Sam Harris: Science can answer moral questions

Thank you. I'm still figuring out how to explain my position in the process. I think there are better ways of explaining what I want to say, and that's what I'm in search of while I'm discussing the subject.
I find these discussions really helpful in determining what my own ideas are on the subject.
I'm not sure I understand what you mean. Do you mean statements such as "Forcing women to wear burkas is a bad thing to do"? It still is prescriptive. It looks like a descriptive statement, but its content isn't meant to have a correspondence with reality.

But as I said, maybe I misunderstood what you meant. Can you give an example of how you think a prescriptive statement can be derived from a descriptive one?


Descriptive: Women living in countries where they are forced for wear burkas are treated badly. Women living in America in a family where they are required to wear burkas are also often treated badly. They seem to have little freedom and autonomy. Physical violence towards women as a form of punishment is common.

Therefore: Forcing women to wear burkas is a bad thing to do

It's still prescriptive, but based on descriptive statements plus unexpressed prescriptive statements like "women ought not be punished using physical violence". I could find descriptive statements of reality that underlie the formerly unexpressed prescriptive sentence. But, ultimately, I think there are underlying values that do NOT have further underlying descriptive statements.

I'm reading Harris' book at the moment. If I'm understanding him correctly, he's claiming it bottoms out at descriptive rather than prescriptive statements. Or perhaps he's thinking that it doesn't bottom out at all. I'm only in chapter 3.
 
It's still prescriptive, but based on descriptive statements plus unexpressed prescriptive statements like "women ought not be punished using physical violence". I could find descriptive statements of reality that underlie the formerly unexpressed prescriptive sentence. But, ultimately, I think there are underlying values that do NOT have further underlying descriptive statements.

I'm reading Harris' book at the moment. If I'm understanding him correctly, he's claiming it bottoms out at descriptive rather than prescriptive statements. Or perhaps he's thinking that it doesn't bottom out at all. I'm only in chapter 3.
The part I bolded remains the key imo. We all await linda's response. :)

I have not read Harris, but your understanding is mine too.
 
The part I bolded remains the key imo. We all await linda's response. :)

Is there something I haven't responded to? I thought it was pretty clear that descriptive statements about values reduce to descriptive statements about brain processes which reduce to descriptive statements about physiology and biochemistry which reduce to descriptive statements about physical processes. Physical processes may or may not reduce further to statements about symmetry, but of course, at this point, we are no longer even remotely talking about the bottoming out of ethics or morals.

Linda
 
Is there something I haven't responded to? I thought it was pretty clear that descriptive statements about values reduce to descriptive statements about brain processes which reduce to descriptive statements about physiology and biochemistry which reduce to descriptive statements about physical processes. Physical processes may or may not reduce further to statements about symmetry, but of course, at this point, we are no longer even remotely talking about the bottoming out of ethics or morals.

Linda
At this point, you certainly are no longer even remotely talking about ethics or morals.
 
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Cute. But I suspect you recall Atoms obey The Laws of Physics, You are made of Atoms ... etc.
 
Is disobeying The Laws of Physics immoral?

If the Brainstate Evaluative Machine has determined that your disobeyance is contrary to flourishing human well-being, yes.

Response to be updated as physics evolves. No more philosophical arguments will affect morality, only mass-energy Facts. Physicists are our new clerics.
 
I apologize for the delay. I had written almost an entire post and had to save it in a file because I was in a rush. After that, the computer broke down.

Humans marginally value autonomy over well-being. Humans ought to be provided with autonomy for small sacrifices in well-being. The first sentence would be a fact about human values. The second would be a statement about good and bad actions.

The second would be a moral statement. That's what you meant? And I'll add: the second statement does not logically follow from the first one.


The subject in this case is whomever made the prescriptive statement, not the subject of that prescriptive statement.
Grammatically, no.



Exactly. "A person says..."

