Pan Am 103: Unaccompanied bag from Malta: Evidence?

[Buncrana]

Above all else, it's a tale that genuinely has a right being in the 'conspiracy theories' forum.

It really does highlight the absolutely senseless and totally incoherent logic that Megrahi (and his accomplice...no, megrahi on his own) apparently considered, or didn't, in the planning and execution of their terror and retribution masterplan. And all with the full force and support of the old experienced warhorse Libyan state?

So many unknowns, countless opportunities for it the whole operation to fail and just as much chance the entire plan will be exposed at one of the many security processes that must be negotiated. Not only does this cunningly and carefully thought out mission carry high odds of being uncovered, but in that position, also of the true perpetrators being uncovered.

Cue a few more billion dollar fighters and missiles overhead.

The circumventing of the three airport security systems is simply inconceivable in itself, without the utterly staggering suggestion that after all this has been successfully bypassed, we are to believe that the bag would then be loaded in precisely the position required to complete the attrocity.

I just don't buy it. Try as I might sometimes.

 

[Rolfe]

It's really just the Official Version with an added twist to make the findings more plausible. If we postulate that Gadaffi was trying to mimic a PFLP-GC operation from Heathrow as regards timing of the explosion, but was sneakily feeding the bomb in at Malta to confuse the investigation and so using a digital timer instead of a barometric one, then we explain a number of things that are otherwise anomalies.

However, we have to ask why he would do that, and we don't have an answer. This modus operandi was never suggested at the trial. We also have to assume he was fairly relaxed about whether it would actually work or not, given the number of things that might have gone wrong.

• We still have to postulate the complete and continuing subversion of the Maltese aviation authorities, something which was investigated to destruction and no evidence found for it.
• The suitcase might have been misrouted in the system - goodness knows, it happens often enough.
• One of the planes might have been delayed sufficiently for the explosion to have occurred at ground level - again not an uncommon occurrence in northern Europe in the middle of winter.
• Maier would really have been expected to spot the radio and pull out the case for manual inspection - there's no plausible explanation in the Official Version of why this didn't happen.
• The trail of the case through Frankfurt airport would have been expected to have been perfectly obvious, if the records hadn't vanished - postulating wholesale destruction of Frankfurt baggage records by Libyan agents is actually preposterous.
• It would have been impossible to have influenced the positioning of the case at Heathrow, unless we're also going to postulate Libyan infiltration of the precise personnel at Heathrow who performed that baggage transfer - again a fairly preposterous suggestion.

There was a pretty fair chance that plane simply wouldn't have come down, and also an excellent chance of Megrahi's involvement being discovered by way of the Frankfurt baggage trail and his presence at Luqa. The possibility of the case being intercepted intact and the MST-13 discovered (and possibly even fingerprints and DNA, which was just emerging as a crime detection method at that time), wasn't negligible either.

I just like it because it explains tray B8849, which I still haven't convinced myself is a plant, and the utter weirdness of anyone choosing to buy clothes to pad out a bomb suitcase in the way we're supposed to believe happened here, and it reconciles the MST-13 and the 38-minute explosion, and the two different radios both called BomBeat.

It's that or Hayes, Feraday and Thurman plotting to plant the timer fragment, Feraday planting the radio manual, and some explanation I still don't understand for both the whole Frankfurt luggage disappearance scenario coupled with the Erac printout, and the terrorists buying new clothes for the suitcase in a small shop.

I like to feel my understanding of the situation is increasing when I put it like that though.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

I suppose - we have some features which seem to suggest Lbya, and some which look extraordinarily like the modus operandi of the PFLP-GC.

Is this then

1. A Libyan operation deliberately designed to look as if the PFLP-GC did it
2. A PFLP-GC operation, with retrospective manipulation of the evidence to implicate Libya
3. Something else?

The first one seems more parsimonious, but leaves a huge number of questions unanswered. The second involves postulating the fabrication of evidence by the investigating authorities, which is always less parsimonious, but has a lot going for it. The third is Charles, and the guy who thinks it was an accidental detonation of cargo ordnance, and the baying mob shouting "the Jews did it!".

The bits I'm hung up on are the Frankfurt records and Bogomira, and the Maltese clothes.

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

As an addition to everything you've stated above Rolfe, are we seriously proposing that after the BKA raid on the PLFP cell in Germany in October, discovering a considerable cache of arms and explosives, and crucially, a radio cassette manipulated into a bomb, Gadaffi then formulates a plan to exact his revenge for the '86 US raid, obtains all the relevant parts and semtex, and send the bomb from Malta straight back to the heart of where these devices were initially discovered just a few weeks before: Germany, and Frankfurt Airport?

This could be the most ill-conceived and amateurish attempt at implicating another group in bombing ever. It's not so much the proposition that Libya may look to take advantage of the methods known to the security authorities, it's the suggestion of the method utilized, Malta via Frankfurt via Heathrow,that simply runs contrary to any logic. Had someone suggested this plan by the Libyan's was carried out with Heathrow as the point of introduction of the device, then it certainly offers more cogency and most importantly offers substantially greater chance of a successful mission.

Of course, Heathrow wouldn't want any responsibility left at their door.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Just to let you guys know, I'm still reading as much of this as I can daily. It's an awesome experience.

One point I guess, a question. From the Independent, above

The team then began interviewing airline and airport staff, and discovered the list of luggage checked into the hold against passengers' names on Air Malta KM 180 to Frankfurt bore no resemblance to what the passengers had checked in. The Air Malta list was a shambles, one officer said.

Can anyone tell me, being reasonable, is there any known evidence on which to reasonably conclude that KM189's records were, or appeared to be, "a shambles?" Or is this just some convenient statement of "oh don't you worry, everything lines up fine with our new leads." ?

 

[Rolfe]

As an addition to everything you've stated above Rolfe, are we seriously proposing that after the BKA raid on the PLFP cell in Germany in October, discovering a considerable cache of arms and explosives, and crucially, a radio cassette manipulated into a bomb, Gadaffi then formulates a plan to exact his revenge for the '86 US raid, obtains all the relevant parts and semtex, and send the bomb from Malta straight back to the heart of where these devices were initially discovered just a few weeks before: Germany, and Frankfurt Airport?

No, not very seriously. I'm just trying out theories for size. We still don't have a narrative I'm especially comfortable with insofar as it reasonably explains all the main facts as we have them, so one must continue to consider all possibilities.

