Question to free will skeptics

[President Bush]

I don't need to 'know' this. It is the axiom of choice.

A choice occuring without a choice mechanism is not possible because that would also be a mechanism - namely the mechanism that behaves in a manner that is not like any other mechanism. It is excluded from the discussion by virtue of paradox.

You can call it circular if you like but then it would show up your understanding of logic as limited to only parroting fallacies without understanding the formulation of logical systems under which they are valid.

It is quite simple: in the study of 'choice' we formulate our logic with:

1) Sets of possible choices
2) Mechanisms by which choices are selected

You are free to disagree with this if you want but then you are just going to have to tell me what you mean by 'choice' - that word won't attain meaning through its six letters alone you know.

I'm no mathematician, but I'll give it a shot:

According to Wikipedia, "choice" is:

... the mental process of thinking involved with the process of judging the merits of multiple options and selecting one of them for action.

Is it possible to demonstrate a proof requiring the axiom of choice to produce a simple answer of either yes, it does or no, it doesn't... that the subject of axiom of choice has something to do with the subject of free will (to be a necessarily true statement)?

 

[Taffer]

Of course they can:
"Blub is everything that isn't what it isn't."

Ok, granted.

And that's exactly what your definition is doing, you're claiming that:
Free will is everything that varies when everything else is fixed.

Of course that's what my definition is. By my definition, free will cannot be deterministic in nature. Everything material is deterministic in nature (except random blah blah). Therefore, free will has to be immaterial, and thus be whatever is left over when all other variables are fixed.

I see no error in logic.

But in this context, random means indeterminate, or at the very least undetermined.

When talking about particle decay the point at which a particle decays is not determinable in advance. There are no known parameters you can fix to control when it decays. It appears to breaks deterministic cause/effect in itself.

How can particle decay possible allow free will?

ETA: Would you be ok with this definition: Free will is an immaterial force which allows one to act outside of determinism.

 

[cyborg]

I notice you truncated the quote you used just before the statement making precisely this point.

No. You fail to understand the point here. The general class contains the basic behaviour under which all specific instances must adhere. The general class itself doesn't really have a behaviour of note.

Let’s consider gravity as an example...

I'm afraid this issue cuts to the basic heart of mathematical expression. We're already more general than considering any specific phenomena.

Is it possible to demonstrate a proof requiring the axiom of choice to produce a simple answer of either yes, it does or no, it doesn't... that the subject of axiom of choice has something to do with the subject of free will (to be a necessarily true statement)?

I cannot parse that statement.

You don't, however, need anything more than a yes/no answer to answer any question that can be formulated mathematically. You are using a machine that demonstrates this principle quite adequately I feel.

You may want to join the 'Proof of Logic' thread if that doesn't make you happy. (You do realise logic is synthetic right? For someone fond of collecting fallacies you sure don't seem to understand the underpinnings of them). Otherwise we'll need to agree on some axioms to discuss this because otherwise the label "free will" is impotent and as meaningless as "fsdsp-ialsdj" as a descriptor for human behaviour.

 

[Belz...]

If there is no free will then we only appear to make decisions, the actual determination being made by variables or systems involved.

That's what I said, but what does it matter ? You still make decisions, and since you're not omniscient, you don't know the outcome before it happens, so from your point of view, it doesn't matter whether or not you do have free will.

 

[Belz...]

I think that needs more explanation. In explaining what I mean by free will I have defined "will" and said what I think it is free from.

Now you say that it cannot be "will". Why not? Can an action never be the result of a conscious intention?

You say it cannot be "free". Do you mean that a conscious intention cannot be free from anything? That it is restrained, controlled and burdened by everything?

I'm saying that whatever you do is the result of the factors involved. Since all of that stems from the motion of particles, it's deterministic. Deterministic means no "free will" in the classic sense of the word. And if you add random quantum stuff, it still isn't "free will", because there's still no ghostly spirit making the decisions despite all those factors.

Redefining "free will" to mean something else is just trying to salvage a useless term.

 

[Belz...]

