Poll about realism

[hammegk]

So, what happens when one dies? Does that mean the death of the mind too ... meaning the whole thing was merely illusory after all?

mu.

or,

Define mind.

or,

One can postulate some form of non-interactive dualism, and have what we call a human consciousness continue elsewhere/when.

or,

 

[cpolk]

So, what happens when one dies? Does that mean the death of the mind too ... meaning the whole thing was merely illusory after all?

What happens to the "I" when we die has no impact on reality, so there is no reason to discuss it. Unless it does have an impact on reality - in which case, we will discover it as we study reality.

 

[Z]

ZD, these two statements contradict each other. You are equating as equally real

a) a real couch

and

b) a couch which only exists in cyberspace

Nobody is disputing that in some sense these are both cases of something existing, but nobody in their right mind will claim they exist in the same sort of way. So you have to have two different definitions of what you mean by "real" or "exist". Once you resort to two definitions of these words the argument from hallucination has succeeded, because it has forced the direct realist to specify his previously ambiguous conception of "real". If I require you to use a consistent definition of "real" your defence doesn't work.

Geoff

In either case, you're not perceiving the couch directly anyway - or indirectly or any other -ectly. You're perceiving the light which comes from the couch. If you want to reduce 'you-ness' to the brain, then the brain perceives NOTHING AT ALL except signals from the senses and from itself. It learns to associate sets of sensations each with the others and to form patterns of relationships within these sets - but the brain is never exposed to an object (neither real nor sense-datum) at all but to neurochemical signals alone.

But yeah - the couch in cyberspace and the couch in realtime are both equally real. The difference of course is that one couch exists within a simulated reality and the other does not.

Or to be more blunt - nothing unreal exists. Even hallucinations are real - they just aren't what the observer thinks they are.

BTW JG - it would seem your deep admiration for John Searle is not as widespread as you indicated previously... Zenon Pylyshyn seems to be much more 'cutting edge' than Searle and doesn't seem to even acknowledge the work done by Searle. Of course that's just from a quick glance... I'm just getting into the meat and potatoes of Z. Pylyshyn.

 

[cpolk]

But yeah - the couch in cyberspace and the couch in realtime are both equally real. The difference of course is that one couch exists within a simulated reality and the other does not.

Or technically speaking, the couch exists in our "reality" as energy and in the brain's "reality" as matter.

 

[Iacchus]

Define mind.

The mind is all I've got. Without it, I would possess nothing. So obviously it's the mind that maintains my reality ... which, apparently is not the same as the reality "out there."

 

[cpolk]

The mind is all I've got. Without it, I would possess nothing. So obviously it's the mind that maintains my reality ... which, apparently is not the same as the reality "out there."

I'd argue that your mind tells your "I" what it needs to know to interact. We don't need to know how many particles are in a stick to interact with it. Our mental image of the stick is still the reality of the stick, but only so much so as we have invested in interacting with it. The more we invest in interacting with it, the more information we have about it.

Nothing about "direct" claims that you should know everything about an object. The information my senses have collected may not be the same as yours (for instance, if I've seen it and you've felt it), but the overall information that either of us can possibly attain by interaction is exactly the same.

Therefore, realism holds. The only issue is whether it is direct or indirect, and that is determined by whether the sensory organs are considered to be internal or external.

 

[Iacchus]

I'd argue that your mind tells your "I" what it needs to know to interact. We don't need to know how many particles are in a stick to interact with it. Our mental image of the stick is still the reality of the stick, but only so much so as we have invested in interacting with it. The more we invest in interacting with it, the more information we have about it.

And, albeit I might claim there's more to it than this, I think most folks would agree that hallucinations are produced within the mind. So, if the mind produces a strong enough hallucination to where you can't distinguish between it and what exists "out there," then really all you're looking at is what's going on inside the mind. I don't deny the existence of a direct reality, yet at the same time I don't believe it's directly experiencable. There will always be a buffer between you and the external reality.

Nothing about "direct" claims that you should know everything about an object. The information my senses have collected may not be the same as yours (for instance, if I've seen it and you've felt it), but the overall information that either of us can possibly attain by interaction is exactly the same.

Yes, the mind is capable of assuming many things.

Therefore, realism holds. The only issue is whether it is direct or indirect, and that is determined by whether the sensory organs are considered to be internal or external.

What, the realism of the observer ... or, the realism of what's being observed?

 

[cpolk]

And, albeit I might claim there's more to it than this, I think most folks would agree that hallucinations are produced within the mind. So, if the mind produces a strong enough hallucination to where you can't distinguish between it and what exists "out there," then really all you're looking at is what's going on inside the mind. I don't deny the existence of a direct reality, yet at the same time I don't believe it's directly experiencable. There will always be a buffer between you and the external reality.

