Proof of Immortality II

[xtifr]

- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.

Gah, we've been over this. More than once. Yes it would be you. It would be another you, but it would still be you. It would be YOU and it would be somebody else. Which is something that doesn't make much sense in plain English only because we're discussing impossible scenarios here.

- The separateness of the brains would result in different experiencers (in that sense).

Only in the sense that it would also result in different leg-lifting in different legs if the original was running at the moment of copying.

Jabba, if you woke up tomorrow and found another you lying beside you, you would have no way of knowing of you were the original or the copy, and neither would anyone else. And you would still be you in either case, so it really wouldn't matter. There'd just be two yous now.

There's no special property unique to the original. The original and copy are identical in all respects. There is no soul in the scientific model that is unique to a particular body. The moment you try to introduce any such concept, no matter how you try to phrase it, you are outside the scientific model, and can no longer use your premise to try to show the scientific model is self-contradictory, because what you're describing at that point is not the scientific model. Make up all the terms you want; it won't change that.

ETA: Religious scholars--many much smarter than you or I--have been trying to fit the soul into the scientific model for a long time, and have had no success. These are not new ideas you're throwing out. The implications of matter duplicators with respect to the soul has been debated in science fictional circles since the 1930s or so. It's an old, tired argument.

 

[Agatha]

1) Die

2) ?

3) Immortality

Somehow, I doubt step two is "collect underpants"!

Jabba, if you (and therefore your brain) was dead, all the imaginary replication of brains in the world would not result in a new consciousness because consciousness is an emergent property of a living neurosystem.

If replication of a person was possible (which I trust you accept is not), then replication of a person would result in two identical but separate persons. Both would be identical but separate MEs, identical but separate selves, SELVES, "selves", experiencers or whatever the term du jour is. No matter what word you are using, they would be identical but separate. Not different except that they cannot occupy the same point in spacetime, which means that their experiences will begin to diverge.

When you propose that they would be different, what do you mean by the word "different"?

 

[Mojo]

Not different except that they cannot occupy the same point in spacetime, which means that their experiences will begin to diverge.

And note, Jabba: even before their experiences begin to diverge, they will still be separate entities.

 

[jond]

Jabba, hope you're enjoying Oregon. Portland is my second home, both my kids are in college out there (Reed & Whitman). It's beautiful this time of year, and was particularly so a couple weeks ago when I had a long weekend out there.

Please, read the responses from the many contributors. Agatha's excellent post very clearly answers your question and should put an end to your side discussion of duplicate brains. Read it, read it again, and then if you have questions about it, ask them.

ETA: Agatha's Post #723

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.

It would bring a new, identical experiencer to life. It would be somebody else who is exactly identical to you. Just like the body, including the brain, would be exactly identical to your body, but wouldn't be your body.

 

[Akhenaten]

It would bring a new, identical experiencer to life.

Except that it would be dead, which I imagine would severely limit its capacity to do very much experiencing.

It would be somebody else who is exactly identical to you. Just like the body, including the brain, would be exactly identical to your body, but wouldn't be your body.

It would, however, be just as dead.


Sorry to gainsay you, Dave, but if we're going to continue with this ridiculous replicated brain hypothesis then we may as well go the whole nine yards.

 

[Jabba]

It would bring a new, identical experiencer to life. It would be somebody else who is exactly identical to you. Just like the body, including the brain, would be exactly identical to your body, but wouldn't be your body.

Dave,
- It would bring a new, identical but different experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME.
- And, the cause of the difference would be separate (different) brains.
- We've been tripping over the word "different." But, wouldn't you agree with what I just said?

 

[Slowvehicle]

Dave,
- It would bring a new, identical but different experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME.
- And, the cause of the difference would be separate (different) brains.
- We've been tripping over the word "different." But, wouldn't you agree with what I just said?

Good Morning, Mr. Savage!

It would be refreshing if you would pay attention.

Your hypothetical duplication (which is not now, nor may it ever be, physically possible), if it worked as has been hypothesized, would "bring" a new, "identical" emergent consciousness, which would believe that it was, in fact, "you". Each consciousness would be convinced, in fact, that it was the "original", and the other was the "duplicate"; and there would be no way for either to gainsay the other.

It has been a while since I bothered to ask this, but what has this to do with your claim that the "soul" exists,and is "immortal"?

 

[Mojo]

Dave,
- It would bring a new, identical but different experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME.

But it wouldn't be different from you. That's what "identical" means.

I think the word you need here is "separate" rather than "different".

 

[Loss Leader]

Dave,
- It would bring a new, identical but different experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME.
- And, the cause of the difference would be separate (different) brains.
- We've been tripping over the word "different." But, wouldn't you agree with what I just said?

