Proof of Immortality II

[Jabba]

Yes, that's what I mean too. Just as there would be two identical brains, there would be two identical "experiencers". Obviously you could not have two brains producing one experiencer in the scientific model, just as you cannot have one brain in two skulls.
I still don't understand the point of this discussion.

Dave,
- We're having this discussion again because you had previously agreed that the experiencer in the replica brain, would be different than the experiencer in the original brain. But, at this point, you seem to be saying that there would be no difference between the two experiencers.

 

[Mojo]

Dave,
- We're having this discussion again because you had previously agreed that the experiencer in the replica brain, would be different than the experiencer in the original brain.

Please provide a link to the post in which Dave agreed to this.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- We're having this discussion again because you had previously agreed that the experiencer in the replica brain, would be different than the experiencer in the original brain. But, at this point, you seem to be saying that there would be no difference between the two experiencers.

As I made very clear the first time, I meant it would be "different" in the sense that it would be separate, not that there is any difference between them.

Right now I have two Staples brand 1.0 black click pens on my desk. There is no difference between them - they are identical - but they are two different pens.

Like all human language, the meaning of the word "different" depends on the context.

 

[Hokulele]

Dave,
- We're having this discussion again because you had previously agreed that the experiencer in the replica brain, would be different than the experiencer in the original brain. But, at this point, you seem to be saying that there would be no difference between the two experiencers.

If they are different, how can you tell them apart? Would the original know they are the original? If so, how?

 

[jond]

Just in case he has you on ignore (and just in case he doesn't have me on ignore), I'm quoting your valuable post, hoping Jabba addresses it.

Of course, he will likely still not do so, unless Dave or another one of his Chosen Ones presents this argument, so let's hope one of them does (I know they have argued similarly, but maybe not in a way Jabba can understand it).

Thanks. I'm not sure he knows how to use the ignore feature, but he certainly displays selective reading traits!

 

[jond]

xt,
- Can an impossible combination be a potential combination?

Not in any sense of the word impossible that I've encountered.

 

[Jabba]

The only difference between the experiencers is their locations. They are exactly the same, but there are two of them.
Are we really having this discussion all over again?

Dave,
- Yeah. I'm still trying to nail down an issue that I thought we had nailed down several times before. See below.

Dave,
- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.
- The separateness of the brains would result in different experiencers (in that sense).
- How's that?

It would bring a new, identical experiencer to life. It would be somebody else who is exactly identical to you. Just like the body, including the brain, would be exactly identical to your body, but wouldn't be your body.

Dave,
- It would bring a new, identical but different experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME.
- And, the cause of the difference would be separate (different) brains.
- We've been tripping over the word "different." But, wouldn't you agree with what I just said?

I would agree with that the way you phrased it that time.

- Maybe, I can summarize now.
- You say that the experiencers would be different, but only in that they would be separate. Otherwise, they would be identical.
- I say that the separateness would be the cause of their primary difference. (This primary difference I have in mind being something perhaps impossible to confidently convey to one’s audience… But, I’ll try again anyway.)
- This new experiencer would be a different “who,” a different “person.” For instance, I would not be reincarnated by a duplication of my brain. In that sense, this new person would not be identical to the original person. And, he would not be identical in the most important sense. As in, again, I would not be reincarnated.
- So, my claim is that the scientific model would accept this (profound) difference between replicas, and that the difference is caused by separateness.

 

[jond]

Dave,
- Yeah. I'm still trying to nail down an issue that I thought we had nailed down several times before. See below.










- Maybe, I can summarize now.
- You say that the experiencers would be different, but only in that they would be separate. Otherwise, they would be identical.
- I say that the separateness would be the cause of their primary difference. (This primary difference I have in mind being something perhaps impossible to confidently convey to one’s audience… But, I’ll try again anyway.)
- This new experiencer would be a different “who,” a different “person.” For instance, I would not be reincarnated by a duplication of my brain. In that sense, this new person would not be identical to the original person. And, he would not be identical in the most important sense. As in, again, I would not be reincarnated.
- So, my claim is that the scientific model would accept this (profound) difference between replicas, and that the difference is caused by separateness.

