Rumsfeld proven a liar. Twice.

[thaiboxerken]

I thought you said it was the lies of Rumsfeld that motivated people. Which is it, Ken?

Both.

 

[BryanLower]

The Scud missles were a violation of the UN resolutions, were being sought by Blix, and are an appropriate delivery vehicle for the very agents Iraq couldn't account for:

The inspections were in the process of acounting for them-- accounting for their destruction, as it happens. You can't deliever agents that don't exist.

It's not their "feelings". I'm concerned with. It's their failures, and how to fix them.

Diverting attention to the political leaders they steered wrong not only doesn't fix the problem, it compounds it.

I'm sorry, but there were voices of caution before the war, and they were ignored. The political leaders don't give a pass. It's not a matter of sparing one party while blaming the other. Both the intelligence community and the political leaders are culpable.

[quote'
How so?

"Probably" is weak, but "certainly" requires evidence to support.[/quote]

Before the Blix inspections regime, all we could say is "probably." If you go to war based on "probably", you'll have to start a lot of wars. With the Blix inspections not finding any WMD, "probably" gets closer and closer to certainty. If the inspections had been allowed to continue, the longer they went without finding anything, the closer to certain we would come. Now, in hindsite, "probably" becomes "certainly". The WMD wasn't there.

Whoops. Sorry. Wrong hyperlink:

Hans Blix, An Update on Inspection, January 27, 2003.

Better?

You you have one "more recent", or "mo betta"?

No, this is good enough. The reports provide information on the data being gathered, and the remaining gaps in the data. The Iraqis, procedurally, were cooperating very well, though Blix wanted more cooperation "on substance". By the time the second report had come along, Iraq had formed commissions to search for documents, and had provided people to verify the destruction of chemical weapons. THIS IS PROGRESS! And it is gathering data. If this is not gathering data, then you woudn't know about the missiles (not WMD, but still a violation). So we were gathering data. You can't accept it as gathering data for one purpose, but reject it for another, with no reason to do so.

And lets keep in mind, ladies and germs, that they DIDN'T FIND ANYTHING. This was not because of Iraqi non-cooperation, but because THERE WAS NOTHING TO FIND. I'm not willing to throw American lives into an adventure based on someones belief that Hans Blix is incapable of finding WMD. Blix was there. He found nothing. That data was the best both in time and place. I'll make my decisions based on the best data.

That's opinion, and apologetic at that.

I doubt Saddam would even thank you for it.

Won't dignify it.

 

[Ziggurat]

So I have to step in the place of the generals and make military decisions before I can have an opinion on foreign policy.

A military decision is HOW to invade Pakistan. A political decision is WHETHER to invade Pakistan. And damned straight you better have an opinion about that before you claim we needed to pursue a course of action which could only be accomplished by doing that.

How would Pakistan react? They would have been really annoyed, to be sure. There would have been sabre rattling. But for them to retaliate against the United States would out them in a position of paying too high a price.

Umm... no. They'd have PLENTY of other options besides direct retaliation. Would we only invade Waziristan? OK, Pakistani army units don't respond. Instead, intelligence services start funneling arms to the local tribesmen, and we have a giant insurgency on our hands, much worse than Iraq (because the majority of the locals would be actively hostile, not just wary or indifferent, and because the terrain is much worse). Suppose Osama flees to Islamabad. Do we then march on Islamabad? Or do we retreat in defeat? Given that he might flee Waziristan for other parts of Pakistan, how can you be sure an invasion of only the frontier provinces could even do the trick? No, invading Pakistan was simply never an option.

In fact, the Pakistani reaction to the limited air strikes is about what we could expect if we dropped troops in to search the border region.

