Poll about realism

[UndercoverElephant]

What about in my example of us setting up a physical stick and a videocamera. Now there is a real physical stick at the beginning of the causal chain.

Then it becomes the same as watching as football game on the tv. It may be realism, but it can't possibly be direct realism.

 

[Pragmatist]

Hi Geoff, long time no argue!

What is real? What is "true"? Those questions are in essence the same because to resolve a statement such as "x is real" you are trying to resolve whether the statement is true or false.

Let's look at a hypothetical situation. A child on the ground releases a helium ballon which floats up in to the air. Approximately 30 seconds after releasing the ballon, the child looks up and observes the ballon floating in the air above him - he concludes that "the ballon is up". Which is self evidently true. However, simultaneously, another observer who is passing over the ballon in a high flying aircraft observes the ballon floating below him and concluses that "the ballon is down". Which is also self evidently true. The statements are contradictory but they are both true. How is this possible?

Simple - "truth" is relative. What is "true" depends on the relation of the observer to the observed, what is true about some objective fact may be true for one observer but false for another. Neither observer is at fault, nor is their basic logic flawed. Similarly the definition of "real" depends explicitly upon what is "true". To the child on the ground, the "reality" of the balloon is that it is "up". But to the observer on the plane, the reality is that the balloon is "down". Ergo "reality" is a function of the observer.

Now, the question is, can we directly relate the observers? If we can encompass both observers in some "universe", we can resolve contradictions between truth and falsity within that "universe" by reference to other possible observers within it. We can work out some all-inclusive logical relation that includes both observers and their observations without contradiction and without sacrificing their relative "truths".

But, if we can't place those observers in some gestalt for the purposes of analysis then their "truths" are not resolvable, we simply have to live with the contradiction and the impossibility of resolving it.

Let's imagine that you place a brain in a vat, you set up the computer and feed it the signals that convince it that it is experiencing "reality". Fine. It seems clear to you that "reality" is that you are real and that what the BIV experiences is "illusion". However, from the point of view of the BIV you don't even exist therefore what is "true" for you cannot be true for the BIV. In other words, the BIV exists within your "universe" - but you don't necessarily exist within the "universe" of the BIV. Therefore the issue of "truth" is unresolvable because there is no common "universe" that you both agree upon.

Taking it one step further, you assume that your experience is "real" and that you have put another brain in a vat. But how do you know that you are not the brain in the vat? Maybe somebody put your brain in a vat and programmed it to believe that it was putting someone else's brain in a vat! The "reality" of the situation may be the exact opposite of what you believe from the POV of the encompassing "universe". The argument can be extended indefinitely. You can add independent observers but they cannot prove they are not BIV's either, and so on. Therefore the only "truths" that exist are the relative truths of the various observers, BIV's etc., and their "truths" are true to them but not necessarily to anyone else.

The most important thing to realise is that because there is no encompassing, absolute frame of reference, there is no absolute value of "truth", and by extension, no absolute value of "reality". Arguments about what is the absolute value of "reality" are completely pointless and meaningless.

You appear to be arguing from an assumption of some absolute frame of reference, which is absurd.

PixyMisa pointed out to you that the experience of the BIV is "real". Your experience is also "real". The experience of all observers is "real". Unless you can show inconsistency within a frame of reference that valid for and common to all. In the absence of such a frame, everybody's experience is "real". But the word "real" doesn't have the same definition in each of the different frames or "universes".

 

[.13.]

Then it becomes the same as watching as football game on the tv. It may be realism, but it can't possibly be direct realism.

I disagree because the camera can be set to send the signal as our eyes would send it to our brains.

In the case where I'm watching a football game the light from the players hit the camera and is converted to electrical signal. And my TV converts it back to optical. But when we feed the signal from the camera straight to the BIV's nerves as our eyes send it to our brains we have the exact same situation as we were looking the stick ourselves. So in my opinion P5 is flawed because perfect hallucinations don't exclude the observations of physical objects.

 

[hammegk]

Simple - "truth" is relative.

