Resolution of Transporter Problem

[PixyMisa]

I don't recall Dennett being abusive.

It was edited out in the revised edition.

Actually, IIRC, what Dennett said was that, by definition, Mary must know her "reactive dispositions" to the colour red. This is subtly more informative than your wording.

No it isn't. It's exactly the same thing.

Well, the whole argument is about qualia, so it would pretty weird if they weren't in there!

The concept of qualia is inherently dualistic. You cannot introduce them into a materialist context and expect anything but mockery.

This says a great deal about your own reactive dispositions.

If you mean by that, that I have some grasp of basic logic, then yes.

This argument resembles that of religious fundamentalists to me, Pixy. I find it closed-minded to the point of ridiculousness. For a start qualia are usually defined as the subjective components of experience, the redness of red etc, not what's left over when you take everything physical out.

Nope. Qualia are explicitly non-physical.

You might construct the latter from the former but to then use this argument to refute their existence is a trick more used by extreme muslim clerics or other religious loonies.

Nonsense.

The arguments - Searle's, Chalmers', Jackson's alike - only make any sense because qualia are explicitly non-physical. And they founder for exactly that reason: They have introduced something they have defined as non-physical into what were supposed to be reductio ad absurdum arguments against physicality.

I had nothing to do with any of this. They messed up all by themselves.

The qualia refutation which I personally subscribe to is to state that subjectivity simply is data processing, and that there is no actual observer or experiencer, merely the appearance of the same.

You're close to grasping the point here.

The point is that the observer is not a thing. It's not an organ in the body or a location in the brain. It's a synthesis of mental processes. If you have the "appearance" of an observer, that means you have something that acts in every outward respect as you would expect an observer to behave.

And that means you have an observer.

 

[Nick227]

Dennett. What was the title of that book again?

Consciousness Explained. But Dennett is just offering some bare bones for a theoretical model. He's not going anywhere near practically demonstrating how the human brain actually works. You are on your own with your assertions, Pixy. Well, you can have RD to play Sanchopanza, if you want, I guess.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

What I recall from my reading is that Chalmers coined the term "hard problem," at a Tucson consciousness conference, to contrast certain problems with others. Yes, he maintained that it would remain after the "easy problems" had been solved, but I don't recall him saying it could never be answered, though it's possible he did. If this is what he meant wouldn't he call it the "impossible problem" or something similar?

If he was a materialist and believed this, it would be the "impossible problem". But he's a dualist. From his Wikipedia entry:

Chalmers main argument against physicalism, and his primary contribution to the ancient debate on the mind-body problem, is based on a thought-experiment in which there are hypothetical philosophical zombies. These zombies are not like the zombies of film and television series, but are exactly the same as ordinary human beings, except that they lack qualia or sentience. He argues that since such zombies are conceivable to us, they must therefore be logically possible. Since they are logically possible, then qualia and sentience are not fully explained by physical properties alone.

Assuming that's accurate, he's talking complete tripe. P-zombies, like qualia, are incoherent notions under materialism, and therefore cannot be used to dispute materialism.

It does however intuitively appear to be dualistic, to most humans anyway. There do seem to be clearly defined subjects and objects.

True. But not relevant. Chalmers is trying to establish an absolute, not discussing the sociohistory of the mind-body problem.

So how would you demonstrate that a thermostat is having a subjective experience? Dennett's assertion is based around his model for conscious experience. I don't recall him actually demonstrating it to be true.

Simple: It turns the heat on when it gets cold.

I don't know that anyone really "earns ridicule." I think it is more that those who have a need to administer it seek out suitable subjects.

I disagree in general, and regardless, I think that these three have gone above and beyond in this respect.

 

[PixyMisa]

Consciousness Explained.

Ah, yes, that was it.

But Dennett is just offering some bare bones for a theoretical model.

Yes. So?

He's not going anywhere near practically demonstrating how the human brain actually works.

Where do human brains come into it?

You are on your own with your assertions, Pixy.

Hardly. I didn't come up with this on my own, you know. This is mainstream modern philosophy and neuroscience.

 

[Nick227]

The concept of qualia is inherently dualistic. You cannot introduce them into a materialist context and expect anything but mockery.

The concept of qualia is inherently human, Pixy. Qualia is how it seems things are. That's why apparent qualia need to be logically dealt with, and why mockery just doesn't imo get one very far here.

If you mean by that, that I have some grasp of basic logic, then yes.

