Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[fls]

Linda, since you seem to be taking Harris' place here, please specifically (and preferably as scientific proof or hypothesis, since that's the milieu, this isn't the scientology forum) define "human well-being" and "flourishing". Be sure to reference whether the definitions pertain to the individual, the society, the family unit. And prove it from whatever base begins this inviolate knowledge.

Those things which contribute to quality of life. Those things for which people will indicate a preference. So this will include access to resources, such as education, less so as to the extent of boredom, and not at all to something like whether a star in another galaxy has become a super-nova.

Flourishing is a more relative term, since it relates to the ranges of human societies past and present. When the average life expectancy is 30 years, a society with a life-expectancy of 40 may be said to be flourishing, but not in relation to the average expectancy developed countries enjoy at present. It would represent the extent to which individuals, families or societies experience or could experience those things which represent well-being.

The 'proof' is simply a careful study of what it is that we are referring to with our moral intuitions - preferences as to health, poverty, autonomy, etc. I've mentioned previously the Trolley Scenarios, whereby people make choices, which distinguish between scenarios in which lives lost would be the same but the degree of involvement in causing those deaths would be different. This indicates that increasingly active involvement in causing death moves someone lower on the moral landscape. By contrast, our moral intuitions don't distinguish between scenarios where a characteristic has been assigned randomly.

I don't know how else you (or Harris) can continue to argue a scientific morality if you can't provide these proofs.

And/or to you or anyone, a repeat from a page ago:

"Please someone, anyone, show us a moral question that can be (today) answered scientifically, and show the scientific proof."

Pugliucci mentioned an example of aborting a fetus. He brought up the issue that the timing could depend upon whether it could suffer, so science could help us by determining when fetuses can feel pain and suggest the procedure by done before that point. His implication was that the choice to use the experience of pain as a criteria could not itself be subject to scientific determination. But as I've mentioned previously, our moral intuitions and preferences tell us that it is the experience of pain in others which makes something 'moral'. Once we have an understanding of this, it tells us what we value, and how we move up and down on the moral landscape.

Linda

 

[fls]

Of course. This is obvious. We are biologically wired to value our own life, and it is common to value high life expectancy as good.

But does science ever say that a life expectancy of 80 years is good compared to that of 20? Let me put another example: is the existence of a star that lasts longer than another scientifically good in comparison?

Our life, yes. The life of a star, no. Because it is clear that the lives of stars aren't relevant to our values the way that the lives of humans are.

Would the existence of the Milky Way galaxy be scientifically better the longer it lasts?

Yes, to the extent that it impacts our existence.

Good is a worthless word in science unless it means accurate or exact.

It is also worthwhile if it means "preferred".

Only in an anthropocentric way we value human life expectancy.

Exactly. What we formerly called "morals" are anthropocentric values, which includes valuing our own lives.

And that is unscientific, just like it is unscientific to say that the Milky Way is better than the other galaxies because it contains human life, which we value so much.

In what way are you defining "scientific" and "unscientific"?

So it's wrong. But it also is futile. It is futile because most of us already value life expectancy since we're equipped with survival instincts, and there is an (scientifically) expected great consensus upon this matter. So what's the great news? "Scientific studies recently revealed that high life expectancy is better than low life expectancy". D'uh! Wrong, and futile.

So isn't it obvious that we should value well-being? Yes. Isn't it obvious that we should value the Milky Way and our solar system? Yes. All in a moral sense, not scientifically. Morality is a lot about ad populum. We find what is generally valuable through consensus. If half the population didn't value well-being, it would certainly be a topic of heated discussion. But it isn't. Some might not value well-being. Up to them. I will continue valuing well-being. Can science inform us where our common moral ideas come from? Definitely yes. Can science answer moral questions? No. The Milky Way galaxy is not good. Science doesn't make moral judgments, and that's what makes it objective.

