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Resolution of Transporter Problem

Is identity Object instanceof Class or Object.equals(Object)?

I am guessing D2 would be the type of data structure that blurs the distinction between classes and their objects.

Namely, any instances of C (D2) would instantly become their own <whatever> due to modification of the underlying structures. Is there even a name for a class who's instances can change their own metadata? Once a class does so, is it still the same class? Is it a different class that inherits from the first and only exists in a single instance?

If the source code for executable doesn't exist, are the instances of classes in the executable actually the abstract classes themselves? If not, do the abstract classes not even exist? If a class doesn't exist, how can there be an instance of it?

I know people do research on this kind of stuff -- executable code that modifies itself. What do they call such a thing?
 
I know people do research on this kind of stuff -- executable code that modifies itself. What do they call such a thing?
The last I read anything on this type of programing it was called inoperable. It tends to be destructive. Not that we won't have workable programs in the future. I believe we will.
 
I agree with all of this -- except your "best" solution. My solution would be to simply acquire a necessary resolution "snapshot" of the brain state supporting C, send that to the destination, and allow the original to go about their merry way.

Why destroy the original? If we can manufacture a body from scratch, we can certainly merge memories from different individuals. When the traveler gets back they both step into the machine again and get "resolved" into one consciousness again.


Well, as long as it's smoother than the Vista upgrade ;) (yeah, I was sidetracked by the cartoon I posted, where the original always gets squashed; sorry 'bout that).
 
Well, as long as it's smoother than the Vista upgrade ;) (yeah, I was sidetracked by the cartoon I posted, where the original always gets squashed; sorry 'bout that).
If it fails you can always get a Total Recall... or is that The 6th Day? I get those mixed up.
 
If it fails you can always get a Total Recall... or is that The 6th Day? I get those mixed up.

Total Recall, I think (same as got Arnie elected).


I doubt me or me' could find the sales receipt anyway (unless me.D3's got it).
 
Sorry. Had you pegged as one of those "materialists" who won't get in. Maybe it was just Belz, Merc and Darat though.

Q - "How many radical behaviourists can you get into a teletransporter?"

A - "Depends entirely how forceful you are. They won't get in themselves."

Nick
If you think it is materialism that kept us out, you are quite simply wrong. Can't speak for Belz, but neither Darat nor I are materialists.
 
If you think it is materialism that kept us out, you are quite simply wrong. Can't speak for Belz, but neither Darat nor I are materialists.

He is referring to a previous thread where a few self-proclaimed materialists stated they would not step in the machine.

I now agree that if materialism is true, then there is in theory a transporter that people should not be afraid to use. So if one is a materialist, they should be willing to step into the transporter. If not then either we just haven't explained the mechanism to them properly or they don't really understand what materialism entails.

If you are not a materialist (physicalist, whatever) then I am sure there are a number of very good reasons for not using such a machine -- in particular, C is only equivalent to D2 if physicalism is true.
 
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I'm not per se a materialist. I don't claim not be one either. I would have no problem stepping in the transporter.
 
He is referring to a previous thread where a few self-proclaimed materialists stated they would not step in the machine.

I now agree that if materialism is true, then there is in theory a transporter that people should not be afraid to use. So if one is a materialist, they should be willing to step into the transporter. If not then either we just haven't explained the mechanism to them properly or they don't really understand what materialism entails.

If you are not a materialist (physicalist, whatever) then I am sure there are a number of very good reasons for not using such a machine -- in particular, C is only equivalent to D2 if physicalism is true.
I know what he was referring to; I was a bit disappointed that Darat's, my, and perhaps Belz's arguments were so poorly remembered.

And it had nothing to do with being afraid to use the machine. Moreover, the unwillingness was pretty much independent of ontological stance. Assuming one's ontological conclusions may "resol[ve the] transporter problem" in some senses, but that aspect was irrelevant to our objections. As such, I would consider the problem yet unresolved--or rather, that the OP and I resolve it differently.
 
Mercutio, are you, like Paul Anagnostoplous, not a materialist simply because you reject such philosophical labels? I can say with confidence that you are not a dualist. That, I guess leaves idealist.

