Nonpareil
The Terrible Trivium
If I can legitimately use 1/1080! as P(me|A), I win. Variation re the other entries won’t make any difference as to the correct conclusion. Re this opinion, I have very little doubt.
You are wrong.
The issue has never been the probability of your existence. The issue has always been whether or not your existence is less likely than any other.
You have not show this. You "win" nothing.
In order for me to properly use 1/1080! for P(me|A) [instead of 1.00] in the Bayes formula, my current existence needs to be somehow “set apart” from the 1080! other potential selves in the bucket from which I was chosen. If I am just one of the crowd, P(me|A) is simply 1.00. I have very little doubt re this opinion also (though a bucket of potential selves seems to contradict something I had said previously...).
Again, wrong. P(you|A) remains what it always was. P(someone|A) is one.
The question is not "how unlikely am I". It is "how unlikely am I compared to everyone else". As it is, all that you've done is establish that there is a staggering number of possible brains that might come into existence. That does not make any single, specific brain's existence at all significant from a probabilistic standpoint. One of them was going to turn up.
In addition, my current existence needs to be set apart in such a way as to suggest that there exists a more probable explanation than “A.” I also have very little doubt about this opinion.
This, at least, is true. You do lack evidence for immortality, even granting everything about your argument up to this point.
I think that most of you will not appreciate the above, and will fuss at me for saying that I will try to do something instead of just trying to do it. For now, I’m pretty sure that thusly stating my current position is, in fact, functional.
It isn't.
We’ll see.
We already do.