Richard T. Garner and "Beyond Morality"

What is 'morally' wrong with doing things that are bad for the things that I care about? It is perfectly rational to ask that question.
Thinking about that more, I find it very strange we even need to go into this. The mystery we are trying to resolve is: What is morality? What makes it so compelling to most people?

If knowing what the facts are, and finding out that society will generally accept policies towards them, regardless of what any individual thinks, is NOT 'compelling' enough for you, then how is that word supposed to even be useful?

But, let's roll with it the properly philosophical way, for now. Maybe all this will improve upon what I said before:

So, it seems that morality in this description of yours is merely the self- interest of following the herd mentality in order to 'get along'?
Not quite. It cannot be any old values, (well, at least not for very long). Here, we have to introduce the Core Value that morality tends to be about: What those questions about morals tend to reflect the best. What values does morality, (to use my earlier words), stabilize on?

The answer, according to the specific theory I outline, is a form of Welfare Consequentialism. And, that is what I am willing to defend. (Though, I could be wrong about it.)

I intend to demonstrate that questions about morality will inevitably translate into questions about consequences for the welfare of the society. There is no other stable form of morality that can exist (according to theory). Talk of any other option would be in the realm of fiction.

Welfare Consequentialism can be roughly abbreviated as "well being", if one prefers the Sam Harris term. Or, perhaps even "prudence", if one prefers the phiwum term.

ETA: Actually, phiwum rejects my usage of the term "prudence", below. So, I would redefine it as "prudent policy for the society", and the point would still be clear enough.

If I find myself in a society that follows Sharia Law, am I then 'morally wrong' to disagree with stoning a woman to death because she has been raped?
Sharia Law has not yielded very good consequences for its society, compared to others, based on several measurable factors. Do I need to go into details?

Say, I was a psychopath that cared a great deal about gratifying my desires to cause others pain. Is it therefore 'morally wrong', for me to commit to some action that would limit my ability to do this?
Psychopaths are not so good for the whole of society, either.

Though, what makes this example fascinating is the argument that there could be a non-zero optimal number of psychopaths. Meaning: Any number less than the optimal, and MORE people would be exploited by them, than otherwise, because more people would be less wary of their existence. (The number has been proposed as 2% of the population, if I recall correctly.)

When you say that morality is an 'emergent property' of societies, what exactly do you mean by 'emergent property'?
That is a very good question! (And, it happens to be the one I was working a lot on, since I started this thread, because I think it might be the key to understanding a lot of what I am saying.) Emergence generally defined as "a complex system or pattern that arises out of the interactions of relatively simple systems".

Our emotions are a good example: Love is an emergent property of our physiology. There are a number of activities that go on in our body and brain, that emerge as a feeling of loving something. Some people are convinced that love does not really exist, because there is no object of "love" in our bodies. Not even a single, specific chemical. But, those who claim such things are missing the point: Love is not to be found in the simpler systems, but in how those systems interact.

Termite mounds are an interesting example, because there is no central planning involved: Each termite does its own thing, and thanks to the complex interactions they make, they build a complex mound to live in. (And few people doubt such mounds exist, since they take physical form.)

Another example I want to cover is a swarm of bees. Each bee moves on its own accord, but most of them tend to move in a unified manner. Though, there is a statistically predictable number of ones that will veer off in the wrong direction. This demonstrates that there CAN be individuals who "go against the grain", but that does not mean the "grain" does not generally exist.

Morality is a complex system made up of many components that I can divide into two provisional buckets: Those that are more directly part of our evolutionary inheritance, and are largely innate within individuals. Then, there are those that are only apparent in the movement of the society, as a collective.

Examples of innate moral systems include (but are NOT limited to): In-group/Out-group biases, tendency to moralize disgust and purity, taboo against incest in particular, a sense of fairness, etc. (There was someone who once placed these sorts of things into 4 sub-categories, but I will have to get back to you on that.)

