DeiRenDopa
Master Poster
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- Feb 25, 2008
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Observations and the forces of nature (gravity)
In my previous post I talked about the classifications of astronomical objects, and how a strong desire (of humans) to know 'what things are, really' has lead to not only some satisfying answers (e.g. variable stars with {insert description of time variability of their light curves} ARE eclipsing binaries), but has inextricably involved the application of the physics of the day.
In this post I'd like to take a look at what the process of going from observations - in general, not just in astronomy - to fully internalised theories (in physics) is like, and what it involves. Much of this post is adapted from the second one I provided a link to, in my previous post, in another thread.
What is "gravity"? Does "gravity" exist? Is it "a force of nature"?
In that other thread, a JREF Forum member proposed a very simple test which demonstrates that gravity, as a force of nature, exists; something like this: hold a weight, such as a bottle of water, in one hand, hand facing down; with your other hand underneath it, palm up, let go of the ball ... the ball will drop into your (lower) hand; ergo, gravity exists.
But does it really? After all, all this test shows is that the weight falls when released from one's hand; to call that 'gravity' is rather underwhelming.
However, we can proceed empirically - being very careful to define just what we mean by this word - and make lots of observations, actively (doing 'tests', or 'experiments') or passively, with lots of different objects, in lots of different places, at lots of different times.
We will find - empirically - that there are plenty of cases where objects do not drop, or fall, when released; for example, a leaf on a windy day, a piece of wood released under water. And we need to confront the problem of induction too.
By being careful, and using induction, we can gradually build more and more powerful summaries of the results of hundreds, thousands, millions, ... of observations (whether active experiments or just passive observations), and in the best of these summaries the word 'gravity' will be used, as will the word 'nature'.
In that sense the word 'gravity' may be said to have great explanatory (and predictive) power.
In parallel, and to some extent overlapping, we may develop other summaries of empirical tests (of 'nature') which include another word with great explanatory (and predictive) power, 'force'.
Historically, with some anachronisms and a bit of revisionism, this gets us up to somewhere in the 1500s, maybe a bit earlier, maybe a bit later.
Now we add a true revolution, which I shall term the quantitative revolution ... we can move on from nice word summaries to adding first numbers and then equations, and 'gravity as a force of nature' becomes something whose explanatory and predictive powers expand enormously ... but only if the equations and numbers are understood! We are now in the time of Galileo (more or less).
At that time the heavens and Earth were separate - nature consisted of two almost totally independent parts, each with its own 'forces'; how the planets moved across the sky, for example, had nothing to do with how cannon balls (and feathers) fell when let go.
Then, in the myth, an apple fell on Newton's head while he was gazing at the Moon (it was daytime) ... and nature became unified, and the universal law of gravitation was published.
It was quickly tested, by 'curve fitting' - applying math to points in the sky - and found to work.
And a century or so later - well after Newton had died - a key part of Newton's law was tested in the lab.
So what does all this have to do with a persistent feature of so much EU material? A great deal actually.
First, the 'known forces of nature' that 'EU theorists' are so enamored with, are known via equations and numbers only; if you work at the 'qualitative' level, you cannot have 'known forces of nature'.
Second, a century (or more) may well pass between the first publication of the equations and numbers describing a 'known force of nature' and its testing in the lab.
Third, the application of math to points on the sky can lead to acceptance of a new 'force of nature'.
And so on.
Now we know, from reading lots of EU materials, and from the posts of such JREF Forum members as Z and MM, that many 'EU theorists' reject all three of the above points, especially the third one. This alone makes the EU approach to science very different than that of scientists - or at least physicists - over the past four+ centuries ... and it means that the discussion we should be having is not about Birkeland, plasmas, the CMB, quasars, Einstein's EFE, filaments, etc; rather it should be about what constitutes science (or at least physics).
If we were to have such a discussion, I think we'd find that a key aspect of so many EU proponents' approach is an unstated, and possibly unrecognised, misunderstanding of equations and numbers; in short, a world where the quantitative revolution didn't happen.
