Wowbagger
The Infinitely Prolonged
Thinking about that more, I find it very strange we even need to go into this. The mystery we are trying to resolve is: What is morality? What makes it so compelling to most people?What is 'morally' wrong with doing things that are bad for the things that I care about? It is perfectly rational to ask that question.
If knowing what the facts are, and finding out that society will generally accept policies towards them, regardless of what any individual thinks, is NOT 'compelling' enough for you, then how is that word supposed to even be useful?
But, let's roll with it the properly philosophical way, for now. Maybe all this will improve upon what I said before:
Not quite. It cannot be any old values, (well, at least not for very long). Here, we have to introduce the Core Value that morality tends to be about: What those questions about morals tend to reflect the best. What values does morality, (to use my earlier words), stabilize on?So, it seems that morality in this description of yours is merely the self- interest of following the herd mentality in order to 'get along'?
The answer, according to the specific theory I outline, is a form of Welfare Consequentialism. And, that is what I am willing to defend. (Though, I could be wrong about it.)
I intend to demonstrate that questions about morality will inevitably translate into questions about consequences for the welfare of the society. There is no other stable form of morality that can exist (according to theory). Talk of any other option would be in the realm of fiction.
Welfare Consequentialism can be roughly abbreviated as "well being", if one prefers the Sam Harris term. Or, perhaps even "prudence", if one prefers the phiwum term.
ETA: Actually, phiwum rejects my usage of the term "prudence", below. So, I would redefine it as "prudent policy for the society", and the point would still be clear enough.
Sharia Law has not yielded very good consequences for its society, compared to others, based on several measurable factors. Do I need to go into details?If I find myself in a society that follows Sharia Law, am I then 'morally wrong' to disagree with stoning a woman to death because she has been raped?
Psychopaths are not so good for the whole of society, either.Say, I was a psychopath that cared a great deal about gratifying my desires to cause others pain. Is it therefore 'morally wrong', for me to commit to some action that would limit my ability to do this?
Though, what makes this example fascinating is the argument that there could be a non-zero optimal number of psychopaths. Meaning: Any number less than the optimal, and MORE people would be exploited by them, than otherwise, because more people would be less wary of their existence. (The number has been proposed as 2% of the population, if I recall correctly.)
That is a very good question! (And, it happens to be the one I was working a lot on, since I started this thread, because I think it might be the key to understanding a lot of what I am saying.) Emergence generally defined as "a complex system or pattern that arises out of the interactions of relatively simple systems".When you say that morality is an 'emergent property' of societies, what exactly do you mean by 'emergent property'?
Our emotions are a good example: Love is an emergent property of our physiology. There are a number of activities that go on in our body and brain, that emerge as a feeling of loving something. Some people are convinced that love does not really exist, because there is no object of "love" in our bodies. Not even a single, specific chemical. But, those who claim such things are missing the point: Love is not to be found in the simpler systems, but in how those systems interact.
Termite mounds are an interesting example, because there is no central planning involved: Each termite does its own thing, and thanks to the complex interactions they make, they build a complex mound to live in. (And few people doubt such mounds exist, since they take physical form.)
Another example I want to cover is a swarm of bees. Each bee moves on its own accord, but most of them tend to move in a unified manner. Though, there is a statistically predictable number of ones that will veer off in the wrong direction. This demonstrates that there CAN be individuals who "go against the grain", but that does not mean the "grain" does not generally exist.
Morality is a complex system made up of many components that I can divide into two provisional buckets: Those that are more directly part of our evolutionary inheritance, and are largely innate within individuals. Then, there are those that are only apparent in the movement of the society, as a collective.
Examples of innate moral systems include (but are NOT limited to): In-group/Out-group biases, tendency to moralize disgust and purity, taboo against incest in particular, a sense of fairness, etc. (There was someone who once placed these sorts of things into 4 sub-categories, but I will have to get back to you on that.)
Examples of collective moral systems include (but are NOT limited to): An expanding circle of altruism, an established monopoly on legal violence (aka leviathan theory), codified morality, etc. (When I have the longer list I was preparing, I can mention others.)
Our sense of morality emerges out of a mixing bag of all of those factors, and possibly others.