Examples of collective moral systems include (but are NOT limited to): An expanding circle of altruism, an established monopoly on legal violence (aka leviathan theory), codified morality, etc. (When I have the longer list I was preparing, I can mention others.)

Our sense of morality emerges out of a mixing bag of all of those factors, and possibly others.
(This is not meant to imply a "Black Box". We CAN open the "box" to study how these factors play out. Morality is does NOT need to be a mysterious force, or anything. I only mention this, because it came up a lot, in the past.)

That, so far, is very descriptive, rather than normative, I agree. But, let us continue:

Also, why should this emergent property be binding on individuals?
I am suggesting that it is MORE binding to the society, as a collective, more-so than the individuals in it, directly.

But, that also implies there will be increased pressure, from society, for the individual to conform to it.

Also, as there are (and have been, and will be) many societies, do their moral views all hold equal weight? If we have conflicting views between societies, which is right? How do you decide without imposing your own moral views, which merely begs the question?
As I said, before, we first need to add an unambiguous Core Value to the system: Something that all moral questions tend to lead into, regardless of what we would like to say on the matter.

I claim that Consequentialism is likely going to be "King", and that this is NOT escapable. No matter what problems you or I have with Consequentialism, that is ultimately where morality is going to head towards. (At least according to theory.)

Once we add Natural Selection to the emergent systems I described, above, it becomes clearer: Those values that lead to the surviving and thriving of the community (those being the "consequences") will more likely be "inherited" by the next generation, than any values that detract from that.

(I tried to avoid stuffing the concepts into such group-selection-like terms. But, I suppose it might work better in the context of establishing the "Core Value" first, rather than later?)

I am aware that the units of selection would be fuzzy, here. Even fuzzier than memes, perhaps. But, I am not quite proposing a formal system of group-selection, anyway. I am only borrowing that language to describe the general behavior of what the emergent moral systems seem to do.


Incidentally, that fuzziness leads me to another point to bring up: Objective Moral Truths will need to take the form of Provisional Objective Moral Truths. That is: We may never know the actual truth about reality of moral values. But, we can continue to improve our estimates of what they are. This is the same as science's stance on empirical claims, in general. I bring this up, because it helps us avoid situations where people in power prematurely claim they have all of the right answers. The objective moralist must always be vigilant for signs that they were greatly wrong about something, and the policies they influence would need to take that possibility into account.

The rest of your post seems to repeat what I responded to above, but if I missed anything, let me know.

Thanks for providing a link to Garner's book. Having read some of it, I am left with the inescapable conclusion that he is going to have you for breakfast.
I am going into this fight knowing I am the underdog. I am under no inclination to underestimate my foe's powers, believe me!

you seem to be naive about the subject matter that you are engaging in.
I understand the history of these things is important. History tells us a LOT about why bad ideas were bad ideas. However, for the sake of this debate, I would rather not get into that history too deeply. It does not concern me who exactly said what, and when, right now. I would rather debate the merits of our positions more directly.

Since moral realists want to say that moral judgements are sometimes true, I have suggested that it is up to them to explain how they understand this, and to support their claims.
The truth of a moral statement would be measured against what seems to be in the best interests of the society.

Sometimes, at the proximate detail level, those interests would change and transform, as the society changes and transforms. So that a particular judgment would work best at one point in time, but be bad for everyone, at another point in time.

Proximate means: The smaller, more chaotic details, largely dependent on details in the particular environment; to distinguish it from more Ultimate factors, such as Natural Selection, and its resulting consequentialist trends.

If you had demonstrated an 'objective morality', it would be a simply stunning demonstration which has surpassed the best thinkers of the last two millennia. You stand to make a substantial career for yourself in philosophy. Yet you seem to lack an appreciation of what such a demonstration would entail. Your position, so far, is incoherent, let alone demonstrating some kind of objective truth.
Let me know where I am still failing, after this post.

3. That your own position is most definitely more 'woo-ish'. This 'emergent property of morality' which has the special metaphysical quality of being binding on human behaviour sounds suspiciously like the FSM. I can't prove it doesn't exist, but there seems to be little reason to suppose it does.
Let me know if I am still missing something, given the above description.

