Proof of Immortality III

[JayUtah]

Prove or retract.

Sure, as soon as you show that your theoretical equivalence actually matters in the context of the probabilistic argument that is the subject of this thread.

You do understand that all I did...

Of course I understand. And I explained how it doesn't matter.

Define "qualitative differences."

A difference that is qualitative, specifically in contrast to quantitative. Consult a dictionary if any of those words as unfamiliar.

If you are making a deductive argument then you are making a probabilistic argument, that's the point.

Yet there remains a qualitative difference between deductive reasoning and probabilistic reasoning, and it is a vital difference.

Define "different mode of reasoning."

As it is defined in the first chapter of any book on logic. "Mode of reasoning" is not something I made up.

 

[I Am The Scum]

*CONFESSION*

Why I get from context what "OOFLAM" is referring to in general, I don't know what the literal acronym means and at this point I'm afraid to ask.

"Ooflam" is the sound that a soul makes when you press or squeeze it. This typically occurs when someone is hastily attempting to push the soul behind a curtain.

 

[JayUtah]

"Ooflam" is the sound that a soul makes when you press or squeeze it.

Ah, like an immaterial whoopie cushion.

 

[ComfySlippers]

"Ooflam" is the sound that a soul makes when you press or squeeze it. This typically occurs when someone is hastily attempting to push the soul behind a curtain.

Urban myth.

An Ooflam is a squeaky chew-toy, played with by three-legged dogs on mountain tops.

 

[HighRiser]

Dave,
- I'm just saying that OOFLam refers to everyone's sense of self -- but, it implies that whoever has an immaterial sense of self is wrong.

- My target audience would be people who don't believe in immaterial selves, and that's pretty much every one here.

You're still trying to semanticaly shoehorn reason into a belief system that isn't based in reason. What you don't seem to comprehend is that this "immaterial sense of self" that your position is so very emotionaly entrenched in, isn't considered "wrong", as you just said; it's considered unevidenced and therefore an unsupported assertion.

The sense of self can be considered immaterial, but all the objective evidence indicates it is an emergent property of the natural processes taking place in the material of a healthy brain.

 

[caveman1917]

Sure, as soon as you show that your theoretical equivalence actually matters in the context of the probabilistic argument that is the subject of this thread.

Let's recap, here is your claim:

In no way, under any circumstances, by any means, can a probabilistic argument be proof of an allegation of fact.

Are you now saying that claim should have been:

The argument in this thread is not proof of an allegation of fact.

If so, sure, but that's quite something else than the original claim.

A difference that is qualitative, specifically in contrast to quantitative. Consult a dictionary if any of those words as unfamiliar.

That's not a definition, that's just repetition. See paragraph below.

As it is defined in the first chapter of any book on logic. "Mode of reasoning" is not something I made up.

It's not defined in my textbook on logic, the closest thing there is is the chapter on modal logics.

A logic is a formal system and a semantics. Please define, explicitly:

1. Logic A is "qualitatively different" from logic B.
2. Logic A is "quantitatively different" from logic B.
3. Logic A is a "different mode of reasoning" than logic B.

 

[JayUtah]

Let's recap

You did not show relevance.

 

[caveman1917]

You did not show relevance.

You stated a proposition, I proved its negation. If the negation of your proposition is not relevant, then neither was your proposition - given that relevance is independent of truth-value.

So either your proposition was irrelevant, in which case you should change it (I've suggested a different version already), or the negation of your proposition is relevant and hence relevance has been shown.

Also, will you define your terms already?

 

[JayUtah]

You...

In exactly what way does your theoretical derail here affect the probabilistic argument the OP is attempting?

 

[JoeMorgue]

I'm 38 years old, been alive for ~13,800 days.

I visited Disney World once and spent one day there.

So the odds of me visiting Disney World is 1 in 13,800.

Therefore Bayesian statistics show that it is highly improbable that I ever visited Disney World.

If you torture statistics long enough you'll get the answers you want. THIS PROVES NOTHING.

 

[JayUtah]

So the odds of me visiting Disney World is 1 in 13,800.

Pretty small, yet it doesn't negate the fact that you were there, and you could probably come up with evidence to show you were there. Factual evidence is qualitatively different in most cases than statistical inference.

 

[caveman1917]

In exactly what way does your theoretical derail here affect the probabilistic argument the OP is attempting?

In exactly the same way as your theoretical derail about probabilistic arguments in general. As per my previous post, either both a proposition and its negation are relevant or neither are. If you agree with this then your question makes no sense, you should ask it to yourself. If you disagree with this then feel free to make the case.

This is "relevant":

In no way, under any circumstances, by any means, can a probabilistic argument be proof of an allegation of fact.

but this is not:

It is false that: "In no way, under any circumstances, by any means, can a probabilistic argument be proof of an allegation of fact."

?

Are you sure you did not mean to make the claim I suggested as a replacement? Although I see I have to change it again as it's still wrong:

The argument in this thread is not proof of the allegation of fact made in this thread.

Given that it may very well be proof of an allegation of fact, such as the fact that Jabba is making that argument in this thread.

 

[Mojo]

I'm 38 years old, been alive for ~13,800 days.

I visited Disney World once and spent one day there.

So the odds of me visiting Disney World is 1 in 13,800.

Therefore Bayesian statistics show that it is highly improbable that I ever visited Disney World.

No, no, no.

Given that Disney World exists, the odds of you visiting it on a particular day is one in 13,800.

Therefore, given that you visited it on a particular day, the odds that Disney World exists is one in 13,800.

This is extremely unlikely.

So, because you have visited it, Jabba can essentially prove it doesn't exist using Bayesian statistics.

 

[ComfySlippers]

Pluto lives at Disney World.
How many legs does Pluto have?

 

[JoeMorgue]

(Fast forward 5 years)

So if you'll all accept the presumption that odds of Pluto having not more than 78 legs but not less than 12 legs I will at some point in the future present my evidence that Pluto is immortal.

 

[halleyscomet]

- I accept that natural law operates just as completely on material selves as they do on mountains. I just believe that there is an immaterial self that science either denies or is confused about.

That's overly hostile phrasing. By claiming you think science "denies" the existence of a soul or is "confused" about it you imply either deception or mental incapacity on the part of scientists. Science operates on what can be proven. There is no proof of an immortal soul. There is no confusion. There is no denial. If you can provide proof of an immortal soul then do so and become the most famous man to walk the earth since Muhammad.

 

[jt512]

@caveman1917:

I'm inclined to agree with JayUtah that there are qualitative differences between deductive arguments and probabilistic ones. For example, if hypothesis H implies that observation X is impossible, and X is observed, then H is false with certainty. However, if hypothesis H implies only that observation X is improbable, and X is observed, then not only does this not imply that H is false, it doesn't even imply that H is probably false. So here we have an argument of a particular from that is valid in a purely deductive context not in a probabilistic context. I'd call that a qualitative difference.

 

[gabeygoat]

What the hell is all the giant red text for?

 

[gambling_cruiser]

It's the Internet equivalent of a temper tantrum

 

[Mojo]

For example, if hypothesis H implies that observation X is impossible, and X is observed, then H is false with certainty. However, if hypothesis H implies only that observation X is improbable, and X is observed, then not only does this not imply that H is false, it doesn't even imply that H is probably false.

Got that, Jabba?