Proof of Immortality III

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Dave,
- No.
- My quote above was misleading...
- It's much the same issue -- but, with different answers.
- My claim is that we have no reason to doubt the scientific explanation for Mt Rainier; whereas, we just don't have any scientific explanation for my particular self. And again, probability is based upon ignorance vs knowledge; there is no such thing as absolute probability.

We do have a scientific explanation for it. You're trying to prove it wrong. But you can't prove it wrong by assuming it's wrong.
 
Dave,
- No.
- My quote above was misleading...
- It's much the same issue -- but, with different answers.
- My claim is that we have no reason to doubt the scientific explanation for Mt Rainier; whereas, we just don't have any scientific explanation for my particular self. And again, probability is based upon ignorance vs knowledge; there is no such thing as absolute probability.

We do have a scientific explanation for it. You're trying to prove it wrong. But you can't prove it wrong by assuming it's wrong.
Dave,
- This is why I think that you and I are not talking about the the same kind of "self"...
- The self I'm talking about is a specific observer (with memory -- at least for this lifetime) and "identity." You and I both doubt that we could ever reproduce this specific observer (I would not be looking out two sets of eyes) -- we would have no idea how to do that. Theoretically, we could reproduce the body and brain -- but, that would not reproduce the observer.
 
2 > 1

Dave,
- This is why I think that you and I are not talking about the the same kind of "self"...
- The self I'm talking about is a specific observer (with memory -- at least for this lifetime) and "identity."

And the scientific explanation for that is that the memory and ability to observe are all done by a physical brain, and the identity - just like everything else's identity - just refers to which one it is.

You and I both doubt that we could ever reproduce this specific observer (I would not be looking out two sets of eyes) -- we would have no idea how to do that.

We would have no idea how to do that because when you make a copy of something, you have two things, not one. This is true for everything in reality that we know of. I can't think of any case where we can follow the same steps twice and end up with one thing, not two.

The reason science has no explanation for such a phenomenon is because there is no evidence that phenomenon has ever happened. When you make a copy of something, the copy is always separate from the original, even if they are absolutely identical.

Theoretically, we could reproduce the body and brain -- but, that would not reproduce the observer.

Why not? What would be the difference between the two observers? In what way would they be different from each other?
 
- This is why I think that you and I are not talking about the the same kind of "self"...

Yes. You're talking about mystical woo-woo made up concept of "self" that exists only because you say so.

The self I'm talking about is a specific observer (with memory -- at least for this lifetime) and "identity." You and I both doubt that we could ever reproduce this specific observer (I would not be looking out two sets of eyes) -- we would have no idea how to do that. Theoretically, we could reproduce the body and brain -- but, that would not reproduce the observer.

This is the absolute most meaningless statement ever. Everything single nanosecond of your existence, every single sensory input, every single neurological moment changes your "self" into a totally new person via this argument.
 
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Dave,The self I'm talking about is a specific observer (with memory -- at least for this lifetime) and "identity."

All properties produced by the physical brain. You've shown no evidence that there needs to be or actually is anything else to produce those.

You and I both doubt that we could ever reproduce this specific observer (I would not be looking out two sets of eyes) -- we would have no idea how to do that.

Asked and answered. You're trying to equivocate the philosophical notion of identity with the properties of the self. We already went through this several times.

Theoretically, we could reproduce the body and brain -- but, that would not reproduce the observer.

Pseudo-philosophical gobbledky-gook. You're simply trying to confuse the notion of identity by pointing out that two things must necessarily be two things, in hopes that you can throw enough mud on the problem to keep believing you've confounded your critics and preserved your cherished belief. As I said, we already went through this several times and you have no answer for your critics. Cardinality is not your immortal soul; it's just a property of sets.
 
- The self I'm talking about is a specific observer (with memory -- at least for this lifetime) and "identity." You and I both doubt that we could ever reproduce this specific observer (I would not be looking out two sets of eyes) -- we would have no idea how to do that. Theoretically, we could reproduce the body and brain -- but, that would not reproduce the observer.

You keep including that phrase. What you are requiring between those parentheses is the opposite of what you are saying outside them. We would not be reproducing a specific self, but instead extending the same one into the clone of whatever is separate from the self to meet your highlighted requirement.

Were we to clone you, complete in every physical detail, there would be no you and a copy of you. We would have two yous, and neither what have a basis to conclude he was the original. Your "identity" would have been reproduced.
 
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Dave,
- This is why I think that you and I are not talking about the the same kind of "self"...
- The self I'm talking about is a specific observer (with memory -- at least for this lifetime) and "identity." You and I both doubt that we could ever reproduce this specific observer (I would not be looking out two sets of eyes) -- we would have no idea how to do that. Theoretically, we could reproduce the body and brain -- but, that would not reproduce the observer.

You keep bringing the incomprehensible issue of you seeing through your copy's eyes into the discussion without elaborating on it. Every time you state it, people ask why. I'll ask again.

Why would two separate and identical conciousnesses be expected to share their senses?
 
Why would two separate and identical conciousnesses be expected to share their senses?

Because he thought his cloning Gedankenexperiment would be the zinger that illustrated why consciousness needed to be invested in a soul, and couldn't be the emergent property of an organism. He didn't realize at the time that his "zinger" relied on a circular argument: that cloning would be a problem only if there were a soul that couldn't be subdivided or copied, not if consciousness and "self" were simply emergent processes. So now he's frantically trying to come up with something -- anything -- that he can say would be duplicated in a way that confounds the scientific model.
 
