Proof of Strong Atheism

[Dark Jaguar]

I'm not holding out hope at all. Don't believe it'll happen, don't believe the evidence will appear. No reason to. I'm just saying if the evidence did show up, I'd believe it, and yes that does apply to your example.

I'm saying that blindly stating there are no gods for the wrong reasons and stating that as a matter of faith, not fact, and that even if almighty Odin himself showed up and ran over you with eight legged Sleipnir the horse, you'd still not believe in the existance of gods. Again though, I doubt many atheists have this sort of view, excepting those who came to have some other spirituality and don't believe in gods for the wrong reasons. You know, like believing the earth orbits the sun not due to the evidence but because it says so in some mystical tome, the Pamphlet of Ages.

So basically it's the difference between freely stating "there are no gods" (which I do) and stating "I will never accept the existance of any gods" (which I don't). The difference between saying "there is no Santa" and saying "I will never accept the existance of Santa". And to go further to more positive evidence roles, the difference between saying "the earth is round" and "I will never accept a flat earth". If I said the latter, I'd never be able to accept even the in between reality, which is that the earth is slightly distorted by it's own spinning having been presented with that evidence.

 

[Zombified]

Piggy, would you care to address the following strawman version of God?

God percieves the complete state of the universe and chooses some or all outcomes that are to humans entirely random.

This version of God doesn't have a place or time; by definition it can see or influence anything, but it cannot be treated by any known physical law at all. It can interact with the universe without violating any physical laws. It could in principle make its presence known by violating a statistical expectation, but it has enough information to choose not to if it was so motivated. It is capable of many of the things Gods are usually accused of, except that it cannot violate logical consistency (a very strong restriction, actually). It cannot necessarily be accused of kicking off the universe - it depends on it - but it could certainly influence a great deal ever since. I would certainly grant that it has many of the non-space, non-time qualities you're complaining about (in fact, they are necessary features of this description), but it's not undefinable, either. (And without going into fiddly details, I've defined a version of God that's completely compatible with quantum theory.)

To be clear, I don't believe a word of it, and its certainly an unfalsifiable notion and an entirely unparsimonious interpretation of QM. It's not clear you can rule it out other than by the fact that it hasn't made its presence felt to us, however.

(I don't think I should call this playing the Devil's Advocate, exactly, but...)

 

[Piggy]

I'm not holding out hope at all. Don't believe it'll happen, don't believe the evidence will appear. No reason to. I'm just saying if the evidence did show up, I'd believe it

This is nonsense: It'll never happen, but if it did happen, it would have happened.

Again, I have no hope that Santa Claus will take me on a ride in his flying sleigh, I don't believe it'll happen, don't believe he'll show up, no reason to, I'm just saying if he did show up, I'd believe it.

So what?

 

[Piggy]

I'm saying that blindly stating there are no gods for the wrong reasons and stating that as a matter of faith, not fact, and that even if almighty Odin himself showed up and ran over you with eight legged Sleipnir the horse, you'd still not believe in the existance of gods.

I have not said that. It is not part of my argument. Please read the argument and address that. If you want to create some other argument and criticize it, please start another thread.

 

[Piggy]

So basically it's the difference between freely stating "there are no gods" (which I do) and stating "I will never accept the existance of any gods" (which I don't).

Neither do I. So why do you bring this up?

 

[Piggy]

And to go further to more positive evidence roles, the difference between saying "the earth is round" and "I will never accept a flat earth". If I said the latter, I'd never be able to accept even the in between reality, which is that the earth is slightly distorted by it's own spinning having been presented with that evidence.

That's absurd. Flat earth != not perfectly spherical earth. You're talking nonsense here.

If you say "I will never accept a flat earth", you're only being rational.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

This is nonsense: It'll never happen, but if it did happen, it would have happened.

Again, I have no hope that Santa Claus will take me on a ride in his flying sleigh, I don't believe it'll happen, don't believe he'll show up, no reason to, I'm just saying if he did show up, I'd believe it.

So what?

