Proof of Immortality, VI

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Dave,
- I have numerous claims and sub-claims, but those are central.

Given that you've been dividing the cake for five years now, I doubt that you know which sub-claims are central to your main claim.

- At the top(?) of my syllogism, I claim that

Have I not already told you to stop repeating what your claims are? We know them. We've argued against them. We've torn them down. Move on with your demonstration.

- That’s just the beginning.

Mother of god, no!

- I will try to outline all my different premises. I will then ask you to point out all your disagreements.

Again, you've been doing exactly that for five years. No one cares about your premises anymore.
 
1. There is a reasonable possibility that the human self is not physical -- not, at least, in our current understanding of physical.

Call it a soul. Then you will see that you are begging the question.

Well-educated and honest participants in the thread see that you're begging the question without calling it a soul but it might help you see it.
 
4. For that to be an appropriate element in judging the probability of OOFLam, my current existence needs to be set apart from most other selves in a way that is relevant to OOFLam.
5. My self is thusly set apart.

I like to look in to this thread from time to time to see how the latest fringe reset works. I see that the attempted refutation of the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy has here deteriorated to the five-year-old level of "Because I say it isn't."

Dave
 
It's been almost two months since the last fringe reset. I'm not surprised we're getting another one.

Jabba, you have made these claims over and over again, and you do nothing except make these claims. Your attempts to prove them are what we're interested in, and it's abundantly clear you can't prove any of them. Kindly give your critics their due; they have prevailed and all you can do is repeat the claims, insult your critics, and plan a fantasy blog based on favorably rewriting your experiences here.

I have numerous claims and sub-claims...

And they were comprehensively rebutted. You acknowledged the existence of the rebuttal but still have not addressed it. Now you're simply making all the claims over again as if your critics do not exist. And we are not the only audience you've had who have noted that this is your typical behavior. Hence I have to ask why any reasonable person should engage you? If you're simply going to talk to hear yourself talk, what credence is there in your erstwhile claim that you're here to be shown whether there are any errors in your proof?

There is a reasonable possibility that the human self is not physical...

And you have not proved this claim. Your entire proof for it consists of expressions of a fervent desire to be immortal. That is not a reasonable possibility. Reasonable possibilities, lines of reasoning, and conclusions have to be accompanied by reasoned argument. "I really want this and would be emotionally devastated to learn it isn't true," is by no means a reasonable possibility.

...not, at least, in our current understanding of physical.

As an excuse for your admitted inability to provide scientifically valid evidence of what you claim, you have claimed science is deficient to the point of being unable to gather evidence for the properties you wish to universally attribute. Special pleading.

The likelihood of an event occurring -- given a particular hypothesis -- has mathematical implications (albeit indefinite) regarding the posterior probability of the hypothesis.

Yes, but not by any correct model you've put forward. One of the fatal flaws I identified in your argument was your unfamiliarity with Bayesian and other statistical processes. You conceded that unfamiliarity. You couldn't even copy the formula correctly.

And "albeit indefinite" seems to be your excuse for simply making up all the numbers you put into the formula. There is one magnitude of uncertainty that arises from uncertainty in the input data. But the uncertainty in your model arises from its having too many unconstrained degrees of freedom, which makes your results uselessly uncertain. You don't understand degrees of freedom and weren't interested in learning about them when the subject was presented. Hence you do not possess the required knowledge to discuss the subject sufficiently.

Your latest formulation was simply gibberish written in largely meaningless mathematical notation.

The likelihood of the current existence of my "self" -- given OOFLam -- is no more than 10-100.

Your attempt to reckon P(E|H) is rife with errors. They have all been repeatedly shown to you, but you ignore them. Your claim has been soundly refuted, whether you choose to acknowledge the refutation or not.

For that to be an appropriate element in judging the probability of OOFLam, my current existence needs to be set apart from most other selves in a way that is relevant to OOFLam.
My self is thusly set apart.