I don't understand where you are drawing a distinction except that you seem to be objecting to the use of an obvious example. Science finds that moral ideas depend in some part upon the lives of humans so that actions which influence life expectancy are preferred. How is this objectionable?

Science doesn't make moral judgments. Harris claims it can.

He makes an argument in the second talk posted in this thread in which he just moves the goal posts. He says that since there is no reason why we should value evidence and parsimony (they're axiomatic principles in science) the same applies to his axiom about the well-being of conscious creatures. But in practice it makes no difference whether you place that axiomatic principle inside or outside the realm of science. If you place it inside, you're claiming that science can answer moral questions, just like Harris does. If you place it outside, you're assuming a consequentialist moral approach based on one or various non scientific moral axioms. Both approaches can lead to the same results, but Harris is wrong because there is no scientific principle which says how to morally value things. He just wants to fit it into what is known as the scientific method. Sorry, that's begging the question in a particularly naive way. That's why some people here claimed that Harris wasn't saying anything new, and besides, is wrong. Just like I said: wrong and futile.

The idea of "how to morally value things" is an outdated notion of what makes an action good or bad. We start with an systematic study of what it is that humans mean when they say that something is right or wrong, but once we have that understanding, we no longer need to make reference to these notions. We are capable now of recognizing that he primitive cave person who had the idea that they needed to give gifts to the witch-doctor in order to enjoy good health was simply wrong. Once we recognize what humans are referring to by good health, then we can can refer to good health as the absence of disease and infirmity instead of whether you are in good graces with the local Shaman. Similarly, once we recognize what humans are referring to with morals, we can refer to good actions as those which reduce suffering, rather than the extent to which they correspond to the words of superstitious goat-herders.

Linda

 

[Dragoonster]

I honestly don't know whether he did or not. I (perhaps naively) prefer to read a book by a contemporary philosopher writing in my native language rather than digging through translations of thousand-year-old books which couldn't possibly have addressed topics like embryonic stem cells, factory farming, and life support machines.

So how exactly did Harris address stem cells, factory farming, and life support machines? I mean exactly, as in put the questions to rest. Anyone can "address" these questions.

Stem Cells lead to more flourishing and bliss compared to non-stem cells? Did Harris say and/or prove this?

 

[fls]

So how exactly did Harris address stem cells, factory farming, and life support machines? I mean exactly, as in put the questions to rest. Anyone can "address" these questions.

Stem Cells lead to more flourishing and bliss compared to non-stem cells? Did Harris say and/or prove this?

This is a pretty simply question to answer, especially once you shed references to religious texts. It is pretty clear that advances in the understanding and treatment of disease have been beneficial to humans and other animals. Where do you see problems?

Linda

 

[Beth]

This is a pretty simply question to answer, especially once you shed references to religious texts. It is pretty clear that advances in the understanding and treatment of disease have been beneficial to humans and other animals. Where do you see problems?

Linda

The problems are in the details. Yes, advances in the understanding and treatment of disease is generally considered a good thing. Still, there have been times and situations where the advancement achieved was not sufficient to justify the wrongs done in pursuit of that goal.

For example, there was a fairly well-publicized study back in the first half of the 20th century where some black men with syphilus were not given treatment, but instead observed to see the progress of the disease over time. This was done without their knowledge or consent. By today's standards, the benefits obtained were not sufficient to justify the harm done to those men.

Do the benefits of stem cell research outweigh the cost? Personally, I think so. However, I'm not clear how Harris's approach resolves the issue of different valuations placed on both the benefits and the costs by the different members of our society. Perhaps you could outline how you think his approach might be used to make that determination for the case of stem cell research.

 

[fls]

The problems are in the details. Yes, advances in the understanding and treatment of disease is generally considered a good thing. Still, there have been times and situations where the advancement achieved was not sufficient to justify the wrongs done in pursuit of that goal.