It has been stated many times - this is not a drug-induced-type hallucination. The images are not being created by the brain, but by the machine. If I am wrong about this, please correct me.

What, the realism of the observer ... or, the realism of what's being observed?

Both. Let me demonstrate by way of the example:

P1: Matter can neither be created nor destroyed, but converted between states of matter and energy.

P2: The machine is transfering energy. Energy is being used to process all of the information of a physical stick into the brain. In order to do this, the machine must have all of the information of a physical stick, as well as all of the information of how the human senses obtains information through interaction.

P3: Since the reailty of the stick and the program of the stick contain the exact same information, they are both real. One is represented in matter and the other in energy.

What the brain is seeing as matter, we are seeing as energy. "Both" things contain the exact same information, and therefore are exactly the same thing, and are in accord with the laws of physics.

The reason it makes no difference is the same as the reason why my seeing the stick and your touching the stick results in different experiences of the stick - the observer is interacting differently with the program than the brain is. This is still direct realism.

 

[Iacchus]

It has been stated many times - this is not a drug-induced-type hallucination. The images are not being created by the brain, but by the machine. If I am wrong about this, please correct me.

No, I am not referring to the machine in this regard, neither am I referring to a drug-induced hallucination. Regardless, I don't think it would make a difference in any of these respects.

Both. Let me demonstrate by way of the example:

P1: Matter can neither be created nor destroyed, but converted between states of matter and energy.

Yes, this has allegedly been observed.

P2: The machine is transfering energy. Energy is being used to process all of the information of a physical stick into the brain. In order to do this, the machine must have all of the information of a physical stick, as well as all of the information of how the human senses obtains information through interaction.

Yes, this has allegedly been observed.

P3: Since the reailty of the stick and the program of the stick contain the exact same information, they are both real. One is represented in matter and the other in energy.

I'm not sure I understand you here. Are you comparing information to energy? In formation can be something as simple as text on a page.

What the brain is seeing as matter, we are seeing as energy. "Both" things contain the exact same information, and therefore are exactly the same thing, and are in accord with the laws of physics.

The reason it makes no difference is the same as the reason why my seeing the stick and your touching the stick results in different experiences of the stick - the observer is interacting differently with the program than the brain is. This is still direct realism.

And perhaps I should remind you that you are merely an observer, trying to explain this to another observer, me. So, outside of what's being observed, there is no reality to speak of ... between you and me that is.

 

[cpolk]

No, I am not referring to the machine in this regard, neither am I referring to a drug-induced hallucination. Regardless, I don't think it would make a difference in any of these respects.

I apologize. That was my mistake, then. When I first started the argument, the first thing I questioned was the fact that the machines had advanced to the point of simulating reality, but the drugs had not. :/

Either way, it doesn't make a difference. But for clarity (because I personally know more about how machines work than drugs), I'm going to have to stick with machines.

I'm not sure I understand you here. Are you comparing information to energy? In formation can be something as simple as text on a page.

The information itself is not energy, it is lines in the program. However, the machine cannot function without a power source. Take your monitor for example - it is converting electricity into a display, and the program in the computer is telling it what to display.

Therefore, the machine is not simulating the stick itself, it's transfering energy (from its power source), and the program is telling it to become the stick.

And perhaps I should remind you that you are merely an observer, trying to explain this to another observer, me. So, outside of what's being observed, there is no reality to speak of ... between you and me that is.

Excellent point! Let's say we unplug the brain, and plug you into the machine. You are now perceiving what the brain perceived - the stick - as a real, physical object. I, on the outside, will be observing the same stick as energy being manipulated by the program into a stick. You are experiencing the matter, and I am experiencing the energy, but they are the exact same thing. The energy I'm looking at is the stick that you're looking at.

Okay - time for you to unplug.

Now, you know what it is like to view "the stick" from the machine, but I don't. I only know what that stick looks like in energy form. We have experienced the same exact stick in different forms, exactly like what would have happened in the example previously given, had I seen the stick and you felt the stick.

Since we don't have to know everything about the stick for direct realism to work, then it applies - there is nothing that I know of the stick in energy form that you can't learn, and there is no information that you've obtained from the physical form that I cannot learn.

We may have individual experiences with the stick, due to different types of interactions, but the total amount of information that the two of us can gain from interactions with the stick is exactly the same

 

[Pragmatist]

I'm not sure I'm arguing at all. I'm not actually defending a position, although you seem to be the last in a long line of people who think I am. I'm a direct realist, but I haven't really explained why. All I have tried to do is explain the argument.