The possibility that Megrahi had a hand in it can't be dismissed while we still lack a reasonable explanation for B8849. I felt this all along, but then dismissed it with the observation that we have no real clue where B8849 came from, or what was in the tray. As Paul Foot remarked, it could have been a case of wine or a bag of golf clubs. There are a number of possibilities that have to be considered as regards its origin, once you accept that the evidence from Luqa says there was no unaccompanied bag actually on KM180 - it's not an open-and-shut connection. In addition, if B8849 went on the plane, it was x-rayed by Maier. Careful, conscientious Maier who was aware of the threat from Toshiba BomBeat radios.

However, I can't get over the sheer size of the coincidence. Megrahi really was at Luqa that morning, travelling as Abdusamad. For some random piece of mis-routed luggage just to happen to appear in the system in such a way as to make it look as if there was a rogue bag on KM180 is one helluva big coincidence. The sort of coincidence Cannistraro and Marquise would have given a major body part for, in fact. The whole business of the vanishing records and the divine intervention of the Erac printout only compounds the mystery.

So, I tend to favour the possibility of some distinctly non-divine intervention in the Frankfurt department, over this huge and remarkably convenient coincidence. The trouble is, this introduces its own problems. First, it adds a whole new chapter to the proposed conspiracy. Not only do we have the Hayes/Feraday/Thurman triumvirate in a position to manipulate the evidence found at Lockerbie, we have to postulate involvement of Frankfurt personnel - principally the BKA, but also quite possibly Erac and Berg. Second, it's not nearly so easy to pick holes in that story as it is to find anomalies in the RARDE investigation. It's a completely bizarre sequence of events, but accepting that, it holds together fairly well. Either we still have to accept a degree of coincidence in that Bogomira fortuitously saved a printout that later turned out to be exactly what was needed to support a fabricated trail of evidence leading to Megrahi, or she is one helluva actress.

Paradoxically, if we were forced to accept that the timer fragment and the radio manual were wholly genuine and Hayes and Feraday the soul of integrity, this wouldn't really to my mind give huge weight to the Libya theory, as there's no real reason Jibril's group couldn't have acquired these items. They certainly don't implicate Megrahi personally, and unless you can support the "Megrahi introduced the bag at Luqa that morning" part, you simply don't have any sort of a case. However, there's every reason to suspect Hayes, Feraday and Thurman of shenanigans, and the timer fragment and the radio manual to be fabrications.

Conversely, it's relatively difficult to hand-wave tray B8849 away without postulating a positively supernatural coincidence, and yet if you don't do that, you very definitely have specific evidence suggesting a connection to Megrahi. I'm not quite sure how you square this circle.

This is why I was trying out a variant of the Official Version, to see if there was any possibility it might fly. I like it in that it explains tray B8849, and it actually explains the bizarre purchase from Gauci, which I otherwise simply can't get my head around. It's unsatisfying as regards the timer fragment and the radio manual, as it assumes these are genuine, despite the very strong reasons for suspecting they're anything but. On the other hand, this again reduces the extent of the postulated conspiracy (down to basically bribing Gauci and Giaka to provide the extra evidence that would be necessary to get a conviction).

It also reopens most of the enormous objections that have dogged the Official Version all along - all but the 38-minute explosion, that is. We still have absolutely no idea how the case was got on the plane at Malta, despite huge efforts on the part of the investigators to crack this aspect, and actually the distinct possibility that someone involved might have talked by now. The theory provides no explanation for the disappearing Frankfurt records, though in fact such a disappearance would have been essential to the central premise of the proposed plot - that the Malta introduction wouldn't be identified, and so the PFLP-GC would take the blame. It also leaves us with the Bedford suitcase being a huge unexplained coincidence, and frankly that is nearly as big a coincidence (if it wasn't the bomb bag) as tray B8849 would be (if it wasn't the bomb bag).

But most of all, we have the problem of Frankfurt security. If that bomb came through Frankfurt, Maier should have picked it up. Frankfurt was on the alert for a device of exactly that nature. You can suggest after the event that Maier must have missed it, if you like, but the idea that a terrorist who was aware of the alert at Frankfurt nevertheless decided to press ahead regardless in the hope that a device still had a decent chance of getting through undetected is pretty far-fetched. (At least the Frankfurt bag-switch theories postulate that Frankfurt security and Maier were deliberately and actively circumvented, rather than assuming the device sailed through entirely unaided.)

Finally, we have the problem of the positioning of the bag in the luggage container, which was vital, but which this theory has no possible way to influence. We've really just swapped one set of problems for another, and we have to decide which set we prefer. In fact, for the "Gadaffi was trying to mimic a PFLP-GC attack" scenario to work at all, we really have to postulate not only that the Luqa airport security was completely subverted, but that Frankfurt was too, and the BKA weren't that bothered about it - and that Gadaffi also had at least one agent among the loaders who transferred the interline baggage on the tarmac at Heathrow. This is getting just as ridiculous as suggesting that the BKA were into some sort of cover-up, following which they co-operated with Cannistraro's little scheme.

I merely want to examine all reasonable possibilities (so far as any possibility meets the criteria of "reasonable" in this case). We're not the "Megrahi didn't do it" campaign on any point of principle, and a reasonable conclusion that Megrahi did it would be as acceptable as any other reasonable conclusion. It's not looking promising though.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

It's not so much the proposition that Libya may look to take advantage of the methods known to the security authorities, it's the suggestion of the method utilized, Malta via Frankfurt via Heathrow,that simply runs contrary to any logic. Had someone suggested this plan by the Libyan's was carried out with Heathrow as the point of introduction of the device, then it certainly offers more cogency and most importantly offers substantially greater chance of a successful mission.

That's all very well, but if you're going to introduce the device at Heathrow, and you want to mimic the PFLP-GC, you might as well use a barometric timer in the first place, and completely avoid the risk of the thing blowing up on the tarmac.

My main reason for embarking on that line of speculation, however, is tray B8849. That's the one single solitary piece of evidence for the entire "Megrahi put the bomb into the system at Luqa" hypothesis. If that wasn't there, Megrahi would just be one more slightly shady airline passenger going about his slightly shady business that morning. I'm finding the "coincidence" theory a bit hard to swallow, so as well as considering the possiblilty that the record is a fabrication, I'm also considering the possibility that somehow the Official Version could be correct all along.