IIRC Jabba was suggesting that if his "self" were to be replicated after his death it would be "another instance" of Jabba rather than just another person identical to Jabba. Then when someone suggested a scenario in which his "self" was replicated in a duplicate body while he was still alive he brought up the "looking through two pairs of eyes" thing as a strawman.

I'm pretty certain that this idea was at the root of Jabba's long-standing inability to understand that two identical things are not the same thing, and that there are two of them, not one.
 
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A child can understand that two things are identical but separate.

Unless Jabba doesn't understand why he still has a bowl full of Cheerios every morning after he's eaten one Cheerio I don't really buy that he can't grasp the concept.

Jabba obviously believes that there is a soul created by God that lives forever after the physical body dies. The amount just inane doublespeak he's been putting into justifying one of the most common Woo beliefs out there while pretending (largely to himself I'm beginning to think) that that's not exactly what he is doing is just mind boggling.
 
I've never understood this tangent. Nothing about copying a person or a mountain has anything to do with a soul - most of all because Jabba refuses to define the word soul . Without a working definition, there's no way to test for it, even if that test is only a mathematical exercise.
 
A child can understand that two things are identical but separate.

Unless Jabba doesn't understand why he still has a bowl full of Cheerios every morning after he's eaten one Cheerio I don't really buy that he can't grasp the concept.

Jabba obviously believes that there is a soul created by God that lives forever after the physical body dies. The amount just inane doublespeak he's been putting into justifying one of the most common Woo beliefs out there while pretending (largely to himself I'm beginning to think) that that's not exactly what he is doing is just mind boggling.
 
If I may repeat myself: Jabba is the worst magician in the world. We can all see the rabbit up his sleeve, but wants us to agree that we can't and then look impressed when he "reveals" it from thin air. Worse, we all have to help him with the mechanics of the trick as he knows the outcome he desires, but knows no way of achieving it
 
Dave,
- This is why I think that you and I are not talking about the the same kind of "self"...
- The self I'm talking about is a specific observer (with memory -- at least for this lifetime) and "identity." You and I both doubt that we could ever reproduce this specific observer (I would not be looking out two sets of eyes) -- we would have no idea how to do that. Theoretically, we could reproduce the body and brain -- but, that would not reproduce the observer.


If we were to duplicate you exactly in a hospital, when you wake up, do you know if you are the original "you", or the copy? If so, how do you know this?
 
A child can understand that two things are identical but separate.

Unless Jabba doesn't understand why he still has a bowl full of Cheerios every morning after he's eaten one Cheerio I don't really buy that he can't grasp the concept.

Jabba obviously believes that there is a soul created by God that lives forever after the physical body dies. The amount just inane doublespeak he's been putting into justifying one of the most common Woo beliefs out there while pretending (largely to himself I'm beginning to think) that that's not exactly what he is doing is just mind boggling.

You typed that out twice, exactly the same way both times.

I see identical two posts, not one.

What do you make of that, Jabba?
 
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If I may repeat myself:

Stop slow flooding.

Jabba is the worst magician in the world. We can all see the rabbit up his sleeve, but wants us to agree that we can't and then look impressed when he "reveals" it from thin air. Worse, we all have to help him with the mechanics of the trick as he knows the outcome he desires, but knows no way of achieving it

Yes, it's a clever observation.
 
3305
Dave,
- This is why I think that you and I are not talking about the the same kind of "self"...
- The self I'm talking about is a specific observer (with memory -- at least for this lifetime) and "identity." You and I both doubt that we could ever reproduce this specific observer (I would not be looking out two sets of eyes) -- we would have no idea how to do that. Theoretically, we could reproduce the body and brain -- but, that would not reproduce the observer.

3309
You keep including that phrase. What you are requiring between those parentheses is the opposite of what you are saying outside them. We would not be reproducing a specific self, but instead extending the same one into the clone of whatever is separate from the self to meet your highlighted requirement.
Were we to clone you, complete in every physical detail, there would be no you and a copy of you. We would have two yous, and neither what have a basis to conclude he was the original. Your "identity" would have been reproduced.

3310
You keep bringing the incomprehensible issue of you seeing through your copy's eyes into the discussion without elaborating on it. Every time you state it, people ask why. I'll ask again.
Why would two separate and identical conciousnesses be expected to share their senses?

3314
I've never understood this tangent. Nothing about copying a person or a mountain has anything to do with a soul - most of all because Jabba refuses to define the word soul . Without a working definition, there's no way to test for it, even if that test is only a mathematical exercise.
js, HR & LL,

- Again, this is why I think that you and I are not talking about the same kind of "self"...

- I seem to recognize (or, imagine) a concept that you don't.
- Again, again, the concept to which I refer is also the same self/soul as reincarnationists believe keeps coming back...
- If we were somehow able to reproduce this ME now, it would be as if I was a radio receiving signals from two different stations at the same time.

- Now, if there is no way to replicate this kind of self, and to replicate ME, then, I must be brand new. And, if time is infinite, the number of potential selves is totally unlimited, in effect I came from nothing, and I am unimaginably 'lucky' to currently exist.
 
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