I would really recommend that you read this paper:

http://people.duke.edu/~alexrose/dditamler.pdf
I think it is really strange that the author would claim that someone, who took great pains to unravel the evolution of morality, is really arguing for nihilism on the subject of morality. It would be like claiming that a biologist who wrote about the evolution of teeth does not really believe teeth exist.

I think the cracks in philosophy start to show, when they confuse their useful fictions with actual reality.

Philosophy is still really good at systematics, but very poor when it comes to actually answering questions, these days.
 
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Indeed nihilism is consistent with the claim that such beliefs are necessary for human survival, welfare and flourishing.
http://people.duke.edu/~alexrose/dditamler.pdf

I am not quite making the claim that such beliefs are "necessary" for human survival. But, rather they inevitably emerge out of human survival systems.

There is no physical reason humans can not revert back to a pre-moral or proto-moral stage of life. Though, it is extremely unlikely.
 
Welfare Consequentialism can be roughly abbreviated as "well being", if one prefers the Sam Harris term. Or, perhaps even "prudence", if one prefers the phiwum term.

When I use the term "prudence", I mean practical reasoning based purely on self-interest. It doesn't involve concerning oneself with others' interests or what is good for society as a whole except insofar as it affects the actor's interests.

So, I wouldn't use "prudence" here, where you're speaking about the well-being of the species as a whole.
 
When I use the term "prudence", I mean practical reasoning based purely on self-interest. It doesn't involve concerning oneself with others' interests or what is good for society as a whole except insofar as it affects the actor's interests.

So, I wouldn't use "prudence" here, where you're speaking about the well-being of the species as a whole.
If your usage of the term "prudence" is really so purely and greedily self-interested, then never mind.

I kept thinking in terms of "prudent policy for the society".
 

In re-reading chapter 6 of Garner's book, there is something similar that I find confusing:

http://beyondmorality.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/CHAPTER_SIX_June_2012.pdf

The error that the moral
error theorist identifies and attacks is the belief in the objectivity of moral values, rights,
and obligations. Such things, the error theorist claims, are not discovered in nature,
they are the product of our genes, external circumstances, and human invention.​

But, aren't genes and external circumstances things that can be discovered in nature?


He also adds "human invention" to the list. So, I suppose that could be a point of contention between us: The objective moralist would limit the scope of invention to claims of moral authority, but those would, technically, be false ones.
 
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Beginning with the process of Natural Selection is good enough.

As you have not yet defined "Natural" I still do not know what you mean. I know what “Natural Selection” means in biologic medium, not in Human societies.

Those moral values that allow a society to survive and thrive better are selected for, and society will more likely continue selecting for them, until something better happens to come along.

This is factually false. All Human societies in the past have chose roads to decline and fall.

It doesn't matter if YOU think it is "good" or not. It is, objectively, what morality will end up being about, anyway.

You have to demonstrate this. (Underline is mine). I have asked you a proof three days ago at least.

I do not have a choice in the matter, either. If I said "I prefer not to have morality stabilize around well-being", it would be like saying "I prefer not to live on a planet that is revolving around the sun!"

There is a big difference. I cannot mentally control things in the world. I can mentally control my wishes. “I prefer” is an utterance of a wish. The Sun is an object in the world. Here lies the difference between Physics and Ethics. I have the choice between altruism and egoism. I have no choice on planetary orbits.

Let us suppose you have a (very improbable) capacity to predict the future in the next 50 years. You can (hipothetically) prove that this is the future. You can (hipothetically) prove that if we want the "stability" of our society this is good for it. But you cannot to prove that we ought to wish the "stability" of our society. Bcause...

As a nietzschean I deny this is good for me. Because what we have is not progress but decline and illness of vital forces opposite to will to power.
As an egoist I deny altruism is good for me. BecauseI can exploit people and become rich, powerful and respected with my egoism.
As the Dostoevsky's conservative dandy I deny this is good for me. Because the gregarious society suffocates my personal freedom, and freedom is my unique good.