Or, your bald assertion is wrong. Which, I wonder?

 

[cpolk]

Everyone:

I submit the distinction I gave gave to justgeoff to the rest of you as well.
Simply because the data behind our perceptions of the "objective world" may exist inside of a supercomputer, is no reason to jump to the conclusion that the objects represented by our perceptions are any less "Real" "Independent" or "Objective" than they would be under any other metaphysical scenario. All that the BIV scenario questions then, is the *ultimate nature* of the portions of objective reality we percieve, not the actual existence of objective reality itself.

In either case, though, it is real. To the brain, the stick is a real stick. To the observer in the 'real' world, that stick is a real sequence of programming that equates to a real stick.

 

[Iacchus]

Then it becomes the same as watching as football game on the tv. It may be realism, but it can't possibly be direct realism.

Yes, and when you put it in that context, there is no such thing as direct realism. In which case it becomes purely a matter of what you wish to believe ... albeit granted, most of us would choose to believe there was an "objective world" out there.

 

[cpolk]

Then it becomes the same as watching as football game on the tv. It may be realism, but it can't possibly be direct realism.

This is why I was asking for the definition of internal and external. If the eyes are considered internal, as they are part of the body, then the example is flawed from the start and does not matter, and direct realism holds because the image in our brain is created directly from the senses. If the eyes are external, as they are not a part of the brain, then all of our senses are also external, and indirect realism is the answer.

So the only difference between direct and indirect realism is whether or not the perception of reality is internal or external. It does not change the reality, nor its function, nor our ability to perceive it.

 

[Iacchus]

This is why I was asking for the definition of internal and external. If the eyes are considered internal, as they are part of the body, then the example is flawed from the start and does not matter, and direct realism holds because the image in our brain is created directly from the senses.

Then what would you need a brain for, if there was no need to re-create the imagery? If you experienced a hallucination to where you couldn't tell the difference, then what?

 

[Mercutio]

Then what would you need a brain for, if there was no need to re-create the imagery? If you experienced a hallucination to where you couldn't tell the difference, then what?

Ignorance of sensation and perception research, as well as ignorance of neurophysiology and function...

Your first question is flawed because you don't even know enough about the topic to know what the question is. Of course, you have been directed to sources which could cure your ignorance...for months now.

 

[scribble]

Ignorance...

Of course, you have been directed to sources which could cure your ignorance...for months now.

Surely it's been years. I can't believe you still "debate" with him.

 

[cpolk]

Then what would you need a brain for, if there was no need to re-create the imagery? If you experienced a hallucination to where you couldn't tell the difference, then what?

The brain is what takes the information from all of the senses - not just the eyes - and processes them into a group.

This is what I was trying to say from the start - the definition of internal/external decides what is direct or indirect.

Images are created by the eyes, and the eyes send them to the brain. If the eyes are considered internal, then the process is happening internally. If the eyes are considered external, then the process is happening externally. If there are no eyes, there is no vision.

If I were to touch the stick, my perception of the stick now changes, adding information from the sense of touch. Whether this happens internally or externally depends on whether my skin is internal or external.

Direct/indirect realism has nothing to do with whether or not my senses allow me to know everything there is to know about an object; only whether the process is internal or external.

If someone were to send me a pic file of a stick, it would not be real; I would not be able to sense it with anything other than my one sense - my other senses tell me that it is a picture. If that program, however, contained all aspects of a real stick, then it is real. The stick will look and feel like a stick. The stick will make a snapping sound when I break it and fragment into smaller pieces. Etc.

In this existence we call reality, assuming we are the brain in the vat, we are governed by laws of physics that the "machine" is hard-wired to obey. Therefore, the "stick" itself is not only a sequence of programming that represents a stick, but that sequence is entirely made up of the programming of each atomic and subatomic particle that makes up the stick, and functions according to the hard-wired laws that govern the "machine".

Therefore, it is not reality that should come into question in a philosophical debate, nor whether our perception is direct or indirect, but whether the hard-wired rules are real or an illusion, since the machine has no more control over the universe that it creates than the brain does.

