Red Herrings on Parade
Before I summarize the strong atheist argument, it will be helpful to examine some of the more common false arguments used against it.
These are not your textbook fallacies. I suspect this is so because most of them are so transparent that no one dares trot them out except when atheism rears its ugly head, and even rational people are inclined to lose theirs.
1.
The demand for logical impossibility:
This has been discussed above, so it doesn't need restating. Essentially, it is an attempt to avoid the question of whether a thing actually exists, by replacing it with the abstract question of whether its existence is impossible even under hypothetical circumstances rather than in the only circumstances we actually know.
2.
The vanishing field trick:
This strategy involves positing a God which exists "subtly" or "on a transcendent level" or in other forms of no-place and no-time. It defines existence in a way that cannot be distinguished from non-existence, and reality in a way that is not discernable from non-reality.
3.
The appeal to biological doubt:
Haven't seen this one so far on this thread, or the parent thread, but it's not uncommon when things get desperate for the last-gaspers. This is a variety of know-nothing argument which states that, because we don't have "direct access" to reality, but only to our mental schema, then we could be wrong about anything, and so can make no positive statements about what's not real. The refutation of this argument is a bit complex, so I'll
link to it.
4.
The demand for scientific disproof:
Perhaps the most prevalent of the fallacies regarding strong atheism, this argument contends that God must be accepted as potentially real because science cannot falsify claims about God's existence -- and this, because God is by nature undisprovable, or not subject to scientific scrutiny; or, alternately, because science inherently cannot achieve a margin of 100% certainty. And yet, there is no justification for limiting our methods of inquiry to those which are narrowly scientific. Although some definitions of God can be dismissed on the basis that they contradict verified observations, others reuqire no such measures because they can be dismissed solely on the basis of their internal contradictions or incoherence, or because their descriptions are mere gibberish, or for other reasons which do not involve science.
5.
The "pick any card" ploy:
While admitting that the concept of God in its broadest sense allows multiple and often mutually exclusive definitions, it is commonly claimed by last-gaspers that we are obliged to concede the possible reality of God because one of these definitions might describe an entity which could fit the bill of a thing that we would be obliged to concede is potentially real. Yet this claim solves nothing, is utterly unsupported, and retains the fatal plasticity of the original incoherent concept. For the claim to have merit, at least one definition must be selected and proposed for consideration.
6.
The bottomless pit adventure:
A souped-up variation of the "pick any card" ploy, this strategy seeks to remove the burden from the claimant, and insist that every theory in the candy-dish must be examined exhaustively before the concept can be positively rejected. Another version demands that everything must be known about the universe (and sometimes beyond!) before the God theory can be rejected. Yet this is unreasonable on its face, and not only because it amounts to a non-claim. In the first case, it requires a literally infinite search (there is no end to the number of candies which can be conjured up to add to the dish), which is unreasonable in light of the fact that one successful example brought by the claimant is sufficient to anchor his claim. In the second case, it makes the unjustified -- indeed nonsensical -- assumption that omnisicent knowledge is required to answer the question at hand, when in fact, all we need to know is what this entity is defined to be, and all we then need to determine is whether or not our knowledge of the universe prevents or allows the potential reality of such an entity.
6.
The next best theory defense:
This no-nothing ruse insists that all knowledge is provisional, and that everything we know may eventually be replaced by a different view of reality. However, this is patently untrue, especially when it comes to rejecting theories about the world rather than asserting them. There are many hypotheses which are dead beyond any recall -- geocentrism, spontaneous generation of multi-celled organisms from dead organic matter, the flat earth, phlogiston, controlled demolition of the World Trade Center towers, and oceans of water lying just above our atmosphere, for example. A generic appeal to a hypothetical next-best-theory which is imagined to replace our current understanding of the world is simply insufficient to derail the process that must be accomplished in order to defend the last-gasp position -- that is, some viable definition of this God thing must be brought out and shown to be potentially real.
7.
The "some day my prince will come" argument:
My personal favorite, because it is the most bizarre, this defense argues that even if there are no viable definitions of God right now, it's possible that someone may one day invent one. This is like arguing that we are obligated to believe that a thrak may possibly exist, despite the fact that there is no evidence of thraks, despite the fact that thrak-theorists can't even agree on any qualities of thraks, because who knows, one day someone might get it right.
Well, I'm afraid it's been a long week and I've worn myself out, and it's late in my neck of the woods, and there are tasks demanding my attention before I turn in, so I don't have time to type up the synopsis. Look for it tomorrow. Thanks for your patience.
