Proof of Immortality II

[Butter!]

Jabba, it might help if you laid out some exact definitions with which we can work from here on out. Please define identity, self, experiencer, consciousness and any other terms you think we might need now, using the definitions with which you'd like everyone to move forward. It would really help if we all had some common ground here, wouldn't you say?

The definitions keep shifting and my head feels like it's going to explode trying to sort it all out.

 

[Akhenaten]

- I thought that we understood each other about the meaning of "identity." What am I missing?

An argument.

 

[Agatha]

- From the following, I had understood that you accepted that “identity” was an emergent property.

What do you mean by "pre-existing"? That's the phrase here that troubles me most. You are a physical phenomenon. Your consciousness is an emergent property of the functioning of your brain.

Jabba, xtifr wrote consciousness, not identity, in the above quote. Consciousness and identity are not synonymous.

Looks like I still don't understand what you're saying.
- I think of "identity" as being part of consciousness (which you accept is an emergent property).

A sense of identity is part of consciousness, that doesn't mean that the identity of someone is the same as their consciousness, or that the words are synonymous.

- I think of "identity" as the same "thing" as the experiencer (as in "features" versus "identity").
- I thought that we understood each other about the meaning of "identity." What am I missing?

That you are using words in an idiosyncratic way?

Perhaps, as isissxn so sensibly suggests, you could define your terms so that we can see where the unbridgeable gulf is located between your definitions and the general understanding of words such as identity, self, experiencer, consciousness and emergence.

- Would "experiencers" differ from one replica to the other?

No. Not at the moment of replication. At that moment, nobody would be able to identify which was the replica and which the original. Both copy and original would believe themselves to be the original, both would have identical (but separate) memories, feelings, thoughts, and senses of identity.

Because two objects cannot occupy the same point in spacetime, their experiences would immediately start to diverge and both original and copy would start to be slightly different. However, it would still be the case that both would firmly believe themselves to be the original, and it would still be the case that there would be no way ever to tell which was the original and which the copy. Throughout the lifetimes of their consciousnesses, both would be indistinguishable from the original.

However, as this replication remains in the realm of fantasy, is it possible we could move on to some of your ideas on immortality?

Defining some of your terms would be a good start, but it would also be super if you could give us some ideas of how you think an emergent property of a neurosystem could survive the death of that neurosystem.

Can a traffic jam still exist when all the cars are parked back at people's residences? If not, how does the emergent property of consciousness differ from the emergent property of traffic jams?

 

[jond]

Jabba, xtifr wrote consciousness, not identity, in the above quote. Consciousness and identity are not synonymous.


A sense of identity is part of consciousness, that doesn't mean that the identity of someone is the same as their consciousness, or that the words are synonymous.



That you are using words in an idiosyncratic way?

Perhaps, as isissxn so sensibly suggests, you could define your terms so that we can see where the unbridgeable gulf is located between your definitions and the general understanding of words such as identity, self, experiencer, consciousness and emergence.

No. Not at the moment of replication. At that moment, nobody would be able to identify which was the replica and which the original. Both copy and original would believe themselves to be the original, both would have identical (but separate) memories, feelings, thoughts, and senses of identity.

Because two objects cannot occupy the same point in spacetime, their experiences would immediately start to diverge and both original and copy would start to be slightly different. However, it would still be the case that both would firmly believe themselves to be the original, and it would still be the case that there would be no way ever to tell which was the original and which the copy. Throughout the lifetimes of their consciousnesses, both would be indistinguishable from the original.

However, as this replication remains in the realm of fantasy, is it possible we could move on to some of your ideas on immortality?

Defining some of your terms would be a good start, but it would also be super if you could give us some ideas of how you think an emergent property of a neurosystem could survive the death of that neurosystem.

Can a traffic jam still exist when all the cars are parked back at people's residences? If not, how does the emergent property of consciousness differ from the emergent property of traffic jams?

This is an excellent post that I fear won't be read by Jabba. I wonder if either Xtifer or GodlessDave could be so good as to present it?

 

[Jabba]

No. Each would have its own experiencer, just like each one had its own brain, but the only difference between the experiencers would be which brain they were produced by.