All the three men know and agree with your account of the facts: the progress in social cohesion and altruism. It is not in facts that they disagree, but in values. You can convince them with facts about facts. What other argument can you use if they agree on facts but continue to disagree in values?
 
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Wowbagger said:
This is probably a good point to bring up: Much of our morality is shaped by society, and dependent on development, or both. It would be naïve to assume the behavior of children indicates how morality could be flexible and context-dependent. This, however, indicates objective morality is more complicated, not that it does not exist.

It can be used as an analogy or a starting point.

The adult’s “Thou shall not eat ye cake” could be seen as analogue to or equivalent to an objective moral rule, maybe some of god’s rules. In the last case, objective, I would guess. Anyway, of course we have no control on the values passed to the kids by parents, an obvious huge factor and also how hungry the kids were (also a very important factor). The key aspect is the kids forming a small group and breaking moral commands – they “stole” the cake and lied. The decisions, the actions were “immoral” and selfish from a broader point of view. It made sense from a point of view within the kids’ group, to go against the rules. This can be read as in indication that if the individuals decide they can profit from going against the ruling moral codes they may decide to do so. For those individuals, the ruling code becomes null (even if temporarily), even if it means a loss for a larger group – or themselves if they are caught in the act. This means those specific moral rules (do not steal, obey authority, do not lie), aimed towards group welfare, can be cast aside and are context-dependent. History and newspapers show us this happens frequently. Moral codes, ethics, these things are the product of individual attitudes within a group under a given set of circumstances. Emergent properties, one could say.

Group welfare and its success will be affected by the behavior of its components and surely the behaviors which make it work better (or do not hamper its work) will be selected. So far so good, but it seems in terms of determining what would be these core values, when it comes down to detailing them, we can not go beyond being vague. We’re stuck to generics –group welfare, collective success, etc. If there are objectives, they are generic, for in detail the rules seem to be context-dependent. Maybe there are and we have not yet found them. Maybe there are, but they only apply to small groups (this would be my wild guess – but don’t ask me to define small, I would tend to say the smaller size would be 1). Or maybe these broad objectives are achieved through several context-dependent rules. However, I think we must remember its not impossible that under certain circumstances, living in groups (or larger groups or in a given group) may not be an advantage to its individuals (or some of them). The objective group welfare codes would then collapse.
 
...snip...
Now, I value my truck. I care about it. Science can surely demonstrate that if I vandalize my truck, it will be bad for my truck, which I care about. (In particular, it will lower the value of the truck, which is important to me, it will make it less comfortable to drive, which is also important, and so on.)

Now, I asked, "What is morally wrong with doing things that are bad for things I care about?" You have answered: nothing, per se. Nothing at all is morally wrong with doing things that are bad for things I care about, unless someone other than I am impacted....snip...

OK, you love your truck. But if you really need money (suppose you own money to Don Vito Corleone), you may be forced to sell it.

Or, you may say "Screw it all!" and go hiding it somewhere, your next steps being claiming it was stolen and then aplying for the insurance money. Your urgent needs won over group wellfare, morals and the risk of being caught in the act.
 
...snip...
Sharia Law has not yielded very good consequences for its society, compared to others, based on several measurable factors. Do I need to go into details?
...snip...

Sorry for the massive snipping, but I believe this could be questioned. From our point of view, living under Sharia (or quite possibly any authoritarian regime) would be awful. But if we never knew anything different... Which is exactly BTW why authoritarian rulers as a whole hate the interwebs...
The questions, I believe, should actually be:

1. How many people live nowadays under authoritarian regime?
2. What the future reserves for authoritarian regimes in the long run?

For answers, I guess (1) could in principle be answered, even though disagreement on exactly how to define an authoritarian regime. Now, when it comes down to (2), I honestly don’t know the answer and fear my bias and hopes will be too strong…
 
I was recently reminded of a conundrum regarding how an individual's sense of morality is formed: Which is often done in hindsight. That is: Someone will take an action, even one they felt guilty about, and THEN they would form their moral values around justifying that action. And, this has been proven to happen in scientific experiments and such.