It's really just a secondary attraction that the MST-13, the SF-16 and the purchase of the clothes can all be fitted into that explanation as well. The main issue is B8849. Libyans putting the bomb on board at Heathrow wouldn't explain that.

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

If we are inclined to think that Feraday/Hayes/Thurman have contrived the evidence against Megrahi, which appears very possible, especially given the subsequent accusation and criticism which caused Thurman to 'leave' the Bureau and what was known about Rarde's, and specifically Feraday's conduct in previous investigations and his evidence given in court, then I think it's reasonable to presume they did not initiate these decisions of their own volition. So, given this position it would necessitate decisons taken from higher.

The German's and the BKA were perhaps in an even more precarious position than either the UK or US authorities given the public knowledge of the uncovering of the PLFP cell, and even more concerning and damaging, if it were confirmed that this group or it's devices were the cause of the 103's destruction, and the Germans had simply let the known bomb maker, whom they had caught red-handed with bombs designed for aircraft, go free from custody and disappear out of the country.

What was going on at Franfurt in the first few days after the disaster and the records and details they must have secured? What the hell were they doing withholding a computer printout from late January until August which showed an unaccompanied piece of baggage entering their system around the time KM180 was unloaded, even although the records at Malta appeared to show no such luggage? All the while the PLFP are prime suspects, investigators are scouring europe for confirmation of Toshiba radios, and recriminations are intensifying between the UK and German investigators as to the source of the bomb bag? Was it also known during this time that, Talb a known associate of the PFLP, was also known to have visited Malta?

If there is the suggestion that certain hand-picked US and UK investigators were engaged in some sort of surreptitious plot to implicate Libya and perhaps latterly Megrahi, would it be so preposterous to think that the German's wouldn't also have a strong vested interest in such machinations?

I can see the implication that this involves, but I don't neccessarily concede that Berg would also be required to be privy to this plot. From the information we have gleaned, I accept that Erac would have to be likely party to this, and yes, that does then present the unusual premise that someone apparently outwith the internal investigation would need to be induced in some respect in the scheme. Sadly, given everything we aleady know about the conduct of the US, UK and German investigators assigned to the critical discoveries of this case, I do not find this scenario or suggestion implausible.



I've some more newspaper articles from the first few months of the investigation coming up. Sorry Rolfe, it seems for some strange reason, that the document viewer I'm looking through for these old articles, includes all the major UK broadsheets, except the Herald!

 

[Rolfe]

Can anyone tell me, being reasonable, is there any known evidence on which to reasonably conclude that KM189's records were, or appeared to be, "a shambles?" Or is this just some convenient statement of "oh don't you worry, everything lines up fine with our new leads." ?

You know, you really need to be less suspicious. Journalists can make mistakes without it having to be part of some deliberate misinformation plan!

Not only is there no known evidence so far as I can tell that the records were a shambles, subsequent events indicate that this simply can't be true. Air Malta were successful in more than one legal action they took against accusations the bomb got on that aircraft, and I can't see how they could have done this if the records were a shambles.

Other sources make it pretty clear that the investigators absolutely bust a gut trying to blow a hole in the Luqa records, going as far as to tap the private telephone calls of the baggage handlers, and found nothing. We can see how eager the judges were to grasp at any straw that would let them favour the Official Version, but they had no such straw as regards this issue. If there had been any problem with these records, I'm quite confident we would have heard about it as justification for the final baseless assumption that "he must have done it somehow".

I think someone has misrepresented the situation to the journalist, maybe out of frustration or misunderstanding. It's extremely unlikely to be deliberate.

It makes me wonder how much credence can be put on the rest of it, the account of who the passengers were and where they were going. However, as far as I remember it checks with other acconts I've read.

I suppose this is all examined in the court records, though.

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

Interesting article, for various reasons, for I think there is one small pertinent paragraph..

The Independent (London)

March 25, 1990, Sunday

German police set to charge Pan Am lawyer

BYLINE: From LEONARD DOYLE in New York

SECTION: HOME NEWS PAGE; Page 3

LENGTH: 860 words

WEST GERMAN police plan to charge an American lawyer acting for Pan Am's insurance underwriters with attempting to extort confessions from Frankfurt airport baggage handlers over the Lockerbie disaster, a lawyer for the handlers says.

The New York lawyer and an American detective working for a private Israeli investigation agency are to be accused of making an attempt to pin the blame on the handlers.

It is alleged that they illegally persuaded two handlers to go to London in an attempt to show that they were responsible for the explosion and to get them into the hands of the British police. That incident brought a diplomatic rebuke from West Germany to the US embassy in Bonn.

The handlers' West German lawyer has decided to lodge a formal complaint, and the Frankfurt prosecutor, Achim Thiele, is expected to submit criminal charges against the two men this week.

The two handlers, Roland O'Neill, a West German, and Kilins Aslan Tuzcu, a Turkish immigrant, underwent lie-detector tests about the bombing in January at the suggestion of the Pan Am insurance lawyer, James Shaughnessy. They allegedly failed the tests and were asked to go to London under false pretences. Mr Shaughnessy apparently expected British police to interview them. The plan backfired, however, when the British police refused to co-operate and tipped off the West German federal police, the BKA, that the men were in London.

Mr O'Neill spent the day sightseeing in London, and Mr Tuzcu remained at Pan Am's Heathrow terminal, unaware that an attempt was being made to implicate them in the disaster, according to their lawyer, Countess Rudt von Collenberg.

Mr Shaughnessy gave a 34- page handwritten statement to Scottish police, a copy of which has reached The Independent on Sunday.

The West German authorities were angered by the incident. Last month, the US ambassador in Bonn, Vernon Walters, sent an urgent cable to the Secretary of State, James Baker.

The cable, a copy of which has also been obtained by The Independent on Sunday, said that ''a number of actions taken by American attorneys involved in PA-103 litigation . . . have sorely irritated German authorities and may lead to German criminal prosecution of US citizens''.

He added: ''Among charges allegedly under consideration, are kidnapping and extortion.'' In an interview in New York last weekend, Mr Shaughnessy said that he and the detective, James Keefe, had done nothing improper or illegal. Because of a lack of official information, they had been forced ''to try to find out the facts and the truth about what happened'', to mount a legal defence in the $ 300m lawsuit started against the airline by the families of the 271 people killed when flight PA-103 exploded over Scotland.

