Proof of Immortality II

[Loss Leader]

And an oldie but goodie, V.S. Ramachandran's Phantoms in the Brain.

... which is cited with great approval in The Dueling Neurosurgeons.

 

[Loss Leader]

But anyway, if time is actually infinite[i/], I think that P(ME|A) should still be 1/∞ rather than ∞/∞ , or 1. I say that because the time coordinate for ME should still be singular throughout an infinity of time.
- If time is actually finite (and there are no other universes after ours, or co-existent with ours) what is the likelihood that my would-be-time-coordinate would be too late?

Good gosh, something can be infinite and still have a location. You can set boundaries upon an infinite line. There are an infinite amount of numbers, but we can still find 2 and add 3 to it.

 

[jond]

Yes, but not for the reason you think. The "time coordinate" for a particular you is singular because your consciousness is a process, not a thing. It does not remain the same, but is determined by the exact state of your brain at the particular time.

Which means that it would be a continuum of singular points throughout his life. Jabba will never address this, however.

 

[Jabba]

688

- We're talking about a different kind of difference here. We have the “basic physical” difference, and another difference that I’ll call the “emergent property” difference...

Once again, this difference would not exist in the scientific model...

Dave,
- This might just be words getting me confused, but we've all agreed that in the scientific model, there's the basic physical brain, and then there's its emergent property of consciousness.

 

[Akhenaten]

688

Dave,
- This might just be words getting me confused, but we've all agreed that in the scientific model, there's the basic physical brain, and then there's its emergent property of consciousness.

Ignoring, just for the moment, that you have no way of knowing what "we've all agreed to", you appear here to be doing nothing more than restating what the LCP has said but in a way that you seem to hope will be construed as meaning that the physical brain and its emergent consciousness are in some way separable.

As usual, it won't work.

 

[godless dave]

688

Dave,
- This might just be words getting me confused, but we've all agreed that in the scientific model, there's the basic physical brain, and then there's its emergent property of consciousness.

That's not what I'm talking about not being in the scientific model. I'm talking about the special difference you're postulating not being in the scientific model.

In the scientific model, if two brains were identical, the emergent properties of those brains would also be identical.

 

[Akhenaten]

In the scientific model, if two brains were identical, the emergent properties of those brains would also be identical.

My understanding is that the Jabbanetic model (which Jabba believes should be the scientific model) holds that consciousness (or whatever it's being called today) consists not only of the emergent properties of a physical brain but also contains a ME factor which, of necessity in terms of immortality, may only exist once.

I think this is the main conflict between reality and Jabbanetics™. Reality, at least hypothetically, allows for perfect replicas whereas Jabbanetics™ doesn't. If it did, Jabba would be able to explain whether it was the original or the copy which contained the immortal soul.

Although getting him to admit that he's actually been talking about immortal souls for all this time is probably the biggest hurdle to jump in exposing that particular line of argument.

 

[xtifr]

- I suspect that #1 is not just relevant -- it's critical. And for me at least, #1 will take some heavy thinking.

So, in other words, you were trying to put words in my mouth again. Really bad form, Jabba! I already said that I'm not sure it's reasonable to say that differences have causes, and then you try to pretend that I've agreed that a specific difference has a cause.

Causes (in the technical causality sense) are events. Differences aren't events. They're not even things. They're closer to being abstract concepts, like numbers.

But at least we've finally agreed that leg-lifting in running is no different from the self in consciousness.

- We're talking about a different kind of difference here. We have the “basic physical” difference, and another difference that I’ll call the “emergent property” difference -- if that’s acceptable to you. (Just seeing if we can find some words that we can both agree upon…)

You're talking about. I've agreed that there are two kinds of differences: differences of identity and differences of features. Now you're trying to introduce a third kind. No, I don't agree. At best, you're talking about something that's orthogonal to the two kinds of differences we've actually agreed on, and is thus irrelevant. (Not that any of this seems relevant to me.)

Furthermore, leg-lifting is not an emergent property. It's just an ordinary property of legs. "Emergent" is, in fact, a basically subjective classification. And it's certainly not relevant, since we're talking about leg-lifting.

So the proper term for your hypothetical concept would simply be "property difference".

- Anyway, I’m claiming that the basic physical difference is the cause of the emergent property difference – even though the result here would seem to be simultaneous with the cause (much like quantum entanglement?).

And now you've gone completely off the rails. "Like quantum entanglement?" It's pretty clear you have no idea what those words even mean. Though at least you had the decency to add a question-mark. So I'll answer what appears to be a question: no, it's absolutely nothing like quantum entanglement, any more than weight is like smell.

A physical difference is not an event, therefore it is not a cause of anything. And that's all I'm going to say on the topic unless you can show the relevance of the question.

- But anyway, if time is actually infinite[i/], I think that P(ME|A) should still be 1/∞ rather than ∞/∞ , or 1. I say that because the time coordinate for ME should still be singular throughout an infinity of time.

That's like saying that if you flip a coin ten times, you should factor in the infinite number of sequences that aren't ten long to determine the probability of the sequence you came up with. Probability doesn't work that way.

In any case, you don't get to pick something the scientific model allows but doesn't require, and claim that disproves the scientific model.

- If time is actually finite (and there are no other universes after ours, or co-existent with ours) what is the likelihood that my would-be-time-coordinate would be too late?

The inverse of the probability that you exist. Which is finite.

