• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

On Consciousness

Is consciousness physical or metaphysical?


  • Total voters
    94
  • Poll closed .
Status
Not open for further replies.
What is just slightly inconsistent in this whole ‘stuff’ stuff (..we’re all ‘one’ stuff…sounds positively new-agey to me!) is that science exists nowhere but in the minds of its practitioners. Its practitioners insist (we’ll assume rightly so) on its legitimacy and credibility. The models predict with various degrees of accuracy the reality of which we are a part. The blindingly obvious issue, though, is that they are models. As I said…they exist nowhere but in the minds of those who practice science. They are not reality…they are, in fact, entirely metaphysical in nature (in the sense that they don’t actually exist as anything substantial…they are abstract thought and exist entirely as a function of the faith of those who believe in them).

So what we have are metaphysical models which…as a result of some magic bean…(…stuff????) …somehow correspond to reality.

Explain the coherence of the models and their ability to approximate reality to the degree that they do as well as our ability to discover / create / understand / utilize the models.

Actually…I don’t think there is an explanation.

So science explains ‘things’…but what explains the fact that science explains things?... and what explains the fact that we understand the explanations?

Is ‘stuff’ the result of science…or is science the result of ‘stuff’?

…or (gasp) is ‘stuff’ science! The implications…mind…actually. We’ll insist till we’re blue in the face that reality functions (generally speaking) according to the known values of science (and what we don’t know about it functions according to the as-yet-to-be-known values) but to advance that proposition to its logical conclusion somehow becomes heresy.

Of course, it can’t be established by any known scientific method or process…this conclusion, thus…I suppose…it has to be dismissed (philosophy and all that). Science occurs exclusively in mind. Science extrapolated to its ideal state would be reality. Reality is mind (where ‘science’ is exclusively known to occur). ‘Stuff’, therefore, is mind.

Science is psychology taken to its maximal extent.


Interesting to consider…if ‘mind’ were capable of science to some kind of ideal degree, would the result be some kind of direct interaction with and control over reality?
 
The models predict with various degrees of accuracy the reality of which we are a part.
Right.

The blindingly obvious issue, though, is that they are models.
Right.

As I said…they exist nowhere but in the minds of those who practice science.
Yes. Of course, that includes computers.

They are not reality…
They are part of reality. They exist in minds, and minds are brain function, and brains are quite obviously real.

they are, in fact, entirely metaphysical in nature (in the sense that they don’t actually exist as anything substantial…they are abstract thought and exist entirely as a function of the faith of those who believe in them).
Of course, every part of that sentence, and everything that follows, is entirely false.

Actually…I don’t think there is an explanation.
There is: The very moment you start thinking there's more than one kind of stuff, you're wrong, your ideas are irredeemable, and must be discarded.

Abstractions must be instantiated to be considered, and the instantiation is physical. It can't be anything else. There is simply no problem to be solved here.
 
Sorry for the length. I guess I am naturally wordy.
Thats understandable as you are entering the rubicon (Pixy's philosophy).

I agree with your position and realise that all we can know through our own endeavors is the appearance of what exists from our position within it. Science cannot reach beyond this horizon and any notions that science is somehow explaining or identifying what exists or not, is philosophy masquerading as scientific knowledge (namely materialism).

Likewise mathematics cannot reach beyond this horizon, it may appear to on occasion, until one remembers the extent to which it is an abstraction.

Pixy has little interest in what exists, what existence is, or in a consideration of the extent to which our little world of existence is limited and accompanied by the unknown.

Such considerations might loosen the grip on the mask.
 
Thats understandable as you are entering the rubicon (Pixy's philosophy).
Yes, that first encounter with science can be discomfiting.

I agree with your position and realise that all we can know through our own endeavors is the appearance of what exists from our position within it. Science cannot reach beyond this horizon and any notions that science is somehow explaining or identifying what exists or not, is philosophy masquerading as scientific knowledge (namely materialism).
You didn't actually read anything that I wrote, did you?

Likewise mathematics cannot reach beyond this horizon, it may appear to on occasion, until one remembers the extent to which it is an abstraction.
Mathematics is entirely an abstraction, so your comment doesn't mean anything.

Pixy has little interest in what exists, what existence is, or in a consideration of the extent to which our little world of existence is limited and accompanied by the unknown.
No.
 