I don't think you realize what you're talking about. This isn't a few square miles. It's a huge area which even the Pakistani army isn't really safe in. We can drop a few troops in IF we know where a vulnerable target is, sure. But how the hell do you get that info? Do you remember how long it took to find Saddam? Do you know anything about how it was accomplished? We did it by eating away at his network. But you can't do that with just a few troops. You need to control the whole area, so that everyone in the network is vulnerable. That kind of work is simply not possible with a few troops: you need complete battlefield supremacy, and in a place like Waziristan, that means you would need to fight a bloody insurgency for months on end. With no guarantee of success either: as I mentioned, what do we do if he flees to Islamabad? We would have invaded in force, which would have pissed off enough of the general population, plus the military and intelligence services, that there's no way we could count on their assistance, even if Musharaff still wanted to offer it (which he might not because his life would be in even greater danger).

And if they had reacted more forcefully? I would trade all the crap that we're experiencing in Iraq for an equal amount of crap in/with Pakistan-- perhaps more, since we would actually be dealing with a threat (Bin Laden), not a non-threat.

It wouldn't be a little more, it would be orders of magnitude more. And you would have turned a non-threat (the Pakistani military) into a direct threat. And if your case against invading Iraq was that he did not in fact have nuclear weapons, why the hell would you want to turn an ACTUAL nuclear-armed power into an enemy, and possibly an extremely unstable (and hence unpredictable) one at that? You REALLY don't know what you're talking about.

Do you realize that you're placing a greater burden of justification on me advocating limited military action in Pakistan (if that would indeed be necessary, deferring to the experts) than you place on the Bush administration for an ALL OUT INVASION of the non-threat Iraq. That is ridiculous. You "don't accept the price", yet you accept the price of invading Iraq. Rubbish. Absolute rubbish.

You're comparing different things. I'm saying what you propose to do in Pakistan cannot be done short of conquering the entire country (which could involve nuclear war, and I think really would be unacceptably costly to you). But our ability to invade and topple Saddam turned out to be quite accurate, and even before the war most critics of the war conceded that point. THAT is the equivalent comparison here, and there's no double standard at all.

 

[BryanLower]

No, you have to do a risk-benefit analysis. You have to consider the consequences of what happens if you're wrong. If we invade and he had no weapons, how does that compare to if we don't invade and there are weapons? One scenario is much worse than the other, and you sometimes need to act based on the magnitude of the consequences, not just the probabilities involved.

The risk-benefit analysis is inadequate. You have to consider the probability that you're wrong, because acting and being wrong also has consequences. As we have seen, those consequences are really bad. The loss of prestige in the world, the loss of American lives, the derailment of the war on terror, the freedom of Bin Laden, all ramp up the risk of acting and being wrong. Besides, Saddam was contained, as I said before. The risk was minimal compared to the risk of destabilizing the region.

Well, actually, you CAN. Your argument is that you shouldn't.

Got me on that.

But that's rather simplistic, and it's far from the whole argument for going into Iraq. There were things about Iraq that we DID know (we knew they continuously violated many provisions of the cease-fire that stopped the first gulf war, for example). And sometimes, not knowing something SHOULD change how you act.

None of these add up to a current threat to the United States, and with an actual threat running free, these do not add up to a reason to invade Iraq. It is the responsibility of our head of state to act in our best interests. It is not in our best interest to attack a non-threat instead of attacking a threat.

As for "sometimes, not knowing something SHOULD change how you act", of course! They make you put inspectors in the country to find out more! You can't fall into the false dilemma that the Bush Administration tried to push on us (the choice is between invading and not acting). NO! there were a lot of options between inaction and invasion, and many of the other options entailed less risk and fewer consequences than invading. There were some really good papers written by some very competent people before the war. They were all ignored.

Sure: no IAEA inspection of any country has ever uncovered clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Ever. There was no reason to think that their failure to do so in Iraq constituted proof that no such program existed.

It also doesn't mean there ARE weapons in a particular place, at a particular time. This argument IAEA inspections have not uncovered clandestine etc. etc., therefore inspecctions in Iraq would be incapable of finding WMD", is at least a Division error, and may also include other fallacies. You're wanting to look at the entire history of weapons inspections, so you don't have to look at the actual evidence that was actually produced by one particular inspection. It would be inconvenient for you to look at that data, I understand. Your best efforts to invalidate it haven't even touched it, because you're attacking Blix and the IAEA, not the actual evidence.