For example, there was a fairly well-publicized study back in the first half of the 20th century where some black men with syphilus were not given treatment, but instead observed to see the progress of the disease over time. This was done without their knowledge or consent. By today's standards, the benefits obtained were not sufficient to justify the harm done to those men.

It also seems fairly simple to figure out that these men were harmed.

Do the benefits of stem cell research outweigh the cost?

What are the costs?

Linda

 

[fls]

Do the benefits of stem cell research outweigh the cost? Personally, I think so. However, I'm not clear how Harris's approach resolves the issue of different valuations placed on both the benefits and the costs by the different members of our society. Perhaps you could outline how you think his approach might be used to make that determination for the case of stem cell research.

Here you are just asking how one goes about performing a cost-benefit analysis. There are textbooks available on this topic.

Linda

 

[AlBell]

Indeed there are. And they are about as far from science as one can get.

 

[Beth]

It also seems fairly simple to figure out that these men were harmed.

Yes. It's also fairly simply to figure out that what was done to them contributed to advances in the understanding and treatment of their disease, an outcome which has beneficial effects for society and the well-being of many humans.

What are the costs?

A good question. IMO, no more than any other type of research project. However, not everyone agrees that those are the only costs associated with such research. Some people feel that the cost of harvesting stem cells, in particular stem cells from aborted fetuses, is too high a price to pay. I disagree with their assessment, but I have no scientific basis for that disagreement. I simply place a different value on unwanted fetuses than they do.

Here you are just asking how one goes about performing a cost-benefit analysis. There are textbooks available on this topic.

No, that's not what I'm asking about. Given a set of values and expectations in regard to inputs and outputs, I know how to do a cost-benefit analysis. It's establishing the set of values and expectations for those inputs and outputs that is the issue here.

The researchers that performed the experiment that harmed those men had a set of values for the costs and benefits of their research. They felt that the benefits were sufficient to justify the costs. Today, we place a different value on the harm that was done and feel that those men deserved better treatment and the benefit to society was NOT sufficient to justify the experiment. As moral values within a culture change over time, I think the peaks and valleys of Harris's moral landscape would change with them.

How do we establish the set of values and expectations with which to conduct the cost/benefit analysis for various questions of morality? Is there a scientific approach for that? I think this is what Harris is claiming is possible. I'm not yet convinced. Perhaps it is possible, but there hasn't been any details or examples given to show how it might be done.

 

[fls]

Yes. It's also fairly simply to figure out that what was done to them contributed to advances in the understanding and treatment of their disease, an outcome which has beneficial effects for society and the well-being of many humans.

There's an easy way to figure out whether one outweighs the other. Let the researchers design the experiment telling them that they won't know beforehand whether they are going to be subject or experimenter.

A good question. IMO, no more than any other type of research project. However, not everyone agrees that those are the only costs associated with such research. Some people feel that the cost of harvesting stem cells, in particular stem cells from aborted fetuses, is too high a price to pay. I disagree with their assessment, but I have no scientific basis for that disagreement. I simply place a different value on unwanted fetuses than they do.

No, that's not what I'm asking about. Given a set of values and expectations in regard to inputs and outputs, I know how to do a cost-benefit analysis. It's establishing the set of values and expectations for those inputs and outputs that is the issue here.

The researchers that performed the experiment that harmed those men had a set of values for the costs and benefits of their research. They felt that the benefits were sufficient to justify the costs. Today, we place a different value on the harm that was done and feel that those men deserved better treatment and the benefit to society was NOT sufficient to justify the experiment. As moral values within a culture change over time, I think the peaks and valleys of Harris's moral landscape would change with them.

How do we establish the set of values and expectations with which to conduct the cost/benefit analysis for various questions of morality? Is there a scientific approach for that? I think this is what Harris is claiming is possible. I'm not yet convinced. Perhaps it is possible, but there hasn't been any details or examples given to show how it might be done.