 

[Iacchus]

Ignorance of sensation and perception research, as well as ignorance of neurophysiology and function...

Your first question is flawed because you don't even know enough about the topic to know what the question is. Of course, you have been directed to sources which could cure your ignorance...for months now.

No, direct realism does not exist in this sense. If it did, then why do we need a brain to interpret it ... via the senses that is?

 

[Iacchus]

The brain is what takes the information from all of the senses - not just the eyes - and processes them into a group.

Yes, and where does the information come from that generates the hallucination that you are unable to distinguish from this alleged reality you claim to perceive?

 

[cpolk]

Yes, and where does the information come from that generates the hallucination that you are unable to distinguish from this alleged reality you claim to perceive?

It comes from the senses created by the body, which in this hypothetical, is also re-created. The "image" of the stick is not merely programmed into the brain; the program serves to recreate the human body altogether for the brain. If it did not do so, then the brain could not have "human" perception. Therefore, the brain is still getting its information from its eyes.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You appear to be arguing from an assumption of some absolute frame of reference, which is absurd.

I'm not sure I'm arguing at all. I'm not actually defending a position, although you seem to be the last in a long line of people who think I am. I'm a direct realist, but I haven't really explained why. All I have tried to do is explain the argument.

As for the content of your post, I don't really understand what you mean. You seem to have no fixed definition of "real" at all, and you don't think it is a problem. I don't agree that "real" means "true". I don't agree that the BIV's fake universe is "just as real" as the real universe, in fact I find it difficult to understand why anyone would make such a claim.

 

[cpolk]

I'm not sure I'm arguing at all. I'm not actually defending a position, although you seem to be the last in a long line of people who think I am. I'm a direct realist, but I haven't really explained why. All I have tried to do is explain the argument.

I hope I'm not considered one of them. If so, I apologize. I'm just trying to grasp a complete sense (no pun intended) of the hypothetical.

I don't agree that the BIV's fake universe is "just as real" as the real universe, in fact I find it difficult to understand why anyone would make such a claim.

In this hypothetical, there are two differernt focuses of perception. My perception from the outside is not the brain's perception from the inside. So to make a claim such as "we all know it is just a brain in a vat" when "all" includes the brain is wrong unless the brain is also aware. Further, consider this point:

If someone were to send me a pic file of a stick, it would not be real; I would not be able to sense it with anything other than my one sense - my other senses tell me that it is a picture. If that program, however, contained all aspects of a real stick, then it is real. The stick will look and feel like a stick. The stick will make a snapping sound when I break it and fragment into smaller pieces. Etc.

In this existence we call reality, assuming we are the brain in the vat, we are governed by laws of physics that the "machine" is hard-wired to obey. Therefore, the "stick" itself is not only a sequence of programming that represents a stick, but that sequence is entirely made up of the programming of each atomic and subatomic particle that makes up the stick, and functions according to the hard-wired laws that govern the "machine".

Therefore, it is not reality that should come into question in a philosophical debate, nor whether our perception is direct or indirect, but whether the hard-wired rules are real or an illusion, since the machine has no more control over the universe that it creates than the brain does.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

JustGeoff

Ok, to simplify, there are 3 positions here which seem at first to contradict each other.

1. Direct Realism - Our perceptions provide us with direct awareness of an objective/external world, and we can directly perceive objects in this objective/external world. (see footnote *)

2. Indirect Realism - We can only have direct awareness of our perceptions of the external/objective world.

3. Transcendental Idealism - Our perceptions consist of our cognitive/perceptual categories and something called "Noumena" a state of "Pure Information" and "things in themselves", which we cannot be directly aware of, and can only be percieved once filtered through said cognitive/perceptual categories.

I assume that there is a typo in (2) and you meant "indirect".

(1) is confusing because it uses the word "perception" twice, once as a noun and once as a verb.

Can these 3 positions be reconciled, and if so how?

By looking at exactly what happens when we percieve something.