That's a hind-sight evaluation, and has little bearing on how we should have made our decision. The logic is equivalent to saying I shouldn't have paid for car insurance this last year because I never got pulled over and I never got into an accident.

You're correct. I didn't intend this to be part of my argument, just a side note to remind anyone who may have forgotten this inconvenient little fact.

Well, no. Actual compliance on Saddam's part could have satisfied me, but he never did comply. And that's NOT actually in dispute.

So if Saddam had failed to comply by destroying WMD without reporting its destruction, you'll hold this in the same reguard as his failing to comply by CREATING WMD?

By the time the Blix inspections started, there was nothing to find. If there had been any WMD in the country, they had either been destroyed, or they had deteriorated over time. So it would have been impossible for Saddam to comply to your standards. If compliance means "don't hide anything", well, he had nothing to hide. If compliance is "report everything, and any failure to report is a violation", then failures to report something good-- such as the destruction of WMD-- is held in the same regard and the failure to report something bad-- like the creation of WMD. What is our ultimate goal? Are we trying to make sure there is no WMD in Iraq, or are we trying to make sure all the paperwork is filled out correctly?

I was fully aware that Iraq's records probably were inadequate. But inadequate in the positive or the negative? I wanted inspections to determine which.

You can only make that claim if you assume I took the position that he DID have weapons. I never took that position. I took the position that it wasn't worth the risk. Just like I took the position that it wasn't worth the risk to drive without car insurance. I wasn't wrong about that decision, even though it turns out I haven't needed it.

If there are no WMD, then there is no appreciable risk to the United States. If you send troops into the country, you are creating risk. It is only reasonable to create this risk if you know that you're eliminating a greater risk. If you don't *know*-- to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person's burden of proof-- then you're creating risks based on assumptions, faith, and lack of evidence. Your position is not rational.

But the problem goes fundamentally deeper than that. Inspections were explicitly not intended to be indefinite. The moment the UN was satisfied that he had no weapons, and it could have been completely true.

If the UN had determined that Saddam had no WMD, they would have been correct. Inspections don't have to be infinite. If any future evidence arrises that WMD programs have been reconstituted, more action could be taken.

He could have disarmed completely, he could have taken that next step (which he NEVER did) of complying with all the UN security council resolutions, and then what? He's free to go. He's free of inspections, he's free of sanctions. And once that happens, do you honestly think he wouldn't start those programs right back up again? Of course he would.

With continued scrutiny from the United States, Saddam would have been taking a huge risk to do what you're saying. In any case, if you start invading people because if what they may do, some day.... maybe kinda sorta... then you're going to have to invade a lot of countries.

And there'd be no basis on which to re-institute sanctions, either.

That is just not true.

In other words, the inspection regime, REGARDLESS of how good you think it was, was never capable of doing the job that really needed to be done: ensuring that Saddam never got WMD's. It could, at best, ensure that at one moment of time, after which all bets are off. That simply wasn't enough of an assurance for me.

Yet you're satisfied that Bin Laden is no longer a significant threat. Fascinating. Your assertion that suddenly Saddam would be free from scrutiny after inspectors gave him a clean bill of health is simply fantasy.

I have a hard time seeing toppling a bloodthirsty dictator who killed hundreds of thousands of his own people as being a particularly bad thing to begin with, so if we've got to do that in order to satisfy my concerns, well sorry, but I came to a different choice than you did.

There are a lot of bloodthirsty dictators out there, and we don't topple them because it is not in the best interests of the United States to do so. To topple a bloodthirsty dictator, in itself, is not a bad thing. To do so in a way that creates negative consequences for the United States, while allowing a known threat to go free, IS a bad thing. To be wrong about the reasons, to embarass the United States around the world, to loose valuable support from allies, to create a security dilemma with Iran that may end with Iran having nukes IS WORSE THAN A BAD THING. To take this course in order to satisfy your concerns, sorry, is unrealistic foreign policy.