So that's the core of using evidence as the measure of what you decide to believe in. That's pretty much the entire point of this whole skepticism and rationality thing right? The idea is to point out that we follow the evidence and not dogma. The evidence clearly indicates there's no Santa or Zeus. The point is that if further evidence was ever presented, we are actually in a mental state to accept that evidence for what it is. That's "so what". If some psychic actually did show that he can do what he claims in a well conducted test and later confirming tests, then Randi would cough up the million rather than sit and say "no, that didn't actually happen". On the OTHER hand, not basing your ideals in evidence means that in spite of all the evidence showing that one can't dowse, a dowser will still be utterly convinced he can.

So yes, the distinction seems pretty important to me.

 

[Piggy]

Piggy, would you care to address the following strawman version of God?

Only if you sincerely propose this as a definition of God which may possibly exist.

Keep in mind that this thread is a continuation of an existing debate.

The purpose of offering a definition in this context is to honestly support the contention that we cannot close the book on God-theory because one of the sub-theories may be said to potentially exist.

Discussing other sub-theories, such as Hephaestus, is a waste of time.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

That's absurd. Flat earth != not perfectly spherical earth. You're talking nonsense here.

If you say "I will never accept a flat earth", you're only being rational.

So you are saying if the evidence did show up, hypothetically, you'd just ignore it?

I'm actually speaking from a psychology standpoint. Anyone so stuck in their own dogma that they are convinced the earth was created in 6 days will never accept any evidence of even slight deviation from it. If they refuse to acknowledge a massive deviation due to their dogma, they are very likely to never accept even a minor deviation, like a second or two.

At the same time, if evidence emerged that, for example, the big bang never took place, I'd gladly accept it. As it stands I can freely state "the big bang happened and it is silly to think otherwise". If it was shown otherwise, then I would stop thinking that.

I don't find that such a ridiculous thing. New evidence overturns certain things sometimes. One can doubt it'd ever happen, and be perfectly rational for doing so, but one must at least be willing to accept evidence to the contrary should it arise.

 

[Piggy]

So that's the core of using evidence as the measure of what you decide to believe in. That's pretty much the entire point of this whole skepticism and rationality thing right? The idea is to point out that we follow the evidence and not dogma.

Why do you label my arguments "dogma"? A lot of careful consideration has gone into this, which you fail to reference.

It's easy to throw out the decoy of "we should always be open to new evidence". But that's simply not true.

We do learn things. We do know things.

Repost from parent thread:

I'm not trying to say throw all science to the wind, just that we have made lots of discoveries that have proved past theories wrong.

In case you haven't seen this, you are in for a treat.

The Relativity of Wrong.


Another Repost from parent thread:

That Infernal Ratchet

Asimov, in Yahzi's link, said it much better than I could.

And yet we continually run across this argument, from educated and sensible people, that because humankind has a history of being wrong about a great many things, we must therefore conclude that we might be wrong about everything. Popular misunderstandings of Kuhn have not helped the situation.

The problem with this notion is that, as Asimov points out, the very fact that we know we have been wrong is in itself proof that we can get it right. For some notions, there is a level of proof which serves as a ratchet, preventing us from ever returning to the old notions, unless of course we destroy our civilizations to such an extent that our accepted body of knowledge is wiped out.

There is no going back to the flat earth, the geocentric universe, bodily humors, phrenology, or spontaneous generation. We really do know better now.

I would add sympathetic magic to the list as well.

The question before us here is whether to add God to the list. But there is no reason to believe that we are prohibited from reaching a definite conclusion.

 

[Zombified]

Only if you sincerely propose this as a definition of God which may possibly exist....

The purpose of offering a definition in this context is to honestly support the contention that we cannot close the book on God-theory because one of the sub-theories may be said to potentially exist.

I don't believe this God exists and I would happy if you could close the book. Nor do I have any idea if a theist would be happy with this definition. I'm proposing as a test of your argument because its not clear to me how you've ruled it out, however. I'm not sure how far I can defend it, because it's sort of off-the-cuff.

I haven't followed your previous debate; that's the risk inherent in starting a new thread. If this idea is out of scope for the discussion you want to have, though, that's fine, I'm easy.

