Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[bokonon]

Me? No

They? Yes

Science? Who knows, I haven't seen Harris' calculation that solves this question now and for eternity and in every hypothetical circumstance. Have you? What use is "science can answer moral questions" if it's more like "science can potentially answer moral questions, in time, if we understand more..."?

That's not what he says. He says it can answer moral questions today, and would generally return the answer that rape and murder are not above the waterline on the moral landscape. Since that answer is apparently the same one you've arrived at through some mysterious non-science process, I'm not sure why you dismiss him as an idiot.

 

[Dragoonster]

That's not what he says. He says it can answer moral questions today, and would generally return the answer that rape and murder are not above the waterline on the moral landscape. Since that answer is apparently the same one you've arrived at through some mysterious non-science process, I'm not sure why you dismiss him as an idiot.

He's an idiot because he believes the answer can be solely scientifically determined.

You say: "He says it can answer moral questions today, and would generally return the answer that rape and murder are not above the waterline on the moral landscape."

Prove this scientifically and I'll leave the thread.



...or is science suddenly not about proof?



To expand or clarify:

"science can answer moral questions"

Please someone, anyone, show us a moral question that can be (today) answered scientifically, and show the scientific proof.

 

[Paulhoff]

He's an idiot because he believes the answer can be solely scientifically determined.

You say: "He says it can answer moral questions today, and would generally return the answer that rape and murder are not above the waterline on the moral landscape."

Prove this scientifically and I'll leave the thread.



...or is science suddenly not about proof?



To expand or clarify:

"science can answer moral questions"

Please someone, anyone, show us a moral question that can be (today) answered scientifically, and show the scientific proof.

Do you mean no one can show that rape and murder will cause the fabric of a society to fall apart?

Oh my.

Paul

 

[Dani]

Linda:

My apologies for the delay. I honestly needed to take a break from this thread.

For clarification, in this post when I mention "human values" or "what humans value", I'm (obviously) talking about moral values.

I think you're right, that I haven't yet understood your point, because as it is, it appears contradictory. It seems to be that science can investigate morals once a goal has been established. That is, a goal (i.e. a characteristic of interest such as a life-saved or a sense of well-being, whose choice depends upon a human's values) is chosen a priori, and scientific investigation shows you how to achieve that goal. The choosing of the a priori goal cannot be got at through science, however, since it represents human values whose descriptions vary. Science can describe those values, but it doesn't provide a way to single out one description from another, so it doesn't provide a way to resolve conflict between two different descriptions a priori. On the other hand, were those descriptions to all be the same, then the goal would be obvious. The goal would be the description of human values.

This is a fair description of my position.

Here is where it is inconsistent or contradictory. The last sentence in the above paragraph demonstrates that it isn't about is's and ought's, but simply about consistency, so all this reference to Hume et. al. is a red herring. Scientific investigation reveals that there is far more consistency in human values than there are difference. That is, it is scientific investigation which is taking us to that purported goal. But more importantly, it hasn't been explained where the idea comes from that science is being asked to establish goals. That is, science can be said to answer moral questions only if it is science which prescribes what it is that humans value. Yet it doesn't seem to bother us that science does not prescribe the shape of the universe or the number of species. We still manage to propose that science can answer cosmological or biological questions.

I'm not especially interested in defending Hume's position because I haven't arrived at my own position through his words and that would be a discussion about our respective interpretation of what Hume said. I think we have enough work interpretating our respective views.

You say that there is far more consistency than difference in human values, which is as vague a statement as it can be. I can neither agree or disagree with that. The fact though is that there is difference in human values, and I don't know how a majority position can constitute scientific evidence that said position is a scientific truth, especially knowing the evidence that points to the fact that majority positions have changed over time. You need more than an argumentum ad populum to solve this problem.

