been solved, which would be really exciting, because then science really could could determine human values Y'know, like properly.

3. Therefore Harris has a problem.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

It can describe them, but it cannot not prescribe them. Moral standards are prescriptions, not descriptions.

What exactly do you mean by "prescribing moral standards"? And if according to you, science can't "prescribe" them, what can then?

No, it would just mean that atheists cannot claim an absolute source of their morality.

Yes they can. I just told you what the source of morality is for humans (whether they're theists or atheists): The human brain. That's the source.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

By this argument maths comes from human brains, so instead of doing maths we should do neuroscience. Logic comes from brains, so instead of doing logic we should do neuroscience. Moral philosophy comes from human brains, so instead of doing moral philosophy we should do neuroscience.

I don't know how or why you're drawing that absurd conclusion but that is not what I said nor suggested at all. The fact that morals comes from human brains doesn't dictate (in a strict Dictatorial sense) what we should do with those morals. It just means the source of morality is no magical mystery and science can study it and give us better and more objective clues as to how we can use these tools to our own personal benefit. We are then free to take those suggestions or ignore them.

 

[Paulhoff]

Golly, any other new science can take years and longer to begin to show results, so why should this one be treated the same, so let's just throw in the towel and go home.

Paul

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I don't know how or why you're drawing that absurd conclusion but that is not what I said nor suggested at all. The fact that morals comes from human brains doesn't dictate (in a strict Dictatorial sense) what we should do with those morals. It just means the source of morality is no magical mystery

Not Piggy's straw man again? When did anyone even hint at the possibility that the source of moral ideas might be some kind of magical mystery?

Of course the source is the bloody brain. Who here do you think this could possibly be news to?

I really wish we could put this talking point to bed once and for all.

and science can study it and give us better and more objective clues as to how we can use these tools to our own personal benefit. We are then free to take those suggestions or ignore them.

I'm curious as to how it plans to do this - we don't need neuroscience to tell us that we don't like being hit on the head with a hammer, and neuroscience alone can't tell us not to hit other people with hammers. You need moral philosophy to get to such conclusions.

As I hinted earlier, I suspect that trying to do moral philosophy by doing neuroscience is probably going to be as fruitful as doing logic or mathematics that way.

Science can help us get to morally preferable outcomes in all sorts of other ways, but I'm not clear at this stage why we should think it will help us this way.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Not Piggy's straw man again? When did anyone even hint at the possibility that the source of moral ideas might be some kind of magical mystery?

Of course the source is the bloody brain. Who here do you think this could possibly be news to?

I really wish we could put this talking point to bed once and for all.

Since you had taken my previous post and made a potpourri-type of conclusion that didn't reflect at all what I meant, I felt the need to clarify and restate the facts. Sorry if repeating the simple basic facts annoys you. I never claimed that you didn't know what the source of morality was. But your erroneous interpretation of my post was calling for a clarification.

I'm curious as to how it plans to do this - we don't need neuroscience to tell us that we don't like being hit on the head with a hammer, and neuroscience alone can't tell us not to hit other people with hammers. You need moral philosophy to get to such conclusions.

I never said moral philosophy is useless for these kind of things. But science is an also valid tool that can shade even more light on these matters. For instance, now we know, thanks to neuroscience, that empathy is something real and that can be scientifically proven, through the study of mirror neurons.

Another good example: nowadays we know that there's nothing inherently wrong with homosexuality. We no longer have a "witch burning" mentality of the matter. We understand it as a natural, biological phenomena. It's thanks to the gradual education of the masses that the bias against homosexuality has begun shading (it clearly hasn't disappeared entirely). Whenever someone comes with the argument that there's something wrong with homosexuality, we, instead of wasting time getting into philosophical disputes, can actually talk them through the science: There's no scientific evidence that homosexuality is any form of disease or atrophy of any kind.

As I hinted earlier, I suspect that trying to do moral philosophy by doing neuroscience is probably going to be as fruitful as doing logic or mathematics that way.

Why? What's wrong with a moral philosophy that's rooted in scientific facts?