 

[Piggy]

So you are saying if the evidence did show up, hypothetically, you'd just ignore it?

I'm saying that some hypotheticals are worth considering. Others are not.

If Santa Claus gave you a ride on his sleigh, would you just ignore that?

 

[Piggy]

I don't believe this God exists and I would happy if you could close the book. Nor do I have any idea if a theist would be happy with this definition. I'm proposing as a test of your argument because its not clear to me how you've ruled it out.

This version of God doesn't have a place or time

In that case, this God exists in no-place at no-time. Things which exist never and nowhere, don't exist.

 

[Piggy]

Some more reposts to respond to Zombified's point

From the parent thread:

There is also a second fatal problem arising from multiplicity, which is the existence of a virtually infinite variety of often mutually exclusive definitions, all of which are allowed by God-theory.

This makes the concept in fact a non-concept. If there are no universally accepted core qualities, and if novel conceptions can be chucked in at will, then it becomes impossible to make statements regarding existence or non-existence.

Instead, what one would have to do is redefine God in such a way as to exclude all but one definition, and to propose that this is God.

When this is done, in order to avoid self-contradiction, contradiction of known fact, or replication of the original incoherence arising from multiplicity, God necessarily has to be relegated to no-place and no-time, or robbed of any definite qualities (e.g., the "it's a metaphor" argument), or described in terms so soft as to be mere word salad.

We've seen the response here to the simple question of location. All these techniques are used, and they either nullify any meaningful definition of "real" or "exist", or they're non-starters (metaphor, gibberish), or they replicate the original fatal plasticity.

 

[Zombified]

In that case, this God exists in no-place at no-time. Things which exist never and nowhere, don't exist.

It can see the state at any event. It can influence a measurement at any event. It is therefore arguably everywhere, and no less at a given event than a physical particle would be.

 

[Piggy]

A very long repost

An extensive repost, but perhaps the most detailed argument responding to abstract propositions and the principle of meaningfulness:

OK, now to respond to Bri's posts.

Some of my responses may seem like quibbles at first glance, but they are not. They are carefully considered. And in light of the problems inherent in considering the topic, given the caveats listed in the earlier post, careful consideration is demanded.

So to rephrase, an extra-universal entity can be meaningfully said to interact with our universe, yet it still remains extra-universal. So an extra-natural entity could interact with nature and remain extra-natural.

But you notice that the God-theorists play a little shell game here. They consider the question in the abstract, and yet when it comes down to explaining how this principle then may be said to actually apply to a particular conception of God, they can't do it. So they retreat back to the abstract question.

Looked at another way, the definition is really just a list of properties (supernatural, sole, creator of the universe, ruler of the universe) all of which must apply to an entity that can possibly exist in order to call the entity "God" by this definition. Do you agree?

Yes and no, respectively.

Yes, "the definition is really just a list of properties".

But no, it is not true that "all of [them] must apply to an entity that can possibly exist in order to call the entity 'God' by this definition". They can equally all apply to an entity which does not exist, and this entity would still be called "God" under this definition. It would simply be a God which did not actually exist.

For example, we can develop a definition of Santa Claus -- an immortal man who lives at the North Pole and delivers presents to children from a flying sleigh every Christmas -- and all these properties can apply to an entity which does not exist and we will nevertheless call it Santa Claus.

I hope the importance of understanding why we need to clarify this point will become apparent as we continue.

Perhaps you intended something other than what you wrote, but I cannot assume that.

If so, it sounds as though you are admitting that a supernatural entity (disregarding the other properties listed for a moment) can possibly exist and can even possibly interact with the natural world. So such an entity can possibly exist and if it exists it can possibly be said to meaningfully exist (i.e. it is distinguishable from the non-existent because it can have the ability to interact with the natural world). Is this correct?

No, this is not correct.

It is not correct because the issue of meaningfulness does not yet apply.

Before I explain, let me say that I think you may be placing too much emphasis -- or a slightly misplaced emphasis -- on the issue of meaningfulness.

