Proof of Immortality III

[Loss Leader]

- Again, again, the concept to which I refer is also the same self/soul as reincarnationists believe keeps coming back...

Jabba -

You SAY you're using the concept that reincarnation-ists call a soul, but you don't DEFINE it. What are the properties of this soul? When reincarnated, what of the soul survives? How can we tell a reincarnated soul from a new one? Are there reincarnated people walking around now? If not, when can we expect that? How would we know?

You say your body produces a new soul from nothing. Then how could any other body have your soul? What are the hallmarks of a soul that would let us identify one in the wild?

Since the physics of biology already accounts for the conscious mind, what does a soul do that neurons don't? How do you know?

 

[godless dave]

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3314js, HR & LL,

- Again, this is why I think that you and I are not talking about the same kind of "self"...

- I seem to recognize (or, imagine) a concept that you don't.
- Again, again, the concept to which I refer is also the same self/soul as reincarnationists believe keeps coming back...
- If we were somehow able to reproduce this ME now, it would be as if I was a radio receiving signals from two different stations at the same time.

It's not that we're not imagining that concept, it's that we don't understand why you're including it in H when scientific models of consciousness don't describe any such thing. We have never observed anything that behaves like that.

In scientific models of consciousness, the observing, experiencing, and self awareness all occur in the brain. There is no aspect of the self that is not physically in the brain. It has the same location as the brain. Making a copy would make a copy because that's how everything else works in nature.

If E is a self that is not produced by a physical brain and doesn't have a physical location, then P(E|H) is 0 because E doesn't exist under H.

 

[HighRiser]

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3314js, HR & LL,

- Again, this is why I think that you and I are not talking about the same kind of "self"...

- I seem to recognize (or, imagine) a concept that you don't.
- Again, again, the concept to which I refer is also the same self/soul as reincarnationists believe keeps coming back...
- If we were somehow able to reproduce this ME now, it would be as if I was a radio receiving signals from two different stations at the same time.
- Now, if there is no way to replicate this kind of self, and to replicate ME, then, I must be brand new. And, if time is infinite, the number of potential selves is totally unlimited, in effect I came from nothing, and I am unimaginably 'lucky' to currently exist.

Why?
Two instances of one consciousness are two separate instances. Why would they share senses? Why do you expect them to?

There's no evidence for radio brains, but I don't have any interference trouble that arises when I leave the radio in my shop turned on, and tune in the same station in my truck.

Stop repeating the same things over and over and try to address the question I asked. If radio brains is part of the answer, explain how or why radio brains is included in the answer, because just saying "radio brains" again doesn't explain a damn thing about an expectation of shared senses between radio brains.

 

[jond]

- I seem to recognize (or, imagine) a concept that you don't.
- Again, again, the concept to which I refer is also the same self/soul as reincarnationists believe keeps coming back...
- If we were somehow able to reproduce this ME now, it would be as if I was a radio receiving signals from two different stations at the same time.

Wait! Didn't you say your self was an emergent property the other day?

Why yes, yes you did:

Pixel,
- I think the difference is that I am an emergent property. Mt Rainier is not.

So which is it? A soul or an emergent property?

 

[jsfisher]

js, HR & LL,

- Again, this is why I think that you and I are not talking about the same kind of "self"...

- I seem to recognize (or, imagine) a concept that you don't.

No, we understand all this. One of the points, though, is that you are not consistent in applying that meaning.

For P(E|H), your calculation presumes a physical existence and the likelihood of the events that resulted in it. For P(E|~H), you switch to your alternate concept.

You get only one meaning for E. Pick one or the other or a broader version that encompasses both, but you have to pick one and only one.

- Again, again, the concept to which I refer is also the same self/soul as reincarnationists believe keeps coming back...
- If we were somehow able to reproduce this ME now, it would be as if I was a radio receiving signals from two different stations at the same time.

If that is the meaning for E you'd like to use, then you don't exist under any reality patterned after our scientific understanding, and you will not be able to assert your existence under any other reality for lack of evidence.

- Now, if there is no way to replicate this kind of self, and to replicate ME, then, I must be brand new. And, if time is infinite, the number of potential selves is totally unlimited, in effect I came from nothing, and I am unimaginably 'lucky' to currently exist.

Lot of assuming there, but nothing to help your case.

 

[JayUtah]

If we were somehow able to reproduce this ME now, it would be as if I was a radio receiving signals from two different stations at the same time.

That's only a problem if you presuppose the existence of a soul. The hypothesis H that you're trying to dispute with this preposterous line of reasoning doesn't require any such thing, so isn't disputed by it. This is the concept everyone but you recognizes.

...in effect I came from nothing, and I am unimaginably 'lucky' to currently exist.

Nope. Same old Texas sharpshooter's fallacy.

 

[zooterkin]

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Knock it off, Jabba.

 

[Mojo]

- If we were somehow able to reproduce this ME now, it would be as if I was a radio receiving signals from two different stations at the same time.

Under the model you are arguing against, if we were to reproduce you, there would be two of you, with a body each. You're begging the question again by assuming your desired conclusion of a soul.

 

[theprestige]

A die is rolled. It lands with one of its faces up. How 'lucky' is that?

 

[Mojo]

A die is rolled. It lands with one of its faces up. How 'lucky' is that?

Under the hypothesis that the die is fair, there is only a one in six chance that that number came up. If there is a reasonable likelihood that the die is fixed then Jabba can use Bayesian statistics to virtually prove that the likelihood of it being fair is zero, therefore it is fixed and it isn't luck that made that side come up. Or something.