Lets say I am looking at apple. For simplicities sake lets say that I am only looking at an apple, and nothing else, but that I have full visual access to the apple, that I am able to look at this apple in everyway I would any other apple, at that this apple is, in principle at least, perceivable by other beings, that is, it exists in the objective world, and is not a personal hallucination of mine.

This already assumes direct realism is true. You have already equated the apple you percieve with an apple in the real world.

Now acording to each position what exactly is going on when I percieve the apple?

1. (DR) I am directly aware of an apple which exists in the objective world.

2. (IR) I am directly aware of my perception of the apple.

3. (TI) Through my cognitive/perceptual categories, I am percieving an apple,
which exists beyond my perceptions as an "Apple in Itself", in the noumena.

(2) is slightly wrong. It should say "I am aware of sense-data/representation of an apple".

Since they are the simpler positions lets first try to reconcile 1 and 2.

Notice now that thier simplified one and two don't actually contradict each other.

They still contradict.

(1) has to mean :I am directly aware of a real apple in the independently existing physical world.

(2) has to mean :I am directly aware of a representation of a real apple in the independently existing world.

How then can they be reconciled? By suggesting that we can be made directly aware of something in reality by our perceptions.

That is a contradiction. Perception and awareness just mean the same thing anyway. If you are aware of something then you are perceiving it. So when you say "aware of my perceptions" what you must mean, instead of "perceptions" is "representations" or "sense-data" or "ideas" or "qualia". You are either directly aware of an object or you are directly aware of a representation of an object. You cannot simultaneously be directly aware of both.

That is, in the case of the Apple, we are directly aware of our perception of the Apple, but also being made directly aware *of* the Apple. To see how this would be the case imagine that I were to turn the Apple, and find out that it had a bruise.
The bruise itself existed prior to my perception of it, IE I had no "awareness" of it, but by turning the apple I am given direct awareness of its existence through my perception.

Except you are using "perception" as a noun which means "representation".

In this way I become directly aware of something in the external world, without becoming aware of anything outside of my perception....

This is a self-contradictory statement. You are usinig "perception" as a noun. Previously in this thread it has only been used as a verb.

* I still fail to see why the ultimate nature of these objects must be physical. Nor can I find any arguments as to why they must be so. If you know of any I'd be grateful if you could provide them.

Because that is how they are defined. That is what "direct realism" means. It means that "the natural attitude" is correct, after all. It means that what we perceive are real physical objects. If their "ultimate nature" is not physical then direct realism is false because what we directly percieve seems to be a physical world. You can argue that we percieve it directly, and that is direct realism. You can argue that we perceive it indirectly, which is indirect realism - which I believe to be a prima facie untenable position precisely because what we are directly aware of is physical objects so it seems absurd, as you are inferring to also believe that things in themselves just happen to be exactly the same as the representations we percieve. Indirect realism therefore just doesn't make sense at all. I don't understand what it is trying to say. For these reasons I think that if you don't want to accept direct realism you have no choice but to turn to some form of non-realism and transcendental idealism is non-realism. There reason it is non-realism is because the noumenal world of things in itself is closed to us. So to answer the question: the reason the ultimate nature of these things must be physical for a direct realist is that if their ultimate nature is non-physical we are not directly aware of things-in-themselves. Direct realism requires that we are aware of things-in-themselves, and the things we are aware of are physical.

 

[hammegk]

Under the sequences being discussed, 2) fails as illogical (interactive) dualism, and the choice of monism remains 1)body or 3)mind.

 

[Iacchus]

Under the sequences being discussed, 2) fails as illogical (interactive) dualism, and the choice of monism remains 1)body or 3)mind.

So, what happens when one dies? Does that mean the death of the mind too ... meaning the whole thing was merely illusory after all?

 

[cpolk]

Furthermore, the absolute representation of a stick in programming is a real stick. It is in the form of information. The computer uses some form of energy to create that stick into the mind. Since nothing can be created nor destroyed, the machine is merely converting that energy into energy that the brain can then convert into matter in its reality. Therefore, the stick, whether it is built physically or in energy, is the same object as long as the physical and the energy versions contain the exact same information.