You also say that, according to my position, science can answer moral questions only if it is science which prescribes what it is that humans value, whereas science does not prescribe the shape of the universe, etc. Not really. In fact, I think science can describe what it is that humans value. That is, the wide range of human values. It also can describe the interaction between innate and environmental factors that have an effect on our behavior, and those same factors. What it can't do is single out some human values (which, in order to avoid nonsense, wouldn't be contradictive of each other) and conclude that this is what humans value. At most science could say that most people value X, and possibly just now. But of course, if someone says that science not only can single out some human values to make a description of human values, but it can say that some are better and true while others are worse and false, I would simply demand evidence, and by evidence I mean observable facts, not moral assumptions.

 

[Earthborn]

If they are no better and no worse,

Just because there is no objective measure one can use to determine which is better and which is worse, doesn't mean there is no better and no worse. It just means that "better" and "worse" are terms that refer not to objective reality, but to subjective value judgements.

why is criticizing them even a worthwhile activity?

There is no objective measure to determine whether some activity is worthwhile of not. That does not stop anyone from engaging in activities that they subjectively consider worthwhile.

I'm not an objectivity fetishist and therefore don't believe that things are somehow "better" if they are "objective". I take the opposite view: that the things that are truly worthwhile don't exist in "objective reality" but can only be found in our subjective minds and in the intersubjective interactions between them.

 

[fls]

Linda:

My apologies for the delay. I honestly needed to take a break from this thread.

For clarification, in this post when I mention "human values" or "what humans value", I'm (obviously) talking about moral values.

This is a fair description of my position.

Yeah.

I'm not especially interested in defending Hume's position because I haven't arrived at my own position through his words and that would be a discussion about our respective interpretation of what Hume said. I think we have enough work interpretating our respective views.

I mention it because it has been raised in this thread as relevant. Bits that don't need discussion (there isn't disagreement or confusion, or they aren't relevant) can be safely discarded (at least, that's what I do).

You say that there is far more consistency than difference in human values, which is as vague a statement as it can be. I can neither agree or disagree with that.

It can certainly be made more specific. It was vague because I thought I was referring to something uncontroversial at this point. The list of human universals is long, our brains have the same basic components such as reward centers, types of information processing or decision-making (including systematic errors in thinking) show up as patterns in brain processes, etc. We don't need to pretend that a rational morality necessarily encompasses an exponential increase in altruism as kinship decreases, for example.

The fact though is that there is difference in human values, and I don't know how a majority position can constitute scientific evidence that said position is a scientific truth, especially knowing the evidence that points to the fact that majority positions have changed over time. You need more than an argumentum ad populum to solve this problem.

I'm not putting forth an argumentum ad populum. I'm pointing out that your statement in bold seems to say that the reason science cannot answer moral questions is because moral questions depend upon human values and human values vary. This pre-supposes that science could answer moral questions if human values did not vary. I'm just asking you to confirm or recognize this, in order to move on to the next part of the process.

You also say that, according to my position, science can answer moral questions only if it is science which prescribes what it is that humans value, whereas science does not prescribe the shape of the universe, etc. Not really. In fact, I think science can describe what it is that humans value. That is, the wide range of human values. It also can describe the interaction between innate and environmental factors that have an effect on our behavior, and those same factors. What it can't do is single out some human values (which, in order to avoid nonsense, wouldn't be contradictive of each other) and conclude that this is what humans value. At most science could say that most people value X, and possibly just now. But of course, if someone says that science not only can single out some human values to make a description of human values, but it can say that some are better and true while others are worse and false, I would simply demand evidence, and by evidence I mean observable facts, not moral assumptions.

Okay. So now you seem to be saying that actually science can answer moral questions as long as there is a way to distinguish between human values. If they were all the same, we wouldn't have to come with a way to distinguish them. But since they aren't the same (although science is showing us that realistically, a better description would be "the narrow range of human values"), then a way to distinguish human values as better or worse would also allow science to answer moral questions.

And that's what Harris is addressing. Do we have a way to distinguish between human values which reliably and validly sorts them into better and worse?