(This is not meant to imply a "Black Box". We CAN open the "box" to study how these factors play out. Morality is does NOT need to be a mysterious force, or anything. I only mention this, because it came up a lot, in the past.)
That, so far, is very descriptive, rather than normative, I agree. But, let us continue:
I am suggesting that it is MORE binding to the society, as a collective, more-so than the individuals in it, directly.Also, why should this emergent property be binding on individuals?
But, that also implies there will be increased pressure, from society, for the individual to conform to it.
As I said, before, we first need to add an unambiguous Core Value to the system: Something that all moral questions tend to lead into, regardless of what we would like to say on the matter.Also, as there are (and have been, and will be) many societies, do their moral views all hold equal weight? If we have conflicting views between societies, which is right? How do you decide without imposing your own moral views, which merely begs the question?
I claim that Consequentialism is likely going to be "King", and that this is NOT escapable. No matter what problems you or I have with Consequentialism, that is ultimately where morality is going to head towards. (At least according to theory.)
Once we add Natural Selection to the emergent systems I described, above, it becomes clearer: Those values that lead to the surviving and thriving of the community (those being the "consequences") will more likely be "inherited" by the next generation, than any values that detract from that.
(I tried to avoid stuffing the concepts into such group-selection-like terms. But, I suppose it might work better in the context of establishing the "Core Value" first, rather than later?)
I am aware that the units of selection would be fuzzy, here. Even fuzzier than memes, perhaps. But, I am not quite proposing a formal system of group-selection, anyway. I am only borrowing that language to describe the general behavior of what the emergent moral systems seem to do.
Incidentally, that fuzziness leads me to another point to bring up: Objective Moral Truths will need to take the form of Provisional Objective Moral Truths. That is: We may never know the actual truth about reality of moral values. But, we can continue to improve our estimates of what they are. This is the same as science's stance on empirical claims, in general. I bring this up, because it helps us avoid situations where people in power prematurely claim they have all of the right answers. The objective moralist must always be vigilant for signs that they were greatly wrong about something, and the policies they influence would need to take that possibility into account.
The rest of your post seems to repeat what I responded to above, but if I missed anything, let me know.
I am going into this fight knowing I am the underdog. I am under no inclination to underestimate my foe's powers, believe me!Thanks for providing a link to Garner's book. Having read some of it, I am left with the inescapable conclusion that he is going to have you for breakfast.
I understand the history of these things is important. History tells us a LOT about why bad ideas were bad ideas. However, for the sake of this debate, I would rather not get into that history too deeply. It does not concern me who exactly said what, and when, right now. I would rather debate the merits of our positions more directly.you seem to be naive about the subject matter that you are engaging in.
The truth of a moral statement would be measured against what seems to be in the best interests of the society.Since moral realists want to say that moral judgements are sometimes true, I have suggested that it is up to them to explain how they understand this, and to support their claims.
Sometimes, at the proximate detail level, those interests would change and transform, as the society changes and transforms. So that a particular judgment would work best at one point in time, but be bad for everyone, at another point in time.
Proximate means: The smaller, more chaotic details, largely dependent on details in the particular environment; to distinguish it from more Ultimate factors, such as Natural Selection, and its resulting consequentialist trends.
Let me know where I am still failing, after this post.If you had demonstrated an 'objective morality', it would be a simply stunning demonstration which has surpassed the best thinkers of the last two millennia. You stand to make a substantial career for yourself in philosophy. Yet you seem to lack an appreciation of what such a demonstration would entail. Your position, so far, is incoherent, let alone demonstrating some kind of objective truth.
Let me know if I am still missing something, given the above description.3. That your own position is most definitely more 'woo-ish'. This 'emergent property of morality' which has the special metaphysical quality of being binding on human behaviour sounds suspiciously like the FSM. I can't prove it doesn't exist, but there seems to be little reason to suppose it does.
I think it is really strange that the author would claim that someone, who took great pains to unravel the evolution of morality, is really arguing for nihilism on the subject of morality. It would be like claiming that a biologist who wrote about the evolution of teeth does not really believe teeth exist.
I think the cracks in philosophy start to show, when they confuse their useful fictions with actual reality.
Philosophy is still really good at systematics, but very poor when it comes to actually answering questions, these days.
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