ReFLeX said:
Plainly, God transcends matter (or is that really plain...?), but anyway, why does the rock have to be made of atoms? I suppose, to make it more palatable to an ideal perspective, you could substitute "problem" for "rock" and "unsolvable" for "unliftable". Does this resolve your objections to the argument?
If the thing isn't composed of atoms, I don't see how it can be made to fit within the meaning of "rock". As for whether this difficulty can be mitigated by substituting "problem" for "rock" and "unsolvable" for "unliftable", let me ponder that for a moment.
To relate the switch back to Robin's question, we would then be considering how to decide whether to attribute to God (X) the ability to create a problem unsolvable even by him or (Y) the ability to solve any problem, since he clearly can't possess both - assuming first of course, that neither X nor Y individually is an intrinsic impossibility.
My first observation would concern some ambiguity, not necessarily insurmountable, about the notion of "creating an unsolvable problem". I can understand, of course, the more or less colloquial sense of "creating problems", but I'm not sure whether it applies here. Are we talking about inventing logical or mathematical problems, or something else? Are such things really "created"? I'd welcome your thoughts.
I'll assume for the moment that "creating problems" should in this case probably mean something closer to "inventing logical or mathematical puzzles" than to "causing difficulties". I'll grant then, that power X does not by itself involve impossibility. But power Y, the ability to solve any problem, does involve impossibility - because some problems don't have solutions. I would never ascribe to an omnipotent being the ability to solve, for example, the pair of equations 2x=3 and 5x=4.
So I would submit that substituting "problem" for "rock" and "unsolvable" for "unliftable" does not resolve the difficulty; it only transfers it from X to Y. To wit: creating absolutely unliftable rocks strikes me as inherently impossible, though the ability to lift anything is unproblematic. On the other hand, I have no objection to the notion of creating absolutely insoluble problems, but the ability to solve any problem seems like an irrational concept.
Robin said:
Can you make that objection more precise? Are you saying that it is impossible for something created to possess inherent infinite properties?
Yes, I'm strongly inclined to say that's the case, although I'm open to revising this position. By the way, after rereading the encyclopedia article you originally linked (setting forth what you elsewhere alluded to as the "classical" philosophical view, I believe), I note that it makes virtually the same point: an "infinite creature" (which I take to mean a created thing possessing inherent infinite properties) is given as an example of an impossible concept, uniting as it does two mutually repellent elements (createdness and infinitude).
Robin said:
We must allow that an omnipotent being can create an infinite object (infinities not being mutually exclusive). So why not an object with some infinite property?
As I said, I'm inclined to favor the classical view: finitude is an attendant condition of the term "created object".
Robin said:
Can God say of some object - "I have made this and it shall never be broken"? If so are there any circumstances whatever under which the object can be broken? That sounds like an unbreakable object to me.
I think an omnipotent being worthy of the name ought to be able to say this, and the result would be an object that was to all intents and purposes unbreakable because if it then were broken another paradox would result (the reversal of a divine decree). We agree, it seems, up to that point at least. But here again, while I don't buy into any of the theology, the Scholastic distinction of powers seems philosophically persuasive and relevant. The object remains theoretically breakable by God's absolute power, since no object can be inherently unbreakable, but in the regulated order of the
potentia ordinaria no force, including God, can break it.
Robin said:
If God cannot make that statement then we have identified something that God cannot do. If God can make the statement then we know that God does not have the ability of breaking any object that there can be limitations on his power.
But a limitation placed by the omnipotent will on itself appears to me to be a qualitatively different affair than an external limitation, and I hope I do not overstate matters when I suggest that most philosophers of religion have concluded that it is a unique case that does not defeat omnipotence. At any rate, however you qualify this apparent "limitation" on omnipotent power, it is arguably one that has so thoroughly been absorbed into philosophical/theological discourse that it should be regarded having been already internalized in the definition of the concept "omnipotence" for purposes of standard usage.
To return to the notion of the distinction of powers, I gather that this was devised specifically in order to be able to deal conceptually with the uniqueness (among all omnipotent faculties) of God's ability to make irreversible statements of the sort "I have made this and it shall never be broken". And I think that, in fairness, the Scholastics must be credited with a great deal of subtlety and philosophical sophistication for this.
Robin said:
But this is only one example, I have identified others - God cannot possess infinite justice and exercise infinite punishment (for what infinite offence can a finite being do?). God cannot possess infinite justice and not be able to exercise an infinite punishment (as infinite justice implies an infinite sanction). God cannot prevent all evil from happening and allow free will to his creation. God's creation cannot have free will if threatened by an infinite punishment.
I'm not sure I agree with this, but I need to think on it further. Perhaps, though, you could clarify relevance of the infinite punishment point to our omnipotence discussion? As I see it, we are not examining the "God" of Christian theology so much as the "God" of philosophy of religion (notwithstanding the substantial overlap of those concepts). I can see how worldly evil may be admitted into that discussion, but not (purely?) theological doctrines like Hell.
Robin said:
The intrinsic impossibility clause means that the nature that we can give to God is limited only by our imagination and our own nature. Can anybody find an actual logical fault with my dual omnipotence theology proposed earlier?
I'm going back over this and hope to revert to you later.