These are statements which are made by people. Even though you are pretending that what we are talking about is "women shouldn't be forced to wear burqas" what we are really talking about is "Dani and Harris say women shouldn't be forced to wear burqas." It isn't a matter of forming a descriptive statement from a prescriptive statement. It's that you are attempting to form prescriptive statements by talking a descriptive statement and removing the subject.
Bolding mine.

So:

"Linda says that these are statements which are made by people".

It's your turn now:

"Dani says that Linda says that these are statements which are made by people".

Of course I know any statement is made by someone. I know you made the statement "These are statements which are made by people". Of course when you're describing someone else's statement, the person who made the former statement becomes the subject. So what? I'm giving examples of real statements. Statements such as "Women shouldn't be forced to wear burkas" exist.


Show me an example of a moral statement which doesn't start as a statement about human values from which you have stripped the subject.
"Women shouldn't be forced to wear burkas".

Before you are tempted of adding "Dani says", I'll add:

"Rome is the capital city of Italy".

Of course I'm saying this.


But this isn't relevant. We are not looking for a way to derive axioms or prescriptive statements from which to derive descriptive statements. We don't need axioms or prescriptive statements because descriptive statements can be derived from descriptive statements.

All along people have agreed that whether or not an action is good or bad depends upon human values. That is, the generally acceptable examples given were of the form "if I value the life of my friend, then I ought not to put poison into his drink." What we ought to do depends upon what "value" in placed into the equation. And it seems to have been generally agreed that we can describe what that value is. "John values the life of his friend." And so we can rationally derive statements about what John ought or ought not do.
I made a mistake when I switched from "prescriptive information" to "prescriptive statement" during our debate. The nature of a statement is directly related to its grammatical construction, and in this sense, it is clear that "John values the life of his friend" is a descriptive statement. The examples I've been giving so far work both as prescriptive information and prescriptive statements because they were based on its grammatical construction.

The fact though that John values the life of his friend means that he considers desirable that his friend stays alive. This is the piece of information which is prescriptive.

What do I really mean with this? That "John values the life of his friend" is a descriptive statement which includes some subjective (prescriptive in this case) information given by a subject. The value of his friend's life is given by John.


Where we diverge is that you seem to be claiming that it is not sufficient to derive the statements about what John ought to do from a description of his values.
I hope I clarified that. No, I'm not. But the description of John's values follows from some prescriptive information given by John, which is subjective (John's desire that his friend stays alive).

It is also necessary to go backwards and figure out a way to derive this description of his values from a prescriptive statement. But this is an entirely unnecessary and arbitrary claim. Since we can describe what it is that John values, we do not have to have a way to derive what it is that John values. We can simply measure it directly.
I understand that it's not necessary to derive his values from a prescriptive statement, but a prescriptive statement is useful. Subjects can give us prescriptive information (information about human values if you prefer to put it this way) in more ways than statements.

This is what I mean when I say that you are unnecessarily going back one step. The information which is important and necessary is the description of human values. And we have that information. There is no need to gather information (i.e. prescriptions or axioms), which has been rendered unnecessary.
But human values are subjective. Moral information is prescriptive information. We gather this information in order to make a description of human values.


It is an illusion that these statements you reference are prescriptive. They are really just descriptive statements from which you have stripped the subject.
Bolding mine.

Linda says that they are really just descriptive statements from which I have stripped the subject.

Now I added the subject to your statement: Linda. Do you like it better this way?


You seem to find nonsensical statements such as "Women shouldn't be forced to wear burkas". But the fact is that this statement is logically correct and makes sense. It is not a rational statement, but this is far from meaning it's nonsensical.

It is not rational because it doesn't describe reality. It is a moral statement.
 
Interesting review, by the way:

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/books/review/Appiah-t.html?_r=1

[...] In fact, what he ends up endorsing is something very like utilitarianism, a philosophical position that is now more than two centuries old, and that faces a battery of familiar problems. Even if you accept the basic premise, how do you compare the well-being of different people? Should we aim to increase average well-being (which would mean that a world consisting of one bliss case is better than one with a billion just slightly less blissful people)? Or should we go for a cumulative total of well-being (which might favor a world with zillions of people whose lives are just barely worth living)? If the mental states of conscious beings are what matter, what’s wrong with killing someone in his sleep? How should we weigh present well-being against future well-being? [...]
 