... leaving for the day, and may not have time to check on this tomorrow. Have fun.

 

[Huntster]

Originally Posted by Huntster :
The Scud missles were a violation of the UN resolutions, were being sought by Blix, and are an appropriate delivery vehicle for the very agents Iraq couldn't account for:

The inspections were in the process of acounting for them-- accounting for their destruction, as it happens. You can't deliever agents that don't exist.

Why did you not reprint my entire statement?:

The Scud missles were a violation of the UN resolutions, were being sought by Blix, and are an appropriate delivery vehicle for the very agents Iraq couldn't account for:

...At a meeting of the Security Council the next morning, weapons inspectors Blix and El Baradei reported cooperation had improved, but that Iraqi cooperation was less than complete. Blix issued a report to the Council specifying a number of questions that remained unsolved since the passage of resolution 1441 (and previous resolutions). The UN weapons inspector's report specifically stated that Iraq had not accounted for up to 10,000 liters of anthrax, Scud missile warheads (missiles Iraq fired at Israel and coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War and that could be armed chemical or biological agents), and drone aircraft that could fly past UN-allowed limits and that also could be fitted with spray units that could deliver chemical or biological weapons....

You might be able to deliver agents that others believe you have, and others will believe you want to do so when you resist accounting for them.

What's so difficult to understand about this?

It's not their "feelings". I'm concerned with. It's their failures, and how to fix them.

Diverting attention to the political leaders they steered wrong not only doesn't fix the problem, it compounds it.

I'm sorry, but there were voices of caution before the war, and they were ignored. The political leaders don't give a pass. It's not a matter of sparing one party while blaming the other. Both the intelligence community and the political leaders are culpable.

What you are failing to grasp here is that the civilian political leadership, including Congress, rely on the intelligence community for intelligence. When it comes in wrong, the political leadership must try to fix that problem. There have been Congressional hearings, and even they have determined that there has been a serious intelligence failure. Changes have been implemented, and I hope it helps.

So, when Ray McGovern stands up and heckles the Secretary of Defense like he did, I'm afraid I get a bit outraged. McGovern, if still employed as an analyst, might even be charged with a crime by doing what he did (although I can imagine the howling in a place like this if he were appropriately charged). His agency helped MI6 and the UN screw this up, the political leadership and DoD (who are doing a great job, and are out there bleeding) are taking the hit (politically, physically, and in every other way), and he has the gall to stand up like that at a scheduled speech and interupt/heckle the Secretary wit "Liar, liar!"?

...Hans Blix, An Update on Inspection, January 27, 2003.

Better?

You you have one "more recent", or "mo betta"?

No, this is good enough. The reports provide information on the data being gathered, and the remaining gaps in the data. The Iraqis, procedurally, were cooperating very well, though Blix wanted more cooperation "on substance". By the time the second report had come along, Iraq had formed commissions to search for documents, and had provided people to verify the destruction of chemical weapons...

Second report? Which one might that be?

Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update, February 14, 2003.?:

...Similarly to Blix, he reported that "we have to date found no evidence of nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq," but that "a number of issues are still under investigation." ElBaradei also noted that a new document provided by Iraq contained "no new information," and expressed the hope that the newly established Iraqi commissions "will be able to uncover documents and other evidence that could assist in clarifying … remaining questions."...

...THIS IS PROGRESS! And it is gathering data. If this is not gathering data, then you woudn't know about the missiles (not WMD, but still a violation). So we were gathering data. You can't accept it as gathering data for one purpose, but reject it for another, with no reason to do so....

Actually, it's more of the same that had been occurring for years. Enough incremental "progress" to keep the Europeans and Russians opposed to an American invasion.

...And lets keep in mind, ladies and germs, that they DIDN'T FIND ANYTHING. This was not because of Iraqi non-cooperation, but because THERE WAS NOTHING TO FIND.....

Wrong:

....In addition, Kay summarized some of the Survey Group's discoveries, which included: a clandestine network of laboratories and safe-houses controlled by the Iraqi Intelligence Services containing equipment suitable for CBW research; reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientists home; documents and equipment hidden in scientists' homes that could be used for resuming uranium enrichment activities; and a continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD missiles...