I mean that you choose to rail against your own definitions and interpretations of terms.

Nope. Qualia are explicitly non-physical.

Sorry, qualia are explicitly subjective. Non-physicality could be inferred, for sure, from the way some people treat them, but it remains that primarily they are subjective phenomena.

You're close to grasping the point here.

The point is that the observer is not a thing. It's not an organ in the body or a location in the brain. It's a synthesis of mental processes. If you have the "appearance" of an observer, that means you have something that acts in every outward respect as you would expect an observer to behave.

And that means you have an observer.

I think you might just catch the last boat to Fantasy Island if you run. There is no actual observer. Post hoc thinking (dictionary def of "thinking") creates the notion of experience.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Hardly. I didn't come up with this on my own, you know. This is mainstream modern philosophy and neuroscience.

No it isn't, Pixy. You have yet to find one well-known researcher who backs up your assertion.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

The concept of qualia is inherently human, Pixy.

Nope.

Qualia is how it seems things are.

Nope.

That's why apparent qualia need to be logically dealt with, and why mockery just doesn't imo get one very far here.

And nope.

Yes, we have experiences. Yes, that's a universal human concept. Yes, experiences themselves are in some sense an illusion, while at the same time being real.

But qualia are something created by immaterialist philosophers as a job security program. I don't ridicule them for that; after all, they're just wrong, not absurd. When they then introduce them into a materialist context to argue against materialist concepts of mind, though, they are being absurd and I will ridicule them.

I mean that you choose to rail against your own definitions and interpretations of terms.

I didn't define qualia thus, Nick. Neither the term nor the definition is mine.

Sorry, qualia are explicitly subjective. Non-physicality could be inferred, for sure, from the way some people treat them, but it remains that primarily they are subjective phenomena.

Yes, subjective, but we already have terms for that. Qualia are specifically and explicitly non-physical.

Look at the Wikipedia page on qualia. Look at what the arguments are about. Qualia are introduced as an imaginary and incoherent construct in a reductio ad absurdum argument intended to falsify physicalism.

Repeatedly.

Also, read Dennett's argument on that page under "Critics of qualia", where he makes the same point as me that the entire notion of qualia is incoherent. And, just by the by, Dennett did not steal this argument from me.

I think you might just catch the last boat to Fantasy Island if you run. There is no actual observer. Post hoc thinking (dictionary def of "thinking") creates the notion of experience.

Creates the notion of experience, sure. But that's entirely separate from the experience itself, which exists just as it always has.

 

[PixyMisa]

No it isn't, Pixy. You have yet to find one well-known researcher who backs up your assertion.

You mean, apart from all of them? Well, pretty much all the materialist philosophers, and all the neuroscientists.

 

[Nick227]

Creates the notion of experience, sure. But that's entirely separate from the experience itself, which exists just as it always has.

IMO experience doesn't exist, by any meaningful definition of the word "exist." There are sensory phenomena, and post-hoc thinking constructs the interplay of these phenomena into subject-object relationships. There are no actual subject-object relationships. There are but phenomena. The narrative self is largely a human, social phenomena created by post hoc thinking to try and facilitate evolutionary pre-requisites. It's not real by any meaningful definition of the term.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

But qualia are something created by immaterialist philosophers as a job security program. I don't ridicule them for that; after all, they're just wrong, not absurd. When they then introduce them into a materialist context to argue against materialist concepts of mind, though, they are being absurd and I will ridicule them.

But the fact is that qualia do not seem absurd to most humans. Indeed, they seem eminently reasonable. Your entire position seems to me to consist of blindly refuting anything that isn't materialism, regardless of how it seems. I don't find this approach so convincing. As it happens I don't believe in qualia either but to my mind it is still necessary to provide alternative explanations for how things can seem this way. What you do is to define terminology one way and then present the definition as an absurdity. It's ********, Pixy. You don't deal with the actual issues, you just constantly move the goalposts around verbally.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

IMO experience doesn't exist, by any meaningful definition of the word "exist." There are sensory phenomena, and post-hoc thinking constructs the interplay of these phenomena into subject-object relationships. There are no actual subject-object relationships. There are but phenomena. The narrative self is largely a human, social phenomena created by post hoc thinking to try and facilitate evolutionary pre-requisites. It's not real by any meaningful definition of the term.

Nick

This is only because you are restricting the meaning of "exist" to that which suits your dead horse argument.

But there are other meaningful types of existence, such as the ways unicorns and goblins exist.

