Cool, I feel like we are getting somewhere here. Interesting that others get the point about sensation being primary (and our concepts associated with them derivative) when talking about Epistemology (and I am generally not interested in Ontologies, as I hope I have made clear).
For those who get it (of which I am happy I am not alone), the interesting thing about science and consciousness is that (shall we call it the PixyMisa picture of looking at the world) the PixyMisa picture works for most of science. Since we use consciousness itself in doing science however, there are some difficulties in exploring consciousness the same way we explore the properties of rocks ala the PixyMisa picture.
I think there can be progress though (see PixyMisa, no excuses from me in exploring the realm of consciousness).
Sure. Reality as anyone uses the word is best interpreted in a scientific context as a model.
But you are interpreting something. There is, of necessity, some system that is not your model.
The something that is being interpreted is your sensations. It is done through percepts that link to the concepts of the abstract mind. Take the idea of 'Reality' as your model and you will better understand what I am getting at.
Not sure though what the point is in bringing up some system not being in your model. Oh, yeah, my Theory of Mind on how you think just kicked in. You bring it up so that the system is a 'thing' (noumena) instead of abstract thing based on sensation (phenomena). Again, ontology.
The 'things' in my model are abstractions, just like a chair is an abstraction. I understand the pull of taking abstractions and wanting to say they are real (in the ontology sense), and it is how we talk about things in our everyday conversation (which is not a compliment, because we also use anthropomorphism all the time too). It is just that in the context of science and how it could apply to studying consciousness we must be more careful than this.
Nope. That's the point, and if you don't understand that, you don't understand anything at all.
It's all just material, physical interactions. Mind is what brain does.
Category error occurring above. You are confusing model with sensation. We have a model, called, say, "reality". To talk about ANY model as if it was independent of observation is an error. The existence of things (chairs, tables, what we would call physical things; sidenote, you can have the word 'stuff' if I can have the word 'things' as defined above) in the way you are discussing it is independent of any model. Therefore, it is wrong (in a science sense, which is all I am interested in here).
No.
If these are fundamentally different kinds of stuff, they can't interact.
If they are trivially different kinds of stuff, then sure, they can interact - but why are you so worried about trivial differences?
The 'stuff' list
- What we observe.
- Our observations.
- Our sensations.
- Our awareness of those sensations.
1. Is the same as my things. "What we observe" is an abstraction.
2. It is better to start with 3. but that is the order you gave it in. Our observations are the residue of what happens after sensations occur. There are some difficulties associated with observation too (witnesses are notoriously unreliable for instance).
3. That undefinable and yet definite idea of sensation (which Hard-AI'ers do not get because they only deal in objects and not subjects).
4. An even more abstract concept than anything else on the list.
Yep, 3. is primary and the rest are abstractions of different kinds. I can tell that you constructed the list in an effort to be thorough though.
Abstractions aren't stuff; instantiations of abstractions, however, necessarily are. When you think about an abstraction, that's stuff.
I leave the floor to you to define 'stuff' however it is needed to make your points. I am only looking for internal logical consistency as well as applicability for your definitions and concepts. The above is definition.
Having read over the other posts I would like to comment on one thing. What you think of as the physical world PixyMisa, that is an abstraction. The only way you can know of this physical world is through your senses, so in terms of priority of place, senses comes first when talking about epistemology (especially the epistemology of science).
You think I do not get you but I do. My Theory of Mind surpasses yours because I know exactly where you are coming from. I can totally understand and envision all of your points. It is just that they are wrong.
Things (as I define them above being chairs and so on) are abstractions. We all like to think of them as real, but like you said yourself, the only usefulness to such concepts is how they play out observationally. That is the crux of the matter.
I know you want to speak about things as real, but they are just models (very well established models, but still models). When I think about physics, I think most likely in the way you think about the world (because I am using that set of models).
Phenomenal sensations though are of a different kind than models. I can not make you understand that concept. You just have to get it or we can quit here and agree to disagree (fine by me).
If you were to just add the words "in my model, ..." or something to that effect in many of your statements, I would have no problem. It is the notion of something just being but without mention of a model that gets me. It gets my goat because it gets rid of sensation.
Too bad, I thought you were hopefully getting a little wiser.