So, how would the claim of morality working for societal good reconcile that?

The answers, so far, seem to use the language of group-selection, again:

Every gene pool needs variety introduced into it, somehow, and that could come in the form of mutations, among other things. Transpositions, duplications, deletions, recombination, etc. are also factors.

Also every "value pool" needs variety introduced into it, that can be selected from. So, our own, personal formulation of moral values, (including those of hindsight), could be seen as a mechanism for introducing such 'mutations' or varieties within the 'value pool'.

I will see if I can work on a variation of that, that does not use the language of group-selection.

It can be used as an analogy or a starting point.
Also, the plastic manner in which children form their morality could be seen as another mechanism by which variation can be introduced into the 'value pool'.

But, it can also be seen as a manner in which social changes to morality can be entered into the mind. Though, one needs to be careful about that, because we don't want to imply that the mind is a blank slate. Perhaps some parts are more prone to social influences than other parts. But, there is still plenty of innate values to fill good chunks of the mind, that we readily develop as we grow up from being children, regardless of social influence.
 
OK, you love your truck. But if you really need money (suppose you own money to Don Vito Corleone), you may be forced to sell it.

Or, you may say "Screw it all!" and go hiding it somewhere, your next steps being claiming it was stolen and then aplying for the insurance money. Your urgent needs won over group wellfare, morals and the risk of being caught in the act.

I'm afraid I don't see the relevance to the point I was making.

In any case, darn near everyone admits that people sometimes choose to do what they know they ought not do, especially when the "ought" is a moral ought, and their reasons are based on self-interest.
 
I'm afraid I don't see the relevance to the point I was making.

In any case, darn near everyone admits that people sometimes choose to do what they know they ought not do, especially when the "ought" is a moral ought, and their reasons are based on self-interest.

That moral codes and moral decisions are context-dependent; individuals within a group will act according to the prevailing moral codes as long as they think it suits them.

Ina nutshell, that's what you think, right?
 
The parts in bold are the same thing.

You've effectively said:

"I don't think objective morality exists. I think there is an objectively best morality grounded in biology."

How are 'rules of behaviour', not 'moral rules'?

What i have said is that behaviour is behaviour.
Rules are rules.
Rules for behaviour are rules for behaviour.
If you choose to define rules for behaviour as morality, that's your choice.

I see it the other way around. Morality is rules for behaviour.
Not so much an equality as a definition of a subset.
Behaviour exists. This is obvious. Some of that behaviour is called "moral", by some people, somewhere, some of the time. In other times and places, the opinion of other people may differ. That's it.

If we comb through all of history, some patterns will emerge of behaviour that is generally called "moral". (Some may be not just general, but universal:-Not eating your own children, to choose an extreme example). That behaviour will be consistent with individual survival and success within an environment whose most significant feature is other humans. People who reject those rules will always be swimming upstream, socially, because most folk will disagree with them and will withold cooperation.

I cannot accept that any behaviour universally seen as moral could be so out of line with biology as to destroy or severely disadvantage people who hold those beliefs. Natural selection would not permit that. If it had, the human race would not be here.


This seems so obvious as to be tautological. I don't see any mystery in morality and I do wonder why so many people do. When questions are unanswerable, there is usually an error in the question.
 
That moral codes and moral decisions are context-dependent; individuals within a group will act according to the prevailing moral codes as long as they think it suits them.
Ina nutshell, that's what you think, right?

Well, a bit too strong, I'd say.

First, I'm not sure that moral codes are (or at least ought to be) context-dependent. It depends on what you mean by that.

Second, if the highlighted bit means that individuals follow their concept of the moral code only when they think it suits them, then certainly not! There are many cases when a person does what they think they ought to do, even though they'd rather do something else (and even though they think it is in their self-interest to do something else).