Linda

 

[Kuko 4000]

Interesting critique of Pigliucci's critique over here:

http://www.butterfliesandwheels.org/2011/harris-and-pigliucci-on-moral-philosophy/

 

[fls]

Interesting critique of Pigliucci's critique over here:

http://www.butterfliesandwheels.org/2011/harris-and-pigliucci-on-moral-philosophy/

Thanks Kuko. I had been looking forward to reading Pigliucci's critique once he had actually read the book, but that was quite disappointing. After erecting a number of fairly fallacious arguments (Does he actually think that the bestiality analogy represents a "philosophical kill" for vegetarianism? Also, he doesn't seem to see that this example actually supports Harris' supposition that moral discussions don't take place in the absence conscious creatures and their experiences.) he fails to engage on those points which are of interest to me. Rather than his incessant appeals to authority, I'd rather he took Harris' route of referring to his own reasoning instead. Unless I'm a Hume or Plato fanboy, it doesn't help to tell me what they had to say on the matter. Instead I need to know why what they said can be considered relevant or useful.

I find it hard to believe that he actually read Harris' book and still managed to miss what Harris meant by "the well-being of conscious creatures". It may be as the author of that article describes:

"Others may fly into a frenzy and sting at anything and everything, eventually disembowelling themselves intellectually in the process."

Linda

 

[Dani]

It can certainly be made more specific. It was vague because I thought I was referring to something uncontroversial at this point. The list of human universals is long, our brains have the same basic components such as reward centers, types of information processing or decision-making (including systematic errors in thinking) show up as patterns in brain processes, etc. We don't need to pretend that a rational morality necessarily encompasses an exponential increase in altruism as kinship decreases, for example.

You make two different points here.

You say that the list of human universals is long. I assume we're talking about morals. I don't think the list of human universals is long in that sense. In fact, I don't think there is such thing as human universal morals, but I could be wrong. Can you name some of these human universals?

You mention some neurobiological facts about the human being. The problem I see here is that the scientific exploration of the brains doesn't lead to a theory of moral rights and wrongs. Does the release of a certain neurotransmitter actually tell us anything about whether something is morally right or not? If so, how? We can use as an example the neurotransmitter linked with reward. There seems to be something missing to logically conclude that from neurobiological facts we can obtain answers about moral rights and wrongs.

I'm not putting forth an argumentum ad populum. I'm pointing out that your statement in bold seems to say that the reason science cannot answer moral questions is because moral questions depend upon human values and human values vary. This pre-supposes that science could answer moral questions if human values did not vary. I'm just asking you to confirm or recognize this, in order to move on to the next part of the process.

My answer regarding the diversity of human values only refers to the arguments about consistency of human values. I am aware that there is at least a different argument about neurobiological facts. I adressed this argument in the previous paragraph.

Okay. So now you seem to be saying that actually science can answer moral questions as long as there is a way to distinguish between human values. If they were all the same, we wouldn't have to come with a way to distinguish them. But since they aren't the same (although science is showing us that realistically, a better description would be "the narrow range of human values"), then a way to distinguish human values as better or worse would also allow science to answer moral questions.

And that's what Harris is addressing. Do we have a way to distinguish between human values which reliably and validly sorts them into better and worse?

And that's an interesting question. Since there aren't scientific theories about moral rights and wrongs, there seems to be a problem (the nature of this problem is what apparently we disagree on). We inductively can say that science doesn't answer moral questions. Someone is claiming that science can answer moral questions. Great. Next step: evidence. I'm not asking for direct evidence of scientific theories about moral rights and wrongs. Just a plausible scenario from which we can conclude that science can answer moral questions.

 

[fls]

It can certainly be made more specific. It was vague because I thought I was referring to something uncontroversial at this point. The list of human universals is long, our brains have the same basic components such as reward centers, types of information processing or decision-making (including systematic errors in thinking) show up as patterns in brain processes, etc. We don't need to pretend that a rational morality necessarily encompasses an exponential increase in altruism as kinship decreases, for example.

You make two different points here.

