Proof of Immortality, VI

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Jabba said:
- My claim is that your brain and your self are not equally "trackable." My claim is that, theoretically, we can reproduce your brain; but that, we can't, even theoretically, reproduce your self.
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Can you support that claim? Bwahahahaha!
 
Jabba said:
- My claim is that your brain and your self are not equally "trackable." My claim is that, theoretically, we can reproduce your brain; but that, we can't, even theoretically, reproduce your self.
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But under H, the self is a process of your functioning brain. Your self cannot be any other self than yours, and it only exists while your brain is functioning. It is not a separate entity. As has been extensively discussed with you, reproducing the brain results in an identical self, just as reproducing Mt Rainier results in an identical Mt Rainier.

The problem is that you keep considering the self to be a separate entity, despite the fact that this would make the self far less likely than the materialistic model which is what H is supposed to be.
 
jond said:
The problem is that you keep considering the self to be a separate entity...
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Which he is quite entitled to do when he is talking about P(E|~H). When reckoning that, he can assume souls exist. He can assume there are an infinite number of them waiting in heaven to come down and inhabit the little baby bodies that righteous mommies and daddies make for them, and that when the body dies the soul goes back up to heaven. He can assume whatever mystical or religious claptrap he pleases.

But when reckoning P(E|H), he can't assume anything H doesn't give him. It doesn't matter whether he strongly disbelieves H. It doesn't matter whether he can cajole his critics into "agreeing" that H may not be true. It doesn't matter even whether H is true. When reckoning the conditional probabilities that forum the likelihood ratio that -- in a statistical inference -- takes you from the priors to the posteriors, he must reckon each element of the ratio as if its corresponding hypothesis were true.

Not only does H not supply any sort of ineffable "self," it explicitly precludes it. P(E|H) cannot be properly evaluated if it has to accept the existence of anything immaterial. A lot of us are trying to point this out, but hitting the outside of the bullseye ring in the clamor to point out that H doesn't include this. The point they're missing, in my opinion, is that Jabba is trying to sneak his notion of a soul into E, not into H.

Via his typical equivocations and handwaving, Jabba remains ambiguous on what E actually is in his formulation. He wants E to be not only the experience of self-awareness, but the notion that it's an entity that has some form of existence separate from the body. He has loaded E with begged elements of his preferred theory in hopes of fooling his critics into accepting it as observed data, not speculated theory, and to force materialism to explain it as data. Materialism does not explain it and cannot, so by loading the E dice as he has, Jabba wants to make H seem so very improbable.

...despite the fact that this would make the self far less likely than the materialistic model which is what H is supposed to be.
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That too. Jabba always evades this discussion. He tells us it's "complicated" or that "there's more to it than that," but we never descend into the alleged complication (after five years we should have) and we never get the explanation of what there allegedly is more of. The fact remains that Jabba's hypothesis, requiring both a suitable body and a lucky spirit, can automatically be no more probable than a hypothesis requiring only a suitable body.
 
Jabba said:
- So anyway, I suspect that the following won't really answer your question -- but ... Mt Rainier doesn't have a who/self.
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Different structures have different properties.

Mt Rainier is a volcano.

A Volkswagen can drive.

A human can perceive a self.

A computer can communicate and compute.

... etc.

What is your argument that the perception of a self is something qualitatively different?

Hans
 
Jabba said:
- My claim is that your brain and your self are not equally "trackable." My claim is that, theoretically, we can reproduce your brain; but that, we can't, even theoretically, reproduce your self.
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Firstly, so what if that's your claim? Anyone can claim anything. You need to start demonstrating your premises, not merely claiming them.

Secondly, you have already admitted that the self is an emergent process of the brain. Therefore, you have implicitly already agreed that reproducing your brain will reproduce your self. How could it be any other way, given that you agree that the self is an emergent property of a brain? :confused:

You appear to have made so many claims and and indulged in so many tangents and minutiae that your just tripping over yourself in the process. You keep saying things that, in the long run, end up being completely against the main gist of your overall argument.
 