Typically when performing cost-benefit analyses (ETA: in medical research, anyway) direct comparisons are made unless it is more useful and straightforward to assign value, so that it doesn't matter whether different people place different values on outcomes and inputs. That is, the concerns that you raise are already routinely dealt with in cost-benefit analyses.

ETA: Costs don't have to be monetized, for example. 'Risk' would be an example of a non-monetary cost in analyses related to health.

Linda

 

[Beth]

There's an easy way to figure out whether one outweighs the other. Let the researchers design the experiment telling them that they won't know beforehand whether they are going to be subject or experimenter.

It might be easy, but I'm not sure how accurate the results would be.

Typically when performing cost-benefit analyses (ETA: in medical research, anyway) direct comparisons are made unless it is more useful and straightforward to assign value, so that it doesn't matter whether different people place different values on outcomes and inputs. That is, the concerns that you raise are already routinely dealt with in cost-benefit analyses.

ETA: Costs don't have to be monetized, for example. 'Risk' would be an example of a non-monetary cost in analyses related to health.

Linda

Thank you, but I know all this. I agree, it's certainly much easier and more straightforward when direct comparison can be made, such as one treatment compared to another for a particular disease. Such analyses are done in relatively narrow domains. Moral issues, by their nature, are rarely confined to narrow domains but sprawl across all manner of human activities, both individual and group.

For example, at this point, the harm done by smoking and the costs of the illnesses associated with them has been fairly well quantified. On the other hand, it's considerably harder to quantify the benefits of smoking to the individuals who choose to smoke and the benefit to society of having that option open to them. As a moral question, we could ask whether or not it is moral to do certain things, such as smoke or have an abortion. I don't feel that there are definitive answers to such questions.

My question is how can this be applied to moral issues? How would this approach be applied to the issue of stem cell research? How about the question of abortion? How about smoking?

It seems to me that based on the scientific evidence available today, we could conclude that smoking is bad for human well-being. Let's assume that such a conclusion has been scientifically made. Smoking is bad for human health and therefore immoral. Once this has been established, clearly the next question is what should our society do to combat this immoral activity and move to a higher position on the moral landscape. Is this how what you are talking about in terms of answering moral questions scientifically? If not, could you explain why this example isn't a good fit for what you are talking about.

 

[fls]

Thank you, but I know all this. I agree, it's certainly much easier and more straightforward when direct comparison can be made, such as one treatment compared to another for a particular disease. Such analyses are done in relatively narrow domains. Moral issues, by their nature, are rarely confined to narrow domains but sprawl across all manner of human activities, both individual and group.

These same concerns apply to health questions. We manage to ask and answer general and specific questions.

For example, at this point, the harm done by smoking and the costs of the illnesses associated with them has been fairly well quantified. On the other hand, it's considerably harder to quantify the benefits of smoking to the individuals who choose to smoke and the benefit to society of having that option open to them. As a moral question, we could ask whether or not it is moral to do certain things, such as smoke or have an abortion. I don't feel that there are definitive answers to such questions.

You don't think it is possible to distinguish whether or not autonomy is preferred?

My question is how can this be applied to moral issues? How would this approach be applied to the issue of stem cell research? How about the question of abortion? How about smoking?

What question are you asking about stem cell research or abortion or smoking?

It seems to me that based on the scientific evidence available today, we could conclude that smoking is bad for human well-being. Let's assume that such a conclusion has been scientifically made. Smoking is bad for human health and therefore immoral. Once this has been established, clearly the next question is what should our society do to combat this immoral activity and move to a higher position on the moral landscape. Is this how what you are talking about in terms of answering moral questions scientifically? If not, could you explain why this example isn't a good fit for what you are talking about.

Terms like 'moral' and 'immoral' can be dumped, as once you are into specific questions, they aren't meaningful. If you are asking about public health policy with respect to encouraging healthy behavior, there is a large body of research on this topic. For example there is research on the effects of passing laws to prohibit smoking in specific venues - whether this alters rates of disease related to the effects of tobacco, for example. If you wonder about the kinds of choices that people make which respect to smoking when the choice is made in advance vs. choices made at the moment, there's research on that as well.