You say that the list of human universals is long. I assume we're talking about morals. I don't think the list of human universals is long in that sense. In fact, I don't think there is such thing as human universal morals, but I could be wrong. Can you name some of these human universals?

http://condor.depaul.edu/mfiddler/hyphen/humunivers.htm

You mention some neurobiological facts about the human being. The problem I see here is that the scientific exploration of the brains doesn't lead to a theory of moral rights and wrongs. Does the release of a certain neurotransmitter actually tell us anything about whether something is morally right or not? If so, how? We can use as an example the neurotransmitter linked with reward. There seems to be something missing to logically conclude that from neurobiological facts we can obtain answers about moral rights and wrongs.

Some of our ideas about right and wrong come about because we are rewarded or punished for certain behaviors. We feel good when we perform an act of altruism or when we confirm a belief. We experience distress when we perceive pain in another conscious being or when we are deliberately attempting to deceive. So it becomes relevant to understand the common neurobiological basis for these reactions and the conditions under which they occur. And also to understand when they do not. The experience of pain has a stronger relation to morality than the experience of boredom, for example.

I'm not putting forth an argumentum ad populum. I'm pointing out that your statement in bold seems to say that the reason science cannot answer moral questions is because moral questions depend upon human values and human values vary. This pre-supposes that science could answer moral questions if human values did not vary. I'm just asking you to confirm or recognize this, in order to move on to the next part of the process.

My answer regarding the diversity of human values only refers to the arguments about consistency of human values. I am aware that there is at least a different argument about neurobiological facts. I adressed this argument in the previous paragraph.

Are you saying that your statements about the inconsistency of human values were a red-herring, then? That even though you brought it up as though it were relevant to the question of whether science can answer moral questions, it really makes no difference one way or the other?

Okay. So now you seem to be saying that actually science can answer moral questions as long as there is a way to distinguish between human values. If they were all the same, we wouldn't have to come with a way to distinguish them. But since they aren't the same (although science is showing us that realistically, a better description would be "the narrow range of human values"), then a way to distinguish human values as better or worse would also allow science to answer moral questions.

And that's what Harris is addressing. Do we have a way to distinguish between human values which reliably and validly sorts them into better and worse?

And that's an interesting question. Since there aren't scientific theories about moral rights and wrongs, there seems to be a problem (the nature of this problem is what apparently we disagree on). We inductively can say that science doesn't answer moral questions. Someone is claiming that science can answer moral questions. Great. Next step: evidence. I'm not asking for direct evidence of scientific theories about moral rights and wrongs. Just a plausible scenario from which we can conclude that science can answer moral questions.

[/QUOTE]

A scientific theory about rights and wrongs looks at what it is that makes an action right or wrong. The domain Harris maps out with regards to morals is that of the experience of conscious creatures, as individuals or as a group. It is those things which add to or subtract from what we perceive as a good life, what it takes to flourish or languish - suffering, satisfaction, physical health, autonomy, fear, poverty, etc. Similarly, a scientific theory about health maps out a domain with regard to death, disability, disease, discomfort and dissatisfaction.

If you are looking for a plausible scenario, then, fortunately for you, Harris has conveniently bundled this evidence in the form of a book.

Linda

 

[AlBell]

Re: Science can answer moral questions

Ought it do so? If 'yes', please show the math and science demonstrating that answer.

 

[bokonon]

Re: Science can answer questions

Ought it do so? If 'yes', please show the math and science demonstrating that answer.

 

[Beth]

You say that the list of human universals is long. I assume we're talking about morals. I don't think the list of human universals is long in that sense. In fact, I don't think there is such thing as human universal morals, but I could be wrong. Can you name some of these human universals?

http://condor.depaul.edu/mfiddler/hyphen/humunivers.htm

While this is a long list of human universals, very few of them are human universal morals. Murder, rape, and mother-son incest are proscribed. Stinginess is disapproved of. That's about it IMO.

Many of the things on that list aren't about morals or morality at all, e.g. tickling. The majority of those that deal with morality such as tabooed utterances, are universal only in the sense that such taboos exist. The specifics about what is taboo vary tremendously. I don't think such things qualify as a human universal moral in the same way that proscribing murder does.

On the other hand, there do appear to be some universal human morals. It would seem to be a good starting place for Harris, but he doesn't discuss it in his book.