I meant that you have been arguing specific points in this thread and arguing against points raised by others, not that you had presented your opening as an argument. Not that it matters anyway."

As for the content of your post, I don't really understand what you mean. You seem to have no fixed definition of "real" at all, and you don't think it is a problem. I don't agree that "real" means "true". I don't agree that the BIV's fake universe is "just as real" as the real universe, in fact I find it difficult to understand why anyone would make such a claim.

Yep, that is exactly what I am arguing, that there is no fixed definition of "real". And no, I don't think that's a problem - why should it be? If I'm required to make a statement about the "reality" of something I can formally describe the boundary conditions under which my assumption is true. But I am under no illusion that my boundary conditions are absolute and invariable. That is tantamount to saying that "truth" is provisional, which is of course the basic position of science.

I didn't say that "real" means "true" period. I said that arguing about "what is real" is reducible to an argument about "what is true". For any thing, you can ask "is the thing real" or "is the thing not real". Taking the first alone, the positive statement "is the thing real" can be considered as true or false and in that respect the nature of "truth" needs to be considered. I offered that as a simpler way to see the relative nature of the question. Look up dictionary definitions of "reality" and you will see definitions in terms of "truth".

And look at my emphasis of your words above. I highlighted the phrase "the real universe". What exactly is "the real universe"? Define it! You are implicitly assuming that:

a) "The real universe" exists as an objective entity independent of the observer.
b) That you can determine what is or is not a member of that universe.

I'm asking how you can do that in the context of a philosophical enquiry. How can you determine the objective existence of "the real universe"? And secondly how can you determine whether something is "real" and a part of that universe?

If you simply assume that it exists and base your hypotheticals on that, you're begging the question. I believe you are stating a provisional "truth" based on boundary conditions that you have implicitly assumed but not explicitly acknowledged - I'm asking you to consider those conditions.

Cpolk seems to have understood what I said, about the relativity of observers and also that the BIV is part of your reality but you are not necessarily part of its reality. You can't just assume a common frame of reference.

 

[Iacchus]

Excellent point! Let's say we unplug the brain, and plug you into the machine. You are now perceiving what the brain perceived - the stick - as a real, physical object. I, on the outside, will be observing the same stick as energy being manipulated by the program into a stick. You are experiencing the matter, and I am experiencing the energy, but they are the exact same thing. The energy I'm looking at is the stick that you're looking at.

And what would be the difference if you were standing outside holding the stick, and I were inside the house looking out the window at you holding it? In fact I don't see any difference. It still requires a conscious brain in order to interpret that it's a stick, either way.

 

[cpolk]

And what would be the difference if you were standing outside holding the stick, and I were inside the house looking out the window at you holding it? In fact I don't see any difference. It still requires a conscious brain in order to interpret what you're looking at, either way.

There is no difference in the stick whatsoever, that's what I'm saying. In the example you just gave, I would have added information from my sense of touch.

Indirect realism holds that each of us has to perceive everything differently, as we each have individual perceptions.

I am saying that it is true, that we will not experience the same thing about the stick with the same amount of interaction, because our types of interaction will be different. Direct realism states that even though I may have gathered different information from my interaction than you did from yours, I did not gain any information that you couldn't also obtain with further interaction.

The total amount of information about the stick that either of us can learn is the same, so direct realism holds.

In the case of the brain in a vat, we as observers are learning something about the energy that the brain has not learned, and the brain is learning something about the energy (manipulated in the form of a physical stick) that we have not learned. In other words, the observer and the brain both know something about the program, but do not know everything about the program; at the same time, neither learn anything that the other cannot through like interaction. (Well, I guess this doesn't apply as well to a brain in a vat as it would to another "person".)

 

[Iacchus]

In the case of the brain in a vat, we as observers are learning something about the energy that the brain has not learned, and the brain is learning something about the energy (manipulated in the form of a physical stick) that we have not learned. In other words, the observer and the brain both know something about the program, but do not know everything about the program; at the same time, neither learn anything that the other cannot through like interaction. (Well, I guess this doesn't apply as well to a brain in a vat as it would to another "person".)

And, if we were all just brains in a vat (whether we are or not is not the point), how would we know otherwise that it wasn't a collective hallucination? What's to keep us from staging this whole scenario of brains in a vat, and still remain brains in a vat?

 

[cpolk]

And, if we were all just brains in a vat (whether we are or not is not the point), how would we know otherwise that it wasn't a collective hallucination? What's to keep us from staging this whole scenario of brains in a vat, and still remain brains in a vat?