JayUtah said:
Which he is quite entitled to do when he is talking about P(E|~H). When reckoning that, he can assume souls exist. He can assume there are an infinite number of them waiting in heaven to come down and inhabit the little baby bodies that righteous mommies and daddies make for them, and that when the body dies the soul goes back up to heaven. He can assume whatever mystical or religious claptrap he pleases.

But when reckoning P(E|H), he can't assume anything H doesn't give him. It doesn't matter whether he strongly disbelieves H. It doesn't matter whether he can cajole his critics into "agreeing" that H may not be true. It doesn't matter even whether H is true. When reckoning the conditional probabilities that forum the likelihood ratio that -- in a statistical inference -- takes you from the priors to the posteriors, he must reckon each element of the ratio as if its corresponding hypothesis were true.

Not only does H not supply any sort of ineffable "self," it explicitly precludes it. P(E|H) cannot be properly evaluated if it has to accept the existence of anything immaterial. A lot of us are trying to point this out, but hitting the outside of the bullseye ring in the clamor to point out that H doesn't include this. The point they're missing, in my opinion, is that Jabba is trying to sneak his notion of a soul into E, not into H.

Via his typical equivocations and handwaving, Jabba remains ambiguous on what E actually is in his formulation. He wants E to be not only the experience of self-awareness, but the notion that it's an entity that has some form of existence separate from the body. He has loaded E with begged elements of his preferred theory in hopes of fooling his critics into accepting it as observed data, not speculated theory, and to force materialism to explain it as data. Materialism does not explain it and cannot, so by loading the E dice as he has, Jabba wants to make H seem so very improbable.
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Yeah, sorry, I thought it was obvious that I was referring to H there.
 
MRC_Hans said:
Different structures have different properties.

Mt Rainier is a volcano.

A Volkswagen can drive.

A human can perceive a self.

A computer can communicate and compute.

... etc.

What is your argument that the perception of a self is something qualitatively different?

Hans
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Humans build computers and Volkswagens, and eventually humans.

This is an observation and not an "argument that the perception of a self is something qualitatively different".
 
Jabba said:
- My claim is that your brain and your self are not equally "trackable." My claim is that, theoretically, we can reproduce your brain; but that, we can't, even theoretically, reproduce your self.
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My claim is that 2 = 1. My claim is that Barack Obama and Donald Trump are the same person. My claim is that aliens reproduce by inhabiting soybean pods, and that eating edamame turns you into a reptilian cyborg.

I will now provide as much evidence for my claims as you have for yours:
 
jond said:
Yeah, sorry, I thought it was obvious that I was referring to H there.
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No apology needed; it was obvious, at least to most other readers. Jabba has yet to signal that he understands how these constraints work and why they are in place the way they are. Hence I take opportunities like the one you presented to remind Jabba he is not correctly formulating a statistical inference.
 
Jabba said:
- My claim is that your brain and your self are not equally "trackable." My claim is that, theoretically, we can reproduce your brain; but that, we can't, even theoretically, reproduce your self.
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By the way, even though you haven't explicitly refused once again to talk to anyone other than GodlessDave it's obvious you've decided to only respond to him and ignoring everyone else.

Even though it's not against the rules, it's still rude and don't for a minute think that everyone else here hasn't noticed.
 
godless dave said:
You need to decide whether the model H you're using for your calculation of P(E|H) is the materialist model, where the self is a subset of the brain, or some dualist model where the self exists separately from the brain.

If H is the materialist model then P(E|H) would be determined in a manner similar to P(E|G). Just as Mount Rainier is the result of physical processes, so is my self. If you understand the chain of cause and effect that resulted in my living brain then you understand the chain of cause and effect that resulted in my self, because they are the same thing.
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Jabba said:
- My claim is that your brain and your self are not equally "trackable." My claim is that, theoretically, we can reproduce your brain; but that, we can't, even theoretically, reproduce your self.
Click to expand...

godless dave said:
Does H include that claim?
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Dave,

- Just to point out: that claim is one of the premises in my extended syllogism -- one of the sub-issues in our debate. Ultimately, we need to evaluate each of these premises.
- And, guess you could say that my first claim/premise is that given all my premises, OOFLam is very likely wrong...
- Anyway, that's what we're trying to do here. We're trying to judge my premises. I need to make clear what all my premises are. That's part of what I was trying to do above.