If you actually read other peoples' responses, you would have your answer as to where you are going wrong.

 

[John Jones]

Dave,
- Yeah. I'm still trying to nail down an issue that I thought we had nailed down several times before. See below.










- Maybe, I can summarize now.
- You say that the experiencers would be different, but only in that they would be separate. Otherwise, they would be identical.
- I say that the separateness would be the cause of their primary difference. (This primary difference I have in mind being something perhaps impossible to confidently convey to one’s audience… But, I’ll try again anyway.)
- This new experiencer would be a different “who,” a different “person.” For instance, I would not be reincarnated by a duplication of my brain. In that sense, this new person would not be identical to the original person. And, he would not be identical in the most important sense. As in, again, I would not be reincarnated.
- So, my claim is that the scientific model would accept this (profound) difference between replicas, and that the difference is caused by separateness.

You mean a soul. Why don't you just say it?

 

[JoeMorgue]

- You say that the experiencers would be different, but only in that they would be separate. Otherwise, they would be identical.

Yes. What could you possibly find confusing about this?

Seriously do you not know what "separate" and "different" mean?

I say that the separateness would be the cause of their primary difference.

And you would be completely wrong and have zero evidence to support such a claim.

This new experiencer would be a different “who,” a different “person.”

You have elevated making distinctions without difference to a high art form.

For instance, I would not be reincarnated by a duplication of my brain. In that sense, this new person would not be identical to the original person. And, he would not be identical in the most important sense. As in, again, I would not be reincarnated.

Since to you the "most important sense" is some place to stick some Woo, sure whatever. Believe what ever you want.

So, my claim is that the scientific model would accept this (profound) difference between replicas, and that the difference is caused by separateness.

Are completely untrue, backed by zero evidence, devoid of anything that could even begin to grow into a rational thought, and nothing more but obvious Woo based wishful thinking.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,

- Maybe, I can summarize now.
- You say that the experiencers would be different, but only in that they would be separate. Otherwise, they would be identical.

Yes, that's what I've been saying.

- I say that the separateness would be the cause of their primary difference. (This primary difference I have in mind being something perhaps impossible to confidently convey to one’s audience… But, I’ll try again anyway.)
- This new experiencer would be a different “who,” a different “person.” For instance, I would not be reincarnated by a duplication of my brain. In that sense, this new person would not be identical to the original person.

I don't see any sense in which it wouldn't be identical to the original person. It would be a separate "who" that had exactly the same characteristics as the original "who".

And, he would not be identical in the most important sense. As in, again, I would not be reincarnated.
- So, my claim is that the scientific model would accept this (profound) difference between replicas, and that the difference is caused by separateness.

Your claim is wrong. In the scientific model, the difference wouldn't be caused by separateness, the only difference would be separateness.

What you're calling a profound difference isn't a difference at all.

 

[pakeha]

Dave,
- IOW, there would be no biochemical difference between the two experiencers?

Jabba keep in mind that what you call an experiencer isn't an entity but rather a suite of on-going processes of a living neurosystem.

 

[Akhenaten]

xt,
- Can an impossible combination be a potential combination?

Does it really take the opinion of another person for you to understand the stupidity of this question?

How in the name of Thoth are you defining "impossible"?

 

[Akhenaten]

Dave,
- IOW, there would be no biochemical difference between the two experiencers?

Assuming yet another affirmative answer to this question that you've asked and had answered dozens of times already, what is it that you're proposing that might account for a non-biochemical difference?

 

[carlitos]

xt,
- Can an impossible combination be a potential combination?

po·ten·tial
pəˈtenCHəl
adjective
1.
having or showing the capacity to become or develop into something in the future.
"a two-pronged campaign to woo potential customers"
synonyms: possible, likely, prospective, future, probable;​

Using standard English would greatly improve this discussion. Do impossible things show the capacity to develop into something? No, they do not.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Seriously Jabba do you not know how words work?