Pan Am and its insurance underwriters are being sued for ''wilful misconduct'' for failing to provide adequate security.

''Three individuals in Frankfurt were given polygraph examinations, they were not kidnapped and they were not extorted in anyway,'' Mr Shaughnessy said.

West German authorities have been embarrassed by revelations that the BKA did not co-operate fully with Scottish investigators and was withholding vital information to protect covert sources.

German authorities have also been blamed for bungling an earlier tip-off about a terrorist cell, after which Marwan Khreesat - the man the authorities believe made the bomb which destroyed the plane - was set free after being arrested in September 1988 in the belief that he was a mole for Jordanian intelligence services. Mr Khreesat appears to have been a double agent who was stringing the Jordanians along.

In his report to the police, Mr Shaughnessy described how Mr Tuzcu, who speaks only Turkish, Mr O' Neill and another employee all signed statements that the lie-detector tests were voluntary. Mr Tuzcu was asked through a Pan Am interpreter ''if he was involved in switching a bag . . . and whether he was aware that the bag that was switched contained a bomb'', according to Mr Shaughnessy. He denied all knowledge. He was then subjected to a 20- minute lie-detector test, which he allegedly failed.

Mr O' Neill's interview took place at the Sheraton Hotel in Frankfurt on 23 January. Mr Shaughnessy told the Strathclyde police that he agreed to be polygraphed after ''considerable reluctance''. After the polygraph, Mr Keefe said that he ''had lied in several respects . . . specifically that he did not know that bags had been switched on flight 103 . . . that he had not ordered or instructed Tuzcu to switch the bags . . . that he did not know that the bag that was switched contained a bomb''.

Mr Shaughnessy himself then flew to London and contacted the Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary, telling them that Mr Tuzcu, Mr O'Neill and the third employee ''were the only three individuals who were in a position to have switched a bag on flight 103''. It was then that the plan went awry.

British police refused to speak to either of the two baggage handlers and they were interviewed by the BKA on their return to Frankfurt where, according to their lawyer, they ''were cleared of suspicion in the case''.

I'm presuming the accusation of the bag switch is not from the possibility of an unaccompanied bag, such as B8849, was substituted, but as the article suggests in the middle of the article, that as part of the "covert activities", this was the bag that was switched.

ETA: I meant to say, I can fully appreciate withholding information from the public to protect the investigation and possible sources, but to withhold information from your own co-investigators and the police investigating a crime of this magnitude, is astonishing. And pretty damning as to a hidden agenda imo.

 

[Buncrana]

Another article that appears to confirm my earlier suggestion that Talb's visits to Malta were known to the Germans, UK and US investigators pretty early on.

So, by February '89 the BKA apparently have, in their possession, the Erac printout showing the rogue B8849 enter their baggage system, unacompanied and destined for 103A, and indicating it's arrival from a Malta Flight KM180.

Also in February, everyone is made aware that a Toshiba Radio was the housing for the bomb that exploded, and it 'most likely' arrived via Frankfurt.

In March the suitcase is identified, and in mid-March there are claims that the culprits are known, which is later denied.

In May Talb and his associates are arrested in Sweden on other terrorist charges. Details of Talbs visits to Malta are uncovered as is clothing from Malta. It is claimed, some of these clothes were also from Gauci's shop Mary's House.

May, Feraday and Hayes make their apparent discovery of clothing and scraps of timer. Their notes and procedures from this period, however, appear highly questionable.

In May however, the German investigators still decide that B8849, coming unacompanied from Malta and headed straight to 103A, is of no interest to the investigation.

Late August the Scottish police along with the FBI, visit Malta, and only at this stage do the BKA then confide with the Scottish police and announce to everyone that they have a printout, kept by an airport worker, which shows B8849.

The Guardian (London)

December 18, 1989

Lockerbie: A Year On / Theories abound, but facts to pinpoint guilty remain thin
BYLINE: By DAVID PALLISTER

LENGTH: 838 words

Few stories have exercised the febrile imagination of journalists as has the plot behind the bombing of Pan Am's Flight 103.

Complex international terrorist outrages have always been fair game for speculation: Abu Nidal or Ahmed Jibril are the least likely people to encounter such speculation by hiring expensive libel lawyers in London, and "sources" - usually in the police and intelligence world - are never identified.

In the past year four Palestinian groups and three Middle East states, have with differing degrees of reliability been suggested as the perpetrators. Some of the more fanciful reports add in the German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades or the Japanese Red Army.

For real conspiracy theorists, there is scope for a mix of CIA, Israeli intelligence, an international drugs syndicate and shady arms dealers.

As for the means, it has been variously reported that the bomb was placed on a feeder flight in Malta or Cyprus, at Frankfurt or Heathrow. It was either accompanied by a passenger who had been duped or slipped aboard by a baggage handler. Investigators from half a dozen countries have offered "briefings": while the circumstantial evidence is powerful, the facts are thin.

Within a week of the disaster, after Ministry of Defence scientists examined a metal luggage container, it was announced that a bomb was responsible. By January 10, its location was pinpointed, in the forward luggage hold; the explosive was said to be "probably" Semtex.

A month later, Detective Chief Superintendant John Orr, the Scottish detective leading the murder inquiry, said it had been hidden in a radio cassette recorder "probably" loaded at Frankfurt, on the first leg of Flight 103's journey to Heathrow, New York and Detroit.

By March Lord Fraser, the Lord Advocate, was able to announce that the suitcase containing it had been identified. Since then the Scottish police have made no formal announcements, other than to say that they visited a lot of countries and interviewed a lot of people.

On March 17 there was a small sensation. Several newspapers, including the Guardian, reported that the identity of the bomber was known, as was where the device came from and where it was planted. The Sun had the man "under close arrest". All this, it emerged, was nothing more than the outcome of a journalists' lunch with the then transport secretary, Mr Paul Channon, at the Garrick Club.

In Washington, meanwhile, the FBI fingered the usual suspects and pointed out the most-favoured motive. While the Libya-based Fatah Revolutionary Council of Abu Nidal has remained a recurring candidate, suspicion has stuck with Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command. Jibril's group, based in Syria, rejects the PLO recognition of Israel, is also close to Iran and is fundamentalist. Hence the supposition that radical elements in Iran were paymasters for an American target, after an Iranian Airbus was shot down over the Gulf last year by a US warship.

