BStrong
Penultimate Amazing
Cite the part were JFK:
1. Orders the coup.
2. Orders the assassination of the Diem brothers.
No such documentation exists, but documentation does exist that as early as '61 The Kennedy administration was making contacts with SVN military officers that objected to the Diem regime, and eventually when those contacts planed their coup they sought and received permission from the Kennedy administration to carry out their operation to overthrow Diem:
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/index.htm
Records of the Kennedy national security meetings, both here and in our larger collection, show that none of JFK's conversations about a coup in Saigon featured consideration of what might physically happen to Ngo Dinh Diem or Ngo Dinh Nhu. The audio record of the October 29th meeting which we cite below also reveals no discussion of this issue. That meeting, the last held at the White House to consider a coup before this actually took place, would have been the key moment for such a conversation. The conclusion of the Church Committee agrees that Washington gave no consideration to killing Diem. (Note 12)
The weight of evidence therefore supports the view that President Kennedy did not conspire in the death of Diem. However, there is also the exceedingly strange transcript of Diem's final phone conversation with Ambassador Lodge on the afternoon of the coup (Document 23), which carries the distinct impression that Diem is being abandoned by the U.S. Whether this represents Lodge's contribution, or JFK's wishes, is not apparent from the evidence available today.
A second charge has to do with Kennedy administration denials that it had had anything to do with the coup itself. The documentary record is replete with evidence that President Kennedy and his advisers, both individually and collectively, had a considerable role in the coup overall, by giving initial support to Saigon military officers uncertain what the U.S. response might be, by withdrawing U.S. aid from Diem himself, and by publicly pressuring the Saigon government in a way that made clear to South Vietnamese that Diem was isolated from his American ally. In addition, at several of his meetings (Documents 7, 19, 22) Kennedy had CIA briefings and led discussions based on the estimated balance between pro- and anti-coup forces in Saigon that leave no doubt the United States had a detailed interest in the outcome of a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem. The CIA also provided $42,000 in immediate support money to the plotters the morning of the coup, carried by Lucien Conein, an act prefigured in administration planning Document 17)
Astute observers of history will no doubt note the mortality rates for deposed leaders. A retirement lunch of the sort preferred by mafiosi is the rule, rather than the exception.
If officials of the Kennedy administration and JFK himself believed they were signing off on a bloodless operation I believe that was most likely a hope born from optimism, not a rational examination of conditions on the ground in SVN.