 

[Akhenaten]

Dave,
- We're having this discussion again because you had previously agreed that the experiencer in the replica brain, would be different than the experiencer in the original brain. But, at this point, you seem to be saying that there would be no difference between the two experiencers.

No, you're having the discussion again because no matter how politely and succinctly Dave explains things to you, you not only misrepresent what he tells you by switching between alternate meanings of common English words but you apply nebulous definitions to terms that make no sense at all outside of the incongruous confines of what we've all (mostly) come to know as the Jabbaverse.

 

[John Jones]

Dave,
- We're having this discussion again because you had previously agreed that the experiencer in the replica brain, would be different than the experiencer in the original brain. But, at this point, you seem to be saying that there would be no difference between the two experiencers.

Do you think we can't spot your habitual use of the equivocation fallacy?

 

[Loss Leader]

No, you're having the discussion again because no matter how politely and succinctly Dave explains things to you, you not only misrepresent his words by switching between alternate meanings of common English words but you apply nebulous meanings to terms that have no meaning at all outside of the incongruous confines of what we've all (mostly) come to know as the Jabbaverse.

Actually, you're having this discussion again because the next step after disproving the scientific model would be to consider alternative hypotheses and you have no idea how to exclude all of them except reincarnation. You also have no idea how to get your theory to apply only to humans and not to decks of cards, volkswagens, runners or eggplants.

So, you mercilessly stab away at the one and only point you think you can make - that an endless supply of souls is somewhere gestating in a metaphysical pool waiting for circumstances to be right to install themselves into a brain.

 

[Akhenaten]

Dave,
- Yeah. I'm still trying to nail down an issue that I thought we had nailed down several times before. See below.

<snip>

Jabba, this attempted ruse was old years ago.

Pretending to have resolved an issue and then attempting to revisit it by using different meanings of the words used in the initial resolution is not only blatantly dishonest but it's as transparent as liquidspacetime's æther.

Is this really the best that Truly Effective Debate™ has to offer?

- Maybe, I can summarize now.

No, you can't, because you equivocate "summarise" with "restate my initial claims for the infinitieth time".

- You say that the experiencers would be different, but only in that they would be separate. Otherwise, they would be identical.

You left out "instantaneously" but otherwise, so far so good.

- I say that the separateness would be the cause of their primary difference.

Oh goody. Now we're going to embark on a circumlocutory redefinition of "primary".

This'll end well.

(This primary difference I have in mind being something perhaps impossible to confidently convey to one’s audience… But, I’ll try again anyway.)

It's called a soul, Jabba.

Everyone has known that that's what you've been obliquely referring to all along so why not take the plunge and type it out loud.

At least that way you'll find yourself, for the first time ever, on the same page as everyone else.

- This new experiencer would be a different “who,” a different “person.”

Yes, a different mortal person.

And?

For instance, I would not be reincarnated by a duplication of my brain.

No, you'd be dead. So would Zombie Jabba®.

Not much immortality going on there, I'm afraid.

In that sense, this new person would not be identical to the original person.

In what frigging sense, for Isis' sake?

You make this assertion as though it's based on some previously established truth, which it quite clearly is not.

And, he would not be identical in the most important sense.

The most important sense is that he would be exactly as mortal as you were at the time of the duplication.

In the scenario that you've most often proposed "this sense" would equate to "dead". I'm fairly sure this is more or less the opposite of immortal.

As in, again, I would not be reincarnated.

No, you wouldn't.

If only you left that as your final statement on the subject then we could dismiss the jury and all head off for a few celebratory beverages.

- So, my claim is that the scientific model would accept this (profound) difference between replicas, and that the difference is caused by separateness.

I think you might have overlooked that the scientific model (even your pretend one) has no cognisance whatsoever for these imaginary replicas of which you have become so fond.

Come to think of it, you've probably overlooked pretty much else everything in the scientific theory belief model whatever you're calling it today.

Alas! No bevvies.