Resolution of Transporter Problem

[rocketdodger]

He might have covered it, but it does not solve the problem. Unless he means that the problem cannot be solved satisfactorily and therefore transporters can never be practical because of this.

But he seems to imply, unless I misunderstand him, that the 'duplicate' is the same being as the original unless the original survives.

The duplicate is the original for an instant in time. Or, if you prefer, as long as D2 is unchanged. As soon as anything changes the two are different, by definition. This implies that if the original survives it will fail to match D2 an instant after teleportation, unless the conditions at source and destination are identical and quantum fluctuation has identical influences and so forth.

It is quite simple. If D2 fully defines C, then wherever and whenever there is an instance of D2 there is C. You could teleport and save D2 somewhere and a thousand years later it would still be C. Other versions of C, derived from that initial D2, could have lived, had families, etc, but C would still be around.

 

[rocketdodger]

So, are you ready to get in the Teletransporter now? Has the above sufficiently convinced you that you won't die and that self is anyway process?

Nick

That was never my issue, Nick.

My issue was that I thought there needed to be some kind of "physical" continuity rather than simply informational continuity. Then I realized that it is by definition impossible to break informational continuity and everything resolved.

And by that I mean that, for instance, if you had to transfer information from one sheet of paper to another, regardless of the method you need to keep the information somewhere during the process. If you memorized it, took a picture of it, scanned it into a computer, whatever, the information never, not even for an infinitessimal period, disappears. It is always somewhere.

So yes, I would step into the transporter. And I wouldn't want the original to be destroyed, either. I would prefer two instances of myself exist and merge memory at some later point in time -- but that is another discussion.

 

[rocketdodger]

I still don't see anything that I would consider a "problem" as in an unanswered question. Immediately after transporting, there would be another person, and if you killed one of them you'd be killing a person.

So it's not really a problem to solve, it's just a thought experiment that highlights the shortcomings of our traditional way of referring to individuals. It seems like only semantics to me - who is "you" is what it boils down to, and that's just semantics.

Yes but don't you think the semantics are very important?

 

[rocketdodger]

Let us assume our conclusions.

Now, examine our conclusions. See how they match our assumptions?

Wonderful!

4) Profit...

Is this referring to me?

 

[rocketdodger]

I have the "teleportation argument" often with one of my more intellectual friends.

It is my opinion that C would continue to exist seemlessly to all the universe, except one person. The original.

From the perspective of that self aware being that stepped onto the pad to be teleported, its lights out.

Questions:

1) What would the experience of an instantaneous death be like?

2) How do you know the normal mode of human experience isn't instantaneous death followed by an immediate perfect copy? I mean, it would be impossible to know for sure, right?

3) Isn't this what happens when you fall asleep every night? Your conscious awareness of existence shuts down and reboots from neural hardware in the morning, right?

 

[RandFan]

What would the experience of an instantaneous death be like?

My guess is that it is indistinguishable from falling asleep.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

OK, but this has nothing to do with the problem.

Let's just pretend that in the future this has been addressed and is not considered to be homicide.

So we've legislated that it's up to the person being copied whether the original should be killed? Is this the case with every transportation, or only when the transporter malfunctions?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

So yes, I would step into the transporter. And I wouldn't want the original to be destroyed, either. I would prefer two instances of myself exist and merge memory at some later point in time -- but that is another discussion.

I find it difficult to believe that society would put up with arbitrary duplication.

~~ Paul

 

[RandFan]

I'm with Rocket. I don't believe I exist in any sense that would be violated by the transporter. So long as there is a continuation of my thought process I'm fine with that.
Every atom and molecule of my being has been replaced at one time or another. Every night I fall asleep my conscious continuity ceases.

How do we know that we don't often die at night in our sleep and we are replaced by a clone?

 

[blobru]

Assume that consciousness is information processing.

Let D1 be the information which is being processed in consciousness C.

Then we can fully encode C using another set of information D2 which is a superset of D1. That is, D2 contains not only all the information in D1 but also all the information about how C is processing D1.

D2 does not include information that would not affect C. For example, if C is me standing in the shower, D2 does not include information about the shower, only information about my perception of the shower. D2 does not include absolute coordinates of neurons, only relative ones.

Let D3 be the set of all information used to objectively describe C, such as current location of the substrate of C. Information about the shower I am standing in that is not available to my consciousness would be part of D3. Also note that D3 is a superset of D2.


My contention is that D2 fully defines C as far as C is concerned. Thus, any transporter needs to relay D2 from the source to the destination in order for C to function properly at the destination.

But further, my contention is also that D2 is C as far as C is concerned. Mathematically, if one wanted to, they could take an instance of D2 and run it in any sort of simulation they wanted and as long as the constraints were correct C would continue to exist as C.

This implies that, in the transporter experiment, it is impossible to discontinue C because D2 is purely information. Any instance of D2 is still D2. And since D3 is not important to C, C exists wherever there is D2 -- even in the "airwaves," so to speak. The substrate of the information is irrelevant.

Now for the big questions What happens if a copy of D2 is made and the original set D3 is destroyed? Is C dead? No, because by definition C is sufficiently defined (fully defined, as far as C is concerned) by D2. So the copy is the original. So is the original. Information that is the same as other information.

What about if both the copy and original continue existing? Well, immediately after transport, C is not the same as C'. That is, D2 has nondeterministically split into D2a and D2b, and there are simply two instances of the same person walking around.

Assuming transmission of D2 isn't instantaneous, I don't see how we ever avoid creating D2a and D2b.