Myself I'm fine with philosophical labels I just don't see it as important. Idealism or materialism, the world still behaves the way it seems to behave (yes, tautological so sue me). :)
 
I know what he was referring to; I was a bit disappointed that Darat's, my, and perhaps Belz's arguments were so poorly remembered.

And it had nothing to do with being afraid to use the machine. Moreover, the unwillingness was pretty much independent of ontological stance. Assuming one's ontological conclusions may "resol[ve the] transporter problem" in some senses, but that aspect was irrelevant to our objections. As such, I would consider the problem yet unresolved--or rather, that the OP and I resolve it differently.

I understand.

My own objection at the time of that thread was that I didn't realize information can't be discontinuous. So this OP is, as you suggest, only a resolution for me (and anyone else that had objections similar to my own) since I have all along made the assumptions I identify in the OP.

In the interest of discussion, would you care to recap your own objections in a sentence or two? It might help me understand the nature of this issue in a broader way now that I am a little more educated on the subject than I was before.
 
I know what he was referring to; I was a bit disappointed that Darat's, my, and perhaps Belz's arguments were so poorly remembered.

And it had nothing to do with being afraid to use the machine. Moreover, the unwillingness was pretty much independent of ontological stance. Assuming one's ontological conclusions may "resol[ve the] transporter problem" in some senses, but that aspect was irrelevant to our objections. As such, I would consider the problem yet unresolved--or rather, that the OP and I resolve it differently.

As I see it, if one believes that consciousness is the product solely of brain activity or material interactions then one should travel.

IIRC, your objections were mostly along emotive lines..."What if this, what if that" -stuff, which in Sue Blackmore's version of the thought experiment would not be admissable as reasons not to travel.

So, if you are not afraid of using the machine, why exactly would you not travel? Personally, I would consider fear to be a highly reasonable and human response to such a device. I'm sure I would be afraid of travelling. Rationally I believe such fear is unfounded however.

Nick
 
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My own objection at the time of that thread was that I didn't realize information can't be discontinuous. So this OP is, as you suggest, only a resolution for me (and anyone else that had objections similar to my own) since I have all along made the assumptions I identify in the OP.

IMO, people don't want to travel because they want to believe in a persisting self, whether or not they like to wear the label "materialist." The notion that self is merely process is inevitably resisted because billions of years of evolution have conditioned the brain to do just that.

Nick
 
If the source code for executable doesn't exist, are the instances of classes in the executable actually the abstract classes themselves? If not, do the abstract classes not even exist? If a class doesn't exist, how can there be an instance of it?

Indeed - understanding type becomes a lot harder the more mutable your objects are.

My own modest proposal is that:

*) Every unique instance of an object is also a unique class.
*) The strongest class relationships are between objects that have isomorphic functions
*) The weakest class relationships are between objects that be be decomposed into sets of objects which share strong class relationships
*) The more layers of decomposition you have to go through the weaker the relationship is
 
rocketdodger said:
The question you have to ask is who would have the advantage -- smart people that make copies of themselves or the dinosaurs who are trying to stop them?
The people making the interest on the money loaned to governments attempting to feed, house, and educate all the duplicates. You think illegal immigrants are a burden ...

~~ Paul
 
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Mercutio said:
I know what he was referring to; I was a bit disappointed that Darat's, my, and perhaps Belz's arguments were so poorly remembered.
I apologize for my poor memory. What was your argument again?

Mercutio, are you, like Paul Anagnostoplous, not a materialist simply because you reject such philosophical labels?
I say I'm not a materialist because I do not perceive any deep difference between physicalism, idealism, or any other monism. This may, of course, simply be due to shoddy thinking on my part.

~~ Paul
 
Mercutio, are you, like Paul Anagnostoplous, not a materialist simply because you reject such philosophical labels? I can say with confidence that you are not a dualist. That, I guess leaves idealist.

Myself I'm fine with philosophical labels I just don't see it as important. Idealism or materialism, the world still behaves the way it seems to behave (yes, tautological so sue me). :)

You left out one distinct possibility. You are correct that I am no dualist, but I am also not an idealist. There is a label I am completely comfortable with, though.

'Dodger, my objection was simply that the problem as stated required killing someone. The fact that another person was created did not suddenly mean that the person who is killed, is suddenly not killed.
 

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