The inability (or deliberate incomprehension) of someone who is unfamiliar with the research to make their questions specific and relevant doesn't mean that others haven't managed to do so.

Linda

 

[Democracy Simulator]

In his rebuttal/reply to his critics, I think Harris 'comes clean' to some extent on what his argument is. He writes in response to Russell Blackford (Blackford's text is highlighted, Harris' reply is not)

If we presuppose the well-being of conscious creatures as a fundamental value, much else may fall into place, but that initial presupposition does not come from science. It is not an empirical finding... Harris is highly critical of the claim, associated with Hume, that we cannot derive an "ought" solely from an "is" - without starting with people's actual values and desires. He is, however, no more successful in deriving "ought" from "is" than anyone else has ever been. The whole intellectual system of The Moral Landscape depends on an "ought" being built into its foundations.Again, the same can be said about medicine, or science as a whole. As I point out in my book, science in based on values that must be presupposed -- like the desire to understand the universe, a respect for evidence and logical coherence, etc. One who doesn't share these values cannot do science. But nor can he attack the presuppositions of science in a way that anyone should find compelling. Scientists need not apologize for presupposing the value of evidence, nor does this presupposition render science unscientific. In my book, I argue that the value of well-being -- specifically the value of avoiding the worst possible misery for everyone -- is on the same footing. There is no problem in presupposing that the worst possible misery for everyone is bad and worth avoiding and that normative morality consists, at an absolute minimum, in acting so as to avoid it. To say that the worst possible misery for everyone is "bad" is, on my account, like saying that an argument that contradicts itself is "illogical." Our spade is turned. Anyone who says it isn't simply isn't making sense. The fatal flaw that Blackford claims to have found in my view of morality could just as well be located in science as a whole -- or reason generally. Our "oughts" are built right into the foundations. We need not apologize for pulling ourselves up by our bootstraps in this way. It is far better than pulling ourselves down by them.

I applaud Harris for conceding that his concept of 'wellbeing' being the foundation of morality is a presupposition, yet he does not seem to address all the implications this has for his argument. If you note, he does not refute Russell Blackford's argument and in fact it still stands. What Harris says about it is that, 'There is no problem in presupposing that the worst possible misery for everyone is bad and worth avoiding and that normative morality consists, at an absolute minimum, in acting so as to avoid it. To say that the worst possible misery for everyone is "bad" is, on my account, like saying that an argument that contradicts itself is "illogical."'

So for Harris there is 'no problem' in presupposing wellbeing as the basis for moral values and he justifies this by saying that there is an equivalence between this presupposition and the principle of contradiction. Well, there is a lot that can be said about this. Firstly, there is no equivalence between Harris' presupposition and the principle of contradiction. Presumably he means that both his presupposition and the principle of contradiction are self-evident? Well, try and do logic without the principle of contradiction and compare that with trying to talk about morality without Harris' presupposition. It is obviously not self-evident for Nihilists, or Non-Cognitivists or Moral Skeptics, that there are any moral truths, even before we get to a discussion of what they might be. So here we have actually weeded out another Harris presupposition:

1. There are moral truths

If we agree with him on this, then perhaps we can agree with him that his other presupposition of 'wellbeing' is a good starting point for working out what those moral truths are, but then we have come rather a long way on the power of presuppositions alone and none of the way on logic or evidence (i.e. Science).

So where does this leave us? Science cannot determine moral values in the strong sense that moral values (their existence and content) are already presupposed up to the point that science has anything to do with them. Harris has surely conceded this point; at least he has not argued against it.