That's the beautiful part - we have no control! It is completely according to the program of the machine!

What is more beautiful is that the program has hard-wired laws, that we call the "laws of physics". The machine cannot just make the stick materialize in front of the brain, because then the program would not be simulating a real universe for the brain. So, the program has to begin with a seed, let the seed grow into a tree, let the stick grow from the tree, and in some very natural, ordinary manner, allow the stick to be removed from the tree. To do anything otherwise would invalidate P4.

This is where it's really beautiful - the machine doesn't have any control over it, either! It's all in the hard-wired laws!

So, we must conclude that this experiment is not feasible by the terms provided, because it is in violation of P2. Although the brain is seeing a stick, and we are seeing energy being manipulated by the program, we are seeing the exact same thing (as it contains the exact same information), only from a different perspective of the program. Therefore, P2 is wrong and contradicts the experiment.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And look at my emphasis of your words above. I highlighted the phrase "the real universe". What exactly is "the real universe"? Define it! You are implicitly assuming that:

a) "The real universe" exists as an objective entity independent of the observer.
b) That you can determine what is or is not a member of that universe.

I'm asking how you can do that in the context of a philosophical enquiry. How can you determine the objective existence of "the real universe"? And secondly how can you determine whether something is "real" and a part of that universe?

If I was assuming (a) then I would be assuming direct realism, wouldn't I? So it is not so much an assumption as a recognition of the assumptions implied in direct realism. You cannot determine (empirically) the objective existence of a physical Universe. All you can do is make assumptions and then feed the assumptions into logical arguments and see which assumptions lead to contradictions and which ones do not. The reason we need these arguments is because empirical investigation alone won't do. I don't think philosophical arguments alone will do either. I think we need both, especially on the border of physics and metaphysics we are currently investigating.

If you simply assume that it exists and base your hypotheticals on that, you're begging the question. I believe you are stating a provisional "truth" based on boundary conditions that you have implicitly assumed but not explicitly acknowledged - I'm asking you to consider those conditions.

Cpolk seems to have understood what I said, about the relativity of observers and also that the BIV is part of your reality but you are not necessarily part of its reality. You can't just assume a common frame of reference.

You can assume a common frame of reference if you can find a way to communicate with the brain. Let's say we send in an Agent Geoff to tell the brain, in its fake world, that it is a brain in a vat - and we could get the computer to temporarily break the laws of physics just to prove this is the case. Now does it have the same frame of reference?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

BTW JG - it would seem your deep admiration for John Searle is not as widespread as you indicated previously... Zenon Pylyshyn seems to be much more 'cutting edge' than Searle and doesn't seem to even acknowledge the work done by Searle. Of course that's just from a quick glance... I'm just getting into the meat and potatoes of Z. Pylyshyn.

That's just wrong, ZD. Pylyshyn is archetypical of the old school computationalism that is widely believed to have failed. He is an old man. He is associated with theories involving "language of thought", which is also archetypical of why computationalism is wrong. Nobody takes LOT theores seriously anymore. They are great for making computationalist, language-based so-called "models of cognition", but there is now too much evidence suggesting that LOT is plain wrong. It is a view of the mind which claims that thinking really consists of the brain shuffling around symbols in some sort of universal "mind language". If you are going to model thought computationally then you need such a device. The problem is that real brains do not need any such device. The sort of "research" that LOT inspires is therefore worthless. What one purports to learn about human cognition by using this technique is hopelessly intertwined with the false assumption of computation. For example, last year in my "cognitive modelling" class I had to produce a language-based model of the cognitive process required to solve a simple puzzle - in the case a sort of colour-based jigsaw puzzle. Being an ex-programmer I found this child's play and got 85% for the project. But the final paragraph, for which I was NOT marked down (even though my tutor was a complete computationalist dinosaur) is as follows:

So what have I actually learned about human cognition? i.e. In producing this CLIPS model, what have I learned about human cognition which can be distinguished from those things which were imposed before I started by the combination of the computational-symbolic hypothesis and the basic structure of the puzzle and its solution? Perhaps I can rephrase the question: If human cognition is fundamentally non-symbolic and non-iterative, more like a Watt Governor than silicon chip, then what difference would it have made to my model compared to a situation where human cognition is symbolic and iterative? I suspect the answer may have to be "no difference at all", leading me to conclude that I have actually learned very little about human cognition - apart from some things about how real-world human problem-solving differs from CLIPS models. As scientists, we must be careful not to confuse scientifically-valid conclusions based upon real experimental evidence with things which may look like conclusions but which turn out to have been imposed by our original hypotheses, and the tools and methods we have chosen as means of investigation. To re-invent a well-known saying…If all you've got is a computer, everything looks a symbol system.