Dani said:
I apologize for the delay. I had written almost an entire post and had to save it in a file because I was in a rush. After that, the computer broke down.
Humans marginally value autonomy over well-being. Humans ought to be provided with autonomy for small sacrifices in well-being. The first sentence would be a fact about human values. The second would be a statement about good and bad actions.
The second would be a moral statement. That's what you meant? And I'll add: the second statement does not logically follow from the first one.
The subject in this case is whomever made the prescriptive statement, not the subject of that prescriptive statement.
Grammatically, no.
Exactly. "A person says..."
These are statements which are made by people. Even though you are pretending that what we are talking about is "women shouldn't be forced to wear burqas" what we are really talking about is "Dani and Harris say women shouldn't be forced to wear burqas." It isn't a matter of forming a descriptive statement from a prescriptive statement. It's that you are attempting to form prescriptive statements by talking a descriptive statement and removing the subject.
Bolding mine.
So:
"Linda says that these are statements which are made by people".
It's your turn now:
"Dani says that Linda says that these are statements which are made by people".
Of course I know any statement is made by someone. I know you made the statement "These are statements which are made by people". Of course when you're describing someone else's statement, the person who made the former statement becomes the subject. So what? I'm giving examples of real statements. Statements such as "Women shouldn't be forced to wear burkas" exist.
Show me an example of a moral statement which doesn't start as a statement about human values from which you have stripped the subject.
"Women shouldn't be forced to wear burkas".
Before you are tempted of adding "Dani says", I'll add:
"Rome is the capital city of Italy".
Of course I'm saying this.

I understand that it is possible to treat these questions as a moral exercise, or even as a grammatical exercise. My point is that these forms of mental masturbation are irrelevant when it comes to answering useful questions. What you are calling "moral questions" happen to also be useful questions. You are stating that moral questions are answered by playing logical and grammatical games. I am stating that useful questions can be answered using scientific methods. I am not questioning whether, by the rules of your game, moral statements follow a set of rules. I am questioning why anyone would insist on finding answers by playing games instead of using a methodology which provides useful answers. The distinction between prescriptive and descriptive statements only matters if we are playing your game. But if we are not, the distinction is meaningless.
But this isn't relevant. We are not looking for a way to derive axioms or prescriptive statements from which to derive descriptive statements. We don't need axioms or prescriptive statements because descriptive statements can be derived from descriptive statements.
All along people have agreed that whether or not an action is good or bad depends upon human values. That is, the generally acceptable examples given were of the form "if I value the life of my friend, then I ought not to put poison into his drink." What we ought to do depends upon what "value" in placed into the equation. And it seems to have been generally agreed that we can describe what that value is. "John values the life of his friend." And so we can rationally derive statements about what John ought or ought not do.
I made a mistake when I switched from "prescriptive information" to "prescriptive statement" during our debate. The nature of a statement is directly related to its grammatical construction, and in this sense, it is clear that "John values the life of his friend" is a descriptive statement. The examples I've been giving so far work both as prescriptive information and prescriptive statements because they were based on its grammatical construction.
The fact though that John values the life of his friend means that he considers desirable that his friend stays alive. This is the piece of information which is prescriptive.
What do I really mean with this? That "John values the life of his friend" is a descriptive statement which includes some subjective (prescriptive in this case) information given by a subject. The value of his friend's life is given by John.

Okay. That clarifies for me that your distinction between prescriptive and descriptive statements is meaningless with respect to answering useful questions. Methodologic naturalism does not treat information which comes from a subject as different from that which comes from an object.
Where we diverge is that you seem to be claiming that it is not sufficient to derive the statements about what John ought to do from a description of his values.
I hope I clarified that. No, I'm not. But the description of John's values follows from some prescriptive information given by John, which is subjective (John's desire that his friend stays alive).

