Proof of Immortality II

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If I can legitimately use 1/1080! as P(me|A), I win. Variation re the other entries won’t make any difference as to the correct conclusion. Re this opinion, I have very little doubt.

You are wrong.

The issue has never been the probability of your existence. The issue has always been whether or not your existence is less likely than any other.

You have not show this. You "win" nothing.

In order for me to properly use 1/1080! for P(me|A) [instead of 1.00] in the Bayes formula, my current existence needs to be somehow “set apart” from the 1080! other potential selves in the bucket from which I was chosen. If I am just one of the crowd, P(me|A) is simply 1.00. I have very little doubt re this opinion also (though a bucket of potential selves seems to contradict something I had said previously...).

Again, wrong. P(you|A) remains what it always was. P(someone|A) is one.

The question is not "how unlikely am I". It is "how unlikely am I compared to everyone else". As it is, all that you've done is establish that there is a staggering number of possible brains that might come into existence. That does not make any single, specific brain's existence at all significant from a probabilistic standpoint. One of them was going to turn up.

In addition, my current existence needs to be set apart in such a way as to suggest that there exists a more probable explanation than “A.” I also have very little doubt about this opinion.

This, at least, is true. You do lack evidence for immortality, even granting everything about your argument up to this point.

I think that most of you will not appreciate the above, and will fuss at me for saying that I will try to do something instead of just trying to do it. For now, I’m pretty sure that thusly stating my current position is, in fact, functional.

It isn't.

We’ll see.

We already do.
 
What most makes for effective debate is for opponents to truly own up to their own doubts.
I would urge you all to truly step back and admit of your own doubts -- to yourselves, if no one else.

1. The proper formula to use in determining the post-probability of “A”: P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)*P(~A)).
1.1. “A”: the hypothesis that I have only one, finite, life to live.
1.2. “me”: my current existence.
1.3. “~A”: any hypothesis other than “A.”
I have very little doubt as to this being the appropriate formula for determining the post-probability of “A.”

2. If I can legitimately use 1/1080! as P(me|A), I win. Variation re the other entries won’t make any difference as to the correct conclusion. Re this opinion, I have very little doubt.

3. In order for me to properly use 1/1080! for P(me|A) [instead of 1.00] in the Bayes formula, my current existence needs to be somehow “set apart” from the 1080! other potential selves in the bucket from which I was chosen. If I am just one of the crowd, P(me|A) is simply 1.00. I have very little doubt re this opinion also (though a bucket of potential selves seems to contradict something I had said previously...).

4. In addition, my current existence needs to be set apart in such a way as to suggest that there exists a more probable explanation than “A.” I also have very little doubt about this opinion.

5. At this point in the game, my only significant doubt that “A” is incorrect lies in my opinion that I can legitimately use 1/1080! as P(me|A).


6. I’m pretty sure that such is how I perceive our current state of affairs. If I can show that my use of 1/1080! as P(me|A) is legitimate, I win.

7. I think that most of you will not appreciate the above, and will fuss at me for saying that I will try to do something instead of just trying to do it. For now, I’m pretty sure that thusly stating my current position is, in fact, functional. We’ll see.

I admit that I doubt that any of the spoilered text, or anything else you have said, addresses in any substantive way your claims that the "soul" exists, and is "immortal".

Do you ever intend to address that?
 
What most makes for effective debate is for opponents to truly own up to their own doubts. I would urge you all to truly step back and admit of your own doubts -- to yourselves, if no one else.

1. The proper formula to use in determining the post-probability of “A”: P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)*P(~A)).
1.1. “A”: the hypothesis that I have only one, finite, life to live.
1.2. “me”: my current existence.
1.3. “~A”: any hypothesis other than “A.”
I have very little doubt as to this being the appropriate formula for determining the post-probability of “A.”