(to be continued)
In my previous post I talked about the classifications of astronomical objects, and how a strong desire (of humans) to know 'what things are, really' has lead to not only some satisfying answers (e.g. variable stars with {insert description of time variability of their light curves} ARE eclipsing binaries), but has inextricably involved the application of the physics of the day.
In this post I'd like to take a look at what the process of going from observations - in general, not just in astronomy - to fully internalised theories (in physics) is like, and what it involves. Much of this post is adapted from the second one I provided a link to, in my previous post, in another thread.
What is "gravity"? Does "gravity" exist? Is it "a force of nature"?
In that other thread, a JREF Forum member proposed a very simple test which demonstrates that gravity, as a force of nature, exists; something like this: hold a weight, such as a bottle of water, in one hand, hand facing down; with your other hand underneath it, palm up, let go of the ball ... the ball will drop into your (lower) hand; ergo, gravity exists.
But does it really? After all, all this test shows is that the weight falls when released from one's hand; to call that 'gravity' is rather underwhelming.
However, we can proceed empirically - being very careful to define just what we mean by this word - and make lots of observations, actively (doing 'tests', or 'experiments') or passively, with lots of different objects, in lots of different places, at lots of different times.
We will find - empirically - that there are plenty of cases where objects do not drop, or fall, when released; for example, a leaf on a windy day, a piece of wood released under water. And we need to confront the problem of induction too.
By being careful, and using induction, we can gradually build more and more powerful summaries of the results of hundreds, thousands, millions, ... of observations (whether active experiments or just passive observations), and in the best of these summaries the word 'gravity' will be used, as will the word 'nature'.
In that sense the word 'gravity' may be said to have great explanatory (and predictive) power.
In parallel, and to some extent overlapping, we may develop other summaries of empirical tests (of 'nature') which include another word with great explanatory (and predictive) power, 'force'.
Historically, with some anachronisms and a bit of revisionism, this gets us up to somewhere in the 1500s, maybe a bit earlier, maybe a bit later.
Now we add a true revolution, which I shall term the quantitative revolution ... we can move on from nice word summaries to adding first numbers and then equations, and 'gravity as a force of nature' becomes something whose explanatory and predictive powers expand enormously ... but only if the equations and numbers are understood! We are now in the time of Galileo (more or less).
At that time the heavens and Earth were separate - nature consisted of two almost totally independent parts, each with its own 'forces'; how the planets moved across the sky, for example, had nothing to do with how cannon balls (and feathers) fell when let go.
Then, in the myth, an apple fell on Newton's head while he was gazing at the Moon (it was daytime) ... and nature became unified, and the universal law of gravitation was published.
It was quickly tested, by 'curve fitting' - applying math to points in the sky - and found to work.
And a century or so later - well after Newton had died - a key part of Newton's law was tested in the lab.
So what does all this have to do with a persistent feature of so much EU material? A great deal actually.
First, the 'known forces of nature' that 'EU theorists' are so enamored with, are known via equations and numbers only; if you work at the 'qualitative' level, you cannot have 'known forces of nature'.
Second, a century (or more) may well pass between the first publication of the equations and numbers describing a 'known force of nature' and its testing in the lab.
Third, the application of math to points on the sky can lead to acceptance of a new 'force of nature'.
And so on.
Now we know, from reading lots of EU materials, and from the posts of such JREF Forum members as Z and MM, that many 'EU theorists' reject all three of the above points, especially the third one. This alone makes the EU approach to science very different than that of scientists - or at least physicists - over the past four+ centuries ... and it means that the discussion we should be having is not about Birkeland, plasmas, the CMB, quasars, Einstein's EFE, filaments, etc; rather it should be about what constitutes science (or at least physics).
If we were to have such a discussion, I think we'd find that a key aspect of so many EU proponents' approach is an unstated, and possibly unrecognised, misunderstanding of equations and numbers; in short, a world where the quantitative revolution didn't happen.
(to be continued)

IOW, that there are at least two quite distinct classes of quasar (despite the extensive research which shows they are a single class of object) - one that is 'local', and the other which is 'cosmological'; OR that all quasars (and all other AGNs) are 'local'.