As for Searle, all I can do is offer you a quote from the section on Searle in a recent collection called "What philosophers think" :

http://www.philosophers.co.uk/wpt.htm

When Searle turned his attention to philosophy of mind, he came up with perhaps the most famous counterexample in history - the chinese room argument - and in one intellectual punch inflicted so much damage on the then dominant theory of functionalism that many would argue it has never recovered.

 

[Z]

That's just wrong, ZD. Pylyshyn is archetypical of the old school computationalism that is widely believed to have failed. He is an old man. He is associated with theories involving "language of thought", which is also archetypical of why computationalism is wrong. Nobody takes LOT theores seriously anymore. They are great for making computationalist, language-based so-called "models of cognition", but there is now too much evidence suggesting that LOT is plain wrong. It is a view of the mind which claims that thinking really consists of the brain shuffling around symbols in some sort of universal "mind language". If you are going to model thought computationally then you need such a device. The problem is that real brains do not need any such device. The sort of "research" that LOT inspires is therefore worthless. What one purports to learn about human cognition by using this technique is hopelessly intertwined with the false assumption of computation. For example, last year in my "cognitive modelling" class I had to produce a language-based model of the cognitive process required to solve a simple puzzle - in the case a sort of colour-based jigsaw puzzle. Being an ex-programmer I found this child's play and got 85% for the project. But the final paragraph, for which I was NOT marked down (even though my tutor was a complete computationalist dinosaur) is as follows:



As for Searle, all I can do is offer you a quote from the section on Searle in a recent collection called "What philosophers think" :

http://www.philosophers.co.uk/wpt.htm

Pylyshyn won the Jean Nicod prize a LOT more recently than Searle did... And a recent check of several papers reveals that Pylyshyn is more frequently quoted and mentioned while Searle is hardly referred to at all (except by staunch opponents of computationalism) - Dennett gets almost daily mention but Searle barely appears in footnotes.

My suggestion - you're out of touch and your university is behind the times.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Pylyshyn won the Jean Nicod prize a LOT more recently than Searle did... And a recent check of several papers reveals that Pylyshyn is more frequently quoted and mentioned while Searle is hardly referred to at all (except by staunch opponents of computationalism) - Dennett gets almost daily mention but Searle barely appears in footnotes.

My suggestion - you're out of touch and your university is behind the times.

If the papers are coming from the old-school then it's probably best they don't mention Searle too often (turkeys, christmas....). And as for Sussex being behind the times, in terms of cognitive science Sussex is one of a handful of Universities on the planet which define the times. Give us our due, we aren't generally noted for anything else, apart from being millions in the red and entirely situated in a designated area of outstanding natural beauty.

Dennett isn't in the same category as Pylyshyn. Pylyshyn isn't really a philosopher, but Dennett surely is. As for his historical relevance, it depends who you ask. My philosophy of cognitive science tutor, who came through the informatics and psychology route to cognitive science, has claimed that Dennett is the most important living philosopher. But he is yet to be mentioned at all during any of the courses run by the philosophy department and when I have asked about him the usual response was something along the lines of "Dennett is bonkers". Seriously. To them, he is almost irrelevant.

 

[Z]

If the papers are coming from the old-school then it's probably best they don't mention Searle too often (turkeys, christmas....). And as for Sussex being behind the times, in terms of cognitive science Sussex is one of a handful of Universities on the planet which define the times. Give us our due, we aren't generally noted for anything else, apart from being millions in the red and entirely situated in a designated area of outstanding natural beauty.

Dennett isn't in the same category as Pylyshyn. Pylyshyn isn't really a philosopher, but Dennett surely is. As for his historical relevance, it depends who you ask. My philosophy of cognitive science tutor, who came through the informatics and psychology route to cognitive science, has claimed that Dennett is the most important living philosopher. But he is yet to be mentioned at all during any of the courses run by the philosophy department and when I have asked about him the usual response was something along the lines of "Dennett is bonkers". Seriously. To them, he is almost irrelevant.

Well at least we know where your bias is coming from. Though I gotta be honest... took me looking up Sussex to find out much about it. Never heard of it before now. I guess 'defining the times' doesn't extend much outside of philosophy.

Of course here in the U.S. philosophy is considered one of those 'dead' sciences...

Apples and oranges it seems.

Anyway Sussex definitely isn't a forerunner in A.I. research now is it?