 

[jt512]

A die is rolled. It lands with one of its faces up. How 'lucky' is that?

The die could have landed on an edge, and a die has twice as many edges as faces, so there were 2:1 odds against it landing with one of its faces up. Yet it did!

 

[JoeMorgue]

If you a take a dice that has 50 sides and all sides have the same number on them, whatever number the dice actually lands on has some sort of unique essence of the number that makes that number extra special that all the other numbers, despite being the same number, didn't have. This is caused by that being the number landed on and evidence that that was the number landed on.

 

[Jabba]

And the scientific explanation for that is that the memory and ability to observe are all done by a physical brain, and the identity - just like everything else's identity - just refers to which one it is.
We would have no idea how to do that because when you make a copy of something, you have two things, not one. This is true for everything in reality that we know of. I can't think of any case where we can follow the same steps twice and end up with one thing, not two.
The reason science has no explanation for such a phenomenon is because there is no evidence that phenomenon has ever happened. When you make a copy of something, the copy is always separate from the original, even if they are absolutely identical.
Why not? What would be the difference between the two observers? In what way would they be different from each other?

Dave,

- I finally see your point...

- Let's see if I can explain what I've been thinking.
- I've been thinking that science should be able to explain -- in biological, or chemical terms -- why the observers would not be the same observers (and not just absolutely identical). Now, I need to see if I can still make my case.
- I think I can -- but I do, all of a sudden, see one of your points...

 

[John Jones]

Dave,

- I finally see your point...

- Let's see if I can explain what I've been thinking.
- I've been thinking that science should be able to explain -- in biological, or chemical terms -- why the observers would not be the same observers (and not just absolutely identical). Now, I need to see if I can still make my case. - I think I can -- but I do, all of a sudden, see one of your points...

After 4+ years? It would be a miracle out of scripture.

 

[zooterkin]

- If we were somehow able to reproduce this ME now, it would be as if I was a radio receiving signals from two different stations at the same time.

Not that it applies, as already explained by others, but isn't this round the wrong way? I thought you had latched on to the idea that the body/brain was the radio receiver for the soul, and so you'd have two radios receiving the same signal.

 

[JayUtah]

Now, I need to see if I can still make my case.

It depends on whether you really see his point, or have seen only yet another way to obfuscate around it and present the same claims you've made largely unchanged for four years. None of your critics has confidence you've suddenly seen the light until they see you actually incorporate into your argument what your critics have been saying.

Ostensibly, you haven't figured out that two things are two things because you've insisted on vesting in your hypothetical soul all the powers that evidence says insteaid are emergent properties of the organism. Your imaginary quandary is entirely of your own devising. Your hypothesis can't withstand the duplication of the organism with the same properties intact, but this is not a problem for science.

The larger question is whether you've now figured out that you can't assume the existence of a soul in any part of your argument, especially the part where you guess at probabilities and likelihood.

 

[Jabba]

And the scientific explanation for that is that the memory and ability to observe are all done by a physical brain, and the identity - just like everything else's identity - just refers to which one it is.
We would have no idea how to do that because when you make a copy of something, you have two things, not one. This is true for everything in reality that we know of. I can't think of any case where we can follow the same steps twice and end up with one thing, not two.
The reason science has no explanation for such a phenomenon is because there is no evidence that phenomenon has ever happened. When you make a copy of something, the copy is always separate from the original, even if they are absolutely identical.
Why not? What would be the difference between the two observers? In what way would they be different from each other?

Dave,

- They would not be the same observer.

- Which leads to my conclusion that the likelihood of my (and, your) current existence -- given OOFLam -- is virtually zero. Then, using that as P(E|H), and accepting that there is some reasonable possibility that OOFLam is wrong, I conclude that P(H|E) is also virtually zero...
- I understand that you do not believe that there is a reasonable possibility that OOFLam is wrong -- but, if you did believe it might be wrong, would you agree with my conclusion?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,

- They would not be the same observer.

That tells me there are two of them. I'm asking how they are different from each other. How are the observers different from each other? Do they observe differently?

- I understand that you do not believe that there is a reasonable possibility that OOFLam is wrong -- but, if you did believe it might be wrong, would you agree with my conclusion?

The whole point of your Bayesian equation is to prove OOFLam wrong. You're asking me to assume OOFLam is wrong in order to accept your proof that OOFLam is wrong. Surely you can see the flaw in that.

 

[Loss Leader]

Dave,

- They would not be the same observer.

- Which leads to my conclusion that the likelihood of my (and, your) current existence -- given OOFLam -- is virtually zero. Then, using that as P(E|H), and accepting that there is some reasonable possibility that OOFLam is wrong, I conclude that P(H|E) is also virtually zero...
- I understand that you do not believe that there is a reasonable possibility that OOFLam is wrong -- but, if you did believe it might be wrong, would you agree with my conclusion?

"If you agreed with my conclusion, would you agree with my conclusion?"

Jabba, why would anyone conclude that the system is rigged when it's working exactly the way we'd expect it?

 

[Jabba]

That tells me there are two of them. I'm asking how they are different from each other. How are the observers different from each other? Do they observe differently?



The whole point of your Bayesian equation is to prove OOFLam wrong. You're asking me to assume OOFLam is wrong in order to accept your proof that OOFLam is wrong. Surely you can see the flaw in that.

Dave,
- I'm just asking you to assume that OOFLam might be wrong.