Dave,
- My claim is that science would say that the different (separate) brains is the cause of different experiencers. Would you agree with that?
- I accept that the difference (separateness) of the brains is the cause of the difference between experiencers. How's that?
- Just trying to nail down a word to use for the difference between the two consciousnesses. I'm saying that what we're calling "identical" brains would still have different experiencers.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- My claim is that science would say that the different (separate) brains is the cause of different experiencers. Would you agree with that?
- I accept that the difference (separateness) of the brains is the cause of the difference between experiencers. How's that?

I would say the different (separate) brains is the cause of the different (separate) experiencers.

- Just trying to nail down a word to use for the difference between the two consciousnesses. I'm saying that what we're calling "identical" brains would still have different experiencers.

And I'm saying that in the scientific model, two identical brains would have two separate, identical experiencers, because the brain produces the experiencer.

The experiences, like the brains, would be separate and identical.

 

[Agatha]

This is an excellent post that I fear won't be read by Jabba. I wonder if either Xtifer or GodlessDave could be so good as to present it?

Either xtifr or godless Dave are more than welcome to c&p or quote my post, or even present it as their own if they feel that it would help move the conversation along, and that Jabba would read it.

 

[Loss Leader]

Dave,
- My claim is that science would say that the different (separate) brains is the cause of different experiencers. Would you agree with that?
- I accept that the difference (separateness) of the brains is the cause of the difference between experiencers. How's that?
- Just trying to nail down a word to use for the difference between the two consciousnesses. I'm saying that what we're calling "identical" brains would still have different experiencers.

You say "experiencer" but you mean some unchanging self or soul. It doesn't exist in the scientific model.

 

[xtifr]

170- Looks like I still don't understand what you're saying.
- I think of "identity" as being part of consciousness (which you accept is an emergent property).
- I think of "identity" as the same "thing" as the experiencer (as in "features" versus "identity").
- I thought that we understood each other about the meaning of "identity." What am I missing?

The word identity has multiple meanings, and we definitely got our wires crossed somewhere in here. One meaning is the sense of self, but that's not the sense I was talking about. I was talking about the mathematical/physical sense. Two is two. Each photon that exists has a separate physical identity, but no photon has a sense of identity.

I tried to be clear which meaning of identity I was referring to by repeatedly saying "mathematical identity" or "physical identity", but I may not have been as careful as I should.

Anyway, the original person and the copy differ only in their physical identity. They will both have an identical sense-of-self identity, so they can't be distinguished that way. Which is why, as I keep saying, teleportation is indistinguishable from destroying the original when you make the copy.

So, no, if you think the copy can be distinguished from the original by a sense of identity (as opposed to physical identity), that's not true. They can't. There is no difference between their senses of identity. Only between their physical identities. Each has a separate sense of identity, but those senses of identity are both identical and indistinguishable. And again, if they were running, each would have a separate leg-lifting too. Consciousness/sense-of-self/sense-of-identity are no different from running/leg-lifting.

As Agatha put it in her excellent post:

At that moment [of replication], nobody would be able to identify which was the replica and which the original. Both copy and original would believe themselves to be the original, both would have identical (but separate) memories, feelings, thoughts, and senses of identity.

Because two objects cannot occupy the same point in spacetime, their experiences would immediately start to diverge and both original and copy would start to be slightly different. However, it would still be the case that both would firmly believe themselves to be the original, and it would still be the case that there would be no way ever to tell which was the original and which the copy. Throughout the lifetimes of their consciousnesses, both would be indistinguishable from the original.

However, as this replication remains in the realm of fantasy, is it possible we could move on to some of your ideas on immortality?

Defining some of your terms would be a good start, but it would also be super if you could give us some ideas of how you think an emergent property of a neurosystem could survive the death of that neurosystem.

Can a traffic jam still exist when all the cars are parked back at people's residences? If not, how does the emergent property of consciousness differ from the emergent property of traffic jams?

 

[PixyMisa]

You say "experiencer" but you mean some unchanging self or soul. It doesn't exist in the scientific model.

That is indeed the problem. No matter what word Jabba is using, he is referring to an aimmaterial immortal soul.

Jabba thinks that the scientific model doesn't account for the soul. This is correct. And the reason is, there is no such thing.