Evidence for Jibril's involvement came from West Germany and later Sweden. In October 1988 police broke up a PFLP-GC cell and in a Frankfurt flat found a Semtex bomb in a radio cassette player. Jibril has admitted that a central committee member, Hafez Dalkamoni, was arrested with the bomb.

Three similar devices were discovered, with the hallmarks of being made by a man whom the Germans had also arrested. Inexplicably, he was released - despite an international arrest warrant against him; there has been talk of him being a double or even triple agent.

In May a group of suspected Palestinian terrorists was arrested in Sweden. Four men accused of bomb attacks against Israel and American targets were tried, and the verdict will be announced on Thursday. From leaked travel documents and German briefings, the group has been shown to have associated with Dalkamoni in Germany, and more significantly, in Malta.

At Lockerbie, police discovered clothing in the suitcase which had been made and sold in Malta. Mohammed Abu Talb, one of those held in Sweden, apparently met Dalkamoni in Malta before the bombing. Suddenly this month he was named as a suspect by Scottish Detectives in an Uppsala apartment. Jibril has denied that the group belong to the PFLP-GC, but Talb's chequered history as a Palestinian fighter aligns him with the faction.

Although some newspapers have ridden their chosen hobbyhorses, there is as yet no official evidence of the bomb's origin and route.

Most observers dismiss the tantalising diversions floated by Pan Am's insurance investigators. Pan Am is in financial trouble, and the Lockerbie claims against it are exspensive.

Subpoenas issued by it on the US intelligence community - to show that the suitcase bomb was inadvertently allowed through airport security because of a covert CIA operation to smuggle drugs from Frankfurt, in return for help in releasing the American hostages in Beirut - carry little weight.

 

[Rolfe]

Interesting article, for various reasons, for I think there is one small pertinent paragraph..

I'm presuming the accusation of the bag switch is not from the possibility of an unaccompanied bag, such as B8849, was substituted, but as the article suggests in the middle of the article, that as part of the "covert activities", this was the bag that was switched.

ETA: I meant to say, I can fully appreciate withholding information from the public to protect the investigation and possible sources, but to withhold information from your own co-investigators and the police investigating a crime of this magnitude, is astonishing. And pretty damning as to a hidden agenda imo.

That's a very interesting article. It's the other side of the story told in The Trail of the Octopus, in which Shaughnessy is the hero lawyer fighting to uncover the truth, and Aviv is the ace investigator. I think there's some truth to both sides of the story. Shaughnessy was doing his best, but he was barking up the wrong tree.

I also agree, the information about the cover-up at Frankfurt is the more important part of the article. It's a common theme in a lot of the narrative from this time period. I really, really want to know what they were covering up. Not the actual introduction of the bomb, that's almost certain. Possibly they thought they were covering up the introduction of the bomb? Or were they actually covering up these controlled drug shipments?

I wonder if and when the CIA started pressurising Frankfurt anyway? As I said, Frankfurt was in the US zone of the FDR, post-war. And all this was happening at a pretty fraught time in Germany anyway - the wall fell in November 1989, and the cracks started appearing that summer. Remember the film of lines of cars laden with German families' entire possessions driving to the West through the newly-opened Czech border. That was the start, and it was July or August 1989.

This lot rather supports my original suspicion that the disappearing baggage records at Frankfurt were "disappeared" by the BKA in the day or two following the bombing. Possibly taking advantage of Christmas Day. Then, when it became politic to do so, the Erac printout with B8849 was revealed.

How much of this was lies and fabrication though?

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

I suspect the assertions often made that "the BKA did not co-operate fully with Scottish investigators and was withholding vital information to protect covert sources", is true, although in terms of the wider investigation, not entirely. Perhaps indeed they weren't happy to deal with the lowly D&G police in their enquiries, however, I do not imagine that information and intelligence was not being shared with the American CIA and UK's MI6 investigators by the German intelligence.

Just as the UK investigators had confirmed AVE4041 had contained the bomb, and had determined that, given the majority of the luugage in that container had been interlined from 103A, it was 'on balance' likely the device had been loaded at Frankfurt, while also well aware of the Khreesat arrest and devices uncovered, they were extremely keen, and undoubtly relieved, to place responsibility away from Heathrow. Perhaps however, if the BKA were also aware that the UK authorities were withholding the details of the Heathrow 'break-in', and lax security around the interline luggage shed, then accordingly, there was some sensitive information about Frankfurts operations that day that they would not allow to be disclosed.

All the while the D&G are drip-fed only the information and 'evidence' that suits the requirement of both airports to be, by and large, exonerated from absolute and sole culpability. Obviously, the fact that, given the later discoveries of the Maltese implication, one way or another the bomb had come through both systems, but at least neither would be left holding the can for this attrocity on their own. While the break-in was filed away, Bedford's suitcases were deemed immaterial, the knowledge of the Neuss bust, and most crucially due to conatiner 4041, the UK investigators had placed the responsibilty firmly in the German's court as to the origination of the device, it was now down to the German's to find an exit from this tricky position. I've no doubt the strained relations, often commented on between the investigators, was as a result of very pertinent information being supressed at both airports and other information being cast aside as though of no relevance.

Perhaps the intelligence services were long aware of Megrahi's position with Libyan intelligence, but it does seem absolutely crucial as to the point when investigators became aware of Megrahi presence at Luqa airport on the 21st.

 

[Rolfe]

Another article that appears to confirm my earlier suggestion that Talb's visits to Malta were known to the Germans, UK and US investigators pretty early on.

So, by February '89 the BKA apparently have, in their possession, the Erac printout showing the rogue B8849 enter their baggage system, unacompanied and destined for 103A, and indicating it's arrival from a Malta Flight KM180.

Also in February, everyone is made aware that a Toshiba Radio was the housing for the bomb that exploded, and it 'most likely' arrived via Frankfurt.

In March the suitcase is identified, and in mid-March there are claims that the culprits are known, which is later denied.

In May Talb and his associates are arrested in Sweden on other terrorist charges. Details of Talbs visits to Malta are uncovered as is clothing from Malta. It is claimed, some of these clothes were also from Gauci's shop Mary's House.

May, Feraday and Hayes make their apparent discovery of clothing and scraps of timer. Their notes and procedures from this period, however, appear highly questionable.

In May however, the German investigators still decide that B8849, coming unacompanied from Malta and headed straight to 103A, is of no interest to the investigation.