 

[JJM 777]

Re: Science can answer moral questions

Ought it do so? If 'yes', please show the math and science demonstrating that answer.

"Ought" science gather any information, or have any sense in any calculations? Yes if you want to reliably achieve any actual objectives with science.

http://www.johnjoemittler.com/ethics/English/ch_04.html
http://www.johnjoemittler.com/ethics/English/ch_03.html

 

[Earthborn]

I find it hard to believe that he actually read Harris' book and still managed to miss what Harris meant by "the well-being of conscious creatures".

What do you think he meant by it?

Similarly, a scientific theory about health maps out a domain with regard to death, disability, disease, discomfort and dissatisfaction.

No such scientific theory exists. I don't know about anyone even trying to formulate such a theory.

While this is a long list of human universals, very few of them are human universal morals.

It is a long list, that's for sure. But I am not convinced it even represents a list of human universals. Some of the items on the list are even explicitely mentioned not to be universal by expressions such as "most", "on average" and "normally". Many other items on the list are expressed among humans in such vastly diverse ways that it is hard to see how they represent universal traits.

On the other hand, there do appear to be some universal human morals.

Are there? I can't think of a single one.

"Ought" science gather any information, or have any sense in any calculations?

Parsing error.

Yes if you want to reliably achieve any actual objectives with science.

http://www.johnjoemittler.com/ethics/English/ch_04.html
http://www.johnjoemittler.com/ethics/English/ch_03.html

I think this is a load of huey, but I guess it is nice that elephants and the great whales are recognised as the superior beings they clearly are:

Moral weight is present where live brain cells of living creatures are present. The moral weight of each species depends on its brain capacity.

Not so sure about the idea that moral weight depends on species. Seems rather specist to me. Is the moral weight of a human zygote really greater than a fully grown chimp, just because its parents happen to have more brain cells? I'm not so sure that is true. Judging moral weight on the basis of species is also problematic since the division of species is a somewhat arbitrary categorisation.

 

[fls]

What do you think he meant by it?

The first fifty times didn't stick, but fifty-one will do the trick?

I think he is identifying the domain under which we consider actions morally good or bad, as opposed to actions which fall under other constructs, such as health.

No such scientific theory exists. I don't know about anyone even trying to f ormulate such a theory.

These are the domains under which health is investigated.

Linda

 

[Earthborn]

The first fifty times didn't stick, but fifty-one will do the trick?

Perhaps...

I think he is identifying the domain under which we consider actions morally good or bad, as opposed to actions which fall under other constructs, such as health.

... though it would probably help if you tried not to speak in riddles.

 

[fls]

Perhaps...

... though it would probably help if you tried not to speak in riddles.

Sorry, I try not to. I didn't realize you wouldn't find it comprehensible.

Linda

 

[Beth]

While this is a long list of human universals, very few of them are human universal morals.

It is a long list, that's for sure. But I am not convinced it even represents a list of human universals. Some of the items on the list are even explicitely mentioned not to be universal by expressions such as "most", "on average" and "normally". Many other items on the list are expressed among humans in such vastly diverse ways that it is hard to see how they represent universal traits.

Well, technically, two arms and two legs are not universal human traits as some people are born without or lose one or more at some point. Still, a good point. I quite agree that some are so abstract, they don't represent a universal.

On the other hand, there do appear to be some universal human morals. It would seem to be a good starting place for Harris, but he doesn't discuss it in his book.

Are there? I can't think of a single one.

According to the list cited above murder, rape, and mother-son incest are universally proscribed. If you think none of those qualify as universal human morals, could you explain why not?

 

[Earthborn]

Well, technically, two arms and two legs are not universal human traits as some people are born without or lose one or more at some point.

Technically, I would find it strange if anyone tried to claim having two arms and two legs are a "human universal".

According to the list cited above murder, rape, and mother-son incest are universally proscribed. If you think none of those qualify as universal human morals, could you explain why not?

Because there are people who murder, rape or have sex with their mothers, and think there is nothing wrong with it. In some cases there are even large groups of people who have no moral objection to what in another culture counts as murder, rape or incest.