2. If I can legitimately use 1/1080! as P(me|A), I win


No, you don't "win." At the absolute best, you show that anything other than the current scientific model is more likely than what we currently understand. The set of anything else is infinitely huge. It covers, literally, any other thing that the imagination can conceive and more.

You have never shown why your immortality is the most likely candidate for anything other than A. You have never shown why it's a candidate that isn't actually inconsistent with observation.
 
What most makes for effective debate is for opponents to truly own up to their own doubts. I would urge you all to truly step back and admit of your own doubts -- to yourselves, if no one else.

1. The proper formula to use in determining the post-probability of “A”: P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)*P(~A)).

The proper formula really is P(A|me)*P(me) = P(me|A)*P(A). Moving P(me) to the denominator of the right-hand side is no big deal since we can assume P(me) is different from zero. Insisting on the expansion P(me) = P(me|A)*P(A) + P(me|~A)*P(~A) serves no purpose other than to let you obfuscate the reasonableness of your probability/likelihood estimates and to give you an extra degree of freedom in forcing the desired outcome.

1.1. “A”: the hypothesis that I have only one, finite, life to live.
1.2. “me”: my current existence.

I see you have changed the meaning of A yet again. You really need to settle on something.

1.3. “~A”: any hypothesis other than “A.”

No, not "any". ~A is all possible realities other than A.

I have very little doubt as to this being the appropriate formula for determining the post-probability of “A.”

2. If I can legitimately use 1/1080! as P(me|A), I win. Variation re the other entries won’t make any difference as to the correct conclusion. Re this opinion, I have very little doubt.

That simply is not true. I would maintain that your existence across all the ~A realities is considerably less than P(me|A). Having P(me|~A) << P(me|A) is very damaging to your whole argument.

3. In order for me to properly use 1/1080! for P(me|A) [instead of 1.00] in the Bayes formula, my current existence needs to be somehow “set apart” from the 1080! other potential selves in the bucket from which I was chosen. If I am just one of the crowd, P(me|A) is simply 1.00. I have very little doubt re this opinion also (though a bucket of potential selves seems to contradict something I had said previously...).

4. In addition, my current existence needs to be set apart in such a way as to suggest that there exists a more probable explanation than “A.” I also have very little doubt about this opinion.

This doesn't help you. TSS fallacy discussion aside, ~A isn't one, atomic thing. It is all possible things that aren't A. Sure, some of the members of ~A will have the likelihood of Jabba's existence greater than in A, but that does not in any way support your conclusion.

You need to show that across all of ~A, Jabba's existence is more likely.

5. At this point in the game, my only significant doubt that “A” is incorrect lies in my opinion that I can legitimately use 1/1080! as P(me|A).

That's your only doubt? Seriously?

6. I’m pretty sure that such is how I perceive our current state of affairs. If I can show that my use of 1/1080! as P(me|A) is legitimate, I win.

Again, no. I am willing to concede your value for P(me|A) (assuming you pin down A to be something more inline with the scientific understanding of reality). That doesn't help you at all.

7. I think that most of you will not appreciate the above, and will fuss at me for saying that I will try to do something instead of just trying to do it. For now, I’m pretty sure that thusly stating my current position is, in fact, functional. We’ll see.

Why not put all of those detractors in their place by actually doing something, then?
 
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What most makes for effective debate is for opponents to truly own up to their own doubts. I would urge you all to truly step back and admit of your own doubts -- to yourselves, if no one else.


True wisdom is less presuming than folly. The wise man doubteth often, and changeth his mind; the fool is obstinate, and doubteth not; he knoweth all things but his own ignorance.

- Re-Horakhty Nepherkheperure Waenre Akhenaten



1. The proper formula to use in determining the post-probability of “A”: P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)*P(~A)).
1.1. “A”: the hypothesis that I have only one, finite, life to live.
1.2. “me”: my current existence.
1.3. “~A”: any hypothesis other than “A.”
I have very little doubt as to this being the appropriate formula for determining the post-probability of “A.”