Cool, I feel like we are getting somewhere here. Interesting that others get the point about sensation being primary (and our concepts associated with them derivative) when talking about Epistemology (and I am generally not interested in Ontologies, as I hope I have made clear).

For those who get it (of which I am happy I am not alone), the interesting thing about science and consciousness is that (shall we call it the PixyMisa picture of looking at the world) the PixyMisa picture works for most of science. Since we use consciousness itself in doing science however, there are some difficulties in exploring consciousness the same way we explore the properties of rocks ala the PixyMisa picture.

I think there can be progress though (see PixyMisa, no excuses from me in exploring the realm of consciousness).

Sure. Reality as anyone uses the word is best interpreted in a scientific context as a model.

But you are interpreting something. There is, of necessity, some system that is not your model.

The something that is being interpreted is your sensations. It is done through percepts that link to the concepts of the abstract mind. Take the idea of 'Reality' as your model and you will better understand what I am getting at.

Not sure though what the point is in bringing up some system not being in your model. Oh, yeah, my Theory of Mind on how you think just kicked in. You bring it up so that the system is a 'thing' (noumena) instead of abstract thing based on sensation (phenomena). Again, ontology.

The 'things' in my model are abstractions, just like a chair is an abstraction. I understand the pull of taking abstractions and wanting to say they are real (in the ontology sense), and it is how we talk about things in our everyday conversation (which is not a compliment, because we also use anthropomorphism all the time too). It is just that in the context of science and how it could apply to studying consciousness we must be more careful than this.

Nope. That's the point, and if you don't understand that, you don't understand anything at all.

It's all just material, physical interactions. Mind is what brain does.

Category error occurring above. You are confusing model with sensation. We have a model, called, say, "reality". To talk about ANY model as if it was independent of observation is an error. The existence of things (chairs, tables, what we would call physical things; sidenote, you can have the word 'stuff' if I can have the word 'things' as defined above) in the way you are discussing it is independent of any model. Therefore, it is wrong (in a science sense, which is all I am interested in here).

No.

If these are fundamentally different kinds of stuff, they can't interact.

If they are trivially different kinds of stuff, then sure, they can interact - but why are you so worried about trivial differences?

The 'stuff' list

  • What we observe.
  • Our observations.
  • Our sensations.
  • Our awareness of those sensations.

1. Is the same as my things. "What we observe" is an abstraction.
2. It is better to start with 3. but that is the order you gave it in. Our observations are the residue of what happens after sensations occur. There are some difficulties associated with observation too (witnesses are notoriously unreliable for instance).
3. That undefinable and yet definite idea of sensation (which Hard-AI'ers do not get because they only deal in objects and not subjects).
4. An even more abstract concept than anything else on the list.

Yep, 3. is primary and the rest are abstractions of different kinds. I can tell that you constructed the list in an effort to be thorough though.

Abstractions aren't stuff; instantiations of abstractions, however, necessarily are. When you think about an abstraction, that's stuff.

I leave the floor to you to define 'stuff' however it is needed to make your points. I am only looking for internal logical consistency as well as applicability for your definitions and concepts. The above is definition.

Having read over the other posts I would like to comment on one thing. What you think of as the physical world PixyMisa, that is an abstraction. The only way you can know of this physical world is through your senses, so in terms of priority of place, senses comes first when talking about epistemology (especially the epistemology of science).

You think I do not get you but I do. My Theory of Mind surpasses yours because I know exactly where you are coming from. I can totally understand and envision all of your points. It is just that they are wrong.

Things (as I define them above being chairs and so on) are abstractions. We all like to think of them as real, but like you said yourself, the only usefulness to such concepts is how they play out observationally. That is the crux of the matter.

I know you want to speak about things as real, but they are just models (very well established models, but still models). When I think about physics, I think most likely in the way you think about the world (because I am using that set of models).

Phenomenal sensations though are of a different kind than models. I can not make you understand that concept. You just have to get it or we can quit here and agree to disagree (fine by me).

If you were to just add the words "in my model, ..." or something to that effect in many of your statements, I would have no problem. It is the notion of something just being but without mention of a model that gets me. It gets my goat because it gets rid of sensation.

Not even remotely.