You claim you are a suitable "target" based on nothing more than having been "chosen" to be alive. This retrospective selection commits the Texas sharpshooter fallacy. You clearly don't understand what that is and why it's a fallacy. Your argument in support of this claim simply asks that it not be considered a fallacy.

If I am correct so far, the posterior probability of OOFLam is extremely small.

Obviously no part of your argument as presently stated is correct. Two months or so ago you were given a comprehensive refutation of your argument, featuring a concisely enumerated list of its individually fatal flaws. You know this refutation exists, but you took no notice of it except to speculate how you could use it in your own self-interest. Therefore we have to consider that you are deliberately ignoring what you know to be errors in your argument.

For the likelihood of my current existence to be an appropriate element in the relevant formula, my particular existence does not need to be pre-specified as appropriate.

This is your claim, but it blatantly commits the Texas sharpshooter fallacy. You tried to argue otherwise, but were refuted.

There are other characteristics of an event that can identify its likelihood as an appropriate element, as a legitimate target, in judging the posterior probability of the hypothesis.

This was discussed at length and you were refuted. What you proposed in your examples as characteristics that would post-identify the target were shown instead to be pre-specified information. Inference from a suitable set of pre-specified information is not fallacious. Inference solely on the basis of knowledge of the selection, which is what your argument does, is a fallacy.

Do not pretend this was not discussed and your claim refuted.

“Targetness” is complex, and exists in degrees.

"Targetness" is a word you made up to hide your ongoing desire to have the Texas sharpshooter fallacy set aside. There is nothing complex about it; it is ordinary inference. The product of an inference varies in strength. Your argument infers things about the data from nothing more than its having been selected. It is therefore an untenable inference. If you had acquiesced to your critics and described the Texas sharpshooter fallacy in your own words, perhaps you would have seen this.

That’s just the beginning.

No, it's more like the end. All these topics were discussed thoroughly and all your claims were refuted. You chose to ignore those refutations, and now -- as usual -- you just want to start over because you want to prolong the debate rather than concede.

I will try to outline all my different premises. I will then ask you to point out all your disagreements.

...which you will then promptly ignore, just as you have admitted to deliberately ignoring them previously throughout the nearly five years this thread has persisted. A comprehensive set of disagreements has already been presented to you. Prove you're serious about this debate by addressing each and every one of them, to some extent, in your next post. Otherwise we'll have to assume you plan simply to carry on as before, obfuscating and evading, mining quotes for your fantasy-world blog and caring not one whit for any actual test of your claims.

I hope to then introduce our debate to a (new) jury of our peers and present our further cases.

As you did before, you can't win a fair debate so you have to stage your own starring cherry-picked quotes from your critics that make you look good. We're familiar with your venue shopping and the results you got. You can't gaslight your critics here into thinking they must somehow be biased and that this is why your argument has stalled.

Sad, Jabba.
 
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1. There is a reasonable possibility that the human self is not physical -- not, at least, in our current understanding of physical.


Please give your reasons for this possibility


5. My self is thusly set apart.


Well, I'm glad we got that out of the way. Isn't it better to just declare something rather than having to, you know, support it.


2. There are other characteristics of an event that can identify its likelihood as an appropriate element, as a legitimate target, in judging the posterior probability of the hypothesis.


What exact characteristics are those that identify you as the likely legitimate target?


3. “Targetness” is complex, and exists in degrees.


Cite anybody anywhere in all the world that agrees with this statement.
 
Dave,
- I have numerous claims and sub-claims, but those are central.
- At the top(?) of my syllogism, I claim that
1. There is a reasonable possibility that the human self is not physical -- not, at least, in our current understanding of physical.
2. The likelihood of an event occurring -- given a particular hypothesis -- has mathematical implications (albeit indefinite) regarding the posterior probability of the hypothesis.
3. The likelihood of the current existence of my "self" -- given OOFLam -- is no more than 10-100.
4. For that to be an appropriate element in judging the probability of OOFLam, my current existence needs to be set apart from most other selves in a way that is relevant to OOFLam.
5. My self is thusly set apart.
6. If I am correct so far, the posterior probability of OOFLam is extremely small.