It is also necessary to go backwards and figure out a way to derive this description of his values from a prescriptive statement. But this is an entirely unnecessary and arbitrary claim. Since we can describe what it is that John values, we do not have to have a way to derive what it is that John values. We can simply measure it directly.
I understand that it's not necessary to derive his values from a prescriptive statement, but a prescriptive statement is useful. Subjects can give us prescriptive information (information about human values if you prefer to put it this way) in more ways than statements.

This is what I mean when I say that you are unnecessarily going back one step. The information which is important and necessary is the description of human values. And we have that information. There is no need to gather information (i.e. prescriptions or axioms), which has been rendered unnecessary.
But human values are subjective. Moral information is prescriptive information. We gather this information in order to make a description of human values.

Okay, so you are confirming that this is simply a matter of wordplay which has relevance when playing logic games, but is of no relevance to real world investigations.

It is an illusion that these statements you reference are prescriptive. They are really just descriptive statements from which you have stripped the subject.
Bolding mine.

Linda says that they are really just descriptive statements from which I have stripped the subject.

Now I added the subject to your statement: Linda. Do you like it better this way?

You seem to find nonsensical statements such as "Women shouldn't be forced to wear burkas". But the fact is that this statement is logically correct and makes sense. It is not a rational statement, but this is far from meaning it's nonsensical.
It is not rational because it doesn't describe reality. It is a moral statement.
I don't think the statement is nonsensical. I think it is nonsensical to pretend that we would have any interest in the statement if it didn't happen to describe reality (i.e. the reality that humans have an interest in coercion and autonomy, as opposed to bees' lack of interest in coercion and autonomy).

Linda
 
I don't think the statement is nonsensical. I think it is nonsensical to pretend that we would have any interest in the statement if it didn't happen to describe reality (i.e. the reality that humans have an interest in coercion and autonomy, as opposed to bees' lack of interest in coercion and autonomy).

Linda

I think it would be helpful to clarify what you mean by 'reality' when you say the statement "women shouldn't be forced to wear burqas" describes reality.

Yes, because of the reality that humans have an interest, we would like to know if the statement is correct. How does science help us determine this?
 
I think it would be helpful to clarify what you mean by 'reality' when you say the statement "women shouldn't be forced to wear burqas" describes reality.

Yes, because of the reality that humans have an interest, we would like to know if the statement is correct. How does science help us determine this?
By scientists carefully selecting the moral axioms they'll apply in their analysis? :)
 
By scientists carefully selecting the moral axioms they'll apply in their analysis? :)

I could support that actually. If the moral axioms are clearly stated, even if I don't agree with them entirely, I can agree that science can help us determine if the statement is true given those axioms.

But I get the impression that Harris and Linda are of the opinion that no moral axioms need to be stated as a starting point. That they can all be scientifically determined from his base assumption that morality is about the well-being of conscious creatures.

Consider the statement "women shouldn't be forced to wear burqas". Even accepting that base assumption, how can we determine if that is true or false?
 
I could support that actually. If the moral axioms are clearly stated, even if I don't agree with them entirely, I can agree that science can help us determine if the statement is true given those axioms.

But I get the impression that Harris and Linda are of the opinion that no moral axioms need to be stated as a starting point. That they can all be scientifically determined from his base assumption that morality is about the well-being of conscious creatures.
Re what I bolded, look at that statement and think about it. What possible meaning in reality can it have?

Consider the statement "women shouldn't be forced to wear burqas". Even accepting that base assumption, how can we determine if that is true or false?
I'd call the statement a truly lousy example to start with. My first thought is, sounds good ... now what can we force women to do? ;)

At this stage of meandering trash this thread has become, does anyone know if Harris actually made that statement?
 
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I think it would be helpful to clarify what you mean by 'reality' when you say the statement "women shouldn't be forced to wear burqas" describes reality.

Yes, because of the reality that humans have an interest, we would like to know if the statement is correct. How does science help us determine this?

You misunderstand. This statement cannot be 'correct' any more than the statement "crowd should be black" can be 'correct'.

Linda
 

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