Late August the Scottish police along with the FBI, visit Malta, and only at this stage do the BKA then confide with the Scottish police and announce to everyone that they have a printout, kept by an airport worker, which shows B8849.

Why are you so sure the Frankfurt BKA had a printout showing B8849 in February, or indeed in May? I agree Bogomira's story is consistent, but that doesn't mean the printout always showed a tray coming from KM180. And indeed, the entire story where all the records vanish, then suddenly when it's convenient it turns out that just this single extract that we need to show what we want to show is available - well, it's remarkably convenient, to put it mildly.

However, there's an especially interesting bit in that statement of yours. It is clamied that some of the clothes in Abu Talb's possession came from Mary's House? Where did you get that from?

This really belongs in the mystery shopper thread, but that's a bit dormant so here will do for now. I had assumed that Abu Talb would not be buying clothes from a retailer. If he was interested in selling Maltese clothes in Sweden, then surely he would have sourced them from the factories?

I've never been able to make any sense of the clothes purchase. No matter which terrorist group carried out this atrocity, it makes no sense to buy brand new clothes from a small shop only weeks before the mission, to pack round the bomb. The world is full of old clothes that could never be traced back to their manufacturer.

It always made better sense that these clothes came from Abu Talb's stash. If the bombers weren't thinking too hard about the clothes, and Talb had all these clothes hanging around, then then it's not unreasonable to imagine someone just grabbed some of what was available without thinking that the stuff was new enough to be traced. But I didn't think it was likely any of Talb's stuff came from Gauci.

And yet, the evidence that at least some of what was found on the ground came from Mary's House is quite strong. The tweed jacket and the Yorkie trousers at least. Which didn't entirely compute. However, if there is reason to believe that some of Talb's stash did indeed come from Gauci, then it begins to make a little bit better sense.

Gauci's original description of the purchaser doesn't really match Talb either. He was also too young and not heavily built. However, I'm not all that impressed by Gauci's story about the shopper anyway. Nine months later, and Tony's not that bright to start with. David Wright's evidence suggests he may be conflating more than one event. Even if he's describing a real purchase on 23rd November, there's no certainty this was the purchase of the bomb clothes. The police would inevitably have had to start talking to him about particular items of clothing, and if he remembered this particular incident, then these clothes might have become attached to that memory in the early stages of the interviewing. Exactly what the mystery shopper bought is a bit hazy anyway - anything the polce wanted hi to have bought, it seems to be.

So, what's your evidence that Abu Talb had bought some clothes from Mary's House?

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

Perhaps the intelligence services were long aware of Megrahi's position with Libyan intelligence, but it does seem absolutely crucial as to the point when investigators became aware of Megrahi presence at Luqa airport on the 21st.

If they believed what Giaka was telling them, undoubtedly. He was telling them about Megrahi even before the bombing. He told them Megrahi had visited Malta on 7th December.

I read something somewhere about the discovery that Megrahi was also there on the 21st, but it was before I realised how important this was. I suspect Giaka told the CIA about this relatively early bt I don't know.

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

I suspect the assertions often made that "the BKA did not co-operate fully with Scottish investigators and was withholding vital information to protect covert sources", is true, although in terms of the wider investigation, not entirely. Perhaps indeed they weren't happy to deal with the lowly D&G police in their enquiries, however, I do not imagine that information and intelligence was not being shared with the American CIA and UK's MI6 investigators by the German intelligence.

A couple thoughts about that issue. The article said:

"West German authorities have been embarrassed by revelations that the BKA did not co-operate fully with Scottish investigators and was withholding vital information to protect covert sources."

First, I'm not sure that it's true. The British were always mad that the Germans weren't cooperating, and "embarrassing" "revelations" need have no basis in fact.

And second, it doesnt sound like it's abbout the printout - "covert sources" indicates human intel, terrorist info - they were also supposdly holdin out on that at one point, so said Orr et al at LICC. Couldn't get a full list of names for the Autumn Leaves gang, whom they were sort of pursuing.

The printout complaints never break the surface that I've seen, until after it was "resolved" with that prodigal souvenir. Silence ... silence ... silence ... Erac printout emerges - hey, what took you so long? We've been asking for that... (at least outwardly, in the media, it seems that way, or am I wrong?)

Food for thought. Otherwise, not much to add.

 

[Buncrana]

Why are you so sure the Frankfurt BKA had a printout showing B8849 in February, or indeed in May? I agree Bogomira's story is consistent, but that doesn't mean the printout always showed a tray coming from KM180. And indeed, the entire story where all the records vanish, then suddenly when it's convenient it turns out that just this single extract that we need to show what we want to show is available - well, it's remarkably convenient, to put it mildly.

However, there's an especially interesting bit in that statement of yours. It is clamied that some of the clothes in Abu Talb's possession came from Mary's House? Where did you get that from?

This really belongs in the mystery shopper thread, but that's a bit dormant so here will do for now. I had assumed that Abu Talb would not be buying clothes from a retailer. If he was interested in selling Maltese clothes in Sweden, then surely he would have sourced them from the factories?

I've never been able to make any sense of the clothes purchase. No matter which terrorist group carried out this atrocity, it makes no sense to buy brand new clothes from a small shop only weeks before the mission, to pack round the bomb. The world is full of old clothes that could never be traced back to their manufacturer.

It always made better sense that these clothes came from Abu Talb's stash. If the bombers weren't thinking too hard about the clothes, and Talb had all these clothes hanging around, then then it's not unreasonable to imagine someone just grabbed some of what was available without thinking that the stuff was new enough to be traced. But I didn't think it was likely any of Talb's stuff came from Gauci.

And yet, the evidence that at least some of what was found on the ground came from Mary's House is quite strong. The tweed jacket and the Yorkie trousers at least. Which didn't entirely compute. However, if there is reason to believe that some of Talb's stash did indeed come from Gauci, then it begins to make a little bit better sense.

Gauci's original description of the purchaser doesn't really match Talb either. He was also too young and not heavily built. However, I'm not all that impressed by Gauci's story about the shopper anyway. Nine months later, and Tony's not that bright to start with. David Wright's evidence suggests he may be conflating more than one event. Even if he's describing a real purchase on 23rd November, there's no certainty this was the purchase of the bomb clothes. The police would inevitably have had to start talking to him about particular items of clothing, and if he remembered this particular incident, then these clothes might have become attached to that memory in the early stages of the interviewing. Exactly what the mystery shopper bought is a bit hazy anyway - anything the polce wanted hi to have bought, it seems to be.