Assume D2 = info(C|u), '|u': at upload time u. D2 is unchanged during transmission time t. So info(C') = D2 = info(C|u). But D2 fully encodes C -- including her post upload experience, however brief -- during transmission time t. So D2 = info(C|u+t). Therefore, D2 is not identical, so it's already split into D2a and D2b... (this was one implication of the cartoon I linked to).

One possible solution would be to destroy being C at time u; however, this assumes: the transporter never malfunctions, which is unrealistic; and, destruction is "instantaneous" (too fast for C to experience: < ~20 ms?) -- otherwise, C will have had experience (of being destroyed) which isn't encoded in D2.

A better solution might be to put C to sleep prior to upload: there is still the problem that, even assuming a perfect lack of conscious and subconscious experience, any physiological changes in C during transmission time t would not have been encoded in D2; however, if the transporter did fail, one could then simply revive C and/or try again.

ETA: Come to think of it, destroying being C before upload would ensure perfect duplication (D2 = D2), but would again depend on perfect confidence in the transporter and associated info-tech. I think though, if the risk of malfunction were low enough, this would be the most 'practical' solution.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

How do we know that we don't often die at night in our sleep and we are replaced by a clone?

And that clone might be a philosophical zombie. Aaaarrrgh!

You'll remember that Interesting Ian believes that the teleported copy of a person would be dead, because his soul would not follow the teleportation.

~~ Paul

 

[cyborg]

Is identity Object instanceof Class or Object.equals(Object)?

 

[Nick227]

I find it difficult to believe that society would put up with arbitrary duplication.

~~ Paul

I doubt the tax office or crime department would tolerate it.

And as we'd both no doubt miss my girlfriend intensely, I dare say this could create problems. Though I suppose she could be duplicated too.

Nick

 

[RandFan]

And that clone might be a philosophical zombie. Aaaarrrgh!

You'll remember that Interesting Ian believes that the teleported copy of a person would be dead, because his soul would not follow the teleportation.

Interesting Ian, UCE, Franko... good times.

So, do identical twins share a soul or is it simply divided into two? Or is one of them a P-Zombie? Or did god in her infinite wisdom provide for a second soul?

 

[Nick227]

That was never my issue, Nick.

My issue was that I thought there needed to be some kind of "physical" continuity rather than simply informational continuity. Then I realized that it is by definition impossible to break informational continuity and everything resolved.

Sorry. Had you pegged as one of those "materialists" who won't get in. Maybe it was just Belz, Merc and Darat though.

Q - "How many radical behaviourists can you get into a teletransporter?"

A - "Depends entirely how forceful you are. They won't get in themselves."

Nick

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

So, do identical twins share a soul or is it simply divided into two? Or is one of them a P-Zombie? Or did god in her infinite wisdom provide for a second soul?

I don't know, but you can be damn sure I'm going to start using the "one twin of identical twins is a zombie" idea in some other conversations. That's a winner, Rand!

~~ Paul

 

[Nick227]

Doesn't solve the problem to me.

OK, you just got in the teleporter and pressed the button to teleport you to Mars. A green light signifies that you the operation was successful and 'you' have appeared in the transporter on the other end in perfect shape.

One little problem - a red light now comes on and a message appears on a screen indicating that the 'Acme destructor module' has failed that was to destroy the original copy simultaneously during transport.

A technician enters with a 'blaster' pointed at you and apologizes for the slight delay in completing the teleportation, but that he will now complete it manually and all will be well.

This is not of any significance to the thought experiment.

You don't need to ask what your reactions to this scenario will be because you already know what you would do in this situation, likely run like hell!

Nick

 

[RandFan]

I don't know, but you can be damn sure I'm going to start using the "one twin of identical twins is a zombie" idea in some other conversations. That's a winner, Rand!

~~ Paul

Glad to be of help.

Michael J. Fox's wife said to her OBGYN when she found out that she was having twins that "Michael believed that twins are spooky". "They are" said the OBGYN.

 

[rocketdodger]

I find it difficult to believe that society would put up with arbitrary duplication.

~~ Paul

Society doesn't put up with alot of things -- at first.

The question you have to ask is who would have the advantage -- smart people that make copies of themselves or the dinosaurs who are trying to stop them?

 

[rocketdodger]

Assuming transmission of D2 isn't instantaneous, I don't see how we ever avoid creating D2a and D2b.

Assume D2 = info(C|u), '|u': at upload time u. D2 is unchanged during transmission time t. So info(C') = D2 = info(C|u). But D2 fully encodes C -- including her post upload experience, however brief -- during transmission time t. So D2 = info(C|u+t). Therefore, D2 is not identical, so it's already split into D2a and D2b... (this was one implication of the cartoon I linked to).

One possible solution would be to destroy being C at time u; however, this assumes: the transporter never malfunctions, which is unrealistic; and, destruction is "instantaneous" (too fast for C to experience: < ~20 ms?) -- otherwise, C will have had experience (of being destroyed) which isn't encoded in D2.

A better solution might be to put C to sleep prior to upload: there is still the problem that, even assuming a perfect lack of conscious and subconscious experience, any physiological changes in C during transmission time t would not have been encoded in D2; however, if the transporter did fail, one could then simply revive C and/or try again.

ETA: Come to think of it, destroying being C before upload would ensure perfect duplication (D2 = D2), but would again depend on perfect confidence in the transporter and associated info-tech. I think though, if the risk of malfunction were low enough, this would be the most 'practical' solution.

I agree with all of this -- except your "best" solution. My solution would be to simply acquire a necessary resolution "snapshot" of the brain state supporting C, send that to the destination, and allow the original to go about their merry way.

Why destroy the original? If we can manufacture a body from scratch, we can certainly merge memories from different individuals. When the traveler gets back they both step into the machine again and get "resolved" into one consciousness again.