Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

[fls]

The problem with this lecture is that Harris equivocates. He lays out argument A, and presents argument B. He is not clear. This is why supposedly intelligent folk seem to be arguing past each other on this thread.

Either Harris is extremely sloppy (he equivocates accidentally) or he equivocates intentionally and I tend to think the latter is more probable because he uses recognizable terms in moral philosophy to set out his case at the beginning. If I was to be uncharitable, I would say that this is an unfortunate case of 'the Emperor's New Clothes', although with a slight twist as this time a few other people, as well as the Emperor, have bought into the illusion.

Also, please point out where he is not saying what I have described. Yes he says that some moral questions cannot be answered by science, but he is never clear on why some questions can be and others can't be. There are basically two types of moral disagreement. Those where we disagree over facts and those where we disagree over values. Science can obviously help to decide the first point, but it cannot help to decide the second - what does Harris think? The subtitle of his book is, 'How Science Can Determine Human Values'. The man is hardly making immodest claims! If it is not his intention to show how science (what is) can determine oughts (what should be), then he should stop repeatedly alluding to it. Especially, as you kind of point out, he should know better.

Perhaps he wasn't expecting people to choose a rather simple reading of his statements. I've been caught by that same sort issue myself, so I have some sympathy for him.

Linda

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

I don't say there's a line. That would be like asking where the "line" is between our atmosphere and outer space. There's none to be found, but I still know that my house is in the atmosphere and a probe on its way to Mars is in outer space.

Similarly, Bundy is clearly abnormal.

Normal and abnormal are mutually exclusive categories. You have to draw a line (i.e. select criteria) to decide in to which category an individual falls.

An example of an arbitrary dividing line you are implicitly using would be something like "Normal people do not torture, rape and murder others for entertainment."

Without drawing arbitrary lines all we have is a description of what is. For example, you could not define behaviour as being right or wrong, better or worse, but only that it happens x% of the time under conditions y.

 

[Piggy]

The problem with this lecture is that Harris equivocates. He lays out argument A, and presents argument B. He is not clear. This is why supposedly intelligent folk seem to be arguing past each other on this thread.

I agree with fls. If you go scouting for contradictions in the narrow acontextual statements he makes at various points in the talk, you can certainly find them. But if you listen to the entire lecture to try to understand his thesis, it's pretty clear.

I like fls's comparison to the science/religion "wall" and how it collapses upon investigation. That, it seems to me, is clearly the kind of thing he's on about here.

 

[Piggy]

Normal and abnormal are mutually exclusive categories. You have to draw a line (i.e. select criteria) to decide in to which category an individual falls.

An example of an arbitrary dividing line you are implicitly using would be something like "Normal people do not torture, rape and murder others for entertainment."

Without drawing arbitrary lines all we have is a description of what is. For example, you could not define behaviour as being right or wrong, better or worse, but only that it happens x% of the time under conditions y.

This is a pointless exercise (go find the "line" separating our atmosphere from outer space), and in any case, it's irrelevant to my point regarding Bundy.

 

[Skeptic Ginger]

No it is not, your simple assertion ('like it or not') will not do. Science can answer positive questions about what is. It cannot by itself answer normative questions about how things ought to be. Like it or not, ought refers to 'what should be' and not 'what is'. If you can demonstrate how we derive what 'ought to be' from 'what is', without at some point expressing a moral value that is not decidable scientifically, then congratulations you've solved a puzzle of Philosophy that has stood the test of time from Hume onwards. Please proceed.

This is the non-paradigm shifted version of the subject.

Let's look at an analogy. Can one use the scientific process to determine intelligence?

Someone who does not have an IQ allowing the ability to read is clearly not as intelligent as the computer genius who developed Facebook.

Can one make a value judgement who is more intelligent here based on observed evidence?


So you observe the computer genius has no friends and despite his billions seems to regret his social isolation. And the person who cannot read has a constantly cheerful disposition and lots of social interactions with the same people suggesting they are his friends.