No doubt, people often act selfishly and contrary to what they recognize as their moral duty. But they often also act selflessly because their moral duty requires it.
 
phiwum said:
Well, a bit too strong, I'd say.

Yes, its strong. Can't deny...

phiwum said:
First, I'm not sure that moral codes are (or at least ought to be) context-dependent. It depends on what you mean by that.
That would be culture, economy and contingencies such as wars, diseases, environment.

Spartan morals were different from the Carolingian Empire which were different from the Maya which are different from nowadays Brazil which are different from nowadays Iran and so on. Sure, we can find broad common points, but when we take a closer look, the differences appear.

phiwum said:
Second, if the highlighted bit means that individuals follow their concept of the moral code only when they think it suits them, then certainly not! There are many cases when a person does what they think they ought to do, even though they'd rather do something else (and even though they think it is in their self-interest to do something else).

No doubt, people often act selfishly and contrary to what they recognize as their moral duty. But they often also act selflessly because their moral duty requires it.

I do not disagree completely. At least to a certain point, we can choose how to act. I just happen to believe that as society changes due to internal and external factors, some attitudes seen as against moral standards, initially taken by a small number of people may become more acceptable, for better or for worse (this judgement will depend on whose point-of-view we choose). Current conditions may allow Joe to be bound to certain moral standards and be Mr. Niceguy; under other circunstances, Joe may act like a dick.

Not to mention maybe Joe is a selfless person because he wants a better future for his kids and decided this is how he may increase the odds of achieving such a goal. Depending on your point of view, his selfish genes are acting. OK, the genes are not actually deciding, I know.
 
Yes, its strong. Can't deny...


That would be culture, economy and contingencies such as wars, diseases, environment.

Spartan morals were different from the Carolingian Empire which were different from the Maya which are different from nowadays Brazil which are different from nowadays Iran and so on. Sure, we can find broad common points, but when we take a closer look, the differences appear.

Just so long as we're clear that we're taking a descriptive stance here, no problem.

Of course, many folks around here are skeptical of moral realism anyway, and you might be in that camp as well. In that case, a descriptive stance is surely the only reasonable way to discuss moral norms.

I do not disagree completely. At least to a certain point, we can choose how to act. I just happen to believe that as society changes due to internal and external factors, some attitudes seen as against moral standards, initially taken by a small number of people may become more acceptable, for better or for worse (this judgement will depend on whose point-of-view we choose). Current conditions may allow Joe to be bound to certain moral standards and be Mr. Niceguy; under other circunstances, Joe may act like a dick.

Not to mention maybe Joe is a selfless person because he wants a better future for his kids and decided this is how he may increase the odds of achieving such a goal. Depending on your point of view, his selfish genes are acting. OK, the genes are not actually deciding, I know.

Yes, Joe could be choosing things which appear altruistic but are really in his interest. He may not even be aware that his self-interest is playing such a role in his decision.

And, of course, circumstances can affect the degree to which we follow our own moral norms, as well as our view of what these norms are.
 
What i have said is that behaviour is behaviour.
Rules are rules.
Rules for behaviour are rules for behaviour.
If you choose to define rules for behaviour as morality, that's your choice.

If you could please explain to me - in your view:

What features does a moral code necessarily have that a set of rules for behaviour, does not have (and/or vice-versa)?
 
What i have said is that behaviour is behaviour.
Rules are rules.
Rules for behaviour are rules for behaviour.
If you choose to define rules for behaviour as morality, that's your choice.

I see it the other way around. Morality is rules for behaviour.
Not so much an equality as a definition of a subset.
Behaviour exists. This is obvious. Some of that behaviour is called "moral", by some people, somewhere, some of the time. In other times and places, the opinion of other people may differ. That's it.

If we comb through all of history, some patterns will emerge of behaviour that is generally called "moral". (Some may be not just general, but universal:-Not eating your own children, to choose an extreme example). That behaviour will be consistent with individual survival and success within an environment whose most significant feature is other humans. People who reject those rules will always be swimming upstream, socially, because most folk will disagree with them and will withold cooperation.