...I'm not willing to throw American lives into an adventure based on someones belief that Hans Blix is incapable of finding WMD. Blix was there. He found nothing. That data was the best both in time and place. I'll make my decisions based on the best data....

I'll base my decisions with the best sources, just like the White House did. That includes the American intelligence community, and I hope and pray that they get it together so that I can continue to say that.

 

[Ziggurat]

The risk-benefit analysis is inadequate. You have to consider the probability that you're wrong, because acting and being wrong also has consequences. As we have seen, those consequences are really bad.

Well, there's considerable disagreement on exactly that point. I don't think the consequences HAVE been that bad. And I think that we have gained quite a lot from this as well.

The loss of prestige in the world,

I could care less about "prestige". Prestige doesn't stop us getting attacked. What I DO care about is our enemies fearing to attack us. And to create that situation, you need to convince people not that you're nice, but that you're willing to pay even a high price to defeat your enemies, that the prospect of a little blood won't dissuade you. We had created exactly the reverse impression in the decade before 9/11: we had consistently shied away from anything which might bloody our nose, which invited an escalating series of attacks against us. We've reverse course on that front to a large degree, and Iraq is a big part of that reversal. So when you talk about world opinion, that to me matters a hell of a lot more than whether or not nominal allies who wouldn't help us when the going gets tough regardless of Iraq are feeling peeved.

the loss of American lives,

Not very high, considering the scale of the operation.

the derailment of the war on terror,

We disagree on that. I think it's been central to the war on terror.

the freedom of Bin Laden,

You keep saying that, but you haven't actually answered my argument that this wasn't possible. This is mere wishful thinking on your part.

Besides, Saddam was contained, as I said before.

But we were paying a continuing price for that, which is rarely noted, and we couldn't do so indefinitely. What happens, as I already asked, when Saddam eventually convinces the UN that he doesn't have any WMD's? How do we continue to contain him then? We couldn't. Containment was a game, and it only "worked" as long as Saddam played along AND we continued to foot the bill.

The risk was minimal compared to the risk of destabilizing the region.

Destabilizing the region is a bonus, not a drawback. It was the pre-existing "stability" which led to this whole bloody mess to begin with.

None of these add up to a current threat to the United States,

But it's not only about current threats. It's also about future threats. Saddam was eventually going to be a threat, and he was going to cause problems continually along the way. The question was, should we deal with him now or wait till some indefinite time in the future to deal with him? Well, it never made much sense to me to wait just for the sake of waiting.

This argument IAEA inspections have not uncovered clandestine etc. etc., therefore inspecctions in Iraq would be incapable of finding WMD", is at least a Division error, and may also include other fallacies.

Yes. Too bad it's not the argument I actually made. I didn't claim that they were incapable of doing so. I claim that the fact that they had not found a weapons program was and never could be proof that such a program did not exist. And it's PARTICULARLY that future part that concerned me: sanctions were NOT going to last indefinitely, they were never intended to last indefinitely, and without them, even the best inspection regime could not ensure that we would know if (or more likely, when) Saddam developed a nuclear weapons program. So many critics resort to the claim that he wasn't an immediate threat. But the problem with that argument is that there is zero assurance that we would ever know if he became an immediate threat.

So if Saddam had failed to comply by destroying WMD without reporting its destruction, you'll hold this in the same reguard as his failing to comply by CREATING WMD?

That's not the argument at all. If Saddam fails to comply in ANY manner, then that means he's trying to get around the system, he's trying to see how much he can cheat, how much he can violate his agreements, how much he can get away with. And as long as that's happening, then I know that the minute he thinks he IS able to, he WILL go back to actually creating WMD's. The sanctions could not last forever, they were never intended to last forever. The "what next?" problem was getting harder, not easier, with time.

If compliance means "don't hide anything", well, he had nothing to hide.