Can we make a value judgement who is happier here (provided we analyze sufficient data previously established as a measure of happiness)?



Can we study features of perceived beauty, determine which are consistent across cultures, not determined by cultural influence and make a value judgement on what humans naturally perceive as beautiful?



If you agree, then science can determine intelligence, happiness and beauty. Science doesn't 'make' intelligence, happiness or beauty. There is no absolute value in the Universe for these things. Even intelligence is relative to what one uses as an objective measure. But what is that measure? Reading or social skills?



What people don't always recognize is that morality, love, beauty and so on are just as naturalistic as anything else which is a function of the human brain. Morality is no different qualitatively than intelligence. We can easily prove these esoteric things are the same because people with specific brain damage demonstrate just how the brain evaluates and manifests morality, beauty and love.




Back to determining the "ought". Is 26 degrees centigrade hot? Well that depends. Is it the ambient air or the temperature of a human body? Science cannot determine 'hot' until 'relative to what' is added to the problem. But would you make the claim determining 'hot' is outside the realm of science?



Why is a moral ought any different from an objective hot? It's not when you add in the 'relative to what'. It may be that you end up with a range of "ought" rather than clear black and white "oughts". But there is a range of 'hot' as well.


My point is, if you are going to make the claim something is outside the realm of science, then tell us what that outside is. Is it some function that is not within the biological processes of the brain? Pixie dust? Invisible sky daddies? Magic?

I can see the same categories for morality and beauty as I can see for intelligence and hot. One just needs to be reminded all these value judgements involve 'relative to something', not an absolute value. But that is a common issue in all kinds of things no one argues are outside the realm of science.

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

This is a pointless exercise (go find the "line" separating our atmosphere from outer space), and in any case, it's irrelevant to my point regarding Bundy.

My point is that the line separating our atmosphere from outer space is wherever we choose to put it. We can use all sorts of scientific measurements and reasoning to justify why we would put it at a particular altitude, but ultimately the decision would be based on a consensus or compromise of preference between interested parties.

Using Bundy as an example of abnormal is trivial because his behaviour makes him an outlier. We don't need science to tell us his behaviour was wrong. In the real world you claim to inhabit the problems and situations which throw up ethical questions are rarely so stark.

Here's a couple of ethical questions for you to use science to answer:

1) Should the cost of higher education be placed on students or the state?

2) Which state benefits should be universal and which should be means tested?

 

[Ivor the Engineer]

Here's a couple more for science to answer:

Should physicians help in the excution of prisoners on death row?

How many resources should be used to save one person's life?

 

[AlBell]

Here's a couple of ethical questions for you to use science to answer:

1) Should the cost of higher education be placed on students or the state?

2) Which state benefits should be universal and which should be means tested?

Doing so of course without relying on any "intrinsic good", unscientific, choices hidden (or blatently obvious) somewhere in the analyses.

Then, is the Death Penalty ok?
Abortion? First trimester? Third?

 

[Earthborn]

Let's look at an analogy. Can one use the scientific process to determine intelligence?

No, one cannot. "Intelligence" is not a scientifically meaningful term, but a subjective value judgement on how clever you think a person is.

Someone who does not have an IQ allowing the ability to read is clearly not as intelligent as the computer genius who developed Facebook.

Most IQ tests require reading ability, so it is not that a person can't read because s/he has a low IQ, rather has a low IQ because s/he can't read the questions in the test. For IQ tests that don't require literacy, there is still the issue that they test only a limited number of a person's mental capacities. A person might be highly gifted in capacities that the test designers subjectively chose not to include in the test. And the test designers have also subjectively chosen which sort of answers score as "gifted".

Can one make a value judgement who is more intelligent here based on observed evidence?

Only subjectively.

Can we make a value judgement who is happier here (provided we analyze sufficient data previously established as a measure of happiness)?