Too bad, I thought you were hopefully getting a little wiser.
 
Thats understandable as you are entering the rubicon (Pixy's philosophy).

I agree with your position and realise that all we can know through our own endeavors is the appearance of what exists from our position within it. Science cannot reach beyond this horizon and any notions that science is somehow explaining or identifying what exists or not, is philosophy masquerading as scientific knowledge (namely materialism).

Likewise mathematics cannot reach beyond this horizon, it may appear to on occasion, until one remembers the extent to which it is an abstraction.

Pixy has little interest in what exists, what existence is, or in a consideration of the extent to which our little world of existence is limited and accompanied by the unknown.

Such considerations might loosen the grip on the mask.

Thanks!

Shhh though (kidding), I am trying to turn Pinocchio into a boy. Not having too much success yet and you might cause his mask to explode or something!
 
Last edited:
Thanks!

Shhh though (kidding), I am trying to turn Pinocchio into a boy. Not having too much success yet and you might cause his mask to explode or something!

Pixy's a nice guy, with some good ideas. Unfortunately many of us cannot agree with some of his assumptions and conclusions.

I think you'll find that his mask is made of kryptonite or something, there's no shaking it.
 
Yes of course Master Fiend God of the 23rd Dimension!

I won't do another of those for tensordyne; unless the discussion moves considerably, there's no point. If he says something interesting (right or wrong), I'll respond to that specifically.

I just need you two to sign on the dotted line, here, so I can take possession of your souls/minds/consciousnesses.
 
Pixy's a nice guy, with some good ideas. Unfortunately many of us cannot agree with some of his assumptions and conclusions.

I think you'll find that his mask is made of kryptonite or something, there's no shaking it.

Yeah, you are probably right.

When consciousness is finally figured out it will probably be nothing anyone is expecting is my guess.
 
For those who get it (of which I am happy I am not alone), the interesting thing about science and consciousness is that (shall we call it the PixyMisa picture of looking at the world) the PixyMisa picture works for most of science. Since we use consciousness itself in doing science however, there are some difficulties in exploring consciousness the same way we explore the properties of rocks ala the PixyMisa picture.

No, :D

The study of consciousness is exactly like the study of anything else.
 
Yeah, you are probably right.

When consciousness is finally figured out it will probably be nothing anyone is expecting is my guess.

So what exactly is the nature of what you think we do not understand?

Seriously, in clear direct terms without resorting to meta-anything, what is missing exactly in the bioneurological model?

This is the SMT forum. Did you suddenly find something that neurology could not explain?
 
So what exactly is the nature of what you think we do not understand?

Seriously, in clear direct terms without resorting to meta-anything, what is missing exactly in the bioneurological model?

This is the SMT forum. Did you suddenly find something that neurology could not explain?

Of which model are you referring to?

I think you are referring to the general ideas associated with neurological models to date?

One thing I would like to know myself is when and how the physics of biology leads to the sensation of red. If you happen to know that it would be great.

Of course, some do not even know what the sensation of red means because they will make it all about mechanics and nowhere about sensation itself (which is my main point, but if you want to talk specifics of certain models I am all ears).

I could be wrong that a neurological model does not already exist that gives the correlates of consciousness, but are we not still supposed to be trying to figure out what NCC's are, or did I miss a memo or something?

Or is this a framework question in disguise? Doesn't matter. I will let the relevant scientists do their job on this one. I will let you know when they have any kind of answer to the questions I am pondering here. For the moment, as far as I can tell, they are not there yet.
 
Last edited:
No, :D

The study of consciousness is exactly like the study of anything else.

If that is so then just by looking at you I should be able to figure out what you are sensing, and I can not. We can look at something together, and to whatever extent is relevant we can agree about what we see, but I just do not see the same kind of thing happening when I try and 'look' at your consciousness when your brain is being probed.

That is how the study of consciousness is different than the study of 'things' (refer to a previous post if you want to know what I mean by 'things').

Hope that helps.
 
I just need you two to sign on the dotted line, here, so I can take possession of your souls/minds/consciousnesses.
Squiggle squiggle squiggle.

Since the first doesn't exist and I'm frequently told I don't possess the latter two, I can probably live with the risk. :)
 
Status
Not open for further replies.

Back
Top Bottom