 

[Akhenaten]

No. Each would have its own experiencer, just like each one had its own brain, but the only difference between the experiencers, would be which brain they were produced by.

Dave,
- My claim is that science would say that the different (separate) brains is the cause of different experiencers. Would you agree with that?

No, your claim is that you're immortal. All this guff about identical brains is simply a huge red herring.

I doubt that science is even remotely interested in the subject.

- I accept that the difference (separateness) of the brains is the cause of the difference between experiencers. How's that?

I would have thought that given two identical brains to start with, the differences that subsequently developed between them would be the result of experiences.

Having said that, it seems that you're forever doomed to create vague and meaningless posts because of your penchant for using alternative meanings of the same word within single propositions.

- Just trying to nail down a word to use for the difference between the two consciousnesses.

Try "individuality". It won't help one little bit, but it's a word that hasn't yet been defined in Jabbanese and the more the merrier, as they say.

I'm saying that what we're calling "identical" brains would still have different experiencers.

Only as a result of new experiences that occurred after the instant of their creation. Lacking those different experiences, the brains (and therefore the experiencers) would indeed be identical. But not the same. Because they'd be two separate individuals. Which isn't the same as being the SAME, if I'm remembering my Jabbanese correctly.

 

[pakeha]

Consciousness including the sense of self is an emergent property of a neurosystem.

Identity is not equivalent to the sense of self, although a feeling of personal identity is of course part of consciousness. Identity and the feeling of personal identity is not the same.

Even the rich English language uses single words which encompass many shades of meaning. The problem Jabba is facing here is that he is taking one word (such as identity) and using it in a way where the wrong definition shores up his ideas.

Very well said!

Seconded.

768

797xt,
- From the following, I had understood that you accepted that “identity” was an emergent property.

85

170- Looks like I still don't understand what you're saying.
- I think of "identity" as being part of consciousness (which you accept is an emergent property).
- I think of "identity" as the same "thing" as the experiencer (as in "features" versus "identity").
- I thought that we understood each other about the meaning of "identity." What am I missing?

Everything, from trying to separate consciousness from it's nature as a physical process to trying to shoe-horn an experiencer into the mix.

 

[Jabba]

I would say the different (separate) brains is the cause of the different (separate) experiencers.
And I'm saying that in the scientific model, two identical brains would have two separate, identical experiencers, because the brain produces the experiencer.

Dave,
- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.
- The separateness of the brains would result in different experiencers (in that sense).
- How's that?

 

[Loss Leader]

Dave,
- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.
- The separateness of the brains would result in different experiencers (in that sense).
- How's that?

Meaningless.

We don't have to wait until you die to replicate your brain. We have to wait, maybe, ten seconds. Every moment of your life is an almost exact replica of the moment before. But it's never an exact replica, there's always some small difference - location, memories, even a single atom. So, even during your life, there are trillions upon trillions of you.

None of this means that there are ever an infinite number of you, or that there ever could be. So, as stated, this entire tangent is meaningless.

 

[Mojo]

- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.

If the brain was perfectly replicated, is would be somebody else that was identical to you at that point.

- The separateness of the brains would result in different experiencers (in that sense).

But they would, if the brain was reproduced exactly, be identical.

 

[Giordano]

Dave,
- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.
- The separateness of the brains would result in different experiencers (in that sense).
- How's that?

I am gradually learning to not post in this thread. But please, Jabba: you have been told before. If we perfectly replicate your brain after you die, your replicate would be dead too. At least acknowledge this much. Thanks!

 

[pakeha]

Dave,
- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.
- The separateness of the brains would result in different experiencers (in that sense).
- How's that?

Not good, Jabba.
Have you forgotten how consciousness is defined?

 

[John Jones]

Dave,
- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.
- The separateness of the brains would result in different experiencers (in that sense).
- How's that?

Let's try an experiment in immortality.

1) Die

2)

 

[Akhenaten]

Dave,
- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.

Yep. And they'd be dead.

- The separateness of the brains would result in different experiencers (in that sense).

And you'd have demonstrated that immortality isn't a thing. Twice.

- How's that?

Pointless.

 

[Mojo]

Let's try an experiment in immortality.

1) Die

2)

1) Die

2) ?

3) Immortality