Subjectively, because we decided subjectively which properties are a measure of "happiness".

Can we study features of perceived beauty, determine which are consistent across cultures, not determined by cultural influence and make a value judgement on what humans naturally perceive as beautiful?

No, we cannot. There is no such thing as "human nature" that can be distinguished from cultural influence, as everything humans do is influenced by culture. As cultural anthropologists have always said "human culture" = "human nature". You might as well put a fish on the moon to test how it "swims naturally" without the "influence of water".

When it comes to appreciating beauty, there are certainly ideas about beauty that are widely shared among different cultures, but this does not prove they are not determined by cultural influence. It might just as easily mean that some cultural memes have a lot of staying power and originate in the culture that our common ancestors in Africa had. Or they might have spread through cultural exchange.

Let's also not forget that while different cultures may have -- on average -- ideas about beauty in common, they also have many individuals all having their own ideas of what is beautiful.

What people don't always recognize is that morality, love, beauty and so on are just as naturalistic as anything else which is a function of the human brain.

In other words, just as naturalistic as God, the Tooth Fairy and pixiedust, which are functions of the human brain.

But would you make the claim determining 'hot' is outside the realm of science?

Yes, I would make that claim. Science can tell me the temperature, but it cannot tell me whether I should consider it hot or not. That would be a subjective value judgement.

It may be that you end up with a range of "ought" rather than clear black and white "oughts". But there is a range of 'hot' as well.

A range that can shift very dramatically with the circumstances. 26 degrees Celsius is pretty hot for the Artic winter, but downright chilly for the equator. 3000 degrees Celsius isn't hot for the surface of a star, but it is too hot for an oven. If the ranges of moral behaviour are similarly flexible, morality is useless.

My point is, if you are going to make the claim something is outside the realm of science, then tell us what that outside is. Is it some function that is not within the biological processes of the brain? Pixie dust? Invisible sky daddies? Magic?

That "outside" is pretty much the same place "Pixie dust", "Invisible Sky Daddies" and "Magic" inhabit. It is a place intimately familiar to everyone of us, a place everyone of us knows better than what is inside the realm of science. You might call it "memespace" or "culture", it consists of the narratives we tell each other. And it is not really a place.

 

[Piggy]

My point is that the line separating our atmosphere from outer space is wherever we choose to put it. We can use all sorts of scientific measurements and reasoning to justify why we would put it at a particular altitude, but ultimately the decision would be based on a consensus or compromise of preference between interested parties.

Using Bundy as an example of abnormal is trivial because his behaviour makes him an outlier. We don't need science to tell us his behaviour was wrong. In the real world you claim to inhabit the problems and situations which throw up ethical questions are rarely so stark.

Here's a couple of ethical questions for you to use science to answer:

1) Should the cost of higher education be placed on students or the state?

2) Which state benefits should be universal and which should be means tested?

But that has nothing to do with the actual discussion of Bundy we were having.

The question was not whether or not we need science to object morally to his actions. Clearly, we do not.

I was simply asked whether science could be used by Bundy to justify his own actions, and the answer is clearly yes.

(That said, science has quite a bit to say about the question of what do to about people like him.)

Yes, using Bundy as an example of abnormal is trivial. That's what makes it a good example.

And as for a bright line dividing atmosphere and outer space, I can't agree with your thinking. There is no line to be found, and no need to attempt to draw one. Why would we?

Finally, why are you asking me those specific questions, when I have made it abundantly clear that I agree with Harris that science cannot hand us answers to every human dilemma we face?

 

[Apathia]

Well and Good, Biology can tell me what is healthy human behavior.
Procreation is natural to Human kind, and something we've certainly evolved to do.
But I haven't participated in procreation. I've disobeyed this biolological "imperative."
I don't even intend to be a parent.
Am I an immoral deviant?

 

[Piggy]

Am I an immoral deviant?