I fail to see why. Either randomness does not allow for free will, or you fix the outcomes of all random variables in both cases. If you think those random variables give rise to free will, you have to show how randomness can possibly be described as "will", let alone "free". If you do not think randomness affects "free will", then why worry about it at all? Simply fix the random variables for the sake of argument, so we can figure out what the "free will" mechanism is.

[...] If free will exists, it must manifest itself by breaking deterministic cause/effect. The only way to test this is by making the same choice a second time with exactly the same deterministic variables, including random elements.

Yeah, that's pretty much exactly what I think about the subject.

But in this context, random means indeterminate, or at the very least undetermined.

Then it's not random, per se.

 

[The Man]

No. You fail to understand the point here. The general class contains the basic behaviour under which all specific instances must adhere. The general class itself doesn't really have a behaviour of note.

So you are saying that when the basic behavior of the general class does not fit the specific instance, then it is the specific instance that “must adhere” and be modified.

I'm afraid this issue cuts to the basic heart of mathematical expression. We're already more general than considering any specific phenomena.

Yes, that the specific instance requires a change in the mathematical expression of the principles involved, including the general class, and we may find a better understanding of the basic behavior.

 

[cyborg]

So you are saying that when the basic behavior of the general class does not fit the specific instance, then it is the specific instance that “must adhere” and be modified.

No. You do not understand this. It is best to drop it.

Yes, that the specific instance requires a change in the mathematical expression of the principles involved, including the general class, and we may find a better understanding of the basic behavior.

No. It doesn't. This is the point. You don't need to make the basics more complex - they are expressive enough already.

 

[Jekyll]

Of course that's what my definition is. By my definition, free will cannot be deterministic in nature. Everything material is deterministic in nature (except random blah blah). Therefore, free will has to be immaterial, and thus be whatever is left over when all other variables are fixed.

Well yes, the way it is used free will has to be something outside of cause and effect, but it also implies a sense of purpose and judgement which is not present in random actions. So free will is not just what is non-deterministic, it must be neither deterministic nor random, and you need to find a meaningful way to distinguish between random actions and those originating from free will.

How can particle decay possible allow free will?

I don't think it does.

ETA: Would you be ok with this definition: Free will is an immaterial force which allows one to act outside of determinism.

No, I don't think it captures that free will needs to be non random.

Honestly, I think the idea of free will is incoherent and I'm probably not going to be satisfied with any answer.

 

[Jekyll]

Then it's not random, per se.

I misspoke,talking about future events, something being random implies it is undetermined, it's not equivalent to it.

 

[The Man]

That's what I said, but what does it matter ? You still make decisions, and since you're not omniscient, you don't know the outcome before it happens, so from your point of view, it doesn't matter whether or not you do have free will.

Personally I could not give a flying handshake one way or the other. As long as I can decide what I eat for lunch today, you can call that process what you want or explain it anyway you can.

I do however like to discuss, even irrelevant, things. I may learn something new and I do enjoy a good debate.

With that last point in mind, please, don’t ask me why I continue to post on this thread.

 

[President Bush]

Is it possible to demonstrate a proof requiring the axiom of choice to produce a simple answer of either yes, it does or no, it doesn't... that the subject of axiom of choice has something to do with the subject of free will (to be a necessarily true statement)?

I cannot parse that statement.

Too bad

You don't, however, need anything more than a yes/no answer to answer any question that can be formulated mathematically. You are using a machine that demonstrates this principle quite adequately I feel.

Thank you for your use of the relative qualifier "I feel". That the mind is a machine is a point at issue in this thread.

You may want to join the 'Proof of Logic' thread if that doesn't make you happy. (You do realise logic is synthetic right? For someone fond of collecting fallacies you sure don't seem to understand the underpinnings of them).

You seem confused now. Have I said you committed any formal logical fallacies? No.

You might be referring to verbal and material fallacies on your part which I have pointed out. For example, the fallacy of mediocrity which is a fallacy of composition.

Or the question-begging analogy which is a material fallacy.

Otherwise we'll need to agree on some axioms to discuss this because otherwise the label "free will" is impotent and as meaningless as "fsdsp-ialsdj" as a descriptor for human behaviour.