This is a problem for Harris and it is a 'fatal flaw', inasmuch as Harris seems to allude to a stronger claim, especially in the subtitle of his book, 'How Science can Determine Human Values'. Well in the stronger sense of this claim, this is not possible for the reasons Blackford gives, and Harris concedes as much. If Harris is not alluding to the stronger claim in the first place (which is still not clear) it is still a problem for him as he has chosen to use some misleading and ambiguous language in both his TED talk and his book and, as others have pointed out, the weaker argument that, 'if we are agreed that moral truths exist and that well being is a good basis for determining what those moral truths are then science can help us in better informing our moral decisions', is nothing new under the sun.

This passage from Harris encapsulates what I believe to be his tendency to equivocate on this matter:

However, my view of moral truth demands a little more than this -- not because I am bent upon reducing morality to "physical" facts in any crude sense, but because I can't see how we can keep the notion of moral truth within a walled garden, forever set apart from the truths of science. In my view, morality must be viewed in the context of our growing scientific understanding of the mind. If there are truths to be known about the mind, there will be truths to be known about how minds flourish; consequently, there will be truths to be known about good and evil.

So Harris writes he's 'not bent on reducing morality to physical facts in any crude sense', yet at the same time he ends up saying, 'If there are truths to be known about the mind, there will be truths to be known about how minds flourish; consequently, there will be truths to be known about good and evil.' Presumably these 'truths' about the mind are physical facts? Therefore he is bent on reducing morality to physical facts (in whatever sense 'physical facts' can mean) Of course Harris inserts the weaker claim in between this contradiction: 'In my view, morality must be viewed in the context of our growing scientific understanding of the mind.'

 

[Beth]

These same concerns apply to health questions. We manage to ask and answer general and specific questions.

Indeed. It is a good argument in favor of your point of view.

You don't think it is possible to distinguish whether or not autonomy is preferred?

As a rule of thumb, I assume that autonomy is preferred. However, in order for society as a whole to flourish, individual citizens are deprived of autonomy on all sorts of things. It's clear, for example, that allowing individuals the right to drive anywhere at any speed is dangerous to other members of the society. So, it's not that we can't properly prefer autonomy, it's that we must find a balance between the needs of the individual and the needs of society. It is nice to contemplate being able to scientifically determine what the optimum balance is for literally 1,000's of different matters ranging from driving rules to smoking. Certainly, our current system of doing so leaves much to be desired.

What question are you asking about stem cell research or abortion or smoking?

Terms like 'moral' and 'immoral' can be dumped, as once you are into specific questions, they aren't meaningful.

Just like now that medicine is all about meaningful specific questions, the terms 'healthy' and 'unhealthy' are no longer used?

If you are asking about public health policy with respect to encouraging healthy behavior, there is a large body of research on this topic. For example there is research on the effects of passing laws to prohibit smoking in specific venues - whether this alters rates of disease related to the effects of tobacco, for example. If you wonder about the kinds of choices that people make which respect to smoking when the choice is made in advance vs. choices made at the moment, there's research on that as well.

Yes, there is indeed some relevant research. I'm actually changed my mind on one issue - laws prohibiting smoking in public spaces - due to the research I'm seen on that in the past few years. I think I may have mentioned it earlier.

Is that what you were thinking of when you talk about using science to answer moral questions?

 

[Beth]

the weaker argument that, 'if we are agreed that moral truths exist and that well being is a good basis for determining what those moral truths are then science can help us in better informing our moral decisions', is nothing new under the sun.

Yes, this seems to be all that Harris has done.

On the other hand, while it may not be something new under the sun, apparently there are large portions of the population that have not previously been exposed to it.

 

[AlBell]

I see. Strangely, I suspect a good portion of humanity will not agree that 'moral truths exist'.

At any rate it may be a moral truth that book sales are good for Harris.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

Yes, this seems to be all that Harris has done.

On the other hand, while it may not be something new under the sun, apparently there are large portions of the population that have not previously been exposed to it.