Why are you ignoring those other types of existence? Why are they arbitrarily "less meaningful" to you?

 

[rocketdodger]

But the fact is that qualia do not seem absurd to most humans. Indeed, they seem eminently reasonable.

Yet, nobody can come up with a coherent definition?

How can something be "eminently reasonable" if the definition escapes all reason?

 

[rocketdodger]

David Chalmers is the "hard problem consciousness" guy. He asserts that experience cannot be explained by any physical process. He bases this on his misconception that "p-zombies" are conceivable, and must therefore be logically possible.

Yep, I knew what a p-zombie was.

John Searle is the bloke who came up with the (in)famous Chinese Room, which I see as a good test for Introductory Philosophy students. If at the end of the semester you can't take Searle's argument apart inside of ten minutes, you fail.

Yep, knew about that too.

To round things out, we can take a look at Mary's Room, posited by Frank Jackson. Jackson has us imagine a scientist named Mary, who knows everything there is to know about the physical properties and processes and perception of colour, but who has lived her entire life locked in a room that is entirely black and white, and so has never experience colour herself.

... and that as well.

So I was right ... these people couldn't teach me anything except, possibly, via the exercise of taking apart their arguments.

What I find the most sad is that These three arguments (p-zombies, chinese room, Mary's room) can be defeated using simple introspection of one's own thoughts -- you don't need to know anything about physicalism or the science involved.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

But there are other meaningful types of existence, such as the ways unicorns and goblins exist.

Also applicable to something as mundane as money. Where does money exists?

 

[Z]

Qualia is inherently dualistic. I've been told this for at least the last twenty years by everyone from staunch self-proclaimed materialists, to staunch self-proclaimed dualists, to staunch self-proclaimed idealists. How do you spot the dualist in a debate? Watch which one brings in qualia first.

Thanks for clearing that up.

 

[PixyMisa]

IMO experience doesn't exist, by any meaningful definition of the word "exist." There are sensory phenomena, and post-hoc thinking constructs the interplay of these phenomena into subject-object relationships. There are no actual subject-object relationships. There are but phenomena. The narrative self is largely a human, social phenomena created by post hoc thinking to try and facilitate evolutionary pre-requisites. It's not real by any meaningful definition of the term.

Are stories real? Not true, but real? That is, is there such a thing as a story?

 

[PixyMisa]

But the fact is that qualia do not seem absurd to most humans. Indeed, they seem eminently reasonable.

Until they examine dualism rationally, maybe. Once they examine dualism rationally, they reject it, because it is logically incoherent.

Your entire position seems to me to consist of blindly refuting anything that isn't materialism, regardless of how it seems.

No. I refute everything that isn't materialism based on immense amounts of evidence.

I don't find this approach so convincing.

I don't care.

As it happens I don't believe in qualia either but to my mind it is still necessary to provide alternative explanations for how things can seem this way.

They don't.

We have experiences.

We do not have qualia, in the same sense that we do not have square circles.

What you do is to define terminology one way and then present the definition as an absurdity.

No, Nick. Try reading something. Even Wikipedia. I did not define the term that way. The people who invented the term defined it that way.

It's ********, Pixy.

It may be ********, Nick, but it's not my ********.

You don't deal with the actual issues, you just constantly move the goalposts around verbally.

Sorry, you have me confused with a bunch of philosophy professors.

 

[Nick227]

Yet, nobody can come up with a coherent definition?

How can something be "eminently reasonable" if the definition escapes all reason?

For a start, there is a basic definition. The meaning of the term is reasonably well agreed upon imo.

Secondarily, I don't find it so odd that it's hard to give precise definitions for terms used in philosophy. Frequently this is the case.

Thirdly, the word "consciousness," as used in phrases like "consciousness research," has far less of a coherent definition. Yet, this doesn't seem to stop people the world over banging on about it!

Nick

 

[Nick227]

This is only because you are restricting the meaning of "exist" to that which suits your dead horse argument.

But there are other meaningful types of existence, such as the ways unicorns and goblins exist.

Why are you ignoring those other types of existence? Why are they arbitrarily "less meaningful" to you?

Because they are not physically real. Have you ever seen a unicorn? Besides which, goblins and unicorns do exist in a mythological sense. The user illusion doesn't even do this.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Are stories real? Not true, but real? That is, is there such a thing as a story?

Stories are real for me. The events and characters portrayed may or may not be.

Nick