As I pointed out before, if time is actually infinite and people can occur anywhere in time, then you get the infinite monkey paradox: the chance of your existence becomes one, not zero. And if time is finite, the probability of your existence is finite. There is no case where your probability becomes zero.

Infinity is not a number and does not work the way you seem to think. Trying to treat it as a number leads to all sorts of paradoxes. For example, a circle with an infinite radius has a straight line as its circumference, because its curvature is zero. But it's still a circle, because it has a radius.

 

[pakeha]

[ . . . ]
- We're talking about a different kind of difference here. We have the “basic physical” difference, and another difference that I’ll call the “emergent property” difference -- if that’s acceptable to you. (Just seeing if we can find some words that we can both agree upon…)
- Anyway, I’m claiming that the basic physical difference is the cause of the emergent property difference – even though the result here would seem to be simultaneous with the cause (much like quantum entanglement?).[ . . . ]

No, Jabba.
An emergent property of a functioning neurosystem is physical, nothing more.

688

Dave,
- This might just be words getting me confused, but we've all agreed that in the scientific model, there's the basic physical brain, and then there's its emergent property of consciousness.

No, Jabba.
Remember what an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem is?

 

[Jabba]

695

688
Dave,
- This might just be words getting me confused, but we've all agreed that in the scientific model, there's the basic physical brain, and then there's its emergent property of consciousness.

That's not what I'm talking about not being in the scientific model. I'm talking about the special difference you're postulating not being in the scientific model.
In the scientific model, if two brains were identical, the emergent properties of those brains would also be identical.

- But they wouldn't be identical in the sense of their SELVES.
- There is a way in which the emergent properties of those two brains would not be identical. And, if there is a way in which the emergent properties are not identical, they are not identical. The issue becomes, what causes they're difference?

 

[Akhenaten]

695

- But they wouldn't be identical in the sense of their SELVES.

Why not?

- There is a way in which the emergent properties of those two brains would not be identical.

Want to share?

And, if there is a way in which the emergent properties are not identical, they are not identical.

As always, you're leaping ahead to a conclusion without bothering to explain its basis.

The issue becomes, what causes they're difference?

Any chance of you telling us what you think this difference actually is?

 

[pakeha]

695

- But they wouldn't be identical in the sense of their SELVES.
- There is a way in which the emergent properties of those two brains would not be identical. And, if there is a way in which the emergent properties are not identical, they are not identical. The issue becomes, what causes they're difference?

There's no issue whatsoever, Jabba.
Remember what inputs there are to the emergent property called consciousness?

 

[PixyMisa]

695

- But they wouldn't be identical in the sense of their SELVES.

They would be identical in every property that actually exists. They would not necessarily be identical in properties that do not exist, that are not even logically coherent concepts, but that doesn't matter a whole lot.

- There is a way in which the emergent properties of those two brains would not be identical.

No there isn't. There's just two of them.

And, if there is a way in which the emergent properties are not identical, they are not identical. The issue becomes, what causes they're difference?

There's no difference; they're identical. THERE'S JUST TWO OF THEM.

 

[Pixel42]

- But they wouldn't be identical in the sense of their SELVES.

Yes they would. There would be two identical selves.

- There is a way in which the emergent properties of those two brains would not be identical.

No there isn't.

And, if there is a way in which the emergent properties are not identical, they are not identical.

The emergent properties are identical.

The issue becomes, what causes they're difference?

There is no difference other than their spacetime co-ordinates, and the cause of that difference is that there are two of them.

 

[Mojo]

There is a way in which the emergent properties of those two brains would not be identical. And, if there is a way in which the emergent properties are not identical, they are not identical. The issue becomes, what causes they're difference?

How neatly circular.

 

[Loss Leader]

695

- But they wouldn't be identical in the sense of their SELVES.

SELVES isn't a thing. Is going 65 in a red VW a different going 65 than it is in a white VW?

Is the addition function in 2 + 3 any different than the addition function of 7 + 4?

 

[godless dave]

695

- But they wouldn't be identical in the sense of their SELVES.

Why not?

- There is a way in which the emergent properties of those two brains would not be identical.

Not in the scientific model.

 

[xtifr]

- But they wouldn't be identical in the sense of their SELVES.

They would indeed be identical. They just wouldn't share a mathematical identity. Remember, we've identified two types of differences, and not-being-identical is the type of difference that doesn't apply in this case.

Plus, the same thing applies to running and leg-lifting. Have you given up on trying to distinguish that case?

- There is a way in which the emergent properties of those two brains would not be identical. And, if there is a way in which the emergent properties are not identical, they are not identical.

Incorrect premise leads to incorrect conclusion. They are identical.

But even if it were true, that logic would also apply to leg-lifting.

The issue becomes, what causes they're difference?

*their

Differences are an abstract concept, like numbers, and don't have actual causes. The only thing you can call a "cause" of a difference is the causes of the things that are different. Nothing causes the difference between elephants and squids. Elephants and squids each have their own causes, and the fact that those causes aren't the same is why they happen to be different.

But even if that weren't true, your logic would also apply to leg-lifting.

Remember, to show that SELF is magic, you've got to prove that it's not perfectly analogous to leg-lifting (or prove that leg-lifts are immortal).

 

[Hokulele]

- But they wouldn't be identical in the sense of their SELVES.
- There is a way in which the emergent properties of those two brains would not be identical. And, if there is a way in which the emergent properties are not identical, they are not identical. The issue becomes, what causes they're difference?

How can you tell them apart?

 

[Akhenaten]

Are we about due for an explanation of how selves can be identical but SELVES can't?

Or something.