One problem that recurs in discussions about God is a tendency of God-theorists to define existence in terms which are indistinguishable from non-existence. For example, claims that God could "exist on a subtle level" or "on a transcendental level" with no coherent explanation of what that would mean. It's like saying that a rock could be a tree on some "level" at which trees no longer have the properties of trees. The condition of meaningfulness is proposed in order to prevent this type of verbal/conceptual legerdemain.

If the proposed existence of a thing is indistinguishable from its nonexistence, then the proposal of existence is meaningless, because if such a standard is allowed, then there is nothing one can imagine which could not be claimed to exist. That's all.

Now, back to the question: If supernatural entities can possibly exist and interact with the natural world, a supernatural entity can possibly be said to meaningfully exist.

At this stage, it is too early to consider the issue of meaningfulness for any one supernatural entity (remember the caveat of specificity) because the conditions are broad enough to include both potential and impossible beings. All we can say is that the quality "supernatural" is not a disqualifier in and of itself.

The notion of the meaningfulness of the claim to existence is not relevant, or even comprehensible, until we have actually made the claim for a particular being.

An example: Suppose we are considering the issue of whether fell beasts (the pterodactyl-like creatures ridden by the Nazgul in Tolkien's "Lord of the Rings" saga) might possibly exist on earth. And suppose that we defined the unanchored concept of "fell beast" as an enormous winged living creature which resembles a flying dinosaur.

We could then parse out the properties in this definition, and consider them one by one, starting with the concept of being a "winged creature". We could ask whether it is possible that winged creatures exist on earth, and we would conclude that this is indeed possible.

Now, what does this tell us about whether our particular winged creature can be meaningfully said to exist on earth? Nothing. All it tells us is that the property of "winged creature" doesn't by itself knock the fell beast out of contention.

If so, it sounds as though you are taking exception with such a supernatural entity also having all of the other properties (sole, creator of the universe, ruler of the universe), i.e. being the "sole creator and ruler of the universe" Is this correct?

No. This is not the issue. There is no barrier that I can see to an imagined (unanchored) supernatural entity having these other properties. In other words, the already accepted property of "supernatural" does not in any way prohibit the other properties.

This is a crucial point, and it is vital to understand it.

Remember, at this point, we have only confirmed that some supernatural entities may possibly exist -- not that all supernatural beings may possibly exist. So the quality of potential reality does not adhere to any-and-all proposed supernatural beings. Therefore, if we affirm that "supernaturalness" is not inherently incompatible with the other properties, this affirmation has nothing at all to say about whether the entity thus described may possibly exist -- because we cannot say at this point whether such a being falls into the category of supernatural beings which may possibly exist, or of supernatural beings which cannot potentially exist.

Let's revisit our fell beasts. We have concluded that "winged creatures" may exist on earth. (But this does not mean that any and all unanchored concepts which are winged creatures may potentially exist on earth.) We then ask if a winged creature may also possibly be enormous and look like a flying dinosaur. We see no reason to believe that it is impossible for a winged creature to be enormous and look like a flying dinosaur.

Yet this says nothing about whether enormous winged creatures that look like flying dinosaurs might possibly exist on earth, because we cannot say -- at this stage -- whether such a creature would fall into the category of winged creatures that could be existing on earth, or into the category of winged creatures which could not be existing on earth.

If so, let's examine the property "sole" (which seems to be the least controversial). The inclusion of the property "sole" (as with all of the other properties in the list) indicates that IF a hypothetical entity isn't the only entity that has all of the other properties in the list, it cannot be considered God. We might even infer by the inclusion of the word "sole" that if there happens to be more than one entity that had all of the other properties, God doesn't exist by this definition (because there could be no "sole" entity with all of the other properties). But as long as it is possible that there is only one, an entity that meets the other criteria might also exist. Do you agree?

Essentially yes. That is, imagining other hypothetical supernatural creators and rulers of the universe is not a disqualifier. We would have to point to a confirmed, actual other creator and/or ruler of the universe in order to show that this entity could not be the only one. Either that, or show that other elements of the definition necessarily implied multiple creators/rulers. (That said, we are still bound by the caveat of narrowness.)