It does not matter.

1) There is no "experiencer." The thing you call an "experiencer" is a constantly changing process of a biological system. There is no continuous "experiencer."

2) Even if everything you're saying were true, there would still not be an infinite amount of anything. A whole lot multiplied by a whole lot is still a finite amount. You cannot count to infinity. So, the entire tangent is completely pointless.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- It would bring a new, identical but different experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME.
- And, the cause of the difference would be separate (different) brains.
- We've been tripping over the word "different." But, wouldn't you agree with what I just said?

I would agree with that the way you phrased it that time.

 

[Humots]

Dave,
- It would bring a new, identical but different experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME.
- And, the cause of the difference would be separate (different) brains.
- We've been tripping over the word "different." But, wouldn't you agree with what I just said?

But it wouldn't be different from you. That's what "identical" means.

I think the word you need here is "separate" rather than "different".

Exactly! Well said! Take note, Jabba.

 

[xtifr]

I think the word you need here is "separate" rather than "different".

Indeed, that's an excellent way of putting it.

English is not well-designed to deal with this sort of impossible scenario, just as it's not well-designed to cope with time travel. So we have to be extremely careful not to get stuck on the shoals of semantics.

Jabba: you still haven't even begun to address how brain->consciousness->YOU is different from legs->running->leg-lifting. Without that, this whole line of argument seems pointless.

And, sadly, you haven't even begun to think about how teleportation is indistinguishable from destroying the original when creating the copy, which pretty much torpedoes your whole line of argument. Not only are there not infinite possible SELVES, but this shows that there's nothing special about a particular SELF either.

As I said last post, this is not some brilliant new idea you've come up with; this is something that extremely smart people have been pondering for many decades, since the notion of matter-duplicators first appeared in science fiction. You're treading over well-worn ground here.

 

[Jabba]

It would bring a new, identical experiencer to life. It would be somebody else who is exactly identical to you. Just like the body, including the brain, would be exactly identical to your body, but wouldn't be your body.

But it wouldn't be different from you. That's what "identical" means.

I think the word you need here is "separate" rather than "different".

Mojo,

- From www.thefreedictionary.com/different:
1. Unlike in form, quality, amount, or nature; dissimilar: took different approaches to the problem.
2. Distinct or separate: That's a different issue altogether.

- I think this distinction is a serious discussion on its own, all by itself -- but for now, I’ll just say that I’m using definition #2, but need to use the word “different” rather than “separate” because of different implications in “different”…

 

[carlitos]

Just give it up, already. Sheesh.

 

[PixyMisa]

Mojo,

- From www.thefreedictionary.com/different:
1. Unlike in form, quality, amount, or nature; dissimilar: took different approaches to the problem.
2. Distinct or separate: That's a different issue altogether.

- I think this distinction is a serious discussion on its own, all by itself -- but for now, I’ll just say that I’m using definition #2, but need to use the word “different” rather than “separate” because of different implications in “different”…

What you mean is, if you don't use "different", your argument collapses.

Well, news for you Jabba: Your argument collapsed the moment you thought it up.

 

[Hokulele]

Mojo,

- From www.thefreedictionary.com/different:
1. Unlike in form, quality, amount, or nature; dissimilar: took different approaches to the problem.
2. Distinct or separate: That's a different issue altogether.

- I think this distinction is a serious discussion on its own, all by itself -- but for now, I’ll just say that I’m using definition #2, but need to use the word “different” rather than “separate” because of different implications in “different”…

Ah, deliberate equivocation. How refreshing.

 

[godless dave]

In this case, the only difference between the selves is that they are separate.

 

[Mojo]

Mojo,

- From www.thefreedictionary.com/different:
1. Unlike in form, quality, amount, or nature; dissimilar: took different approaches to the problem.
2. Distinct or separate: That's a different issue altogether.

- I think this distinction is a serious discussion on its own, all by itself -- but for now, I’ll just say that I’m using definition #2, but need to use the word “different” rather than “separate” because of different implications in “different”…

The "different implications" being the unsupported assertion that you are trying to sneak past us.

 

[Akhenaten]

Mojo,

- From www.thefreedictionary.com/different:
1. Unlike in form, quality, amount, or nature; dissimilar: took different approaches to the problem.
2. Distinct or separate: That's a different issue altogether.

- I think this distinction is a serious discussion on its own, all by itself -- but for now, I’ll just say that I’m using definition #2, but need to use the word “different” rather than “separate” because of different implications in “different”…

Same

Different

Identical

Separate​

Are we on the same page yet?