Unfortunately Harris has used language which has been extremely suggestive that he was also making a different, stronger claim, and indeed many of his supporters seem to be confused as to what he actually is claiming. To quote one of them (Richard Dawkins):

I was one of those who had unthinkingly bought into the hectoring myth that science can say nothing about morals. The Moral Landscape has changed all that for me. Moral philosophers, too, will find their world exhilaratingly turned upside down, as they discover a need to learn some neuroscience.

Now of course, I do not know for certain what dear Richard meant by his statement, but it looks awfully like he thinks Sam Harris is making the strong claim rather than the weak one. Why on earth would moral philosophers find their world turned upside down by Harris? Surely Dawkins has heard of the moral philosophy called Utilitarianism?

Also, another notable fan, Harriet Hall writes in Science Based Medicine:

I have frequently said that science can only provide data to inform our decisions but can’t tell us what we “should” do; that it can determine facts but not values. I stand corrected. A persuasive new book by Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape, has convinced me that science can and should determine what is moral. In fact, it is a more reliable guide than any other option.

It sounds like she also thinks Harris is making the stronger claim. Of course, Harris only has himself to blame for equivocating and therefore misleading people. There has been copious evidence cited on this thread of things Harris said in his initial TED talk which present a persuasive case that Harris was making this stronger claim at some point. I think he has backtracked a little since then, but nevertheless an equivocator he remains.

 

[Beth]

Unfortunately Harris has used language which has been extremely suggestive that he was also making a different, stronger claim, and indeed many of his supporters seem to be confused as to what he actually is claiming. To quote one of them (Richard Dawkins):



Now of course, I do not know for certain what dear Richard meant by his statement, but it looks awfully like he thinks Sam Harris is making the strong claim rather than the weak one. Why on earth would moral philosophers find their world turned upside down by Harris? Surely Dawkins has heard of the moral philosophy called Utilitarianism?

Also, another notable fan, Harriet Hall writes in Science Based Medicine:



It sounds like she also thinks Harris is making the stronger claim. Of course, Harris only has himself to blame for equivocating and therefore misleading people. There has been copious evidence cited on this thread of things Harris said in his initial TED talk which present a persuasive case that Harris was making this stronger claim at some point. I think he has backtracked a little since then, but nevertheless an equivocator he remains.

Oh, I agree that he has made claims that can't be backed up as you are saying. But I suspect that he may have extended the idea further than many people had previously considered in regard to developing conclusions about the morality of various actions.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

Oh, I agree that he has made claims that can't be backed up as you are saying. But I suspect that he may have extended the idea further than many people had previously considered in regard to developing conclusions about the morality of various actions.

I think it is a case of a popular writer writing about a book about moral philosophy, which then goes on to become vastly more popular than the 'serious' works of moral philosophy that have preceded it. 'The Moral Landscape', appears to many of these readers as new and exciting, precisely because they have not read any other works of moral philosophy beforehand.

I don't begrudge the fact that Harris has sparked a wider interest in moral philosophy; I think it a good thing. I would be hopeful however that 'The Moral Landscape' is not the only moral philosophy book that people consider and that they read other works in order to put Harris' book into its proper context.

Here is a snippet from JS Mill's, 'Utilitarianism':

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest-Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.

Replace 'happiness' with 'well-being' and we have Sam Harris. Also it is worth considering that if we do replace 'happiness' with 'well-being', whether this meaningfully changes anything in the above statement - what could we mean by saying that something improves well-being but not happiness and vice-versa? This relates to one of the problems of Utilitarianism, that it is difficult to define these terms in a meaningful, objective way.

For anyone else interested in these issues there is a very insightful discussion on Amazon, based on (in my opinion) the best review of the book to date (by Kevin Currie-Knight):
http://www.amazon.com/review/R2DG6E...9171211&nodeID=&tag=&linkCode=#wasThisHelpful

(Scroll up the linked page for the review)

 

[Kuko 4000]

Democracy Simulator, just out of interest, have you read the Moral Landscape?