I find your lack of doubt . . . disturbing.



2. If I can legitimately use 1/1080! as P(me|A), I win.


No, if you prove yourself to be immortal, you win.

I have some tragic news for you.



Variation re the other entries won’t make any difference as to the correct conclusion. Re this opinion, I have very little doubt.


The correct conclusion is that you are mortal. Your doubts will be resolved on the occasion of your funeral, albeit by others.



3. In order for me to properly use 1/1080! for P(me|A) [instead of 1.00] in the Bayes formula, my current existence needs to be somehow “set apart” from the 1080! other potential selves in the bucket from which I was chosen.


There's a hole in the bucket, dear Liza . . .



If I am just one of the crowd, P(me|A) is simply 1.00. I have very little doubt re this opinion also (though a bucket of potential selves seems to contradict something I had said previously...).


Pretty much everything you say contradicts something you said earlier, Jabba.

Such is the nature of free-form stream-of-consciousness yammering.



4. In addition, my current existence needs to be set apart in such a way as to suggest that there exists a more probable explanation than “A.” I also have very little doubt about this opinion.


It still beggars belief, even after all this time, that you've not been able to advance your case beyond a facile argument from incredulity.



5. At this point in the game, my only significant doubt that “A” is incorrect lies in my opinion that I can legitimately use 1/1080! as P(me|A).[/I]


Your only doubt is whether you can use a random number that someone else suggested as a throwaway alternative to the long-running joke of your attempt to use infinity as a real number?

Srsly?



6. I’m pretty sure that such is how I perceive our current state of affairs. If I can show that my use of 1/1080! as P(me|A) is legitimate, I win.


Jabba, you can't possibly win, regardless of your perceptions.

You will die. Once. Forever. C'est ça.

This is what the evidence supports. Nothing more, nothing less.



7. I think that most of you will not appreciate the above, and will fuss at me for saying that I will try to do something instead of just trying to do it.


No, most will roll their eyes and think, "What a waste of a mind that could quite easily have turned itself to something more worthwhile than this increasingly tragic/comedic folly."



For now, I’m pretty sure that thusly stating my current position is, in fact, functional.


Alas.



We’ll see.


We already do. You never will.
 
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What most makes for effective debate is for opponents to truly own up to their own doubts. I would urge you all to truly step back and admit of your own doubts -- to yourselves, if no one else.

1. The proper formula to use in determining the post-probability of “A”: P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)*P(~A)).
1.1. “A”: the hypothesis that I have only one, finite, life to live.
1.2. “me”: my current existence.
1.3. “~A”: any hypothesis other than “A.”
I have very little doubt as to this being the appropriate formula for determining the post-probability of “A.”

2. If I can legitimately use 1/1080! as P(me|A), I win. Variation re the other entries won’t make any difference as to the correct conclusion. Re this opinion, I have very little doubt.

3. In order for me to properly use 1/1080! for P(me|A) [instead of 1.00] in the Bayes formula, my current existence needs to be somehow “set apart” from the 1080! other potential selves in the bucket from which I was chosen. If I am just one of the crowd, P(me|A) is simply 1.00. I have very little doubt re this opinion also (though a bucket of potential selves seems to contradict something I had said previously...).

4. In addition, my current existence needs to be set apart in such a way as to suggest that there exists a more probable explanation than “A.” I also have very little doubt about this opinion.

5. At this point in the game, my only significant doubt that “A” is incorrect lies in my opinion that I can legitimately use 1/1080! as P(me|A).


6. I’m pretty sure that such is how I perceive our current state of affairs. If I can show that my use of 1/1080! as P(me|A) is legitimate, I win.

7. I think that most of you will not appreciate the above, and will fuss at me for saying that I will try to do something instead of just trying to do it. For now, I’m pretty sure that thusly stating my current position is, in fact, functional. We’ll see.