- My answer to your question: H doesn't directly address/include that claim, but it would seem to imply that that claim is wrong -- i.e., your self and your brain are equally trackable.,
 
Jabba said:
- My answer to your question: H doesn't directly address/include that claim, but it would seem to imply that that claim is wrong -- i.e., your self and your brain are equally trackable.,
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Then P(E|H) would not be some number over infinity. It would be determined in a manner similar to determining the likelihood of Mount Rainier existing.
 
Jabba said:
Just to point out: that claim is one of the premises in my extended syllogism -- one of the sub-issues in our debate. Ultimately, we need to evaluate each of these premises.
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As along as it remains an unproven claim, it remains an unproven premise. Your argument isn't true until you prove it.

And, guess you could say that my first claim/premise is that given all my premises, OOFLam is very likely wrong...
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Why would you be "given" all your premises? You must prove them. Your argument can't be considered true until you prove it. This is tantamount to your periodic assertion that if you could prove your argument true, then it would be true, and that we should grant you some sort of credit for that. You wallow in that pointless meta-analysis for far too long. It's actually quite silly, and you seem to rely on it in all your arguments at this forum. You grovel for expressions of agreement on all your conditionals.

Anyway, that's what we're trying to do here. We're trying to judge my premises. I need to make clear what all my premises are. That's part of what I was trying to do above.
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We're in the part of your argument where you justify your claim that P(E|H) is very, very small. It is, by your own admission, the linchpin of your argument. Your reckoning of P(E|H) assumes your premises, which is one level of error. It begs the question. But it also omits to limit the reckoning to what H provides, which is another level of error. It incorrectly formulates the inference. Both errors were previously identified in the convenient list I gave you of the individually fatal flaws in your argument.

Your premises have been judged. They've been judged for years, and you clearly have no response to the judgment and no interest in providing any. You're simply trying to delay your inevitable concession.

My answer to your question: H doesn't directly address/include that claim...
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Please don't change the wording of questions you are asked. Answer the question that was asked, not some equivocation of it.

...but it would seem to imply that that claim is wrong -- i.e., your self and your brain are equally trackable.,
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The notion that they are equally "trackable" (yay, another Jabba made-up word to keep things ambiguous) implies that they are separate, which, under H, they are not. They are "equally trackable" under H because they are exactly the same one thing under H. There is no dualism inherent in E, despite your ever-more-deceptive attempts to cram it in there. And when you are reckoning P(E|H) -- how H explains E -- you may use only concepts from H. H specifically rejects any sort of dualism and explains E, self-awareness, by a completely different mechanism. If you aren't talking about that mechanism when you are talking about P(E|H), then you are refuting some straw man of your own invention, not materialism.
 
carlitos said:
My claim is that 2 = 1.
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Carl, I've obviously read only the first sentence of your long post. Nobody but me is open-minded enough to see the infinite pool of potential 9s following the floating point dot? Do you accept it's not a full-stop?
I'll be back
 
Jabba said:
- My claim is that your brain and your self are not equally "trackable." My claim is that, theoretically, we can reproduce your brain; but that, we can't, even theoretically, reproduce your self.
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That's the claim of a lot of people, and I understand exactly why. My whole experience is dependant on my "self", my consciousness. I can't even imagine not having it, since absence of self is beyond my experiences, even theoretically. And as I get older I dread my finality; I wouldn't say it keeps me awake at night, but you get the idea. So I totally understand the mind's resistence to the idea of death, and it keeps looking for reasons why there'll be something beyond, in the absence of the ability to deny death itself (we see plenty of it, so that's beyond question.)

But here's where maturity comes in: plenty of things are true that we'd rather see false, and the point of becoming an adult is accepting that the world is the way it is. Inability to imagine a thing, such as oblivion, is irrelevant: it happens. We have to deal with that. Make the best of your life; you won't get a second chance.
 
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