Does the axiom of choice produce anything which can be said to represent or give an account of in words human behavior?

A proof requiring the axiom of choice is always nonconstructive: even if the proof produces an object then it is impossible to say exactly what that object is. Consequently, while the axiom of choice asserts that there is a well-ordering of the real numbers, it does not give us an example of one. Yet the reason why we chose above to well-order the real numbers was so that for each set in X we could explicitly choose an element of that set. If we cannot write down the well-ordering we are using, then our choice is not very explicit. This is one of the reasons why some mathematicians dislike the axiom of choice. For example, constructivists posit that all existence proofs should be totally explicit; it should be possible to construct anything that exists. They reject the axiom of choice because it asserts the existence of an object without telling what it is.

 

[FenrisWolf]

By my definition, free will cannot be deterministic in nature. Everything material is deterministic in nature (except random blah blah). Therefore, free will has to be immaterial, and thus be whatever is left over when all other variables are fixed.

You say "everything material is deterministic in nature", but I don't think you can support that with physical evidence. Can you see any practical difference between these two things?

1) Something you think is deterministic, but can't make real-world predictions about with very much accuracy

2) Something that isn't deterministic

If you can't predict something with much accuracy, you can't prove it's deterministic, right? Take the weather, for example. It's just air molecules moving around, it's completely material. Yet you can't predict the weather with very much accuracy at all. So how are you going to prove the weather is deterministic?

If you say, "To an observer with perfect information, the weather is deterministic" I'd say, sure. But there's no such observer. So what's the significance of that statement? What use is it?

I guess my problem is, I think that there is some cheating inherent in the term "deterministic." The assumption that "if only I had more information, I could prove this system is completely predictable" is cheating, when you can't even come up with a theoretical way to have that information.

 

[Diagoras]

But with compatibilist free will a choice is made by processes in my brain which are at least sometimes accessible to and possibly sometimes controlled by my consciousness.

Those decisions and thoughts are not controlled by your consciousness. They are part of it. And your consciousness is controlled by the laws of physics and chemistry. Ultimately all your decisions can be traced back along the causal chains to the Big Bang; if it were not for quantum randomness, it would be in principle possible to predict your entire life given perfect knowledge of the conditions of the Big Bang. Since that randomness can't really give you free will to make choices of your own, I don't see how you can claim to have free will. If the causes of your decisions are out of your "control", then so too are the effects of those causes, the decisions themselves.

Not to mean you don't make decisions. You do of course, but the same way that a computer does. Those decisions are based on memories, experiences, brain chemistry, emotional states, etc. that are out of your control, just like the programming of a computer and the input it receives are out of the computer's control. The computer still makes decisions, but its decisions are (ignoring quantum randomness again) completely mechanical and predictable since they follow the laws of physics and chemistry.

 

[The Man]

No. You do not understand this. It is best to drop it.

Best for whom?

The inability to make a clear and consistent point is evidence of a lack of understanding, on the part of the presenter, of either the subject, the audience or both.

No. It doesn't. This is the point. You don't need to make the basics more complex - they are expressive enough already.

Not in the least, the basis of gravity, Newtonian gravity was replaced by the more complex general relativity which may soon be replaced by some more complex expression of basic gravity, or are you just confusing basic with less precise.

 

[The Man]

For those who reject the concept of free will, in any form, the mechanism of human choice comes down to either a deterministic model or a random model. However there is a third option I do not believe is being considered, the combination of both deterministic and random systems. I would conjecture that such a model might conform to a natural distribution curve. At one end few choices would tend to result from the deterministic system. At the other end a similar number of choices would tend to result from the random system. In between the majority of choices would result from an equal probability of either the deterministic or random system. To the random side of the center line the random system would have an increasing level of probability over the deterministic system. Likewise to the deterministic side of the centerline the deterministic system would have an increasing level of probability over the random system. Other factors may shift or distort the normal distribution curve. It seems the more we consider a certain choice the more deterministic that choice might become. Likewise snap or quick decisions might be dominated by the random system. This would not be a time dependent however, because we can consider a choice for quite some time only to finally go with our initial or gut reaction.


So what could we call this combined model of human choice? I mean other then “CRAP” which it most likely is.