I fully agree, along with Carlitos, with your signature line, and how it applies to your post.

I also think that this is really in many ways an extension of your "truth by popularity poll" idea, but adding "just how firmly do you believe it are you?".

As pointed out by others here, there is no real point to disagreeing with your many times reiterated post (with the only thing added is that you remain VERY certain of it). If I assume that you really believe your theory, then all the corrections I and others have made over the past years have meant nothing to you. It is useless to argue further with you. If I assume that you post it, but don't believe it, it is again useless to argue further with you.
 
What most makes for effective debate is for opponents to truly own up to their own doubts. I would urge you all to truly step back and admit of your own doubts -- to yourselves, if no one else.
(snip)

You know what? I find this to be moderately offensive.

Do you think that your inability to convince anyone of your hypotheses' merit is due to your audience's failure to know their own limitations? I don't see any other explanation.

I've examined your argument, which you have refused to support with anything of substance, and found it lacking. The apparent assumption that you haven't convinced me because I don't understand my own thinking or reasoning is very presumptuous.







...
 
What most makes for effective debate is for opponents to truly own up to their own doubts. I would urge you all to truly step back and admit of your own doubts -- to yourselves, if no one else.

I have doubts alright- strong ones that have increased to close to certainty with this particular post. But none of my doubts have to do with my view of your posts as very, very, wrong. And I have zero doubts as to the correctness of the standard scientific model as it applies here.
 
Jabba and Toontown have been arguing that it isn't the Texas sharpshooter fallacy to say that the formation of their specific brain was so unlikely, given the staggering number of other possible results, that it cannot be accepted as chance.


Does this look familiar?
However, suppose we do the experiment with 500 coins instead of five and specify in advance that all fall heads up. It would require 2500 = 10150 tosses of 500 coins each, again on average, to obtain 500 heads specified in advance in an event of 500 consecutive coin tosses by chance. That is, the probability for this outcome is 10–150 and the Dembski information contained in the event is 500 bits. Dembski says this is impossible, for all practical purposes, to produce this particular pre-specified array, and he uses any event containing of at least 500 bits of information as his working definition of "complex" (Dembski 1999: 70). This, he notes, is a far more stringent restriction than the 166 bits implied by the "universal probability bound" of 10–50 = 2–166 proposed by mathematician Emile Borel (1962: 28).

However, while some pre-specified sequence of 500 bits, such as all heads or any other specific pattern of heads and tails selected before the fact, has this very low probability of being produced by chance, the probability for some pattern of heads and tails in 500 tossed coins (or any number of tosses) is 100 per cent! That is, one of the 10–150 possible combinations must occur each time, even though the prior probability of producing each one of them is very, very small. So, if after the coins are tossed we look at the sequence that is produced we cannot very well say that particular sequence is impossible when there it is, staring us in the face.


Source: Victor J Stenger: Physics, Cosmology and the New Creationism
 
What most makes for effective debate is for opponents to truly own up to their own doubts. I would urge you all to truly step back and admit of your own doubts -- to yourselves, if no one else.
...


I have very little doubt as to this being the appropriate formula for determining the post-probability of “A.”

...

Re this opinion, I have very little doubt.

...

. I have very little doubt re this opinion also .

....
I also have very little doubt about this opinion.


"The problem with the world is that the intelligent people are full of doubts while the stupid ones are full of confidence."
Indeed.


I think this post is worth repeating.

Jabba, you are either unable to understand the arguments against your claims, or being dishonest when engaging in discussion over two years. Over and over again you simply repeat the same claims and hope that by repeating them that will create "doubts" in people's minds. What about the doubts in your own mind? How about addressing the many arguments you have simply ignored? How about following up with the academics you have contacted, who gave you useful leads and information and whom you apparently forgot about after a day or two, presumably because they disagreed with you?

Your persistently disingenuous attitude is tiresome and apparent to anyone following this thread. You aren't concincing anybody. Not even close.
 