If so, do you think that a sole supernatural entity can possibly exist (ignoring the other properties)?

It may be possible to imagine some that can, and it is certainly possible to imagine some that can't. But as before, until we aggregate all the properties of our proposed God, we cannot know into which category it will fall.

Do you think that a sole supernatural entity can be said to meaningfully exist (i.e. can be distinguishable from a non-existent entity)?

No. Such a definition suffers from the same fatal plasticity as the uber-concept of God. "Sole supernatural entity" is so vague as to allow a practically infinite variety of proposed beings, which may be mutually exclusive. We cannot tackle the issue of potential existence in any meaningful way until we have clearly defined the entity under consideration.

I can certainly dream up "sole supernatural entities" which could not possibly exist. And it is pointless to demonstrate whether any "sole supernatural entities" other than the one we're considering could possibly exist.

And from what we've seen here, the definitions provided only allow God to be "real" or to "exist" in a way which is not distinguishable from being unreal or from not existing.

That being the case, there is no merit to the claim that anyone is obliged to concede that God can be meaningfully said to possibly exist.

You seem to be moving the target slightly here (which is OK, but I want to make sure we are on the same page). At least some strong atheist claim that "no gods exist" as opposed to "no gods meaningfully exist" as you've defined it. So, you seem to have conceded that the atheist claim "no gods exist" cannot be substantiated and that one must admit that it is possible that gods do exist (at least the one described by the definitions provided).

Here, I refer you to the statements I made above regarding meaningfulness. There can be no discernable difference between the statements "no gods can be said to exist" and "no gods can meaningfully be said to exist", because what is left over from the process of subtracting "gods meaningfully said to exist" from "gods said to exist" are merely those gods which are said to "exist" in such a way that the term "existence" has no discernable meaning (in other words, gods which exist in ways indistinguishable from not existing).

I agree that we can "talk about" something that is logically self-contradictory like a square circle although clearly such an entity cannot exist and we can't really conceive of its existence. I'm not certain that Piggy was making the argument that the definition he posed is logically self-contradictory (in fact, I believe that he previously made the opposite claim, but I'll let him answer that question). Instead, he seemed to be arguing against God's "meaningful existence" -- that if such an entity exists, it would be impossible to ever distinguish it from the nonexistent.

Yes, that's essentially right. In order to claim "existence" for Gods which do not contradict known fact, the terms "exist", "existence", and "real" have to be attenuated to such an extent that they are indistinguishable from their opposites.

 

[Piggy]

It can see the state at any event. It can influence a measurement at any event. It is therefore arguably everywhere, and no less at a given event than a physical particle would be.

Ok, everywhere is different from nowhere. So you're saying it's like gravity, pervasive? You're also saying it sees things?

 

[Zombified]

Ok, everywhere is different from nowhere. So you're saying it's like gravity, pervasive? You're also saying it sees things?

Well, remember I'm a physics nerd.

It knows the wave function. It can collapse the wave function to some component that it chooses.

That makes it necessarily pervasive and in fact nonlocal. Defining that way makes it nonphysical in the sense that its entirely outside predictability by QM, because its about the collapse (there's no theory for which component gets collapsed to) and not the evolution of the wave function. But defined that way, it is both influenced by and influences any given event you choose, and that's as good a definition of "at that event" as you can get.

The more I think about it, the less happy I am with the idea, actually. It doesn't add much insight, it's merely pointing at the last gap.

 

[Meadmaker]

I have a proposed subtheory that I would like you to analyze with your arguments. Some of you might recognize this proposed subtheory, from St. Anselm.

God is an entity, greater than which nothing can be conceived.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

I'm saying that some hypotheticals are worth considering. Others are not.

If Santa Claus gave you a ride on his sleigh, would you just ignore that?

No I wouldn't. That's all I'm saying. Now hold on a minute because there seems to be a lot of the previous thread you guys were chatting in here. All I'm saying is that with sufficient evidence I'd accept pretty much anything to be true. Nothing more. If this is completely off topic then sorry, I thought it was... I didn't mean to offend, or be insulted... Thought we were having a friendly conversation here.