So, what's your evidence that Abu Talb had bought some clothes from Mary's House?

Rolfe.

I'm not sure at all that the BKA had the B8849 printout. They had all the relevant records from Frankfurt and 103A's loading, but I'm highly suspicious that B8849 ever existed until it became clear that Malta was the source of the clothes found and it was suitable for Megrahi to be pinpointed at Luqa airport. I don't think it existed because why would they not reveal this information, and clear indictaor of an unaccompanied piece of baggage coming from Malta, when Talb, known associate of PFLP, suspected of bombings, was arrested in Sweden with clothing originating from Malta?

As I said, it was claimed about the clothing found at Talb's apartment. Again, the somewhat contentious evidence of a "Blue Babygro" presented as evidence against Megrahi, supposedly purchased from Mary's House, was also reported that this same make (and colour I believe) of Babygro was discovered in Talb's apartment when arrested in May '89. I suppose the fact that I'm still of the opinion (of which I could be swayed) that some of the clothes packed around the bomb may well have been purchased from Gauci, then I'm prepared to allow for the fact that given it was known Talb had visited Malta, and although he was known to have connections to people involved in the manufacturing of clothing distributed around Malta, there was a possibility that some of his purchases came from Gauci himself. I'm aware we've discounted pretty much anything Gauci claims about any purchaser, but if we accept the provenance of the clothes, then we have to accept someone may well have purchased them from Mary's House - or possibly the same brands that were regulary delivered to Mary's Shop.

It's actually David Lappard himself who made the possibily tenuous connection between Talb and Gauci:

He had links with some of the PFLP-GC gang in Germany and was in Malta buying clothes in early December 1998. At one point Gauci is said to have identified him from a photograph as the buyer of the clothes. When police raided his home in Sweden, they found clothes that had been bought in Malta. Some reports suggest some of these clothes could be traced to Gauci’s shop. A police phone tap revealed that before his home was raided one of his associates was told: “Get rid of the clothes.” A calendar in his home had a ring around 21 December, 1988 – the date of the Lockerbie bombing.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2009603.ece

 

[Buncrana]

A couple thoughts about that issue. The article said:

First, I'm not sure that it's true. The British were always mad that the Germans weren't cooperating, and "embarrassing" "revelations" need have no basis in fact.

And second, it doesnt sound like it's abbout the printout - "covert sources" indicates human intel, terrorist info - they were also supposdly holdin out on that at one point, so said Orr et al at LICC. Couldn't get a full list of names for the Autumn Leaves gang, whom they were sort of pursuing.

The printout complaints never break the surface that I've seen, until after it was "resolved" with that prodigal souvenir. Silence ... silence ... silence ... Erac printout emerges - hey, what took you so long? We've been asking for that... (at least outwardly, in the media, it seems that way, or am I wrong?)

Food for thought. Otherwise, not much to add.

I agree, and did say as much...

I'm presuming the accusation of the bag switch is not from the possibility of an unaccompanied bag, such as B8849, was substituted, but as the article suggests in the middle of the article, that as part of the "covert activities", this was the bag that was switched.

 

[Buncrana]

And yet another fascinating article taken here from October '89.

The Independent

October 31 1989, Tuesday
Correction Appended

Leading Article: Lockerbie: the German scandal

SECTION: Editorial ; Pg. 24

LENGTH: 705 words

TEN months after the death of 270 people in the Lockerbie bombing, evidence continues to mount for the view that West German police are hindering efforts to discover who was responsible. At first sight, this seems an extraordinary suggestion. What possible motive could the West Germans have for obstructing the hunt? They enjoy a reputation for efficiency, and have achieved some notable successes in the struggle against terrorism. If Strathclyde Police blame them for lack of progress in the Lockerbie investigation, it might, on the face of it, be no more than a way of shifting attention from the failings of Scottish detectives. Moreover, the latest discovery by the Scots, that the clothes in the suitcase containing the bomb were obtained in Malta, does not at first sight reflect discredit on the West Germans.

Last February, the West German federal police, the BKA, obtained a copy of a list from Frankfurt airport's handling authority showing that the suitcase now known to have contained the bomb was checked through Frankfurt from Malta and onto Pan Am flight 103 to London and Miami. The BKA did not pass on this list to the Scots until August, after the Royal Armaments Research and Development Establishment at Fort Halstead, in Kent, had established that various items of clothing manufactured in Malta were in the suitcase with the bomb.

The Scots have further discovered that two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) cell based in Neuss and Frankfurt visited Malta in October 1988. There they met a group of Palestinians identified by intelligence sources as a PFLP-GC cell on the island. The two visitors from West Germany were well-known to the BKA. On 26 October 1988, the West Germans arrested 16 members of the Neuss-Frankfurt cell, thereby foiling a Palestinian plot to blow up a Spanish airliner flying from Madrid to Tel Aviv on 29 October. This was a brilliant coup by the Germans.

But the fruits of the triumph were thrown away. Within 15 days, all but two of the suspects had been released, even though the raids had uncovered a large quantity of guns, ammunition, explosives and a bomb-making factory. One of those still detained, Hafez Dalkammoni, had been to Malta in October 1988. He was arrested with a man called Marwan Khreesat. In the boot of their car was a Toshiba cassette recorder containing a bomb. It was a device of this sort which blew up the airliner over Lockerbie. Scottish police also received a report that the boot contained a suitcase similar to the one containing the bomb, but when they requested photographs of the car, they received pictures taken only after the boot had been emptied and cleaned.

Khreesat was released, although he was thought to be the maker of the bomb in the boot and the Chief Federal Prosecutor had urged that he be held. An internal BKA report, bearing the title 'The greatest police scandal in the history of the Federal Republic', says that three other bombs were overlooked in a shop in Neuss which was also raided on 26 October 1988. These were not found until April 1989. Four days after that, one of the bombs exploded, killing one member of the BKA and crippling another. A fifth bomb which Khreesat is thought to have made has never been found. It probably exploded over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988.