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Does this look familiar?


Source: Victor J Stenger: Physics, Cosmology and the New Creationism

However, suppose we do the experiment with 500 coins instead of five and specify in advance that all fall heads up. It would require 2500 = 10150 tosses of 500 coins each, again on average, to obtain 500 heads specified in advance in an event of 500 consecutive coin tosses by chance. That is, the probability for this outcome is 10–150 and the Dembski information contained in the event is 500 bits. Dembski says this is impossible, for all practical purposes, to produce this particular pre-specified array, and he uses any event containing of at least 500 bits of information as his working definition of "complex" (Dembski 1999: 70). This, he notes, is a far more stringent restriction than the 166 bits implied by the "universal probability bound" of 10–50 = 2–166 proposed by mathematician Emile Borel (1962: 28).

However, while some pre-specified sequence of 500 bits, such as all heads or any other specific pattern of heads and tails selected before the fact, has this very low probability of being produced by chance, the probability for some pattern of heads and tails in 500 tossed coins (or any number of tosses) is 100 per cent! That is, one of the 10–150 possible combinations must occur each time, even though the prior probability of producing each one of them is very, very small. So, if after the coins are tossed we look at the sequence that is produced we cannot very well say that particular sequence is impossible when there it is, staring us in the face.

Absolutely perfect. Crystal clear.
 
Absolutely perfect. Crystal clear.


And this is why Jabba's and toontown's arguments that their existence is virtually impossible, looking back at the prior probability from their current existence, is exactly the Texas Sharpshooter's fallacy.
 
What most makes for effective debate is for opponents to truly own up to their own doubts. I would urge you all to truly step back and admit of your own doubts -- to yourselves, if no one else.
I doubt you will ever recognise the flaws in your argument.

I doubt that you will ever acknowledge those pointing out those flaws.

I doubt that my time spent answering you will ever be repaid in any form.
 
I doubt you will ever recognise the flaws in your argument.

I doubt that you will ever acknowledge those pointing out those flaws.

I doubt that my time spent answering you will ever be repaid in any form.

You can always have the satisfaction of a job well done.
 
What most makes for effective debate is for opponents to truly own up to their own doubts. I would urge you all to truly step back and admit of your own doubts -- to yourselves, if no one else.

I haven't seen you participate in an effective debate yet. :-D

1. The proper formula to use in determining the post-probability of “A”: P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)*P(~A)).
1.1. “A”: the hypothesis that I have only one, finite, life to live.
1.2. “me”: my current existence.
1.3. “~A”: any hypothesis other than “A.”
I have very little doubt as to this being the appropriate formula for determining the post-probability of “A.”

Your appeal to ignorance through the back-door is still a logical fallacy known as an appeal to ignorance.

It's rather pathetic that after all these years, you finally fall-back on an argument as lame as "I have very little doubt, therefore I win."

What kind of support for this position are you getting from PMs/email/invisible lurkers?

:)
 
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What most makes for effective debate is for opponents to truly own up to their own doubts. I would urge you all to truly step back and admit of your own doubts -- to yourselves, if no one else.

1. The proper formula to use in determining the post-probability of “A”: P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)*P(~A)).
1.1. “A”: the hypothesis that I have only one, finite, life to live.
1.2. “me”: my current existence.
1.3. “~A”: any hypothesis other than “A.”

Jabba: based on the bold above, P(me|A) would be the probability that you (Jabba) exist, given that you have only one, finite, life to live.

How does your having only one finite life to live affect the probability that you exist?

Are you now saying that since (according to you) there are an infinite (or maybe just enormous) number of potential selfs, the fact that you currently exist means you must have multiple lives to have beaten the odds?

Also, "~A" still means anything other than "I (Jabba) have only one finite life to live", which as was pointed out previously, includes such goodies as "I (Humots) am immortal and nobody else is."
 
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