Well, yeah. And by that token, so am I.

Are you, by any chance, single?

Just askin'.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

Perhaps he wasn't expecting people to choose a rather simple reading of his statements. I've been caught by that same sort issue myself, so I have some sympathy for him.

Linda

fls, I am happy to concede if I have misunderstood Sam Harris. I have provided plenty of examples of why I believe he suggests that we can derive an ought from an is. Here is another one from the talk:

"There is not a description of the way the world is that can tell us the way the world ought to be ... I think that this is quite clearly untrue.'

I take issue with him on this point. It is an extremely important point in the history of moral philosophy. I can't believe that Sam Harris does not know he is not making it, when he elucidates it in exact language like this. I am mystified as to why several posters in this thread seem to think that it is a problem to take issue with Sam Harris over this.

 

[Piscivore]

Well and Good, Biology can tell me what is healthy human behavior.
Procreation is natural to Human kind, and something we've certainly evolved to do.
But I haven't participated in procreation. I've disobeyed this biolological "imperative."
I don't even intend to be a parent.
Am I an immoral deviant?

Yes. That's why we like you.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

Take a look at that quote again, and put it in the full context of the lecture, including his explicit statement that science will never give us the answer to questions such as "Should we bomb Iran?"

Ok, I'm glad you brought this up as I think it is where Harris shoots himself in the foot. Why can science never give us the answers to questions such as 'Should we bomb Iran'? Is it because the disagreement here is between competing values that are not scientifically decidable?

 

[Piggy]

Ok, I'm glad you brought this up as I think it is where Harris shoots himself in the foot. Why can science never give us the answers to questions such as 'Should we bomb Iran'? Is it because the disagreement here is between competing values that are not scientifically decidable?

I don't read him as saying that we definitely will not get an answer from science on this particular point. Although that may well be true.

But he's certainly correct in stating that science cannot be depended on to give us answers to every question, if only for the simple reason that reality is not required to only offer us dilemmas which have solutions.

Even if we were able to answer every scientific question with perfect accuracy, there is still the potential for dilemmas in which the competing choices are equally balanced.

And of course in the real world even those of us who are open to scientifically-informed solutions must share the globe with those who are not. And in a democracy, that throws a mighty big wrench in the machinery of actually attempting to apply science-based solutions to actual problems.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

I'm looking forward to Piggy's answers to Ivor the Engineer and AlBell's posts.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

But he's certainly correct in stating that science cannot be depended on to give us answers to every question, if only for the simple reason that reality is not required to only offer us dilemmas which have solutions.

Even if we were able to answer every scientific question with perfect accuracy, there is still the potential for dilemmas in which the competing choices are equally balanced.

Ok. So would these dilemmas rightly be called moral dilemmas? They are not factual dilemmas. Therefore science can't solve moral dilemmas? Once all the facts are in and we still are in disagreement about what we ought to do, science cannot avail us? This brings me back to:

Can we move from 'what is' to 'what ought to be', without expressing a moral value (or moral premise if you prefer) that is not scientifically decidable?

What is your position on this? Do you agree or disagree?
What do you think that Sam Harris' position is on this? Does he agree or disagree?

Forgive me if I have got both you and Sam Harris wrong, but you have both given some indication that you think the statement is not true. Back on page 3 you say clearly:

I don't believe there does need to be any purely arbitrary moral premise.

What does purely arbitrary moral premise mean? Does it mean a moral premise that is not scientifically decidable?

I think if we can clear these few points up, I will have an understanding of your position.

 

[Apathia]

Well, yeah. And by that token, so am I.

Are you, by any chance, single?

Just askin'.

I'm single and anatomically male but with some gender issues.

In a scientific utopia I'd have been cured of my unreproductive tendencies and would have become a father.

I'm unrepentant!

 

[Apathia]

Yes. That's why we like you.

It would be so lonely if I couldn't find such a fine lot of criminals with which to associate here!