“The combined model”
“The randomly deterministic model”
“The deterministically Random model”

Wait I’ve got an idea, there is a phrase that has been getting less use these days. Why don’t we just call it “Free Will”?

 

[cyborg]

Not in the least, the basis of gravity, Newtonian gravity was replaced by the more complex general relativity which may soon be replaced by some more complex expression of basic gravity, or are you just confusing basic with less precise.

You're talking past me. This is NOT an issue of formulating a particular explanation for a phenomena. This is about HOW you can actually formulate an explanation full stop.

 

[cyborg]

Thank you for your use of the relative qualifier "I feel". That the mind is a machine is a point at issue in this thread.

Well, do you disagree with your computer's ability to express basically unfettered styles of data based on nothing more than a simple bifurcation?

You seem confused now. Have I said you committed any formal logical fallacies? No.

Then the point of your exercise it what?

You might be referring to verbal and material fallacies on your part which I have pointed out. For example, the fallacy of mediocrity which is a fallacy of composition.

Yeah. I get it.

You're wrong though - you're trying to apply the fallacy at a level where it does not belong.

Or the question-begging analogy which is a material fallacy.

Yeah. I get.

You're wrong though - you're trying to apply the fallacy at a level where it does not belong.

Does the axiom of choice produce anything which can be said to represent or give an account of in words human behavior?

All axioms are axioms of choice. Either you and I are going to agree on a logical system with some axioms that allow us to discuss "choice" or we do not.

You seem to be choosing the later and begging the question of the validity of logic itself without even realising it.

Logic is incomplete: I don't need you to tell me that. Now either you put up or shut up or at least understand the fallacy you're engaging in.

 

[cyborg]

Why don’t we just call it “Free Will”?

You already have and seem quite attached to those 8 letters.

 

[President Bush]

Thank you for your use of the relative qualifier "I feel". That the mind is a machine is a point at issue in this thread.

Well, do you disagree with your computer's ability to express basically unfettered styles of data based on nothing more than a simple bifurcation?

Disagree with something's ability to do something? That would seem odd to me.

Thouh I don't believe my computer has what is defined as mind.

You might be referring to verbal and material fallacies on your part which I have pointed out. For example, the fallacy of mediocrity which is a fallacy of composition.

Or the question-begging analogy which is a material fallacy.

You're wrong though - you're trying to apply the fallacy at a level where it does not belong.

No, obviously, you are wrong.

Really, joking aside, if you want me to understand a distinction you are attempting to make here I think you'll need to be more specific.

Otherwise we'll need to agree on some axioms to discuss this because otherwise the label "free will" is impotent and as meaningless as "fsdsp-ialsdj" as a descriptor for human behaviour.

Does the axiom of choice produce anything which can be said to represent or give an account of in words human behavior?

All axioms are axioms of choice. Either you and I are going to agree on a logical system with some axioms that allow us to discuss "choice" or we do not.

In reading the link to axiom of choice (from above) I get the impression that the "axiom of choice" is but one axiom among many.

I regret to say my math background is quite limited. I'm not sure if my being unable to understand what you mean by "all axioms are axioms of choice" is due to that or not.

You seem to be choosing the later and begging the question of the validity of logic itself without even realising it.

I am trying to understand (what I believe is) your point concerning human behavior being reducible to an axiomatized system of knowledge. Is that an accurate way to state it?

If so... what's the purpose? Nothing here seems to act as a device for calculating behavior. We can't even have the fun as in quantum mechanics where it can be argued whether the wave function describes what's being measured or represents the observer's measurements only.

Logic is incomplete: I don't need you to tell me that. Now either you put up or shut up or at least understand the fallacy you're engaging in.

The Axiom of Choice is necessary to select a set from an infinite number of socks, but not an infinite number of shoes.
— Bertrand Russell

... because there are left and right shoes.


Practically speaking doesn't choosing, generally, involve situations with explicit choices such as: "shall I put my coat on the hanger or throw it on the chair? Then again, perhaps I'll just throw it on the floor."

In situations involving such explicit choices, isn't the axiom of choice unnecessary?