But that's NOT what compliance means. Compliance, and the UN was very definite about this being in the definition, means full cooperation. That was something Saddam was ALWAYS capable of offering, but NEVER did. Why is that so hard to understand? Why do you not get that the inspectors were themselves stating that he was never in compliance because he never fully cooperated?

If there are no WMD, then there is no appreciable risk to the United States.

You mean like how Al Qaeda wasn't a risk to the US because it didn't have WMD's? Sorry, but that argument simply makes no sense. WMD's highten risk, to be sure, but the risk is there any time you've got an enemy with a safe haven, a little money, and enough motivation. That's all it takes, and Saddam had that in spades.

If the UN had determined that Saddam had no WMD, they would have been correct. Inspections don't have to be infinite. If any future evidence arrises that WMD programs have been reconstituted, more action could be taken.

But why would you have any confidence that such evidence would arise if Saddam restarted a WMD program after sanctions had been lifted and inspectors had left? There's simply no way we could ever have any confidence.

With continued scrutiny from the United States, Saddam would have been taking a huge risk to do what you're saying.

No, it wouldn't be that big a risk. You already saw how badly our intelligence agencies screwed up on WMD intelligence from Iraq. Without inspectors there, why on earth would our knowledge be any better? How, exactly, would we be scrutinizing him? This is wishful thinking.

In any case, if you start invading people because if what they may do, some day.... maybe kinda sorta... then you're going to have to invade a lot of countries.

That is just not true.

Wrong. The sanctions and the inspections were specifically intended to disarm Saddam after the first gulf war, when it became obvious and undeniable that he had these programs. Once he's disarmed, the inspection regime's mandate would end. We would never have definitive evidence that he was rearming (even if we had suspicions), and we could never send in inspectors in order to gain the proof we would need in order to get those same inspections approved. For states like China, approving that kind of measure would be a risk to their own sovereignty that they could simply never accept. There's simply no chance in hell it could ever happen.

Yet you're satisfied that Bin Laden is no longer a significant threat.

Yes. What resources does Bin Laden have at his disposal? A video camera, a few remaining henchmen, and that's about it. What resources did Saddam have at his disposal? Most of a large country, an actual military, and a continuous and large revenue stream in the form of oil. Now you tell me: why is the former a bigger threat than the latter?

Your assertion that suddenly Saddam would be free from scrutiny after inspectors gave him a clean bill of health is simply fantasy.

We'd be taking satellite photos of him, sure. But what the hell do you think you can actually figure out from those? Large-scale troop movements, to be sure. Not a hell of a lot more. All it takes to hide from a spy satellite is a bloody roof.

to loose valuable support from allies,

I picked this one out because I find it particularly curious. Which allies are you referring to specifically? What support from them have we actually lost? Why was it valuable to begin with?

I can name some allies whose support we lost. I cannot, however, say that the support we lost was actually ever of much value.

 

[Giz]

I picked this one out because I find it particularly curious. Which allies are you referring to specifically? What support from them have we actually lost? Why was it valuable to begin with?

I can name some allies whose support we lost. I cannot, however, say that the support we lost was actually ever of much value.

Yeah I saw that as well. I can't think what the US is supposed to have lost... other than sound bites.

 

[bigred]

I'm just curious if anyone actually read all this, checked the transcripts/links/whatever/etc.

Wow a politician lied. Shocking. I never cared much for Rumsfeld myself, but how is this even somewhat newsworthy?

 

[CFLarsen]

I'm just curious if anyone actually read all this, checked the transcripts/links/whatever/etc.

Wow a politician lied. Shocking. I never cared much for Rumsfeld myself, but how is this even somewhat newsworthy?

War.

We are not talking about lying about getting a blowjob. We are talking about lying about leading the US into war.

 

[a_unique_person]

Yeah I saw that as well. I can't think what the US is supposed to have lost... other than sound bites.

It was vital, it gives legitimacy to the action. Doesn't matter if it is only token support, as the WMD campaign demonstrated, it's appearances that count. Despite what people are saying here, legitimacy is powerful concept in people's minds.