I cannot accept that any behaviour universally seen as moral could be so out of line with biology as to destroy or severely disadvantage people who hold those beliefs. Natural selection would not permit that. If it had, the human race would not be here.


This seems so obvious as to be tautological. I don't see any mystery in morality and I do wonder why so many people do. When questions are unanswerable, there is usually an error in the question.

Slavery and abolition made no apparent impression on biology or natural selection. Does this mean you cannot understand what the fuss was between the two camps?
 
phiwum said:
Just so long as we're clear that we're taking a descriptive stance here, no problem.

This, in my view, is a key issue. Usually (maybe always) we can only be descriptive. I think it is very hard if not impossible to know the exact reasons for this or that moral code having been adopted by a given group of individuals, as well as the relative weight of each factor. Same is valid for any given individual and I would even dare to say to ourselves. Do we always know or completely understand why we took a given decision?

So, we are (at least for now, I can’t foresee the future) left with descriptive, statistic approaches. They may give us insights about what’s going on, sometimes maybe even a deeper understanding, but as a whole usually there are too many variables we don’t understand, perhaps even know to exist. This is not a rare situation in science or philosophy.

phiwum said:
Of course, many folks around here are skeptical of moral realism anyway, and you might be in that camp as well. In that case, a descriptive stance is surely the only reasonable way to discuss moral norms.

Yes, even though I think –or believe- some very broad common lines could be drawn. However they are so broad, so fuzzy and can be drawn in so many different ways that sometimes I doubt they are of much value. The following would be an example of such a broad statement: “Individuals cooperate because their odds of survival are better within a group which works well; the behaviors which favor this will be selected to build the group’s rules and moral codes”. We can go a bit deeper, being more specific about the rules of cooperation and the codes, but every now and then we’ll find exceptions to the rules and alternate paths.

phiwum said:
Yes, Joe could be choosing things which appear altruistic but are really in his interest. He may not even be aware that his self-interest is playing such a role in his decision.

Or he may have just been taught to follow such role.

Since we usually have big problems to understand in details (OK, that’s my view, and I may be wrong) how it all happens, descriptive followed by statistic approaches are the only way to go. So, the “best” values would be the most common ones, even if we have little if any clues on exactly how they rise. This is the only way I can think maybe one could hope to find something close to or similar to objective values in morals. No, I don’t know if it is actually possible, yes, I can think of one too many problems in advance and they are scattered across the whole process.

Some may say the aspects we nowadays consider good were selected because they were the ones which allowed certain cultures, certain societies to have an edge over other ones, thus improving their survival odds. We could then say they are objective values. Personally, I am not sure if they are the only ones - but I can't prove they are not. I wonder if there are other possibilities, I wonder what were the roles of contingency in the selection certain moral traits - not unlike biologic evolution.

And IF an analogy with biologic evolution is valid, well, are wings "good"? Do wings have an objective value? Only as a solution for flying. An there are lots of types of wings for lots of flying styles. No clear-cut objectives here too, so it seems... It depends on context. Or how you formulate the question.

phiwum said:
And, of course, circumstances can affect the degree to which we follow our own moral norms, as well as our view of what these norms are.

I am probably somewhere within the moral nihilism field, much to my own distaste… So, I just compare morals to observational frames of reference in physics. There are no absolute ones. The problem with this analogy is that we can detach ourselves from a given coordinate system with relative ease, we are used to do so (within certain limits – some things are beyond our common sense even if we can understand their maths).

With morals, however, it can be very hard (at least for me and I bet it’s the same for most humanity) to change reference systems, points of view, even if we know they are relative. Personally, in some cases I can not completely detach myself from my own moral reference coordinates, say “it is their culture, their ethics, their morals” and accept, agree with certain acts and standards. I may understand it is, I know that if I were from that culture, it would most likely be normal for me. So, I label myself a whining moral nihilist…
 

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