- Underlying the "top" are numerous other claims/premises. For instance,
1. For the likelihood of my current existence to be an appropriate element in the relevant formula, my particular existence does not need to be pre-specified as appropriate. My particular current existence does not need to be specified as a legitimate “target” prior to my existence.
2. There are other characteristics of an event that can identify its likelihood as an appropriate element, as a legitimate target, in judging the posterior probability of the hypothesis.
3. “Targetness” is complex, and exists in degrees.

- That’s just the beginning.
- I will try to outline all my different premises. I will then ask you to point out all your disagreements.
- I hope to then introduce our debate to a (new) jury of our peers and present our further cases.


You're just muddying the issue again.

You're trying to use Bayesian statistics to contrast a hypothesis and its complement.

If your hypothesis H is that humans have nonphysical selves, which only exist once, then you're going to get a different P(E|H) than if your hypothesis is that humans are entirely physical and only exist once.

Those are two very different hypotheses.

In order to even start to get a usable value for P(E|H) you need to be clear on what H is.

A few posts back you finally clarified that H is that humans have nonphysical selves, which only exist once. Since I don't believe that hypothesis anyway you're not accomplishing anything by trying to argue to me that it's false. I already think it's false.
 
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You're trying to use Bayesian statistics to contrast a hypothesis and its complement.

I'm glad he clarified that he's still trying to use Bayes' theorem. Yesterday it seemed he was stepping off the Bayes bandwagon to argue purely syllogistically. If you can undermine the premise of a line of reasoning, then the conclusion is therefore not true by that line. And that's the only valid line of rebuttal that would incorporate an attack on the premises of materialism. And that's what he looked like he was doing.

But today he's back touting Bayes, which means he has to follow the proper formulation for P(E|H). And that formulation precludes "fixing" the premises of H because you think they're wrong.

In order to even start to get a usable value for P(E|H) you need to be clear on what H is.

Which, dollars to donuts, won't happen. Part of the false-dilemma shuffle in these sorts of indirect arguments is equivocating over which is the singular hypothesis -- the one that's affirmative, testable, and clearly outlines a specific thing -- and which is "everything else." Jabba has several times flip-flopped over whether H or ~H in his model is a singular hypothesis.
 
I like to look in to this thread from time to time to see how the latest fringe reset works. I see that the attempted refutation of the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy has here deteriorated to the five-year-old level of "Because I say it isn't."

Dave

Oh, I don't know about deteriorated; it is consistent with the age of the thread.
 
Dave,
- I have numerous claims and sub-claims, but those are central.
- At the top(?) of my syllogism, I claim that
1. There is a reasonable possibility that the human self is not physical -- not, at least, in our current understanding of physical.
2. The likelihood of an event occurring -- given a particular hypothesis -- has mathematical implications (albeit indefinite) regarding the posterior probability of the hypothesis.
3. The likelihood of the current existence of my "self" -- given OOFLam -- is no more than 10-100.
4. For that to be an appropriate element in judging the probability of OOFLam, my current existence needs to be set apart from most other selves in a way that is relevant to OOFLam. 5. My self is thusly set apart.


Are you saying that your "self" is set apart from other "selves" because that is required for your argument to be valid?
 
Dave,
- I have numerous claims and sub-claims, but those are central.
- At the top(?) of my syllogism, I claim that
1. There is a reasonable possibility that the human self is not physical -- not, at least, in our current understanding of physical.
2. The likelihood of an event occurring -- given a particular hypothesis -- has mathematical implications (albeit indefinite) regarding the posterior probability of the hypothesis.
3. The likelihood of the current existence of my "self" -- given OOFLam -- is no more than 10-100.
4. For that to be an appropriate element in judging the probability of OOFLam, my current existence needs to be set apart from most other selves in a way that is relevant to OOFLam.
5. My self is thusly set apart.
6. If I am correct so far, the posterior probability of OOFLam is extremely small.