A desire to cover up this catalogue of blunders provides the most plausible explanation for the West Germans' reluctance to co-operate with the Scots. According to one senior Scottish officer, 'the Germans are hardly talking to us now'. The BKA insisted, for example, that surveillance logs on the PFLP-GC cell which were kept before the October 1988 raids did not exist. The Scots had a video still from last month's Panorama programme on Lockerbie enlarged, and found it showed the surveillance logs.

No police force is infallible, as we in Britain have recently and painfully been reminded. The West German government must explain the uncooperative attitude of the BKA, and end it. The fight against terrorism is vital: it must not be impeded by an attempt to conceal error, even error so serious that it may have cost 270 lives.

CORRECTION:
Dumfries and Galloway Police are conducting the investigation into the Lockerbie bombing, not the Strathclyde force, as was incorrectly stated in a leading article on 31 October. We apologise for the error.

 

[Rolfe]

I'm not sure at all that the BKA had the B8849 printout. They had all the relevant records from Frankfurt and 103A's loading, but I'm highly suspicious that B8849 ever existed until it became clear that Malta was the source of the clothes found and it was suitable for Megrahi to be pinpointed at Luqa airport. I don't think it existed because why would they not reveal this information, and clear indictaor of an unaccompanied piece of baggage coming from Malta, when Talb, known associate of PFLP, suspected of bombings, was arrested in Sweden with clothing originating from Malta?

I've been ruminating on what you're saying here, and there's something we haven't really been emphasising. The BKA at Frankfurt must have been in the pockets of the CIA before this even started. We know the controlled drug deliveries made by circumventing Frankfurt security did happen - this is admitted. The story simply is that they weren't happening in December 1988. Such an undertaking inevitably requires co-operation between the CIA and the BKA.

Then again, we have the Autumn Leaves operation. The story goes that when Khreesat was arrested at that time, he made one phone call to his CIA handlers, and was promptly released by the BKA for "lack of evidence" - despite having been caught red-handed with an IED of his own making, obviously designed to bring down an airliner in flight. The implication is that the CIA said "release this guy", and the BKA complied. This was only a couple of months before the Lockerbie crash.

It's not that surprising. Even in 1988 and early 1989, US influence in the former US zone of West Germany was strong. It's perfectly possible, indeed highly probable, that the CIA was in a position to direct the Frankfurt branch of the Lockerbie investigation as it saw fit, from day one. This surely colours what we're thinking about the disappearing baggage records, no?

As I said, it was claimed about the clothing found at Talb's apartment. Again, the somewhat contentious evidence of a "Blue Babygro" presented as evidence against Megrahi, supposedly purchased from Mary's House, was also reported that this same make (and colour I believe) of Babygro was discovered in Talb's apartment when arrested in May '89. I suppose the fact that I'm still of the opinion (of which I could be swayed) that some of the clothes packed around the bomb may well have been purchased from Gauci, then I'm prepared to allow for the fact that given it was known Talb had visited Malta, and although he was known to have connections to people involved in the manufacturing of clothing distributed around Malta, there was a possibility that some of his purchases came from Gauci himself. I'm aware we've discounted pretty much anything Gauci claims about any purchaser, but if we accept the provenance of the clothes, then we have to accept someone may well have purchased them from Mary's House - or possibly the same brands that were regulary delivered to Mary's Shop.

It's actually David Lappard himself who made the possibily tenious connection between Talb and Gauci:

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2009603.ece

Ah, the Leppard who changed his spots, according to Paul Foot. He was writing articles reporting how the PFLP-GC carried out the bombing until the autumn of 1990, when he suddenly launched a series of articles blaming Libya. Or is it his actual book I'm thinking about here? Paul Foot's opinion is that he was printing what his official sources were handily leaking to him, as opposed to doing independent journalism.

That 2007 article is interesting in that it seems Leppard is starting to back-track towards his original position. He's still over-stating the case against Megrahi (for example he fails to mention Giaka was exposed as a lying fantasist who was making stuff up for money), but he's definitely wavering.

The evidence implicating Talb in the Lockerbie attack is best described as “strongly circumstantial”. He had links with some of the PFLP-GC gang in Germany and was in Malta buying clothes in early December 1998. At one point Gauci is said to have identified him from a photograph as the buyer of the clothes. When police raided his home in Sweden, they found clothes that had been bought in Malta. Some reports suggest some of these clothes could be traced to Gauci’s shop. A police phone tap revealed that before his home was raided one of his associates was told: “Get rid of the clothes.”

Well for goodness sake, the evidence against Megrahi was never more than circumstantial either.

Gauci "identified" Talb in the same way as he "identified" Megrahi. He was being pushed by the detectives to pick the right guy out of the photospreads, and when he figured out which photo it was they were interested in, he said "that guy looks a lot like him". This was at the point where the Scottish detectives were still trying to find evidence to implicate the PFLP-GC. I think though that Talb was still too young and not the right build to fit the original description.

Nevertheless, Leppard knows a great deal about this case. His sources are reputable. If he says there were reports that the clothes could be traced to Gauci's shop, then this is likely to be correct. (Whether the reports are correct is another matter of course.)

It would be so much simpler if we could establish there is no strong evidence that any of the things found at Lockerbie actually came from Gauci's shop. Talb is said to have had a great deal of new clothes of Maltese manufacture in his flat in Gothenburg. The story is that he was trying to set up a business retailing Maltese textiles in Sweden. The scenario that the bombers simply grabbed stuff that was handy when they were packing the suitcase is very attractive.

Then, we could postulate that when the authorities were looking for the source of the clothes found at Lockerbie, the manufacturers pointed them to Gauci because he had ordered similar items. Gauci then came up with his story about an Arab shopper on the evening of 23rd November, and embellished it to fit in with the direction of questioning.

I'm not entirely clear about the details of this, and I need to get closer to the original sources. However, another poster has shown evidence that at least some of the things found at Lockerbie actually did come from Gauci's shop, rather than simply being similar items. The Yorkie trousers, I believe, were supposed to be a very small batch all supplied to Mary's House. The story about the tweed jacket seems to ring true also.

I still can't get my head round the concept that the bombers, whoever they were, deliberately went to Mary's House to buy stuff for the bomb suitcase. It's nuts. The world is full of old clothes that will never be traced back to their purchaser. However, if the stuff was bought in Mary's House for another purpose, then carelessly grabbed for packing by someone who wsn't thinking about traceability, that makes a lot more sense. If Talb did buy some of his stock of clothes in that shop, then that leaves this possibility entirely open.

Rolfe.