- Underlying the "top" are numerous other claims/premises. For instance,
1. For the likelihood of my current existence to be an appropriate element in the relevant formula, my particular existence does not need to be pre-specified as appropriate. My particular current existence does not need to be specified as a legitimate “target” prior to my existence.
2. There are other characteristics of an event that can identify its likelihood as an appropriate element, as a legitimate target, in judging the posterior probability of the hypothesis.
3. “Targetness” is complex, and exists in degrees.

- That’s just the beginning.
- I will try to outline all my different premises. I will then ask you to point out all your disagreements.
- I hope to then introduce our debate to a (new) jury of our peers and present our further cases.

Not this fringe reset **** again!
 
You're just muddying the issue again.

You're trying to use Bayesian statistics to contrast a hypothesis and its complement.

If your hypothesis H is that humans have nonphysical selves, which only exist once, then you're going to get a different P(E|H) than if your hypothesis is that humans are entirely physical and only exist once.

Those are two very different hypotheses.

In order to even start to get a usable value for P(E|H) you need to be clear on what H is.

A few posts back you finally clarified that H is that humans have nonphysical selves, which only exist once. Since I don't believe that hypothesis anyway you're not accomplishing anything by trying to argue to me that it's false. I already think it's false.
- I didn't mean to say that.
- H is "We each have Only One finite Life to live (at most)." I meant to say that according to H, whatever we are, we each have Only One finite Life to live (at most). It's ~H that implies nonphysical selves.
 
- I didn't mean to say that.
- H is "We each have Only One finite Life to live (at most)." I meant to say that according to H, whatever we are, we each have Only One finite Life to live (at most). It's ~H that implies nonphysical selves.


Then why do you keep factoring nonphysical "selves" into your formula for the likelihood of your existence under H?
 
- I didn't mean to say that.
- H is "We each have Only One finite Life to live (at most)." I meant to say that according to H, whatever we are, we each have Only One finite Life to live (at most). It's ~H that implies nonphysical selves.

Then nonphysical selves should not figure into P(E|H). As I said earlier, P(E|H) would not be some number over infinity. It would be determined in a manner similar to determining the likelihood of Mount Rainier existing.
 
H is "We each have Only One finite Life to live (at most)."

The problem is still the false dilemma. You want to prove immortality. But you can't, and you know you can't. So you try to disprove what you think is the opposite of it -- this "OOFLam" nonsense. But you screwed up. One finite life is a consequence of materialism, but it is materialism that is the actual theory of causation. You conflated the journey with the destination. You figured out that you can't reckon P(E|H) without switching over to undermining materialism, but you didn't figure out that materialism is not the exact opposite anymore of immortality.

This is why godless dave is urging you to get your act together and actually name the hypotheses you're dealing with, not simply fumbling around with consequents and converses and all the stuff that leads you into logical ambiguity. Statistical inference must still be very precise on what the hypotheses actually are. You haven't achieved that.

I meant to say that according to H, whatever we are...

Except that you can't do that. If you're going to reckon "according to H" then you have to accept H's definition of what we are -- and specifically how that gives rise to self-awareness or consciousness. And H's definition of what we are explicitly rejects mind-body dualism. In fact, it rejects any form of immaterialism -- by definition. Self-awareness under H is simply one of many properties of a functioning brain. You can't simply "fix" that according to what you want to be true and move on. If you're going to use Bayes and you're going to reckon P(E|H), you can't just make stuff up and claim H should have to explain it.

As I said, you're trying to sneak those dualist concepts into E. You want E to include some obfuscated nod to dualism so that you can say materialism can't explain it. You don't get to do that. E can't contain any theories for how self-awareness arises. It is simply the fact that we exist as self-aware beings. It's the data, not the explanation for the data.
 
I'm glad he clarified that he's still trying to use Bayes' theorem.


No, he just has two competing syllogisms - one he thinks is provably false, and one he thinks is at least logically possible.

He's still got a vast excluded middle.

In any case, he's never even begun to explain why his soul, even assuming we grant its existence, would necessarily be immortal.
 
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